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F orew ord
This thesis is about the republican tradition of political thought. It is a tradition 
which has been, or that is my contention, misrepresented by its critics as well as 
by a great many professed friends, few of whom have appreciated the most impor­
tant republican argument. This constitutive argument, the meaning, origins, di­
mensions, and theoretical relevance of which is the more particular topic of the 
pages that follow, is captured, I believe, by the expression the fragility o f liberty. In 
the clear light of hindsight, three events were central to my personal context of dis­
covery of the problem of misunderstood republicanism.
The first event was a book. On board a North Sea ferry boat, in the late summer 
of 1989, I first read Hannah Arendt's The Human Condition. The book left me with 
the intensely ambiguous feeling of having learned something profoundly important 
about the precarious nature of liberty, political institutions, and public space in the 
modem world; but also, on the other hand, that Arendt, like many lesser writers on 
'political participation' suffered from what one Arendt commentator called excessive 
Hellas nostalgia (I later discovered, in light of Arendt’s analysis of totalitarianism, 
that her position was more complicated, and that the commentator was wrong).
The second event was world history: The revolutions in Eastern Europe in the 
autumn of the same year. If Arendt was occasionally employed by political roman­
tics who longed for a community of political action, in the name of whose intrinsic 
worth liberal societies ought to be transformed, the 'rectifying' revolutions (as 
Habermas called them) in Berlin, Prague, and Warsaw placed matters in their 
proper perspective. At any rate they did for me. As my friends and I, safe in our 
Warwick University campus flat, watched the Wall crumble on ITV, eveiybody 
wanted to catch the first plane to Berlin, just to share the joy of action, perhaps 
even to help pick up that popular power which, as Arendt put it, was Tying in the 
street’. We also saw, however, that the supreme pathos of this revolutionary politics 
derived exclusively from its instrumental object which, in the new Europe about to 
take shape, was the most important object of all. I could not go, among other things 
because I had a dissertation to write. On Arendt, of course.
The third event was my discovery, initially through Quentin Skinner’s work on 
the Renaissance, that civic political theory with an instrumental ‘point’ was impor­
tant also to historical republicans like Machiavelli, and that there might be a rea­
son to investigate the tradition more thoroughly to see if others shared Machia- 
velli’s combination of proto-liberal conceptions of citizenship as private, ‘negative’ 
liberty with a call on citizens, in the name of this value, to be virtuous and active. 
As it turned out, all the authors that I came across, even including Aristotle, the 
alleged founder of politics for its own sake, were ‘republicans’ in the above sense, 
although they were so in interestingly different ways.
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During my work on the thesis, I have accumulated many debts. At the Euro­
pean University Institute in Florence, I have benefited from comments and discus­
sions, of republicanism and related topics, with Danny Bums, Ben Crumb. Adrian 
Favell, Vladimir Gradev. Attracta Ingram, Celia Lessa, Iver Neumann. Veronique 
Nunos-Dardez, Axel Petersen, and Marlene Wind. At the Department of Political 
Science in Aarhus, my gratitude goes to Hanne Marlene Dahl, Gorm Harste, Torben 
Jensen, Knud Erik Jorgensen, Kristian Kindtler, Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Jor- 
gen Loftager, Soren Flinch Midtgaard, members of the Comparative Politics divi­
sion, and students who participated in my seminar on republicanism. Soren Flinch 
Midtgaard in particular helped me sharpen my argument at a late stage. Valuable 
particular points were raised by audiences in Florence, at the political science de­
partments in Aarhus and Copenhagen, at the European Studies Program in 
Aarhus, at a session of the Nordic Summer University, and at conferences of the 
Nordic Political Science Association (NOPSA) and the European Consortium of Po­
litical Research (ECPR), where sections of my work was presented. Four people 
helped me during the last stages o f preparing the manuscript: Karin Kristensen 
and Rikke Sommer assisted me with the bibliography. Annette Andersen, expert 
secretary at my department in Aarhus, processed numerous corrected drafts with 
infallible precision and speed. Last revisions were competently carried out by Lone 
Winther Mathias. I also must thank my present employer the Department of Politi­
cal Science at the University of Copenhagen for generously facilitating my final stay 
at the EUI in Florence in the spring term 2000, and of course the latter institution 
for extending the use of its facilities even to the slowest of ‘researchers finishing a 
thesis’.
Two individuals deserve special thanks. My friend Jorgen Poulsen has encour­
aged and supported my work for a long time. Over the years he has read and criti­
cised much of what I have written, often raising agonising points. His personal am­
bition to combine political theory, history of ideas, and empirical enquiry, has been 
a constant inspiration for me as for many others. Steven Lukes, apart from doing 
what he was paid to do as my assigned supervisor in the European University In­
stitute Ph.D. program, guiding, pushing, and criticising in his characteristically 
pointed manner, deserves thanks simply for believing in me during a long period of 
time where I did not do so myself.
Steven Lukes also gave me two valuable pieces of advice. One, which I followed, 
was to go easy on Hannah Arendt. Another was not to get side-tracked on a history 
of ideas trail. But in order to be able to say anything remotely interesting about 
what republicanism is and could be as a species of political theory, I soon found 
that I had to know much more of what it was. This soon became a main concern. 
To start this project (I hardly finished it) took an extra few years. Maybe I should 
have taken this piece of advice as well.
A note of explanation about this long overdue thesis (I entered the Ph.D. pro­
gramme at the EUI in September 1992). Apart from the usual trivial factors -  the
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need to take up full time university teaching when stipends ran out -  there were 
other reasons. Apart from my underdeveloped ability to set myself clearly deline­
ated, limited, and realistic tasks and to get things done, the thesis also underwent 
a series of shifts of emphasis. The reconstruction of ‘the history of ideas of republi­
canism’, as broad a subject as it may well seem, is only a part, if a very important 
part, of the ensuing results. Other parts, some of which were really still work in 
progress, were eventually left out of what was threatening to become a very long 
thesis.
One of these parts was a long chapter which surveyed the liberal- 
communitarian debate with a view to establishing first, that it was ‘won* on a num­
ber of dimensions of controversy by the liberals, and second, that the republican 
tradition may be employed to pose a different set of challenges to which Rawlsian 
liberalism in particular is more vulnerable. The point of the chapter was to demon­
strate the relevance of turning one's attention towards republicanism as a distinct 
set of arguments, before setting of to do it. The Introduction contains a brief sum­
mary of these reasons.
Another part -  or several parts -  on which also much time was spent made up 
the elements of what I tentatively called ‘a republican research program*. In the 
thesis I make a point of showing that the republican tradition was to a high extent 
defined by its distinct causal accounts of the empirical conditions of maintaining 
libertos, and that historically its persuasiveness was very much a matter of whether 
people believed it to be demonstrated that these were in fact the conditions. The 
decision of turning to republican arguments in contemporary political theory, I also 
argue, is similarly linked to our considerations about contemporary conditions for 
maintaining common liberty, or ‘a well-ordered and just society’, as Rawls calls it -  
considerations which some parts of liberal political theory have made a point of ab­
stracting from. Thus each of these parts were attempts to explore, in a more or less 
sustained fashion, the empirical aspects of various elements of the constitutive re­
publican argument about civic virtue as a precondition for the enjoyment of liberty 
and citizenship status.
One section concerned the historical genesis of Western citizenship and the 
question of whether and how it was ‘won’ or ‘given*. Another section was a critical 
review of the debate on Robert Putnam’s book, Making Democracy Work, which 
seemed to highlight aspects of the connection between civic activity and the quality 
of civic space (trust, tolerance) -  although I found that the origins, sites, and phe­
nomenological nature of Putnam’s civility was not so convincing after all. A third 
section was concerned with the reconstruction of the dimensions of value pluralism 
and ‘empirical contestation’ in two contemporary contexts of constitutional delib­
eration, that of ‘multicultural’ extensions of citizenship, and that of European Un­
ion controversy over formats of sovereignty, representation, and democracy. A 
fourth section concerned the contemporary relevance of (generating) patriotic soli­
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darity. I sought to discuss contemporary functional equivalents of activities gener­
ating solidarity in the context of advanced welfare states. I also discussed the pa­
rameters and conditions of what I have termed practices of ‘reconstructive patriot­
ism’ which, I argue, has become a critical potential in contemporary discourses on 
‘national identity’, but for which the notion of ‘constitutional patriotism’ does not 
suffice.
Some of these left-out parts have been developed for separate publication or are 
in the process of being so.1 Others will be soon, I also hope to include them, in a 
more developed form, along with the material of the thesis, a deeper methodological 
discussion of republican historiography and the practice of ‘history of ideas’, and 
above all a much more sustained positive argument about republican themes in 
the context of contemporary political theory, in a bid for the (‘big’) Danish doctorate 
at some point in the, hopefully, not too distant future.
My thesis makes a history of ideas-based case for political activity. Ironically, 
personal shyness has always prevented me from having much of a taste for public 
appearance myself. Writing about civic action has been more intrinsically reward­
ing than I tend to imagine most forms of political activity could ever be. Maybe I 
could find time now to do my share too, writing the occasional letter to the local 
editor or taking my turn on the parents* committee of my children’s school. At any 
rate, I shall certainly find more time for what also to the republicans was the point 
of it all: things like the peace and comfort of a private life, love and affection in the 
company of friends and dear ones. My greatest debts are to my patiently waiting 
family, to my wife Anette, and to Mathias, Daniel, and Miriam.
Florence, June 2000
1. Mourttsen (1999a; 1999b; 1999c; 2000a; 2000b, 2000c; forthcoming).
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Chapter 1:
Introduction
I
Historical memoiy is often short, but we all recall the great experience of the 
popular revolutions in East Central Europe, The collapse of state-socialism had 
tremendous repercussions all over the world, and a large number of undemocratic 
regimes, no longer sheltered by East-West bipolarity, have crumbled. Francis Fu­
kuyama made a name for himself by proclaiming the approaching end of history as 
the victory of liberal-democratic political orders. There is, Fukuyama boldly stated, 
“a fundamental process at work that dictates a common evolutionary pattern for ail 
human societies - in short something like a Universal History of mankind in the 
direction of liberal democracy". Fukuyama was making the broad point that the 
idea of liberal democracy, or some recognlsably liberal version of the conceptual 
pair of liberty and equality, was triumphant in the sense that it was no longer ra­
tional to imagine better worlds that were not liberal, that attempts to do so were lo­
cal leftovers, and that, give and take setbacks and delays, governments across the 
globe would find it increasingly difficult to secure a minimal degree of popular le­
gitimacy, save by taking decisive steps towards conforming to liberal ideas.2
It would be wonderful, at the turn of the millennium, to be finally on the 
Hegelian glory path. I do not think we are, or that such delightful prospects could 
ever be inevitable. My thesis is about why Fukuyama's expectations, and many 
other kinds of excessive optimism on behalf of liberalism and liberal societies may 
be misguided. It does not proclaim a fatalism of the kind which states that “democ­
racy may ... have been a historical accident, a brief parenthesis that is closing be­
fore our eyes".3 But the following pages will be guided by intuitions like those ex­
pressed in Michael Ignatieff s fear that liberal democracy runs “deeply against the 
human grain, and is only achieved and sustained by the most unremitting strug­
gle". The struggle may be, as Ignatieff thinks it is, “against human nature". Or it 
may be against the follies of religious or nationalist fanaticism, the thirst for power 
and wealth of a few, or the excessive zeal of political romanticists bent on project­
ing their noble intentions onto politics, and possessing the means to do so.4
2. Fukuyama (1992:48).
3. Jean François Revel, How Democracies Perish (New York: Harper and Row, 
1983), p.3, cited in Fukuyama (1992:8).
4. Ignatieff (1993:189).
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1. Precarious Liberal Orders
Liberal orders I take to be societies where all individuals enjoy and are able to use 
effectively a reasonable set of legally guaranteed and politically protected civil, po­
litical, and social rights, enabling them in turn to live private lives of enough mate­
rial comfort to pursue their own projects in their own way without fear or appre­
hension. Such orders are not to be taken for granted, or to be passively waited for, 
to be delivered by the Spirit of History, whatever her disguise. The enjoyment of 
these world-historically great human goods is a precarious achievement. This be­
comes obvious for anyone pausing for the briefest moment to consider a number of 
post-cold war developments.
First, the rights of social citizenship introduced by progressive governments to 
check the unequalising logic of the capitalist market, have recently come under 
fire.5 Always more insecure than civil and political rights and never quite realised 
at all in the World’s biggest democracy, the sanctity o f an institutionally secured 
material base - decent housing, health care, education, and an assured basic in­
come - is no longer obvious. While rumours of the dismantling of the welfare state 
have been exaggerated,6 services and eligibility criteria have been tightened, and 
the plight of some groups with poor organisation and weak media presence - the 
permanently ill, the mentally disabled, many old people - remains unenviable in 
many countries.
Particularly salient is the structural segregation o f a heterogeneous new under­
class without the skills or cultural resources, or perhaps the skin colour, to secure 
a stable position in a specialised and competitive labour market.7 The possibility of 
an effectively autonomous individual life in such a situation may be threatened 
even where the contributions of institutionalised solidarity are comparatively gen­
erous. Prospects are yet more dim in states where the welfare of the many is in­
creasingly privatised, tied to labour market participation and corporate affiliation, 
and where the institutional means of enforcing solidarity are progressively weak­
ened. In whatever way national social policy is institutionally orchestrated, welfare 
or its absence is increasingly a matter of relative deprivation and structural margi­
nalisation. Marshall’s vision of a society of equal social membership may well be­
come as remote as the full-employment context he so clearly presupposed.
European integration takes place in the environment of increasing ‘globalisa­
tion’, i.e., the internationalisation of capital movements, trade, and financial mar­
kets, all limiting the scope of manoeuvre for state action. It is increasingly difficult
5. Marshall (1992).
6. Several studies show that core services remain intact or have been extended 
(Goodin, Le Grand, et al. (1987); Moran (1991); Pierson (1991:141-78)).
7. Gorz (1990); Loftager (1996); Offe (1996). There is much debate but less con­
sensus about the character, structural characteristics, and size of the ‘new under­
class’ (Goul Andersen (1996); Roche (1992:11-68); Schmitter Heisler (1991)).
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for governments to pursue progressive social and labour market policies, because 
macro-economic tools to do so have been seriously curtailed.8 However, the future 
of the much advertised People’s Europe is still very much in the balance. Economic 
prosperity and political democracy was aided in new democracies like Spain. Portu­
gal. and Greece, and hopefully the story will repeat itself when the Union moves 
towards Eastern enlargement. But it is not at all clear if a ‘social Europe* of con­
verging minimum wages, regulated industrial relations, concerted employment and 
training programmes, and negotiated finance policies could soon begin to take 
form. And for the time being, so-called European citizenship remains rather mea­
gre.9 Moreover, it is not in fact clear that the brave peace-and-prosperity project of 
the European Union could itself survive in the long run. Unless popular legitimacy 
and identification with the project is strengthened, a very real danger still exists of 
a gradual de-integration process gaining momentum.
A third area of concern for the future of liberal orders has appeared as another 
aspect of ‘globalisation*. It is the increasing size of the group of present-day metics 
in all European countries: refugees and immigrants who only enjoy some of the 
rights of citizenship, and do so at the discretion of political systems given to xeno­
phobic whims, whenever the moods of electorates take a turn for the worse. Worse, 
also of increasing size is a group of illegally resident aliens who seek to secure a 
living on the fringe of society, effectively unprotected by legal rights.
Fourthly, after 1989, some commentators have seen the modernising dynamic 
of capitalism and market economy as so strong that democracy and constitution­
alism will automatically follow. But to believe in such automatism seems particu­
larly foolhardy in view of recent events. In parts of Eastern and Central Europe, 
and certainly in some of the new states of the former Soviet Union where civil tra­
ditions are weak or absent, the very foundations of democracy have yet to be put in 
place. The task of constitution building, including instalment of provisions for mi­
nority rights or merely avoiding constitutional discrimination or exclusion of mi­
norities, has proven a formidable task. Securing democratically responsive govern­
ments and systems of effectively competing elites is a next, equally difficult step. 
But what is most striking in these countries is the difficulty of having, not Just ‘civil 
governments* but also ‘civil societies’.
Often, the aftermath of totalitarian rule is characterised by the near absence of 
civilised public space. Levels of interpersonal trust and standards of public debate 
are low, the respect for the rule of law is poor. In some countries, ‘societies* have 
been reduced to aggregates of atomised Individuals and families, fending for them­
selves, and an uncivil ‘economy’, dominated by mafias, corrupt politicians, and un­
responsive administrators.
8. Newman (1996:51-108).
9. La Torre (1995); Martiniello (1994); Newmann (1996:138-72); Welsh (1993).
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Fifthly, in the environments of imploded civil societies, but also under much 
less serious circumstances in the West, Europe has seen a dramatic revival of dor­
mant nationalisms, some of them with distinctly ugly faces. The quest for identitaiy 
security and the advocacy of exclusive policies of ethnicity may have all sorts of 
reasons, some of them quite tangible and material. Whatever its causes, this type 
of ‘politics of identity’, at least in its more sinister versions, is threatening the very 
core of libera] political orders, namely equal citizenship.
There is no need to exaggerate the shortcomings of global liberal democracy. 
The fall of Soviet communism remains the most promising event since the end of 
the last world war. And, relative to centuries of despotism, the recent increase in 
the democracy count is hardly a council for despair. But in many new democracies 
what is gained may yet be lost, painful transition processes are not over, constitu­
tional changes and the entry into office of liberal elites have not yet produced a 
democratic political culture. Apocalyptic diagnoses of warring ‘civilisations’ aside,10 
the perceived cultural paternalism of Western values remains a seemingly easy tar­
get for elites who pursue strategies of national mobilisation and seek to cloud over 
their own shortcomings. And if human rights are on many lips, there is also at the 
heart of liberal societies, in universities, in the media, in everyday discourse, a new 
growth of a peculiarly defeatist relativism about the most basic of liberal values, 
including the Enlightenment heritage of equality, reflective personhood, and belief 
in rational argument.
More profoundly, I find cause to question what is the relevant yard stick when 
we speak of ’liberty’ and ‘free societies’ and suggest that a proper place to start is 
with the original Roman-legal concept of libertas. Libertas or citizenship status is 
the legally defined and legally underpinned set of protected spheres for unimpeded 
activity, personal immunity, and positive material claims which is enjoyed by an 
individual - against the institutions of the state or against other citizens - as part of 
a collective arrangement where each citizen grants the same status that he enjoys 
himself to all other citizens. Whatever freedom is - whatever are the rights or other 
legal content o f citizenship - it must be secure. A  person is free to the extent that 
his status is actually, i.e., socially and materially, recognised and realised. And in 
an important sense, as recognised by Machiavelli and Montesquieu, one is not 
really free unless one/eels that one’s freedom is secure.
When this is the standard, a liberal order - if literally understood as an order of 
liberty - is certainly a precarious achievement. It is not in place if large groups of 
people experience that their rights are by legal letter only, ignored or violated in 
practice at all levels of state administration or in encounters in civil society with 
representatives and institutions of a majority population. One’s liberty is impor­
tantly incomplete if enjoyed at the discretion of a momentarily benevolent state, or
10. Huntington (1993).
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in exchange for support to a ruling group. A person’s freedom is seriously curtailed 
if his rights are constantly questioned, and his actions and opinions in the name of 
these rights are met by suspicion and intolerance. People are not really free if they 
live lives full of fear and apprehension, afraid of the thief in the night or the gaze of 
strangers in the street.
This idea of liberty is quite broad. It is also different from traditional analytical 
conceptions of (negative) liberty, the stringent use of which I certainly have no wish 
to belittle. In the course of this thesis, I define the conception with some care, de­
lineating it from other conceptions of negative liberty. And, having demonstrated 
the long histoiy of ideas lineage of libertas, I hypothesise that it captures a univer­
sal human value which emerges in the most diverse historical and cultural circum­
stances.
Many liberals are too complacent about these matters. Theorists from Fuku­
yama to Rawls place undue hopes in the inherent reason and moral capacities of 
the individual and society. Less idealistic liberals - i.e., Gellner - stress the impor­
tance of socio-economic development and the civilising effects of the market. Oth­
ers rely on a pluralist ‘elective’ civil society (Rosenblum), liberal ‘irony’ (Rorty). or 
well-designed institutions and effective rule of law (Bobbio).
The thesis certainly does not deny the relevance of these factors, nor does it 
belittle the real progress the world has recently seen. But it points to a specific view 
of the precariousness or - the guiding metaphor of the book - the fragility of liberty. 
However important some of the above factors, liberal orders also need vigilant citi­
zens.
To anticipate some central points to be made in what follows: Liberal constitu­
tionalism as a political project cannot survive with the exclusive help of well 
meaning modernisers, aiding the unfolding movement of progress. It requires a po­
litical culture as well as a strong and vigilant critical public which is capable of 
passing judgement. And the functioning of such a public is itself best understood 
as an ever occurring process, which may, in principle, come to a halt tomorrow. In 
an important way, rights in a constitution are only as safe, as recently noted by 
Jurgen Habermas, as the public political culture supporting them. As one of the 
most important conditions for such support, citizens must be constantly reminded 
of the fragility of their rights, and of the need to protect and realise them as a 
common endeavour. But it is equally important that the very content of the liberty 
status everybody enjoys can somehow be agreed upon, and legitimated through 
time. And even if these matters are in place, the veiy willingness to participate in a 
political community of libertas, fulfilling one’s civic obligations, sharing rights with 
groups of different others - perhaps with a different cultural background than one’s 
own - is a matter of concrete and bounded solidarities that need to be constantly 
generated.
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Moreover, the very necessity of having political activity by citizens should be 
recognised at the level of theory. A normative theory advocating orders of liberty, 
whatever the content of the order or the form of the theory, must incorporate the 
need, the desirability, and the worthiness of such activities - whatever they be. And 
it must attempt to specify what are these activities, and what are the conditions o f 
bringing them about. Or, if a theory does not do so, it has to confront very seriously 
the question why such activity is not deemed important.
These ideas about the fragility of liberty and about the need for citizens to in­
stall, protect, realise, and develop it as an essentially common affair, are at the core 
of the republican tradition of political thought. I suggested above that this republi­
can analysis is still empirically relevant in our contemporary world, and in the 
course of this thesis, particularly towards the end, I shall assume, also for the sake 
of the progressing argument, that it is indeed relevant. But I do not attempt to un­
dertake any part of such a massive and complicated empirical republican analysis. 
However, I do believe that doing so is both possible and important, and that repub­
lican sensitivities could inspire contemporary social science research in many ar­
eas. In stead I look at how arguments have been forwarded in the past for the rele­
vance of civic involvement in politics. I also attempt, on this historical background, 
to systematise, in a set of analytical dimensions, these republican arguments about 
the fragility of liberty. Thus, it is the historical genesis, conceptual and theoretical 
content, and, quite tentatively, the contemporary theoretical relevance (assuming 
its empirical purchase) of this tradition that I shall explore in this thesis.
2. A Contested Tradition
In trying to make some sense of certain familiar images of virtuous citizens acting 
in common in the public sphere of their Res Publica, I partake in a project of tex­
tual excavation and theoretical reconstruction which, while never absent, has re­
cently begun to receive a great deal of attention.11
In doing so, I am acutely aware of entering a field of great academic contro­
versy. In the chapters that follow, I question several standard interpretations of the 
very point and guiding intuition of the republican tradition in Western political 
thought, as well as the standard views of which insights may be reaped for con­
temporary theoretical purposes from studying this tradition. Republicanism, in 
fashion in many circles at least since the publishing of J.G.A Pocock’s impressive 
The Machiavellian Moment has been misrepresented by foes and friends alike, in­
cluding by the latter, formidable figure. And this misrepresentation has brought 
nothing but confusion into the debates of contemporary political theory.
Particularly misguided is the representation, already common in the Enlight­
enment, of republicanism as a voice from a bygone, nobler age before the advent of
11. In particular by Quentin Skinner and Maurizio Viroli.
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individualism and petty materialism, where life was hard, but where politics af­
forded higher rewards for deeds which, in the words of Montesquieu, would “as­
tonish our small souls":12 the communal joy and recognition of equals in action, the 
purification of spirit or realisation of self, the building of character. All with private 
life as a secondary matter, a realm of necessity to escape, or a mere retreat to be 
frequented in the intervals of battle and public appearances.
Although such rewards might indeed be sought by some, and while some of the 
writers in the canon of great republican figures were more susceptible to these ide­
als than others, I argue that it is a mistake to see them as the guiding lights of the 
tradition. Again, what such readings overlook is the constant and towering pres­
ence throughout the republican tradition of what, in De Grazia’s phrase was “the 
point of it all" in Machiavelli - in Machiavelli’s own words, “enjoying what one has, 
freely and without incurring suspicion ... the assurance that one’s wife and chil­
dren will be respected, the absence of fear for oneself*, all part of “that common ad­
vantage ... which results from a self-governing state".13
If the writings of Cicero. Machiavelli, Algernon Sydney, Jefferson, or Tocqueville 
or even those of Aristotle and Rousseau are carefully studied, it is equally difficult 
to find here any early statements of the peculiar contemporary notion of a shared, 
substantial moral life as a political concern of supreme importance, and potentially 
opposed to the enjoyment of ‘formal’ legal rights and private liberty. Nor do we find 
prototypical ideas of the existence, let alone the desirability, o f ‘selves* that are 
closed vessels of cultural signification, as some communitarians would have it. And 
we certainly nowhere come across views advocating that the most important hu­
man interests and goals are entirely relative to 'culture*, or that the latter is made 
up of closed and mutually incommensurable moral vocabularies -  a view which has 
also been connected to the tradition.
And if neither the beauty of political action nor communitarian belonging ade­
quately describes republicanism, nor does it have much more in common with the 
idea of politics as the primordial agonal positing of ‘difference* or constitution of 
ontological selfhood as ‘subject positions’ - the spectre of the post-structuralist 
polis. Nor finally should we see the Rousseauan idea of moral liberty (as opposed to 
what he had to say of civil liberty) as typical of the republican tradition. The repub­
lican type of ‘autonomy’ tends to offer less than the moral transparency of laws 
given and affirmed onto ourselves, or the associated possibility of a rational social 
consensus. But it also, I believe, offers a great deal more.
I shall argue that the republican tradition -  the claims involved by using this 
term will be explained below - is centrally constituted by a single powerful theme 
about the fragility o f liberty, which has exhibited an extraordinary resilience and
12. Montesquieu, The Spirit o f the Laws (IV,4).
13. De Grazia (1989:193): Machiavelli, Discowses (1,16).
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continuity despite its changing conceptual and historical contexts and manifesta­
tions, and which the mentioned customary interpretations overlook. However, it 
becomes an important task for me to point out in mhat way the republican tradi­
tion I think exists is different from such representations. For instance, there cer­
tainly were republican conceptions of ‘self-creation* and ‘community’. but they are 
always ‘instrumental* -  hence the broad republican point that self-esteem, common 
identifications, and social norms may after all be necessary in certain ways to moti­
vate or guide citizens.
The central themes of the thesis may be anticipated further by looking at two 
other debates, both of which help explain why republicanism is more than another 
object of esoteric scholarly dispute in the history of political ideas. Republicanism 
may be usefully seen as a distinct historical and theoretical answer to two families 
of questions in political theory, one about the possibilities and purposes of political 
participation, the other about the alleged defects o f liberalism. The second question 
is most important for my account, but also the first has guided my investigations.
3. Politics with Pathos?
In Western political thought a long tradition recommends the active involvement o f 
citizens in politics. In particular since the sixties, the positive connotations of po­
litical participation have matched those of 'democracy*. Some have seen political 
participation as an answer to many of the ills of modem industrial and capitalist 
society, including moral heteronomy and alienation. To some extent, it makes 
sense to see the present thesis as an attempt to ask and answer the question, "why 
participation?". Lately, the ideal has been running out of steam in some quarters, 
with a growing awareness of the considerable distance between the ideal require­
ments of an active life of the modem polis, and our considered judgements about 
how most people wish to spend their time.
By and large, I share this scepticism.14 Most strong theories of participatory 
democracy are, I believe, unsatisfactory. Their arguments may support participa­
tion in some places, some times, for some people, but as general cases for participa­
tory societies with citizenship primarily defined by political activity, they do not 
work. Most of us know, with Oscar Wilde, that political participation, like socialism, 
would easily ‘take too many evenings’. We might of course find ways to organise our 
days and evenings to fit our lives to innovative participatory schemes. But the 
deeper problem is that what political participation is said to do for us is not so 
plausible or important that most people would dedicate their spare time to its pur­
suit.
14. I discuss the reasons for such scepticism in some detail in Mouritsen (1994), 
to which the following remarks refer.
To state that the participation theories of Rousseau (or rather, of the partici­
patory radical democrat which it has become customary to see in Rousseau) or J.S. 
Mill are ‘unrealistic* because unfit for modem conditions is of course an ideological 
move of little value in itself. It may well be that society can be changed so as to 
make the realisation of such theories more realistic.15 But at least one common ad­
vocacy of participatoiy societies which rests its claims on the nature of social real­
ity seems to me obviously mistaken. If people wish to participate less now than 
they are alleged to have done at certain times in Greece or New England, this is 
hardly merely explained by the rewards of doing so being much smaller. Surely, the 
rise of modem individualism and the spheres of privacy and intimacy have been 
associated with forms of human gratification and fulfilment that cannot in any 
meaningful sense be regarded as mere compensation for a life spent outside the 
public light. Indeed, the very contrast between motivations ’then' and ‘now* may 
well be a mistake.
But my scepticism is theoretically informed. It seems to me, although I can only 
stipulate arguments for my case here,16 that many of the arguments of theorists 
like Barber, Gould, Macpherson, Pateman. and Taylor rest on shaky foundations. 
This is so whatever important differences exist as to what political participation 
means (i.e., what constitutes ‘participation’, and what counts as ‘politics’).17 How­
ever, as with commun!tarlanism, some of the standard arguments for participation 
‘for its own sake* may be rendered sounder when given an instrumental twist.
First, it is probably true that personal autonomy understood as a reflective un­
derstanding of the principles of one’s life may arise through some forms of partici­
pation,18 although I find it unconvincing that it could not also arise from many 
other things (reflecting alone, reading books). It is also something of an Enlighten­
ment prejudice that anything approaching actual practice of such full reflective 
autonomy, à la Sartre, could ever be a motivating factor, or even a very robust 
moral ideal. However, it is another matter -  one which is certainly found in republi­
can writings - that societies require citizens that are capable of reflection, that 
practising it is worthy and should be encouraged, and that some forms of partici­
pation may further such capacities.
Secondly, the most important classical argument for political participation, de­
rived from Rousseau, is an idea of collective autonomy or ‘self-government*. Thus, in 
as far as we live in societies, it is only by actually participating in all decisions that 
have repercussions on our own lives that we could be autonomous, l.e„ by willingly
15. It is indeed “misleading to claim that facts can simply refute ideals and de­
mand changes in the essential requirements of a normative theoiy" (Duncan & 
Lukes 1963:167-74; cp. Taylor (1973); Skinner (1973)).
16. See Mouritsen (1994:62-74).
17. Mouritsen (1994:57-59).
18. E.g., Gould (1988:52,79.283A).
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consenting to the laws governing our lives as well as everybody else’s lives.19 The 
problem here seems to be that we either may already agree reflectively with these 
laws, and then it is not necessary to participate. Or we do not agree, and then par­
ticipating does not really help.20 This idea of collective autonomy is linked to, but 
analytically distinct from, the idea of political participation as a tool of transforma­
tion of individual preferences. In order to work, however, the former requires a 
Rousseauan outcome of the latter (a consensus omnium), which is unlikely to ap­
pear - for reasons also discussed in the thesis. This said, it is certainly recognised 
in various ways in the republican tradition (abstracting from Rousseau) that politi­
cal participation of various forms is an important way to establish and above all to 
legitimise and to stabilise some form of reasonably impartial concordia or constitu­
tional settlement -  which individuals can somehow recognise, even though the ac­
tual degree of transformation of preferences and transcendence of power and inter­
est may be rather less than optimal, and at any rate an entirely empirical matter.
Thirdly, the idea that political participation is a way of experiencing community. 
either in the sense of being integrated into a comprehensive moral universe, or in 
the sense that participating as such is a valuable communal experience, I find un­
convincing in most of its forms. Even if a substantial moral community could exist, 
it is not clear that political participation would be the only, or the best, way to be 
integrated into it, or that political participation of most forms is a particularly 
‘communitarian’ experience. But again, when this is said, it may still be the case 
that some forms of participation constitute an important basis of certain (political, 
liberty-centered) common identifications and solidarities -  e.g. in the form of patri­
otic remembrance -  which are indeed needed by political orders.
Finally, in the sixties it became fashionable to see in political participation a 
performative, expressive, or self-creative aspect. Politics may indeed allow such re­
wards. They did to Machiavelli, and he was pining for them as he wrote the Discorsi 
in Sant’Andrea in Percusina, from which on a clear day he could see the skyline o f 
Florence. But he had no illusions that many others shared his cravings. At any 
rate, many types of politics seem to be rather the wrong places to look for these 
things, certainly for the majority o f people. The idea that the person who does not 
act politically forfeits the most essential part of his being21 is surely difficult to ac­
cept. But this does not mean that the enjoyment of self-esteem and public recogni­
tion or, negatively, the fear of shame, may not be important motivations for the in­
dividual to be active. Indeed, these matters were certainly important to republi­
cans.
19. Rousseau, The Social Contract (1,1); Plamenatz (1963:269); Singer (1973:45- 
53); Gould (1988:233fl)
20. Nelson (1980:41-45); Christiano (1990:158-59).
21. Most recently Oldfield (1990).
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There are other and better ways to argue the need for more participation. First of 
all, behind the autonomy argument, there may be a more tangible one that stresses 
con&ol More participatory structures may be advocated because they are simply 
better ways to secure adequate representation of interests, or constitute an alter­
native channel of power.22 This is a type of argument with which I have much sym­
pathy, and parts of the republican argument that I offer may be seen as a variety of 
such views. But there is more. The republican tradition is the repository of priina 
facie arguments for the continued need to have high levels of political participation 
in societies whose citizens wish to secure their most important common interest, 
which is their interest in common liberty.
However, there is not a single account in republican thought of the exact types 
and locations of activity expected of the citizen who possesses civic virtue. There is 
not really a republican theory of political participation. This is important: The rea­
son that there is no republican theory of participation is that not participation of a 
specific sort, a specific amount, or inside a specific framework, but its instrumental 
point -  common liberty - is at the heart of the tradition. There are all sorts of an­
swers to exactly which activities are the best means to secure this liberty. Republi­
canism does not usually advocate anything like ‘direct’ democracy. And many 
things besides democratic decision making may be implied by the central concept 
of self-government Machiavelli’s civic virtues consisted in fighting in wars and dis­
cussing (or shouting and quarrelling] in the city square. Montesquieu pointed to 
the restless and shifting demands on magistrates by private (business) people, but 
also the determination of patriotism in the face of war. Tocqueville analysed asso­
ciative activities in civil society. Both the variety of activity and the richly diverse 
historical texture of the liberty which they aimed at securing I seek to encompass 
with the broad term ‘republican citizenship’.
In a sense, republicanism does offer a politics with pathos. Machiavelli, Mon­
tesquieu and Algernon Sidney knew well that modem politics was about group in­
terest, the quest for power and influence, and envy and greed. But politics could 
be, and occasionally had to be, about higher things. Indeed no higher thing existed 
than the noble fight for the liberty o f the city - the Ubertas which was one’s own. 
but also everybody else’s. To Cicero, and possibly to Machiavelli, a special place in 
Heaven was reserved for the founders of cities. To Arendt, the members of the
22. Some participation theorists, particularly Barber (1984) and Pateman (1970) 
are also arguing this. Strictly speaking, these are also empirically contingent argu­
ments. Control and interest representation may in fact be enhanced by certain 
forms of delegation, economising on talent and time, combined with an extension of 
democracy to ever more social spheres (Dahl 1982; 1985; Bobbio 1987). They do 
not quite work as ideas of equal participation (if the ideal is political equality (Dahl 
1979; Lively 1975; Beitz 1989) this would seem to imply the need for unequal par­
ticipation - empowerment of the weak and excluded - as some have more resources
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French Resistance could ‘afford to go naked’. Particular acts might be noble, coura­
geous. worthy of admiration, or just plain decent. Republicanism is not a theory 
about the intrinsic value of a ‘participatory’ society, or civic activity as a way of life. 
The good republican citizen participates when it is necessary. When this is. where 
it is. and how much it takes, varies with the particular theory and is at any rate an 
empirical question. The pathos of republican politics derives from the value of its 
absence, from the experience of a freedom which is also freedom from politics, from 
appreciating the fragility of such a state of affairs, and from the occasional sacrifice 
needed to maintain these great goals.
4. What’s Wrong with Liberalism?
Although certain liberals, as recently argued by Phillip Pettit (whose work is dis­
cussed at length in this thesis), seem to advocate a liberty o f the heath, of risky 
chance and survival outside the walls of the city, this is not true for most liberals. 
Nor can liberalism be dismissed as a doctrine of ‘possessive individualism’, as such 
a doctrine, to the limited extent it appeared, was a rather late phenomenon. A l­
though the republican conception of liberty is different from various liberal ones, 
not only do they share the same concept of liberty,23 the most basic substantial 
value of republicanism and most of what we habitually refer to as liberalism is 
really the same.
Because the reconstruction o f republican citizenship that I propose takes liber­
tas so close to what we associate with ‘liberalism’, it becomes important to analyse 
the difference between the two. This is the second and more important angle on my 
reconstruction of the genesis, conceptual and theoretical content, and contempo­
rary relevance of the republican argument: If republicanism is merely an older ver­
sion of the advocacy of negative liberty - less individualist, less concerned with in­
ner moral life, less rationalistic, less given to rights-fundamentalism all according 
to which modem liberalism it becomes confronted with - what is the difference that 
really makes a difference?
The following three questions seem relevant here, and all have guided my en­
deavours. First, historically, in what way is a republican tradition distinct from, 
and discontinuous with, a liberal one? Or rather, as there are many different liber­
alisms and as the term itself should perhaps be reserved to relatively late doctrines 
-  of the nineteenth century rather than the eighteenth, let alone the seventeenth -  
in what ways, when, and with which delineating conceptual tools does it make 
sense to say that republican accounts of liberty were replaced by accounts of lib­
erty which were ‘unrepublican’ (or ‘liberal’ in inverted commas, ‘proto-liberal’, vari-
and clout than others).
23. As indeed they do, in Rawls’ formal sense o f the distinction, with various 
positive conceptions of liberty (Rawls 1972:5; Oppenheim 1961; MacCallum 1972).
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ous species of ‘enlightenment’ theories -  different terms used in the following to 
make similar broadly anti-essentialist generalisations)? Secondly, given that it is 
indeed different, why is this difference important for political theory today? Why. in 
particular, should liberals be concerned with, or be disturbed by republicanism? 
(And should some liberals -  Rawls and consorts perhaps -  be more disturbed than 
others?) Thirdly, what is the relevance of the observation, already noted, that re­
publicanism is veiy much constituted by its alternative causal account o f the em­
pirical conditions of the enjoyment of liberty -  as compared to 'liberalism*? What, 
specifically, is the significance of this for contemporary political theory? In what 
follows I anticipate the significance of each of these broad questions. I start with 
the second question, go back to the first, and end with the third.
4.1 Republicanism and the Liberal-Communitanan Debate
In what ways do republican arguments have purchase on contemporary debates in 
political theory? Relative to the history of ideas reconstruction of republicanism, 
the question is not addressed very much in the body of the thesis, except towards 
the end. A few remarks on how republicanism relates to the famous liberal- 
communitarian debate in political theory are in order in this Introduction, however.
This is, firstly, a clearing operation. As noted already and, I believe, amply 
demonstrated in what follows, it is a mistake to associate the republican tradition 
with most of the points made by authors such as Sandel, Walzer, Taylor, or Etzioni 
fcommunitarianism’ admittedly being a broad school). Despite certain structural 
similarities and occasional overlaps, republicans move inside a completely different 
universe of value, and cany little culturalist baggage of ‘traditions* and ‘embedded­
ness’. Correspondingly, the critical points against contemporary liberalism that a 
reconstruction of republicanism may yield are really quite different from the points 
raised by the above authors -  many of whose ideas may be seen as part of the 
problem from a republican perspective.
Although this is certainly still disputed, and although 1 cannot enter the debate 
here,24 I believe a review of communitarian points and liberal responses -  from 
authors like Amy Gutmann, Will Kymlicka, Stephen Macedo, and Stephen Holmes 
to name a few25 - also shows that whatever else is the matter with liberalism, it is 
not captured by the communitarian critique, let alone remedied by communitarian 
political alternatives. If modem Individuals live inauthentic lives, alienated from 
their community, and if modem societies lack ethical coherence, liberalism is 
hardly to blame. And, by and large, even limited departures from liberal schemes of 
justice and rights seem to be a rather bad idea. Thus, 1 assume that contemporaiy 
political thought must commence from a recognition that the so-called liberal-
24. I do so in Mouritsen (1996; 2000d)
25. Gutmann (1985); Holmes (1989); Kymlicka (1989:47-99; 1990:199-237); Ma­
cedo (1990).
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communitarian debate was ‘won’ in a very basic way by the liberals. However, the 
liberal-communitarian debate also serves to expose certain contemporary liberal 
shortcomings. Liberalism. I would argue, is challenged to become more ‘communi­
tarian*. although in a different and more political manner than communitarians 
think it should. I have in mind a number of points, although I can only stipulate 
them here:
The critique of liberal ‘rights talk* is generally based on a severe misreading o f 
the very point of liberal individualism, liberal constitutionalism, and liberal con­
ceptions of the person -  at least when by liberalism we refer to the broadly neo- 
Kantian. universalist mainstream, rather than to utilitarianism or Hobbesian per­
spectives.
Thus, I would argue that liberalism possesses robust arguments for the pri­
macy of some scheme of individual rights, arguments that take 'culture* more seri­
ously than communitarians do. Communitarians have at times counterpoised the 
value of culturally embedded selves to what is regarded as superficial liberal choice 
and reflection. But it is exactly the recognition of such (overlapping, shifting) em ­
beddedness - as something which is both at the heart of what is valuable in any 
human life, and as something which may cause us to be intolerant and incapable 
of living in justice with others - which renders reflective choice a required human 
capacity, and which renders rights to pursue the course of such choice neces­
sary.26 That such (no doubt partial and peace-by-piece) reflective critique of one’s 
own 'tradition’ or ‘embeddedness’, or of its most ‘basic’ elements, could be impossi­
ble is also hardly a tenable position.27
Communitarians have also argued that a public culture based on 'formal' rights 
constitutes an impoverishing straight jacket for any one culture. But it is exactly 
the recognition of the diversity o f such cultures inside any political community, o f  
the possible conflicts between them, and of the need to protect those individuals 
who wish to deviate from 'their’ culture -  whether for more or less 'impoverished’ 
motives - that necessitates the formality of rights. Indeed, this core communitarian 
critique of recht, in both strong and not-so-strong forms seems to reflect a lack o f  
concern with those several dimensions of pluralism and conflict which render the 
‘formality’ o f rights necessary, a fortiori for complex modem societies.28
Finally, to the extent that communitarians argue the impossibility of justifying 
a moral and political order sub specie aetemitatis and have in mind the degree o f  
‘thickness’ of a universalist conception as found in Rawls’ principles of justice. I
26. E.g. Sandel (1982); Barber (1984:213fl); MacIntyre (1985); and for the liberal 
response e.g. Kymlicka (1988:282; 1989:49; 1990:13-18), Macedo (1990Ö).
27. See for instance Kymlicka (1993:213) against Walzer and Bell.
28. Bell (1993); Sandel (1992:93-97; 1996); Taylor (1989); Walzer (1990a); and for 
the liberal critique e.g. Kymlicka (1988), Lukes (1991a; 1991b); Macedo (1990).
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tend to agree,29 But the replacement of such an ambition with relativism such as 
Rorty’s ‘what we like around here’, or with Walzer’s more sophisticated ideas of in­
ternal criticism, seems equally misplaced.30 Both positions refuse to take moral 
conflict between cultural values seriously, including the way that such values di­
verge, clash, or may be reconciled. Moreover to the extent that we have in mind a 
moral reconciliation of diverse cultural values, based on, or at least referring to, 
moral arguments rather than coercion and violence, it is difficult to see that such a 
reconciliation could avoid a fundamental moral premise of respect for equal human 
dignity,31 or, again, avoid a political premise of constitutionalism and rights of some 
broadly familiar liberal form as the practical embodiment of such respect.
What are then the liberal shortcomings? They are connected to the above. Lib­
eral theory, generally speaking, has too little to say about how its most basic values 
are secured and furthered in practice. Put polemically, liberalism has to accommo­
date itself In several ways to the need for liberal community -  only not in the ways 
presupposed by communitarians:
(1) The liberal turn to culture in the wake of communitarian criticisms is 
timely, but it also highlights the fragility of constitutional orders under conditions 
of value pluralism and value conflict in increasingly multicultural societies. More 
and more sophisticated versions of liberal justice may create increasing space for 
cultural diversity, place increasing demands on the impartiality of liberal orders, 
and demand an ever more wide-ranging idea of tolerance, in theory, and all in the 
name of exposing the blindness and biases of previous liberal cultures. But if liber­
alism as a political project was difficult for individuals to swallow in the days of 
Locke, it may be even more difficult to accept in a culturalist present, at least when 
it comes to translating lofty principles into practice.
Updating Lockean pluralism -  Rawls’ new point of departure - in a realistic 
multicultural scenario, and reminding ourselves of the magnitude of possible cul­
tural expressions that are possible in a good life, we see how demanding a liberal 
project really is. It should be increasingly evident to all but the most complacent 
that many groups are extremely marginalised and powerless, that rights and public 
tolerance are especially important but remain insecure exactly for such groups, 
and that it is extremely difficult for us all to remind ourselves and others of what 
tolerance and Justice requires. Examples are legio, but we can safely say that the 
same conditions that make liberal constitutionalism necessary in the first place 
also serve to remind us of the contingency of the accomplishment. Insofar as com- 
munitarianism criticises privatism, egoism, and lack of solidarity, liberalism - 
rightly understood -  ought to become a very communitarian reminder o f how much
29. Rawls (1972:260-65); e.g. Lukes (1977a: 1977b).
30. Rorty (1985). Walzer (1987:1988).
31. Kymlicka (1990:4): also Benhabib (1992:30-31); Dworkin (1978:179-83): 
Lukes (1991c:65-67); Sen (1992:19).
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we owe each other in respect for justice and rights. Neither libera] institutions nor 
public consensus on abstract liberal values automatically produce liberal citizens, 
capable of liberal practice and liberal ways of life. The ciuic uirtues required in our 
world may not be quite the ones Machiavelli or Sidney had in mind. However, the 
fundamental idea of vigilant citizens protecting their common liberty against arbi­
trary power and intolerance, from despotic states, designing elites, or narrow­
minded majorities, through public scrutiny and critique, concerted action, civil dis­
obedience, or the maintenance of an open public debate, has the same structure. 
In this, potentially quite demanding sense a liberal society, I believe, must indeed 
be a liberal community.
(2) Contemporary liberal theory, with some exceptions, has yet to deal ade­
quately with what Rawls has called ‘reasonable pluralism’. If communitarian rela­
tivism makes nonsense of such pluralism, there is no future either for ambitious 
schemes of the Rawlsian kind. The purpose o f a politically relevant liberal theory 
cannot be, as in Rawls’ recent book, to devise ingeniously the circumstances under 
which an ‘overlapping consensus* could have justice as fairness as its ‘stable’ com­
mon denominator. Rather, it must recognise the unavoidable plurality of reason­
able contestations of liberal citizenship inside any historical political community 
(and not neatly distributed in each their community, as liberal communitarians 
would have it), and the need to find means o f public deliberation and justification 
to ensure working constitutional settlements and resettlements. Moreover, liberal 
constitutionalism has to become constitutionalised in the first place: For political 
purposes there is usually no recourse to philosopher kings with manuals for le­
gitimate liberal variation. Even under the best of circumstances, many inputs into 
constitutional deliberations will fall short of the requirements of reasonable plural­
ism, yet an imperfect constitutionalism is better than no constitutionalism at all.
If we leave behind facile relativism as well as late hopes of formulating a lib­
eralism sub specie aetemitaUs, and start to take pluralism seriously,32 I believe we 
still have very good reasons to be operating inside liberal parameters o f a pragmat­
ics of equality of respect for all human beings, of reflective public justification, and 
of plausible hypotheses about certain basic -  at any rate historically quite stable - 
human needs and interests.33 Yet, liberal citizenship can and will give rise to a vari­
ety of - contingent and contested - historical manifestations in the constitutional 
orders of different states or, over time, of any one state. Even though ‘the right’ is 
still placed above ‘the good’, liberalism must become communitarian in the sense 
that ‘the right’ may only be defined and debated in the light of a certain social and 
cultural facticity. i.e. a historically specific constellation of social and cultural
32. See also Lukes (1994).
33. In Mouritsen (2000d) I discuss these matters in the context of Berlin’s (and 
Steven Lukes’) writings on the nature of value pluralism, including the former's
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groups, who must find out what is reasonable for them. Moreover, such definition 
and debate is inescapably linked to empirically informed (and politically contested) 
generalisations about matters like realism, functionality, possibilities of local com­
binations and compromise, and the likely side-effects and necessary sacrifice in­
volved for different groups of translating political values into institutional practice 
and public policy. Although the heuristic and clarifying benefits for future political 
theory of Rawlsian-type constructivism of one or more isolated political values 
should not be denied, my brief remarks here point in the opposite direction of such 
moral justification which proceeds essentially through philosophical abstraction 
from ‘the world’.
(3) A third way that I believe liberal political theory -  again Rawls in particular -  
concerns questions of moral motivation and solidarity. Rawls’ account of the origins 
and dynamics of a working ‘sense of Justice’ is, at the very least, sociologically and 
psychologically unconvincing.34 What I have in mind, and what contemporary liber­
als have only recently begun to talk about, are those necessary boundaries, geo­
graphical as well as identitary, that any political community must have, also if they 
prescribe to universalist conceptions of justice. Indeed, to the extent that liberal 
communities require more and more demanding practices in the name o f justice, 
the need for bounded solidarity becomes pronounced (it is a sad fact that the most 
‘universalistic* welfare states today have relatively strict immigration and citizen­
ship policies).
The idea -  which is discussed in more detail in the Conclusion -  is that there is 
a difference between affirming principles of Justice as reasonable and, firstly, gen­
erating the moral will to give justice to others (a fortiori when we are talking about 
demanding distributive schemes), and secondly, doing so to an extended group of 
strangers. Whereas Rawls expressly presupposes boundaries in the sense of states, 
my point is that delineation of membership is hardly a matter of a mere ‘division of 
labour* between such states. Liberal communities must give up neutrality and ac­
cept the legitimacy and indeed the necessity of bounded solidarities, which include 
nationally particular political identities. Not in order to protect and further them 
whatever their content, let alone to advance communitarian arguments about cul­
tural birthrights to territory, but rather in order to address continuingly their ori­
gin, content, and dynamic - as the precondition for liberal solidarity. Today’s liber­
alism, particularly of the neo-Kantian kind, has very little to offer by way of a the­
ory of how to generate such solidarities, or how to thematise the solidarities that do 
exist (and may be unquestionably relied upon by liberal states), making them as 
accessible, reflective, and civic as possible.
notion o f‘empirical enlighenment’ (Berlin 1969b; 1990).
34. Rawls (1972:453fl).
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For both the above sets of reasons - (2) and (3) - a liberal society will be a po­
litical community -  inside a large universe of possible legitimate variation.
(4) If we consider seriously how demanding it is to realise liberal tolerance and 
respect for justice, and also how controversial processes of political legitimation 
often are. it is evident that liberalism cannot ‘stay on the surface’. A comprehensive 
liberal rights regime requires willingness on behalf of its citizens to thematize in 
public their own ways of life. This may only be expected if liberalism goes ‘under 
the surface*, crosses the boundaries between ‘public’ and ‘private’, and becomes a 
part of these ways of life.
If communitarianism understands itself as a critique of liberal neutrality about 
ideals of personhood and the good life, liberalism must declare itself communi­
tarian in the sense of encouraging that any culturally specific identity be combined 
with a democratic and reflective, and thus controversial, liberal idea of what it 
means to be a good citizen. Under conditions of pluralism, all political orders in ­
volve cultural loss. The requirement that all cultures must be made to partake in a 
liberal outlook in obvious and unavoidable ways involves systematic endangering o f  
cultural values - religious devotion, fidelity, authority - that do not thrive in an en­
vironment of habitual scepticism and reflectiveness. Just as liberal neutrality does 
not imply neutrality about its most important values,35 it cannot be neutral about 
the conditions for the preservation of liberal values and institutions.
Whereas several liberals have criticised and questioned the coherence of Rawls’ 
ambition in Political Liberalism to avoid a ‘comprehensive’ conception of reflective 
autonomy in favour of a ’political’ conception of the person,36 and while some new 
liberals positively stress the value and importance of reflective and active citizen­
ship, such citizenship is still habitually treated as a happy by-product of multiple 
private institutions and practices in an undisturbed civil society.37 The argument 
against even this liberalism may be that reflection has to be furthered and encour­
aged by the state, and may be connected as a consequence as well as a cause to 
the existence of a vibrant and deliberative public life.
Hence, a liberal society must also be a political community - a community con­
firming and furthering the value and importance of political life.
(5) Connected to this, although it is incorrect that liberals like Rawls or 
Dworkin, because of the importance they accord to inviolable rights, have no place 
for conceptions of obligations and duty,38 it is certainly the case that these ques­
tions are underdeveloped. Moreover, the particular notion of a duty to participate in
35. Rawls (1993a:191fi).
36. See for instance Barry (1990).
37. For instance Macedo (1990).
38. Skinner (1990; 1992), in his attempt to present republican thought as a chal­
lenge to contemporary liberalism, fails to do justice to what most liberals now as 
well as in the past had in mind with the category of rights. I discuss this point in
politics or the life of the community has generally been controversial, and at any 
rate the relation between such a possible duty to liberal rights has not been dis­
cussed. Also this point is briefly discussed in the Conclusion.
All of these points, I submit, make it relevant for liberals to look elsewhere for 
the inspiration needed to reconstruct liberal political theory. Taken together, the 
points constitute strong and politically far reaching reason for people of liberal per­
suasion to accept that liberal projects in several ways require ‘political communi­
ties’. These are ways of life which aflirm and practice reflective and activist political 
cultures, which legitimise constitutional orders as an ongoing concern of practical 
politics, and which somehow maintain solidarities that are bounded and finite, 
even while based on common commitments to liberal orders. This liberal caveat has 
not gone unnoticed in recent years. Indeed, several examples of attempts to create 
more ‘civic’ liberalisms may be noted, with many of which I have much sympathy. 
Some of them, more or less vaguely, refer to republican inspirations. The investiga­
tion of the republican tradition here undertaken could hopefully further inspire 
such attempts.* 39
4.2 Historical Discontinuities between Liberalism and 
Republicanism
A main purpose of my historical reconstruction of the republican argument about 
the fragility of liberty is to highlight its relevance as a reservoir of ideas that may be 
remobilized and utilised to deal with the liberal impasse.
My searchlight on the history of republican thought is the wish to present a di­
dactic picture of the variety and the changing historical form of these ideas, from 
ancient Greece to Tocqueville. Moreover, while the narrative thread remains repub­
lican, the significance of distinct republican orchestrations of the fragility of liberty 
theme comes most clearly into view at the points where they become challenged, 
displaced, or just forgotten by other forms of discourse, or where it was necessaiy 
and possible, as in several ways in the Scottish and American Enlightenment, and 
later in Tocqueville, to formulate republican points with new assumptions and on 
new conceptual territory. These ‘other* forms of discourse, I repeat, may or may not 
be labelled ‘liberal* . What distinguishes them in this thesis is that they were in 
different ways -  on different dimensions of the fragility of liberty argument -  un- or 
positively anti-republican. They were sometimes -  as in the case of Hume -  deliber­
ately so. They sometimes may be labelled republican in some ways, and not in oth­
ers (Madison, Montesquieu).
the conclusion.
39. For instance Ackerman (1988; 1991), Bellamy (1992:1994), Benhabib (1992): 
Dagger (1997); Gutmann and Thompson (1996): Habermas (1992a): Macedo (1990); 
Miller (1995a): Viroli (1992:epilogue).
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I make a point, in this thesis, of the fact that the historical contrasts often as­
sumed are easily overdrawn, that the picture is somewhat blurred -  and that the 
development of historical arguments is for that reason all the more interesting. 
Thus, for instance the fault lines between republicanism and liberalism is not a 
matter of ‘virtue’ versus ‘rights’ or ‘possessive individualism’. ’Early liberalism’ w as 
sometimes concerned with something which was called virtue. And republican d is­
course survived comfortably into the age of natural rights discourse. While early  
republicans saw commerce and excessive personal wealth (but not property) as 
spelling the death of the city, later versions included the possibility of accumulat­
ing social and private wealth as a main fruit of common liberty. The debate over r e ­
publicanism and liberalism in the history of ideas is an academic cottage industry 
in its own right, pursued with much scholarly sophistication. I argue that a great 
many accounts that are either pro or con ‘republican revisionism* share a set o f  
conceptual confusions regarding both traditions. To appreciate the historical d is ­
continuity between republicanism and ‘liberalism’ more subtle means of distinction 
are required,40 I believe the fragility of liberty theme, as I develop it, may give u s  
such means. My contention is linked to specific views about political discourse in  
the history of ideas. In sections 6 and 7 below I shall say a little more about these 
matters. However, to anticipate, the swan song of republicanism does not coincide 
with the advent of commercial society, or capitalism, or natural rights doctrines.
4,3 An Empirical Argument
The third manner in which republicanism is discussed in relation to ‘liberalism’ is  
in terms of its relation to political realities -  in the past and now -  and in terms o f  
what follows from the notion that the republican argument in a very central way is  
‘empirical* and ‘causal’. I need to explain this:
All political theories of course have ontological assumptions, for instance about 
the structure of the mind, human nature, or the character of social bonds. They 
also have epistemological assumptions, i.e., about the nature and limits of sense 
perception or abstract reason. But political theories also have empirical assump­
tions, for instance about human motivations and capacities, or about the sources 
of human conflict, or the political conditions of solving or avoiding such conflicts. 
Crucially, they may be considerations about the conditions of realisation of the 
state of affairs and the values advocated in the theoiy -  and additional values may 
depend in turn on these considerations. As already suggested I am arguing in this 
thesis that the distinctiveness of republican arguments, and also their relevance for 
contemporary political theoiy, has much to do with their specification of distinct
i
40. And in suggesting this I also criticise Quentin Skinner (and Phillip Pettit) for 
overstating the ‘break’ between republicanism and liberalism -  although the way 
they do it is different from that of Pocock.
causa] accounts and empirical assumptions concerning the chic conditions of liber­
tas.
Thus, firstly, I make a great point (much more than does Skinner -  see below) 
of stressing the very diversity and changing nature of these empirical and causal 
claims in the different historical circumstances where republican discourse may be 
encountered. The problem of securing liberty -  over and above the intuition that 
‘virtue was needed’ -  was altogether different in Machiavelli’s city-state, absolutist 
France, or confederate America. So were the corresponding accounts of power and 
tyranny, of the types and formats of virtue, and of the nature of corruption.
If this is a rather obvious observation, it is connected, secondly, to the point -  
of which also a great deal is made in the thesis -  that such empirical and causal 
assumptions very much constituted the grounds of contestation of republican 
thought. Thus, I hope to demonstrate, particularly in Chapters four, five, and six, 
that the potential resonance of an argument (at times in terms of the contested use 
of a concept in new circumstances, or with slightly altered meanings), was not first 
and foremost a question of appeal to (new) values. It was more often one of winning 
a contest of causal and empirical generalisation, while sharing broadly similar val­
ues. From such contestations new values (e.g. as connected to different virtues) 
certainly arose. And, while the persuasiveness of competing accounts was to a 
large degree a matter of adapting one’s arguments to new circumstances, and 
hence appear ‘realistic’, needless to say it also very much relied on rhetorical repre­
sentations of these circumstances. The debate between the Federalist defenders of 
the American constitution and their Anti-Federalist opponents illustrates these 
points with particular clarity.
Thirdly, with the notion of republicanism as a reservoir of empirical arguments 
I suggest that, at a certain level of abstraction, these historically situated argu­
ments may sometimes, if by no means always, inspire contemporary theory. 
Clearly, dramatically changing historical circumstances must be taken into ac­
count. For example, republican conceptions of patriotism may inspire the critical 
reconstruction of civic solidarity through more accessible and overarching ‘national 
identities’ in multicultural societies. But it is the structure of the argument (certain 
assumptions of the psychology of solidarity) rather than any one version of patriot­
ism that may do so. 41 But there are also cases where certain similarities in the 
historical political context are part of the inspiration. Thus, to take another exam­
ple, a close examination of the American constitutional debate of the founding pe­
riod reveals striking parallels with contemporary debates on the European Union.42
This, fourthly takes us to the question of whether republican empirical and 
causal assumptions and arguments -  in some modernised version - are relevant
41. Parekh (1991; 1994) would be an example.
42. Mouritsen (2000c)
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today. Is it for instance the case, as already suggested, that modem societies re ­
quire more civic participation of one form or another? Is patriotism in fact realisti­
cally separable from nationalism? Has the development of political tolerance or 
public spirit anything to do with participation in, say, local associational life, and in  
that case which types of associations and under what circumstances? Does th e  
popular legitimacy of a regime or a constitutional set-up depend on public delib ­
erations, and under which form could such deliberations take place? Is it possible 
to analyse the content and progression of constitutional or quasi-constitutional d e ­
bates in the modem world -  say debates regarding the form of welfare state citizen­
ship, or the creation of cultural group rights, or the form of supranational (Euro­
pean) democracy? And is it possible to diagnose, at least under certain circum­
stances, some degree of reasonable 'arguing', accessibility for powerless groups, 
and resonance of empirical evidence, or is politics under all circumstances entirely 
a matter of rhetorical hegemony and floating signifiers, with agents as prisoners o f  
discourse rather than its reflective creators and users?
Such questions demonstrate that the republican tradition may also be seen -  a t  
a high level of generality, no doubt -  as a normative problem horizon which gener­
ates research questions and causal hypotheses of great political importance. In o r­
der to investigate such hypotheses, the reading of republican classics quickly g ive 
way to sophisticated theories and empirical research of political science and sociol­
ogy. This said, individual republican authors like Tocqueville constantly remind u s  
of archetypal civic questions that we should never forget to ask.43 In each their 
ways, Almond and Verba’s The Civic Culture and Robert Putnam’s Making Democ­
racy Work may be seen as instances of attempts to ask such questions -  in casu  
about what type of 'civicness' liberal orders require, and (Putnam) what generates 
it.44 In this thesis I do not of course ask, let alone suggest the answers to such 
questions. But I certainly claim that such a task could and should be continuously 
undertaken.
Fifthly, and still related, I contend that in the same manner that republican ar­
guments in the past relied for their persuasiveness (or were discredited) on per­
ceived grounds of empirical reference and causal claims, the relevance of republi­
can arguments for political theory cannot be dissociated from some reflection on 
their actual purchase on the world. The claim that contemporary (for instance lib­
eral) political theory is actually vulnerable to the republican arguments that w e 
may reconstruct, in part rests on our ability to demonstrate -  or at least to sub­
stantiate as a plausible possibility -  that the gradual liberal reversal of republican 
arguments was misguided, that the political history and present state of modem
43. That normative concerns and theories guide the selection of research ques­
tions and even their theoretical and conceptual framing is of course not news in the 
philosophy of science from Weber to Popper to Myrdal and Taylor.
44. I discuss (rather critically) Putnam’s book in Mouritsen (1999a;2000a).
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societies shows us that libertas remains fragile. Thus, the classical political philo­
sophical questions about the existence and extent of republican duty, about the 
need to give up neutrality for the sake of an affirmation of a political way of life and 
a comprehensive ideal of reflective autonomy, and about a legitimate (identitary) 
delineation of membership, are also all of them, although not entirely or in simple 
ways, dependent upon the questions of whether virtue and patriotic solidarity are 
in fact needed, whether or not their generation has to be aided, and how this might 
be brought about.
Sixthly, it was a feature of not just republican but ‘classical’ political theory 
generally to be systematically concerned with empirical and causal claims, with 
resting normative theory on such claims, and with attempting to refute other theo­
ries on the basis of empirical criticisms.45 That this is true of a great number of 
historical critics of republicanism, as well as republicans themselves, is amply 
demonstrated in the thesis. However, in this respect the Rawlsian revolution in po­
litical theory was something of a break with the classical tradition (rather than a 
resumption of its concerns, as it is usually assumed),46 because its proponents 
tend to make a virtue of abstracting as much as possible from empirical and causal 
assumptions for the sake of analytical high political theory or moral philosophy. 
Here, the concern with ‘feasibility’ or ‘realism,* i.e. institutional functioning and 
generation of moral motivation is a secondary concern. In the context of this type of 
contemporary liberal theory, republican arguments -  and their attempted empirical 
validation in research -  do not so much represent a project of openly ‘refuting’ lib­
eral causal assumptions. In stead, or so I argue in the Conclusion of this thesis in 
a discussion of Rawls, they are ways to uncover and thematise unstated assump­
tions that are made, or have to be made by liberal theory. And more generally, they 
provide an occasion for a critical discussion of the several ways that the attempted 
isolation of ‘normative’ theory from empirical assumptions and empirical research 
may have to be less complete and to have a less promising future than assumed by 
its proponents.
5. A Space for Argument - Not a Theory
I shall argue the usefulness of distinguishing analytically between four aspects of 
the fragility of liberty theme. The development of these dimensions o f the fragility of 
liberty is at the heart of my thesis. Their reconstruction is an attempt to improve 
and clarify our theoretical vision in a literature which is in need o f it badly. Thus, I 
submit that the first fragility of liberty concerns the need to institute, preserve, and 
protect the artifice. This is about the veiy existence in time and space of a republic 
and its legal and political institutions and the particular status (rights) that citizens
45. See Dunn (1990a; 1993).
46. But see also Parekh (1996:503-18).
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enjoy inside it. Another dimension concerns the fragility of political space. This is 
the trust, tolerance, and reflective potential that makes up republican ‘civility’, and 
which is both, in certain ways, a component of libertas, and part of its condition. 
Thirdly, the very content of libertas is to some extent a contingent and historical 
matter of the more or less reasonable concord that can be reached as an outcome 
of what I call, for want of a better term, political autonomy. Finally, the resolve and 
motivation to realise common liberty in a state, making necessary sacrifices, and 
doing so in co-operation with different others, is a contingent outcome of the gen­
eration of concrete solidarities and the thematisation of civic identities, i.e. republi­
can patriotism. Each of the four dimensions is the repository of a range of different, 
occasionally conflicting, republican arguments, invented in widely different histori­
cal circumstances that are more or less remote from modem political imaginations.
It is important to stress that I do not propose a republican theory. Such a the­
ory, or such theories, could of course be constructed by developing one or more of 
the republican themes. Elements towards republican theories of trust, revolution, 
constitutionalism, or patriotism might be found not just in the work of the republi­
can authors discussed, but also in many relevant areas of social science literature. 
They include Putnam’s work on social capital, Habermas’ and Ackerman’s theories 
of constitutional deliberation, work by neo-Durkheimian sociologists on political 
integration and solidarity, and certain forms of discourse theory, applied to the 
study of the construction of national identities. The normative intuitions that arise 
from such re-theorising of the republican fragility of liberty programme would in 
turn require a sustained discussion of, among other things, republican political ob­
ligation and a republican conception of political membership.
My limited remarks on the contemporary relevance of republicanism reveal the 
flavour of my own preferences. I am a very liberal republican, more at home with 
Tocqueville than Rousseau. But my aim in introducing republicanism as a contem­
porary concern is not to limit unduly the possibilities of theorising at the outset. An 
adequate appreciation of the diversity, the internal tensions, and the disagree- 
ments-inside the tradition is a step towards reconstituting republicanism as a so­
phisticated and pluralistic field of discourse inside which political theory may - also 
- move.
If the more modest ambition of this thesis is to open a field for republican argu­
ment, what could at least be said about such arguments? We noted their empirical 
and causal nature already. If they are seen, as also noted, as competitors to stan­
dard political participation arguments they are in addition, generally speaking, 
chastened arguments. Civic activity is not for its own sake, although it may gener­
ate additional gratifications over and above its immediate instrumental point. And 
if such activity is necessary, it is also itself a fragile and precarious thing: contrary 
to what is commonly believed, republicans are not optimists on citizens’ propensi­
ties to civic virtue.
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Republican arguments are rational arguments too. They sire so in the sense of 
assuming that citizens may appreciate that it is rational to be virtuous, in the 
straight forward sense of being related to basic interests. The contingency and le­
gitimate local variety of constitutional settlements does not make republicanism 
value-relativist. The core of any historical concord of libertas, the ‘point of it all’, 
throughout the tradition remains the enjoyment of that protected sphere of inviola­
bility and security which only accrues to the citizen. Whereas some republicans 
were also Christians who believed in natural law, we might on top of this add that 
the republican argument may typically be seen to start from intuitions like that of 
Turner who notes that “[hjuman beings are ontologically frail, and ... social ar­
rangements, or social institutions are precarious".47 It is this universality of the 
human predicament which is at the heart of republican citizenship.
Citizens in all sorts of ways may forget how to secure this value, or start to take 
it for granted. Particularly, they may be inclined to rely on the efforts of others, be­
cause it is only strictly speaking collectively rational to make sacrifices to secure it. 
They may also be blinded by ideology or by fear and despair to such an extent that 
they forget the primacy of the value or give up its pursuit from the start. And their 
resolve to secure their common liberty may have to be aided by identifications and 
images that dramatise their predicament. Even then, however, such identifications 
and images derive their value from, and may eventually be challenged by, the ra­
tional reference to the common good of libertas.
Finally, republican rationality also has a moral aspect. The call on citizens, 
whatever their specific motivations and the mechanisms of generating them, is a 
call in the name of duty, the duty to help sustain the political community one is 
oneself a part of. And although republicans, with a few exceptions, realise that val­
ues are plural, normative deliberations indeterminate, and politics inevitably con­
flict ridden, rationality may finally be a practical or ‘reasonable* one not just of give 
and take and compromise, but also of impartiality and enlarged minds.
After these general introductory remarks follow two sections dedicated to a dis­
cussion of a number of methodological themes which pertain to republican histori­
ography and to the practice of history of ideas generally.
47. Turner develops the point that “we can, in the absence of natural law, avoid 
sociological relativism through a reinterpretation of philosophical anthropology to 
assert an ontology of rights in the claim that human frailty is a universal feature of 
human existence. This can be seen as a variation of Barrington Moore’s thesis ... 
that while happiness is notable for its diversity, misery is characterised by its 
unity". Technological developments have not. in a certain sense, made life less pre­
carious. And “[sjocial life is characterised by its risk, by the instability of social re­
lations, and hence by the precarious nature of trust" (Turner 1993a: 181, 184). See 
also Benhabib’s remarks on Hannah Arendt’s “anthropological universalism" (Ben- 
habib 1996:196).
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6. A Note on the Study of 'History of Ideas*
This thesis primarily deals with the history of ideas. Until relatively recently - some 
time in the sixties -  it is perhaps fair to say that most practitioners of the subject 
were relatively unconcerned with a range of methodological and philosophy of sci­
ence related questions regarding what they were doing as they approached classical 
texts. At any rate, this has been the claim, not unsurprisingly, by the generation of 
historians of political ideas, many affiliated with the University of Cambridge -  
above all people like Quentin Skinner. J.G.A. Pocock, and John Dunn48 -  which 
came after them. These scholars argued that the failure to attend to such issues 
had led to forms of history of ideas -  in positivist and value relativist writers in the 
vicinity of post-war political science, often practising the *Whig history* of American 
functionalism (e.g. Sabine), as well as in ‘philosophical’ writers wishing to restore 
the practice of conversing about the ageless nature of politics and the malaise of 
the modem condition, like Strauss. Voegelin. or Arendt -  that were not really his­
torical at all.
6,1, Quentin Skinner's Critique of The Orthodoxy9
In a brilliant and famously iconoclastic article from 1969 Skinner advances a 
wealth of examples to dismiss a large part of his predecessors’ “orthodoxy’’ as guilty 
of a whole range of anachronisms arising from the wish to concentrate on “the text 
itself and from the failure to consider its conceptual, ideological, and strategic 
context. The notion that the very point of the study of historical ideas is to demon­
strate their ‘continued relevance’, as comments and answers to ‘timeless* ques­
tions, is linked to the belief that the text speaks for itself, outside of its context, and 
to the concentration on a classical cannon of great works which are universally 
presumed to contain many such comments and answers. Above all, to Skinner, this 
ambitiop reflects a failure to appreciate the manner in which the reader is caught 
in an unacknowledged ‘mind set’ or ‘paradigm’ -  which he cannot or does not seek 
to bracket, exactly because it is unacknowledged, just as it is unacknowledged that 
each classical interlocutor is similarly situated in a universe of conceptual mean­
ings, references, and political concerns.
Skinner highlights several typical ‘mythologies’ of anachronism. The ‘mythology 
of doctrines’ assumes the existence of certain ‘eternal’ doctrines to which classical 
authors are assumed to contribute, leading to such errors as converting scattered 
remarks by authors into ‘doctrines' that are not really there, and which were never
48. Dunn (1980); Pocock (1971b; 1980; 1985b), essays by Skinner (and by his 
critics) in Tully (1988a), several essays in Rorty, Schneewind & Skinner (eds.)
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intended; to the attribution of doctrines to a writer that the writer could not have 
had (because the concepts and political awareness of a problem were not at all 
available in his time); to tracing the morphology of a doctrine though history in 
such a way that it becomes hypostatized into an entity that writers did or did not 
‘discover,* ‘hit upon’, ‘forget’, or perhaps ‘anticipate’ or only ’develop’ in an embry­
onic manner; to criticise authors for not coming up with a bid for a doctrine -  even 
on topics which were clearly irrelevant at the time (voting, public opinion, race re­
lations); or to attribute views to them that ‘they would have had’ - always assuming 
that there was in fact, and must have been, an intention to state some view on these 
matters.
The ‘mythology of coherence* is the exaggerated attempt to look, by reading a 
work over and over, or by sampling elements from all over the work of an author, 
for a unified and rounded presentation, even when this involves ignoring shifts in 
an author’s work; criticism for lack of such coherence: ignoring open statements o f 
intention actually made by an author; insisting that understanding of an author is 
necessarily a deep matter of ‘resolving contradictions’ and overcoming ‘obstacles’ 
(rather than assuming that they may indeed just be contradictions); constructing 
and attributing believes and doctrines which are sufficiently general to include all 
an author’s (contradictory) statements; or finally assuming that an author was per­
secuted and prevented from writing what he wanted, thus requiring us to ‘read be­
hind the lines’.
Finally, even to historians of ideas who are determined not to assume the exis­
tence of eternal doctrines, defining their subject matter. Skinner sees other dan­
gers. One is the 'mythology of prolepsis’, or the tendency to attribute an intention 
to an author in terms of the significance that a text came to have ‘for us’ (Rous­
seaus’ responsibility for ‘totalitarianism’, Machiavelli’s intent to found a ‘modem’ 
way of looking at politics). Another is the 'mythology o f parochialism*. Here histori­
ans of ideas attribute a cross-historical likeness to arguments and concepts 
whereby they assume one text to ‘refer’ to another, or even ‘influence* each other, 
although the necessary and sufficient causes for this to have taken place are not at 
all investigated. Or, the historian conceptualises old arguments, concepts or values 
in terms of familiar contemporary meanings, which are in fact misleading and 
could not even have been understood by the authors.49
Readers familiar with these matters will have noticed that the stated ambitions 
of this thesis, at first sight anyway, seem about to court some of these dangers. At 
any rate, they do not completely conform to the chastened guidelines laid out, later
(1984).
49. Skinner (1969:3-30). Before laying out his own alternative speech-act con- 
textualism. discussed below, Skinner also distances himself from a variety of more 
structuralist views.
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on in the above article and in later works, by Quentin Skinner. In fact, Skinner has 
modified some of his early statements, admitting that in some respects "I went to 
far”.50 However, in light of the fact that I owe my substantial point of departure in 
this thesis to Skinner (the existence of ‘negative’ republican liberty), and as Skin­
ner’s is no doubt the most sophisticated statement in a wider range of contextualist 
historiographic positions, it is relevant to note where I broadly agree with Skinner, 
where my approach signals a difference of emphasis and concern which does not 
necessarily involve a conflict with his views, and finally on which points I am scep­
tical.
It should be noted that what follows is confined to a discussion of a number of 
key elements of Skinner's position, only mentioning other authors in passing, al­
though debates on what the history of ideas is and how it should be done make up 
a small library. Also, they are preliminary and cautious remarks in a thesis that 
was never planned to be much about methodology, for which the author has had 
(too) little taste. This said, in as far as I do history of ideas in a certain way. I can­
not escape the fact that this constitutes a separate, methodological contention of 
this thesis. To some extent my differences with Skinner is a matter of my use of 
history of ideas fo r  something different than he does (a purpose which I claim is 
also legitimate). But apart from this, my views also carry certain substantial conse­
quences for specific interpretations of authors where I, after all, place a different 
emphasis than he -  regarding the distinctiveness of republicanism and its degree of 
incompatibility with old and new liberalism, and doctrines of rights more specifi­
cally - suggesting that his methodology leads him to overstate a point.
6.2. What to Do with Historical Ideas -  in their Context...
Skinner’s 1969 article, apart from its just and not so just criticisms of past practice 
in his field, was a first statement of a larger project which amounts to a specific 
purpose in concerning oneself with classical texts.51 Citing his Cambridge friend 
John Dunn, it was first of all to recover, as far as possible, "the historical identity" 
of works, i.e. of understanding what was the meaning of a text, or parts of a text, 
including small parts like concepts, in its contemporary context, and secondly what 
the author of a text “was doing’, attempting to bring about, in offering the text to his 
readers. I have a great deal of sympathy with this kind of program, and also with 
some of the methodological guidelines that follow from it. Indeed, Skinner’s own 
practice of parallel reading of the ideological context constituted by obscurer tracts 
and pamphlets of a period, has set standards that are difficult to match. Luckily, 
his efforts and those of many others have generated a high quality secondary lit­
erature, which has made the task easier.
50. Skinner (1988:283).
51. Very usefully summarised by Tully (1988b).
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Much more than Skinner polemically grants may probably be gained simply (except 
that it is not so simple) by studying texts more carefully, attending to the ways in 
which a concept is used by an author and resisting the notion of each text as a co­
herent bid for an ‘eternal’ doctrine. This said, it is certainly relevant to look at the 
conventional use of language in a period in order to understand which descriptions 
of activities or states of affairs concepts denote, which aspects of social reality they 
refer to, and how these are typically evaluated.52 Indeed, the following pages con­
tain many attempts to rescue arguments and standard uses of concepts from their 
anachronistic reception, e.g. as ‘well-known* republican ideas. To take two exam­
ples, I disassociate the concept of self-government from rationalist connotations of 
the Enlightenment and of contemporary democratic theory; and I stress that the 
early use of ‘natural right* had a range of connotations, that these changed over 
time, and that they did not generally entail radical self-ownership, self-sufficiency, 
or a fixed normative content.
This is not to say, and Skinner cannot be accused of saying, that the meaning 
of a text is determined by its context - although for reasons noted below, Skinner 
leaves less space for the author than I am inclined to do. The identification of con­
ventional meaning is the first step to consider how meanings may be changed or 
challenged in a work, let alone how meaning may be generated by emphasising 
only a subset of a period’s available values and arguments. Thus, the second part 
of Skinner’s program is to attend to what kind of action an author was undertaking, 
i.e. what type of message he meant to convey, and what form of accomplishment he 
was after (which is not the same as the actual significance that a text came to have 
in a context, as it was read and disseminated). We may better understand such 
choice or change of conventional usage in a political context (of power, alliances 
and political opportunity -  but also, I would add, of new causal analyses of feasible 
projects and political arrangements), including the manner in which a text is meant 
to dispute, confirm, or subtly alter such usage. Conversely, the change of concep­
tual emphases is also a way to get closer to the political projects of an author, his 
allies, and his time. Such political intervention by conceptual contestation is par­
ticularly evident, in this thesis, in the ideological landscapes of the American con­
stitutional debate.
Skinner’s project also contains a dynamic and explanatory element. The analy­
sis of conceptual repertoires is employed in a research program which aims to map 
the dissemination, change and enforcement of Ideologies, including the strategic 
textual points of such developments; the (partial) explanation of historical texts in 
terms of the constraints and enabling of available discourse; and even the way that 
such ideology confines and enables wider changes in general social discourse and
52. These three aspects are developed in Skinner (1989).
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political action, and is hedged in by political and material factors in turn.53 Despite 
its obvious relevance for the field, as for politics and social science generally. 1 do 
not have such aims here. Occasional reference is certainly made to ideological pre­
conditions, to influential works, and to available forms of argument (e.g. the forms 
of discourse which were ‘exported’ to America), but all in a quite general and di­
dactic manner, compared to Skinner’s ambitions.
6.3. ..«And in their Relevance ‘fo r  Us*
In a general way I too wish to preserve the texts in their historical and authorial 
context, as they ‘were’ and ‘were meant*. I recognise (as does Skinner) that we may 
only have access to a part of these meanings, that this difficulty increases with re­
moteness and lack of data, and that any interpretation, as always in the social sci­
ences, is liable to revision. However, I do aim to refute some assertions about 
points of meaning and authorial intention, and I do make claims of the sort like 
‘whatever else, or more, or more specific, is the meaning of this text and its 
author’s intention, it is not this meaning, but rather something like this'. Hence in 
particular my critique of Pocock's and others' interpretations of republican notions 
of liberty.
But I have further claims about the legitimate use of history of ideas, and these 
set my project somewhat apart from Skinner’s. The point of studying historical 
texts is also, I contend, their substantial significance fo r  us. It is a primary aim of 
this thesis -  hence its structure, long historical sweep, and attempt at syntheses in 
Chapter 8 -  to excavate a species of political argument which has contemporary 
importance. To explain what I have in mind, let me start by noting two arguments, 
made by Skinner himself, each of which ties historical accuracy to contemporary 
relevance.
First, I agree with Skinner that preserving the ‘identity’ of arguments and con­
ceptions of politics, acknowledged to have been influential and seriously debated in 
another age by individuals of high intellectual capacity, is a means of looking at 
one’s own political arrangements with a detached and critical eye. In particular, it 
is a way to appreciate the large degree of historicity of contemporary conceptions. 
Skinner uses his own work on republicanism to show that negative liberty is not 
necessarily tied to individual (natural) rights54 (and that we shall miss this if we 
read the republicans as necessarily contributing to a ‘doctrine of liberty’). Only, 
where Skinner stresses the alien terms of this understanding in the context of 
contemporary liberalism,55 I would see this as an example of a recognisable value.
53. Tully (1988b: 12-16).
54. Skinner (1988:287).
55. In order to do so Skinner has to erect what looks like a straw man (discussed 
in the Conclusion) -  contemporary liberal rights discourse as necessarily uncon­
cerned with, indeed conceptually incompatible with, rights and obligations.
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surrounded by a somewhat unfashionable (though not unheard of) type of civic ide­
als, and linked to a number of somewhat forgotten (though hardly incomprehensi­
ble) assumptions of preconditions.
Secondly, history of ideas provides access to the genesis of our own concepts 
out of those of previous eras. It enables us, not only “to illuminate the changing 
applications of our key concepts" but also “to uncover the points at which they may 
have become confused or misunderstood in a way that marked their subsequent 
history."56 Whether such development is evidence of ‘confusion* or of political con­
testation under changing circumstances, this thesis makes similar points. It does 
so as regards the eventual impoverishment of rights language in a capitalist soci­
ety, the nationalist ‘pollution* of patriotism, and the loss, in conceptions of citizen­
ship, of emphases on bounded membership and duties. To my mind, such analysis 
o f conceptual transformation shows us that we may at times learn something from 
the past, as when the narrowing of conceptual meanings also refers to values and 
understandings of politics which were prematurely given up.
This takes me to a third constructive employment of classical texts where 
Skinner and I, at the very least in degrees of emphasis, go different ways -  although 
Skinner has modified his views. In 1969 Skinner claimed that “the classical texts 
are concerned with their own quite alien problems" and that, while there might be 
“apparently perennial questions, i f  these are sufficiently abstractly framed"
whenever it is claimed that the point of the historical study o f such 
questions is that we may learn directly from the answers, it will be found 
that what counts as an answer will usually look, in a different culture or 
period, so different in itself that it can hardly be in the least useful even 
to go on thinking of the relevant question as being ‘the same* in the 
required sense at all. More crudely: we must learn to do our own 
thinking for ourselves57
In the 1988 article Skinner admits that “[m]y way of putting the point appeared to 
deny the obvious fact that western traditions of philosophy have contained long 
continuities, and that these have been reflected in the stable employment of a 
number of key concepts and modes of argument". Yet, while recognising “the long­
standing character o f many of our philosophical disputes", he still criticised “the 
practice of abstracting particular arguments from the context of their occurrence in 
order to relocate them as ‘contributions* to such disputes."58 Well, doing something 
like this, or rather preparing the ground for doing it (Chapter 8), is one thing that I 
intend to do.
56. Skinner (1988:28).
57. Skinner (1969:52).
58. Skinner (1988:283).
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We should certainly use Skinner’s methods and other tools in order not to dis­
tort the identity of classical texts. The interpretative histoiy of republicanism bears 
ample testimony to how present-day conceptions of value may cloud our visions. 
Many historical conceptions no doubt are and will remain locked into quite alien 
horizons of political controversy. Yet the uselessness of connecting values and fig­
ures of argument from previous periods with contemporary ones can hardly be es­
tablished a priori Skinner significantly loads his terms. Who. nowadays, would ex­
pect history of ideas to be a “solution to our immediate problems" or assume to 
“learn directly from the classical authors by focussing on their attempted answers 
to supposedly timeless questions"? Who would believe, as Leo Strauss and some 
others apparently once did, that all important political problems are "perennial”, or 
that conversation about them, to the extent they exist, is an unmediated meeting of 
minds across the centuries? Why not in stead assume that political problems and 
their connected concepts and arguments may be more or less general? That those 
who seek illumination from the past may expect to find not “timeless" debates 
about a fixed number of abstract problems, but sometimes interesting continuities, 
re-occurrences, and historical parallels on a number of questions and answers in 
the context of often recognisable, but somewhat different, universes of human 
value? That this is possible even as we try to recognise as systematically as possi­
ble the divergences in range of application and the details of connotation? The sus­
picion that such restatement necessarily Involves distorting them beyond recogni­
tion through their assimilation to ‘our* unimaginative political universe surely un­
derestimates the great variety of contemporary vocabularies of political value which 
are readily available, or at least accessible, as resources of translation.59
Skinner’s scepticism reflects views on the discontinuity of meaning of most po­
litical concepts. It is impossible to write ‘a history of concepts’ because “progress, 
equality, sovereignty. Justice, natural law, and so on and on" have been used by a 
great many authors, in different historical contexts, with different political inten­
tions. One of his examples is Machiavelli’s virtu Previous interpreters have tried in 
vain to' translate it to known contemporary versions of virtue, have misleadingly 
claimed that he used it in many senses, and that its use was simply confused -  all 
without seeing that virtu meant the qualities “moral or otherwise...most conducive
59. Skinner (1969:51,53; 1988:283). To take an example, understanding Rous­
seau’s conceptions of ‘citizen’ and ‘equality’ requires examination of authorial in­
tention and context. Neither correspond to values widely held today. Yet, some 
structural aspects of the moral sociology of Rousseau have proven applicable to 
quite different circumstances. The connections between social homogeneity, equal­
ity of status, and political stability are familiar to analysts of nationalism and na­
tional identity. Re-reading Rousseau we gain access to a diversity of orchestrations 
of a relationship between the individual and the state which, if not ‘perennial’, 
surely has relevance beyond Rousseau’s own time, let alone his authorial inten­
tions.
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to military and political success," as often linked, we may add, to Machiavelli's ar­
gument that such success was also a precondition of founding and maintaining 
liberty. But Skinner’s point that no modem term captures this intuition is hardly 
controversial. It is unclear why we would wish to restrict ourselves to a single term 
to denote a complex idea or whether past interpretative scholarship invariably 
aimed at such crude ‘translation’.60
In fact the idea in question does not strike one as alien, but relatively under­
standable, as is -  with a degree of imagination and aided by competent historians 
like Skinner -  the universe of value to which the concept belongs. Certainly con­
ceptual meanings of terms change, and certainly we should not assume that all 
writers necessarily contribute to perennial concepts, let alone to the specific 
structure of such concepts which present theory has fixed upon, and certainly 
some classical concepts may be so different that lengthy expositions are required. 
Skinner’s stress on concepts as strategic weapons in diverse circumstances61 leads 
him, I believe, to overemphasise the necessary diversity of conceptual meaning. It 
is after all an empirical matter to what extent, and as regards which types of hu­
man values and political conceptions, continuities and stability exist.
I happen to believe that the structure of Machiavelli’s concept may be employed 
in a generic analysis of recognisably similar types of arguments about civic virtue -  
i.e. those dispositions that, as a matter of a temporal-practical analysis of politics, 
are needed to secure common liberty. These arguments have a certain structural 
stability which corresponds, I believe, to continuities in basic political experience. It 
is quite clear that the content (dispositions, types of practice) of this concept 
changed, as did assumptions of its forms of generation and proper spheres. Some 
uses of ‘virtue’ took it out of politics altogether, others gave ‘economic’ and ‘relig­
ious’ virtue a political meaning, and so on. I analyse such developments in some 
detail to highlight the flexibility and the continuity of historical conceptualisations 
of what it takes to be a good and useful citizen and what the defence of liberty re­
quires, over long stretches of historical time. A  way to describe these developments 
is to speak of types of arguments as constituting the conceptual core around which 
conceptual variation and change may take place, with some uses of Virtue’ (Chris­
tian virtue in most historical settings) departing from this core, and with some new 
terms still sharing it (manners, civility).
I may not be so guilty of anachronistic history of ‘ideas* after all: Skinner scorns 
those who simply seek those ‘answers’ in the past which contemporary orthodoxy
60. Skinner (1969:39; 1988:253, cp.244-45).
61. ”[A]s soon as we see that there is no determinate idea to which various writers 
contributed, but only a variety of statements made with the words by a variety of 
different agents with a variety of intentions, then what we are seeing is equally that 
there is no history of the idea to be written, but only a history necessarily focussed 
on the various agents who used the idea, and on their varying situations and in-
TT7TSI
provides them with already. I am interested to begin with the variety of diverging 
answers -  although I maintain the relevance (and certainly also investigate the oc­
currence) of a broadly similar question, regarding conditions of liberty. As stressed 
by Albert Hirschman, the fact that previous periods asked recognisable questions 
(such as how to avoid religious fanaticism) in quite different circumstances (before 
the advent of capitalism or the modem nation state) and often gave surprising or 
paradoxical answers (for instance that markets are civilising rather than socially 
disruptive) may be a theoretical inspiration to us.* 62 Sometimes the structure of the 
problem context may exhibit interesting parallels, or the lack of a parallel may re­
mind us of the non-obviousness of present context. Again, both possibilities are 
evidenced when we look at American constitutional debate in the context of present 
day European integration.
I also feel an affinity with Isaiah Berlin, who showed that original insights (and 
not merely the strategic intentions) of an author come alive to us in a historical and 
biographical context, out of which it may then be lifted for us to ponder -  exactly in 
order to become wiser on the plural (but still understandable and hardly infinitely 
diverse) political universes of value whose difference we should try to preserve in 
thought.63 Specifically, Berlin’s pluralism may also be applied to recover original 
political universes in the sense of views of the political world and its conditions, 
e.g. conceptions of civic motivation, the structure of vice, or the working of political 
architecture -  all parts of an attention to the content and structures of arguments 
which I am not sure Skinner takes entirely seriously in his concern with strategic 
intentions and historical meanings.
7. How to Do History of Ideas
7.1. Some Remarks on 1Method9
My purpose in the use of the history of ideas has some bearing on the way that I go 
about the reading of individual texts and not least on how my findings are pre­
sented.
My own emphasis on the content o f argument leads me to stress -  also in the 
selection of authors -  what is different original and (thus) interesting. I feel at lib­
erty to emphasise or enlarge aspects of a work which relate to the problem at hand. 
At times arguments to this effect are not the main concern of an author, indeed it 
may even be a point that what he says presupposes the self-evidence of the argu­
ment. Moreover, where details of an argument assume a relevance ‘for us’ which, 
for good reasons, goes beyond the imagination of an author who pronounces
tentions in using it" (Skinner 1969:38).
62. E.g. Hirschman (1977).
63. On Berlin’s value pluralism, see Lukes (1994).
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somewhat less, or less directly, on a matter than ‘we’ would have washed, there is 
occasionally a higher degree of textual dissection and interpretation than elsewhere 
(this may be the case in my account of Madison’s ideas of constitutional delibera­
tion in Chapter 5). The interpretations that I offer no doubt become more contest- 
able the more that this is the case.
Secondly, I place an emphasis on the larger, 'material’ and ‘structural’ histori­
cal context. Relative to Skinner, who emphasises the important role of ideological 
contestation of concepts as related to alliances and struggles over power, I also 
draw attention to the constraints and possibilities of the problem situation which 
presents itself (although of course interpreted and significantly contested by his­
torical actors) for instance with the rise of a centralised state, in the context of 
post-revolutionary federal consolidation in the ‘large republic’, or with the advent of 
a socially levelled, capitalist society. In new circumstances, new political problems 
presented themselves and, particularly, old ones presented themselves in novel 
ways. Thus, I emphasise the contextually different -  yet inside each their context 
relatively stable -  conceptions of dangers that threaten common liberty or corrupt 
the civic resolve to secure it. 1 also note how new types of situational pressure and 
argumentative constraint were put on proponents of old ideals to explain why they 
were still valid, or to restate them to be so. That the thesis takes a (very) long view, 
occasionally skipping a century, jumping from country to country and across the 
ocean, certainly renders this approach necessary in order to avoid anachronism. 
But it is also productive as a way to appreciate that diversity in continuity of argu­
ments which the thesis wishes to preserve.
Thirdly, in a way that Skinner does not much do, I often place readings in a 
very wide historical context. While the identification of conceptual conventions of a 
period is important, I find it legitimate and important to draw contrasts and to ac­
centuate continuities o j argument between quite different periods (i.e., in Chapter 
5, Greek and Roman conceptions of virtue compared to virtue language in America) 
even though the concepts are only partly the same, let alone the words employed to 
denote them. I also note how doctrines ‘start* or ‘are developed’ and reach a more 
‘sophisticated stage’, without thereby implying any claim, criticised by Skinner, 
about ideological influences or teleological movement of spirit.
Fourthly, I should note my guiding intuition o f starting with an presumption of 
finding some version of certain types of arguments in a text. If Skinner had a point 
in warning us about looking for the familiar, since his 1969-article the pendulum 
has swung towards a position which (overemphasises the notion that what we find 
(to the extent that we can even understand it) will belong to an alien universe of 
value.64 I do not deny, indeed I highlight, the vast difference between, say, the con­
64. In the context of ancient Greece, one may compare the accounts of MacIntyre 
(1985) and Rahe (1992), with that of Hansen (1991) -  which indeed I do in the fol­
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ception of ‘the person’ or ‘a good life* in Aristotle and Thomas Jefferson. What I 
suggest, without developing it. is that certain core political values, along with cer­
tain types of concerns about securing them, may constitute politico-anthropological 
‘universals' -  points of convergence for political disputes which human societies at 
a certain level of material development and structural differentiation will exhibit to 
some degree.65
Finally, despite my basic sympathy with Skinner's speech act approach, I also 
have some reservations. In a quite legitimate way Skinner's purposes of intellectual 
histoiy narrow his vision. There is more, in some authors much more, to authorial 
intentions and projects than rhetorical efficiency and strategic manoeuvring inside 
a space of conceptual convention. Tocqueville’s work clearly has to be placed in the 
context of both his anti-Jacobism and his critique of the Ultra-royalists (and of his 
wish to befriend the intellectuals of his period, to have a political career, and to be 
famous), and many of his concepts and preconceptions were shared by the liberal­
ism of the doctrinaires. But in writing Democracy in America he also tried to reach a 
better understanding of a whole range of complex phenomena, connected to what 
he thought was a novel political condition, and to offer what he truly thought was a 
better vision for the future of France, all knit together with a distinct normative vi­
sion of new values and virtues to be cherished, and old ones to sacrifice.
Also, for the understanding of a work of any complexity, such as that of Rous­
seau, mapping the conventional significations and applications of concepts and 
their strategic use only takes us part of the way. They may be entangled in complex 
arguments and visions of politics, not all of which the author has been able to state 
with complete coherence or even clarity to his contemporaries, let alone to us. In­
terpreting these interconnected arguments and visions may a somewhat more labo­
rious and complicated affair than Skinner suggests. My readings -  with their pur­
pose of uncovering details of argument rather than ‘mere’ conceptual meanings and 
authorial strategies -  are for such reasons somewhat more concerned with ‘herme-
lowing chapter.
65. Having already quoted Turner, let me note Berlin’s recognition (in the midst of 
his value pluralism) that there are "if not universal values, at any rate a minimum 
without which societies could scarcely survive", among which, for practical pur­
poses universal, human aspirations was some "area of personal freedom" which 
cannot be given up "without offending the essence of human nature" Berlin 
(1969:126; 1990:18). Physical security, absence of arbitrary power, avoidance of 
fear, and some modicum of material welfare are also likely candidates. Moreover, in 
all discourse concerning regulation of collective arrangements in any organised 
community, it may be speculated that conceptualisation of the preconditions and 
the experience of contingent enjoyment of such values may well parallel those 
‘practical’ descriptions of everyday life-maintaining activities where some anthro­
pological evidence suggest the existence of much the same structure of concepts 
(Lukes 1982:269-70).
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neuticaT, work-internal interpretations than Skinner’s, although 1 share his mis­
givings about overly inventive and intervening reinterpretations.
7.2. Relativism, Concepts, and Discursive *Paradigmsf
Some of the points made above connects to the more general reservation about 
Skinner’s methodology that discourse for several reasons may well be less con­
straining than he appears to believe.66 To avoid confusion, Skinner is not really a 
relativist in any of several ways that this has been and remains fashionable.67
Skinner does not believe, like Rorty,68 that, conceptually speaking, the past is 
such a foreign country that we cannot understand it at all (or only, as claimed by 
some, by emerging ourselves in the self-contained language games of different peri­
ods or alien ‘cultures’).69 Although he does not believe any concepts and beliefs 
may strictly speaking be said to be “forced upon us by the world", in such a way 
that we may be sure that some parts o f reality is represented to us all in the same 
way (allowing some term by term translation), providing we apply our contextual 
scholarship with care, this does not "prevent us from learning alien terms, and in 
consequence finding out what discriminations they are used to make”, using “the 
resources of a given language such as English." In order to have much success 
with this, we must hope for, and Skinner does concede finding (even, in the 1988 
article, at the level of some basic political concepts) "considerable overlap between 
our beliefs and the beliefs of those whom we are trying to investigate". (But he ad­
vances no opinion as to what reasons we may have for entertaining some optimism 
about the degree of this overlap).70
66. Despite Skinner’s emphasis on strategic use of language, he also notes that 
his approach
leaves the traditional figure of the author in extremely poor health. 
Reiterating, defending, underpinning commonplace insights as they 
generally do, individuad authors can readily -  perhaps too readily -  come 
to seem mere precipitates o f their contexts. It is certainly an implication 
of my approach...that the idea o f discourse, not Individual authors, 
becomes the main focus o f attention. The historian primarily studies 
what Pocock calls ‘languages’ of discourse, and only secondarily the 
relationship between individual contributions to such languages and the 
range of discourse as a whole (Skinner 1988:276-77)
67. Nor am 1.1 broadly share the type o f middle ground position defended by Ste­
ven Lukes in a series of articles (1977a; 1977b; 1977c; 1982).
68. Rorty (1979).
69. Winch (1958).
70. Skinner (1988:250-53), cp. the somewhat more realist position of Lukes, al­
ready cited, and (more realist still) of Hollis (1982). It follows, and his entire ap­
proach indeed implies this, that Skinner does not believe that our attempts to un­
derstand the utterances of the past are simply a projection of our own categories 
inside which we are somehow trapped (a position which would make nonsense of 
notions of reflective criticism, revision, and conflict inside the culture of the inter­
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Moreover. Skinner stresses that, in order to be able to understand the meaning 
of our ancestors’ beliefs, we must assume some shared standards of rationality or 
“assumptions at least about the process of belief-formation itself, including non­
contradiction and logical inference -  although this does not entail that what we 
now know to be false could not in a context be a rationally held belief, and al­
though failures or deliberate departures from rationality and consistency cannot 
occur.71
Finally. Skinner denies the charge that we cannot hope to have any access to 
the intentions of authors at all, or that such an ambition would imply the reckless 
return to “the mysterious empathetic process’* of pre-Gadamer Einfûhlung, fa­
mously debunked by that author.72 Noting that it may well be impossible to recover 
intentions with some texts and utterances and that all attempts to recover inten­
tions will be révisable in the light of alternative evidence, he insists on “the logically 
behaviourist, essentially Witgensteinian argument“ that intentions must be as­
sumed “publicly legible" in a given context, where certain conventional meanings of 
concepts (themselves possible to establish) are evoked in certain situations, where 
certain agents may be hypothesised to have certain interests, beliefs and strategic 
motivations, subject to “further corroboration". Again, to believe with Derrida 
(whose “unhelpfully hyperbolic" reasoning takes some flak), that past intentions 
are inaccessible in principle would “render meaningless a whole range of practices 
extending from the conducting of orchestras to the assessment of criminal respon­
sibility."72
Having dispensed with these potential misunderstandings of Skinner’s posi­
tion, I do have some misgivings about the degree to which his methodological 
framework causes his 'traditional figure of the author’ to disappear. When Skinner 
stresses that authorial innovation - over and above repeating and combining con­
ceptual uses already employed elsewhere - is merely a question of marginal change 
of conceptual reference, sense, and loading, he overstates his case.
First, as a theoretical point with which I’m not sure Skinner in fact disagrees 
even though he seems to ignore its significance, our capacity to reason and project 
our reasoning in speech or writing is by no means only a question of our available 
concepts - also not in Skinner’s sense of including the (gradually) renewed con­
ceptual meanings with which we intentionally avail ourselves. The turn to language 
in political theory was certainly a timely reminder that concepts are not neutral 
tools, a matter of mere convention or convenience. They are in stead ways to bias 
arguments, deliberately or undeliberately excluding some areas or representations
preter), although he certainly stresses that escaping our categories requires a level 
of self-reflection that we often lack.
71. Skinner (1988:257).
72. Gadamer (1975).
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of reality (or accounts of its potential transformation), some normative intuitions, 
and some political aspirations from access to ‘good concepts’ like justice, democ­
racy, or freedom.73 4 But it is only a bias, its strength and effectiveness depending on 
the concept in question:
Even as we accept [or as our equally rational ancestors accepted) a specific 
sense, reference, and loading of a term, it is still possible to argue. We may doubt 
whether such a generally good thing as democracy should be sought under all cir­
cumstances. We may question whether the relationship between, say, liberty as 
some species of non-interference and on the other hand other values (including 
more basic values like the equal dignity of all persons) is really the one claimed by 
a theorist, perhaps suggesting that the theoretical account into which the concepts 
fit is partial or even incoherent -  all the while accepting his terms (say, those of 
Nozick). Finally, we may ask whether the causal account of politics assumed by a 
certain conceptual bias is in fact plausible, irrespective of whether we contest the 
meaning of the concept (there is both the possibility of reinventing ‘socialism’ as 'a 
fully democratic welfare state’ and saying that it is a wonderful ideal, but impossi­
ble to realise). Although political arguments are veiy much about conceptual dis­
pute they are also -  no doubt usually at the same time -  a question of using given 
concepts in different arguments. The exclusive focus on concepts may indeed make 
us loose sight of the argument.
Secondly, I believe in particular that the question o f empirical reference and 
causal accounts presumed in a conceptual argument is important for our appre­
ciation of texts. Skinner argues that the question of the ’truth* of textual utterances 
is trivial (not, of course, that it cannot be decided ‘by us*, let alone ‘at all’) and he 
may often have a point.75 But as noted I stress the way that authors, more or less 
close to each other in time and independently of the degree to which they shared 
the same concepts, often quarrelled exactly about political practicability and ‘real­
ism*. A history of ideas designed to ridicule the faulty political science of the past 
would certainly look peculiar. Yet, we may achieve a more differentiated under­
standing of texts which leaves more space for the author and for the possibility that 
he may tell us something interesting if we enter this empirical variable of contesta­
tion as well: At least as interesting as what authors meant by 'rights’ are the, of 
course related, questions of which political mechanisms and causes threatened or 
furthered their safe enjoyment, and which good reasons (apart from strategic inter­
ests and political expediency) they had for advocating one view or the other.
This, thirdly, connects to the ‘realist* intuition to whose methodological signifi­
cance I have already alluded, and where I also depart in some degree from Skinner.
73. Skinner (1988:279-81).
74. A lucid account o f ‘essential contestation’ of concepts is Connolly (1983).
75. Skinner (1988:256).
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IThere is, I believe, a way in which the experiences of real political affairs in their 
historically evolving actuality, as well as arguments about these matters by histori­
cal actors, are not only irreducible to the concepts these actors use (although they 
are certainly not independent of these concepts), but in which they represent a 
long historical continuity ‘beneath’ the employment of a specific language. As 
noted, though hardly argued, I believe certain political experiences of the contin­
gency of some basic values are of this nature, and it is a hypothesis of the thesis (to 
be investigated) that the republican version of this contingency also manages to 
thrive under a range of conceptual circumstances.
Thus, to some degree it may also be possible to talk about the same thing, al­
though we use slightly different concepts, let alone terms, and the fact that we use 
different concepts and terms may well prevent us from realising this. Tocqueville 
continued a long tradition of republican arguments about patriotism. He invented a 
new word, and his concept was not quite the same (more reflective and ‘liberal’, re­
ferring to slightly different activities). However, the structure of the arguments (i.e. 
that patriotism was tied to the experience or memory of liberty, that it had a ra­
tional core, and that it was not unquestioning) was not so novel. Yet, he thought 
echoing Constant and others, that it was. Indeed his own ‘reflective patriotism* was 
expressly invented as a contrast to that ‘patriotism’ which had been so thoroughly 
discredited for instance by the rhetorical moves of David Hume.
Indeed, Skinner’s version of the republican history of ideas may illustrate a 
similar point, and this is an example also of how his methodology leads him to 
substantial claims that diverge from mine. In emphasising that Machiavelli had a 
conception of negative liberty which was ‘preliberal’, not just in the sense that it 
was tied to participation in ‘self-government* (with this I concur), but also in the 
sense that this was conceptually quite discontinuous with the language of ‘rights’, 
he makes too much of the fact that Machiavelli did not employ the terms of dirtttt 
and interessi Apart from the fact that Skinner’s 'rights’ appear to be coloured by 
his (mis)understanding of liberal rights discourse, and while Machiavelli's concept 
of liberty was of course different in the sense of being pre natural law ideas of uni­
versal rights of man, bestowed by God, there were also important continuities with 
for instance the rights discourse that emerged in America.76
On the one hand, and apart from the noted obvious differences, there are clear 
similarities between the idea of the common liberty of the city (derived from the 
Roman concept of libertas, and prevailing in Renaissance writings) as a contin­
gently specified set of areas of mutually guaranteed personal immunity of citizens, 
and on the other hand the civil liberty which Paine, Jefferson, and the Anti- 
Federalists associated with (the actual, secure) enjoyment o f individual rights in­
side a territory. It is the same type of value -  even if  some of the rights (religious
76. Skinner (1988:287).
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freedom and freedom of consciousness) are new. On the other hand, the way that 
American republicans tied the safe enjoyment of this value to political independ­
ence and to the willingness of citizens to be virtuous and vigilant is the same type 
of republican argument, corresponding to the same type of experience of the politi­
cal condition that Machiavelli was also making.
This last point, fourthly, connects to my impression that Skinner underesti­
mates the degree to which old and new discourses were internally ambiguous, het­
erogeneous, and mixed (even in the same authors). American authors who em­
ployed each their mixtures were quite capable of understanding diverging rhetoric. 
Indeed I argue that they consciously entered debates which were about much the 
same values, and presupposed, if not quite the same conclusions concerning the 
political problem context, at least similar assumptions about its structure. Moreo­
ver, in this particular debate there was a degree of give-and-take progression.
Connected sets of traditionally republican concepts like virtue, corruption, and 
patriotism could be used by figures like Hamilton to discredit old republican argu­
ments, and they could become attached to new varieties of Puritan, ‘capitalist’, or 
Enlightenment-individualist discourse, inside each of which they could in turn be 
given more or less civic expression. Although Skinner would hardly deny that con­
cepts are capable of a variety of applications and connotations, selectively sampled 
and emphasised, indeed that this variety is itself continuously contested and ex­
panded, I believe he understates the degree to which this takes place. Clearly, not 
everything ‘could be said’ at any one time. However, the range of competing ‘liberal’ 
vocabularies which in each their way would seem to contradict republican political 
cosmology (in Chapter 4 I mention five: natural rights and state of nature, interests 
and institutional architecture, commerce and civil society, progress, and sympathy 
and moral sense) did not just constrain republican arguments but also, if to a 
vaiying degree and not indefinitely, enabled their reformulation in new ways.
7.3. The Meaning o f  'a Tradition'
When I employ the term tradition to refer to republican arguments this reflects what 
I take to be their great historical resilience and continuity. It also follows from the 
above that I have in mind something slightly different than an idea of a conceptual 
‘paradigm’, ‘language’, or ‘discourse’, when these are taken to mean that a way of 
thinking and writing about politics may be defined strictly at the level of continuity 
and independence o f conceptual conventions. There may be different emphases, in 
writers like Skinner and Pocock who follow such criteria, as to what constitutes the 
defining range and connotative cores of concepts in such a ‘language*. Both these 
authors accept or have come to accept that different languages may be combined to 
some degree -  indeed Skinner has emphasised how the ideological strength of a
discourse is a function of its capacity to merge itself with other potent languages.77 
However, the emphasis I place on the way that conceptual use is ambiguous and 
open to reflective use in new ideological circumstances also makes me quite scepti­
cal of methodologies based purely on the study of conceptual meaning.
Such methodologies help us to restrain our interpretations to what could have 
been said. But they are unhelpful if, as I believe is often the case, they prevent us 
from appreciating the high if not unlimited degree to which structurally similar ar­
guments, which above all refer to the conditions of securing certain important val­
ues, may be stated in languages which include a high incidence of conceptual 
markers (‘rights’, ‘progress’) which belong to alien conceptual universes.
Republicanism If this is accepted -  with the no doubt controversial notion that 'ar­
guments’ over basic human political experiences to some extent constitute a ‘real’ 
substratum below the level of concepts -  it still remains to be explained why my 
particular delineation of republican arguments in 'a tradition’ is better than com­
peting attempts to do the same, including those of more conceptual authors. Let 
me answer in a series of steps:
To begin with, there is reason to note that academics debating ‘republicanism’ 
are not talking entirely past each other. Although moves in the debate are made by 
introducing hitherto neglected authors or in disputing the nature of the ‘break’ 
between, say, Aristotle and Machiavelli, or between both and the American writers, 
there is broad agreement on which authors V e are talking about.* There is also 
agreement as to much the content of republicanism, including, I believe, at least 
the following: That we are talking about continuities of ways of conceptualising po­
litical forms which contain a popular element; which somehow aim at reflecting a 
‘common good’ or balance between the aspirations of different political groups in­
side such forms; which acknowledge or stress the temporal contingency as well as 
the legitimate variety of such forms; which involve the valuation of some degree of 
‘participation’ of various kinds in public life by citizens and the notion that exercise 
of such activities is somehow related to the (equal) status of these citizens; that 
neither these valued activities nor the ‘quality’ of the citizen are to be taken for 
granted - and no doubt more. It is also uncontroversial that the Renaissance ex­
pression of these elements is tied to a number of conceptual elements like virtue, 
liberty, republic, common good, and corruption, each of which get to have a long 
history. My delineation of the republican tradition takes place inside this shared 
understanding.
Secondly, all delineations of traditions are also reconstructions -  hence the title 
of this thesis -  in the sense that they have a deductive element. They are in the end
77. Tully (1988:15). Pocock has later admitted that Moment was to some extent 
“tunnel history" (Pocock 1981b:53).
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traditions fo r us. Each contain -  also those of Skinner and Pocock. although they 
may wish to deny it -  a search light constituted by what the interpreter, in the 
context of contemporary theoretical debates or personal inclinations, considers im­
portant. The definition of the ‘core1, the number of elements, how strictly defined, 
and to what degree it may be diluted or reformulated and still remain ‘the same, 
these are unavoidably decisions of the interpreter -  constantly visible in the fol­
lowing. Although one may be helped by natural ‘clusters’ o f arguments in the texts, 
no focus on continuities in discursive configurations (Which concepts? How to de­
lineate them? How continuous?) could alleviate this predicament. Defining a tradi­
tion in complete disregard of the conceptual continuities assumed by authors would 
certainly constitute circumstantial evidence of idiosyncratic readings. But the dif­
fusion of conceptual use points in so many directions that choices amongst such 
continuities have to be made anyway, according to some criteria. As an example, 
although Hegel shared a good deal of the vocabulary and references of the tradi­
tion, his arguments, values, and entire understanding o f politics is fundamentally 
different from those I have stressed as republican. Hegel thought he was in conti­
nuity with the Ancients, but wasn’t really. Tocqueville who did not quite use the 
same words, and like many of the later writers treated took care to distance them­
selves from past authors, was in much more continuity with the latter’s arguments 
than he believed was the case -  hence he is included.
Thirdly, because of this search light element, any one author could be placed in 
different company, inside differently defined traditions, also if we do require some 
level of auto-coherence in conceptual use and mutual reference, however mediated 
and indirect. The interpreter might be interested in a quite different set of ques­
tions and values (such as specific conceptions of the person, ideals of toleration, or 
views on the just acquisition of property) which aligns some of my ‘late’ republicans 
with other (‘liberal’) writers of the Enlightenment.
Or one might wish to isolate a more narrowly defined civic tradition -  for in­
stance restricting ’republicanism’ to views which also include a recognisable notion 
of the renaissance ideal of vir virtutis, and some correspondingly strong version of 
the way that politics is tied to the pursuit of human flourishing understood as 
manly ‘greatness’ or character. One might choose a short time span, keeping varie­
ties and conceptual complexity of such ideas within a quite limited range. Or one 
might elect to include a whole variety o f much later but arguably continuous ways 
that politics has been seen to carry its own intrinsic rewards in the form of the de­
velopment or building of the self, or the acquirement of (collective) self-knowledge. 
As far as it goes Pocock's history of civic humanism which points all the way to the 
early Marx (and indeed to Hegel) is certainly a respectable search light - driven no 
doubt by views on the lack of contemporary outlets for such political experiences, 
views I do not share. Although I might have stressed it more civic humanism is 
hardly absent from the thesis, but I do think Pocock overstates its importance.
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One might also, for instance from a communitarian standpoint, wish to widen 
the republican dimension of patriotism to include all statements about the impor­
tance of common identifications for political or national integration, or as morally 
valuable in themselves. If one were to start with Rousseau and look at various 
forms of nationalist ideology in the nineteenth century, including a whole range of 
Italian, French and German examples which I have not discussed, no doubt many 
similarities in arguments, assumptions, and value intuitions connect the subset of 
authors who maintain the reference in patriotism to common liberty with those who 
do not.
But despite this deductive element, fourthly, any delineation is not as defensi­
ble as any other. First of all, all search lights are not complementary (as when we 
say -  emphasising or playing down different elements - that Tocqueville in one re­
spect was ‘republican’, in smother ‘conservative*, and in yet another ‘liberal*). 
Sometimes interpreters disagree about the central meaning of terms, arguments, 
and values in a given writer, and such disagreements may be indicative of broader 
incompatibilities in the representation of the common ground participators to a 
tradition allegedly share. My delineation of the republican tradition is broad 
enough to include many concerns. There is room for authors who connected the 
fragility of liberty to vir virtutis ideals and those who did not; for Rousseau’s ‘com­
munitarian’ persona along with his standard republicanism; and for American 
democratic conceptions of self-government along with earlier republican history 
where talk of this value is an anachronism.
But I believe that Pocock’s use of civic humanism to delineate a republican tra­
dition beyond the Renaissance stretches these ideals much to far. And I certainly 
argue that Pocock’s influential picture of the tradition is mistaken in the sense that I 
claim -  whereas he denies -  that these civic humanist ideals were virtually always 
connected to the external instrumental point o f enjoying a species o f negative liberty 
under law.
Also, whereas Skinner has pointed our attention exactly towards this ‘liberty 
before liberalism’, I claim that his description of the tradition is mistaken in the de­
gree o f discontinuity and incompatibility he sees between this early republicanism 
and on the other hand (natural) rights-centred types of discourse per se, and in­
deed a number of other ‘liberal* elements generally believed to define the limits of 
republican thought -  a point discussed in a moment.
I further, and by Implication, claim that various alternative delineations of re­
publicanism (whatever valuable analyses they contain) are mistaken when they 
distinguish between ‘liberal’ or ‘instrumental* republicanism and on the other hand 
‘civic humanism’, assuming that negative liberty was only an issue in the former.78
78. See Chapter 5, section 2.
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I certainly dispute Charles Taylor’s characterisation of the tradition in terms of 
a shared concern with liberty as collective self-expression of a people’s identify.™
Finally, while Phillip Pettit’s definition of the tradition in terms of juridical (and 
social) resilience is illuminating in several ways, and although he describes impor­
tant aspects of the republican value ideal, I believe the use of this ideal per se 
(shared by Locke, Hume, and Kant) -  rather than arguments and intuitions about 
its fragility and the conditions of realising it -  is analytically unhelpful because it 
draws a line of demarcation which makes most writers republicans; which fails to 
make sense of the critique of some o f these authors by others who denied the im­
portance of civic virtue; which does not distinguish between historical instances of 
republican city states and on the other hand those various privileges, protections, 
and ‘liberties* of burghers or artisans that were enjoyed in many places throughout 
the Middle Ages, but without political rights or duties; and which finally completely 
cuts the reference to traditional understandings of what constitutes republican vo­
cabulary.79 80
These critical contentions go beyond mere convention. They are based -  or so I 
claim -  on textual evidence, including interpretations of the projects of authors, of 
distinct arguments forwarded, and of the meaning and reference of key concepts. 
Against Pocock, for instance, I point out the existence, in prominent places, of in­
strumental arguments about the fragility of liberty which, following his representa­
tion, should not have been there. Hence, what follows is also reconstructive in a 
second sense of rectifying what 1 contend are faulty representations of certain 
authors.81
Fifthly, the heart of my reconstruction is the idea that liberty -  understood it­
self as a core (surrounded by a historical variety of further content) ‘negative’ value 
of mutually (legally and socially) guaranteed and defined security and inviolability 
of person and possessions, and some equally defined space of free action -  is a 
fragile and non-natural common good, and that its existence and enjoyment re­
quires continuous civic intervention and activity. Around this core I have come to 
see82 four different, related dimensions of argument which have already been noted
79. See Chapter 8, section 5.1
80. Pettit’s work is discussed in Chapter 7, section 3.
81. There is a third sense in which this thesis is reconstructive. Apart from the 
deductive V-constructwe') and critical (‘re-j aspects. Chapter 8 is an attempt to 
systematise, in a manner which deliberately abstracts from historical references, 
the range, variety, and internal tensions of the tradition as a whole -  ‘presenting’ it 
as a theoretical space for argument for contemporary use. However, the thesis 
contains very little reconstruction in the sense of attempts to develop a positive 
contemporary ‘theory’ of republicanism.
82. My reconstruction is also inductive -  or whatever terms one may use to de­
scribe the manner in which I gradually decided the fruitfulness of distinguishing 
four different dimensions of that core argument which was noted by Skinner (origi­
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above and which will be developed at great length in Chapter 8. These internally 
diversified dimensions are connected as different elements or aspects of the same 
idea of fragility, at times intimately, often through the slightly varying employment 
of the same concepts, and usually all of them present in each of the authors, al­
though with varying emphasis.
They are not inseparably linked. Some authors may not stress that liberty is 
fragile on one or two of these dimensions -  for instance it is possible to think that 
the content of libertas is given but that political structures still require to be de­
fended (Harrington). It is possible to think that libertas does require continued le- 
gitimisation, but that patriotic sentiment can be counted on as a matter of habitual 
allegiance (Madison). In this sense we may also say -  strictly relative to my theo­
retical definition of the tradition of course -  that some authors are more republican 
than others. Such 'degrees* of republicanism may also, for what it is worth, be a 
way to denote the fact that Madison’s place for civic virtue, compared to Jefferson’s 
or Paine’s, was actually quite small (how small is a matter of debate). Finally, we 
may speak of different 'generations’ of republican arguments inside each dimen­
sion, as they were continuously restated Inside new historical contexts and in the 
vicinity of competing frames of discourse, both of which obliged authors to inno­
vate. To anticipate, Ferguson and Tocqueville in each their way restated republican 
arguments in the context of commercial civil society and theories of progress; Jef­
ferson and Paine made cases for periodic constitutional deliberation and revision in 
a context of Lockean natural rights doctrine; Madison forwarded a version of ’in­
stitutional architecture’ and social pluralism which was supplemented with virtue, 
rather than opposed to it as in Hamilton and Hume; Anti-Federalists linked Scot­
tish moral sense with ideas of rational political trust through direct forms of repre­
sentation; and more generally Anti-Federalists and Federalists debated a range of 
issues which were re-framed in the context of ‘the large republic’.
Liberalism These new and competing frames of discourse which emerged in the 
Enlightenment -  discussed at length in Chapter 4 -  is a different and much more 
pluralistic way of speaking of those 'liberal’ challenges which met the republican 
tradition. To repeat, there is no attempt to speak of liberalism as a competing tradi­
tion. The thesis hardly avoids entirely that bipolarity of ideas which structures the 
literature, but it should be stressed that ‘liberalism’, 'early liberalism’ and other 
terms denote amalgams of doctrines which, apart from a shared commitment to 
negative liberty, are highly diversified in manners both too complex and too obvious
nally I operated with three), and in the way that my readings of the texts gradually 
provided each dimension with Its varied content. Hence the legitimacy of not plac­
ing Chapter 8 before the historical chapters.
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to discuss here.83 What further unites them is only that they constitute challenges, 
more or less expressly, in various ways, and on various dimensions, to republican 
arguments.
Republican arguments on each dimension were capable of a much higher de­
gree and variety of reformulation inside each of these languages, in the face of each 
conceptual challenge, than has been customarily assumed. Against Pocock as well 
as Skinner I argue -  not so much methodologically as by way of textual examples -  
that republican arguments survived in recognisable forms in a wide range of con­
ceptual circumstances because both republican discourse and the several dis­
courses it encountered through history were very flexible indeed. But they were not 
endlessly flexible:
The republican moment comes completely to rest to the extent that some ver­
sions of the new discourses become influential. ‘Liberalism* becomes victorious 
when -  or to the extent - that the very idea that libertas is an artificial and precari­
ous achievement of co-operative, politically virtuous citizens disappears. It does so, 
for instance, when an institutionalist political science of checks and balances be­
comes seriously advocated which is thought to render civic virtue superfluous. It 
does so when the justificatory appeal to the inalienable equal status and ‘rights' of 
man before his God becomes disassociated from the contingencies of political 
struggle, and when the language of consent becomes married to a rationalist deri­
vation of a finite set of universal rights. Again, it does so when the gradual accep­
tance that the liberty o f citizens may be employed to pursue their religious callings, 
their personal fulfilment, or their craving for material comfort become completely 
dissociated from republican conceptions of virtue, let alone where such virtue be­
comes seen as the problem rather than the solution. And finally, it does so when 
conceptions of the very temporal contingency of political orders, and of the frailty 
and constant inadequacy of human resolve to sustain such orders, evaporate and 
disappear in Enlightenment narratives of human progress and perfectibility. I de­
velop these matters in great detail, discussing the various parameters o f decline for 
each dimension of republicanism in Chapter 8.
Because the dilution of republican themes was a gradual process -  one may 
remember Madison's idea of ‘economising’ with virtue -  and because of the fact that 
the several aspects o f the republican argument were not logically inseparable It is 
obviously the case that the designation of names to one ‘camp’ rather than another 
is often difficult. At any rate, and to repeat, such a historical division is not my in­
tention, and my approach is not committed to theoretical views of discourse which 
presuppose such one-dimensionality of authorial intent.
83. See for a recent discussion Dagger (1997).
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8. Outline of the Thesis
After this Introduction follow five chapters of history of ideas. Chapters 2-6 contain 
short readings of all the main figures in the republican tradition. Chapter 2 starts 
with a preliminary statement of some points of interpretation, including the role of 
the Pocockian heritage, and a discussion of the first three stages of republican 
history of ideas. Here, I seek to rehabilitate a more political Aristotle: the connec­
tion between Aristotle's ontological ethics of human development and his ideas of 
justice, friendship, and constitutionalism is poorly understood. Politics is not in 
fact the vehicle or locus of a teleology of virtue, as much as a proto-republican, 
prudential science of establishing and maintaining political communities based on 
a common advantage in security and lawfulness - as a precondition for a virtuous 
‘private’ life. Following the research of Mogens Hansen,841 reflect on the significant 
existence of both a ’positive’ and a ‘negative’ idea of liberty in Greece. The second, 
Roman, stage is Cicero’s classical and immensely influential formulation of libertas. 
The third is the Italian Renaissance, with Guicciardini and - above all - Machiavelli, 
the latter introducing a lasting realist concern with power and conflict.
Chapter 3 first discusses the significant British republican tradition - Harring­
ton, Sidney, and Trenchard and Gordon (authors of Cato's Letters) - whose work 
was also a key channel for the transmission of republican discourse to America. 
Here, the republican argument becomes associated with natural rights discourse 
and, as also in Montesquieu, with commerce. After this, I look at Montesquieu’s 
modernisation of republicanism in the context of the rising modem absolutist 
state. Finally, I discuss Rousseau’s clearheaded fanaticism, and the attempt to re­
vitalise a Spartan republic based on martial fervour and rural simplicity. Rousseau 
stands out as an example of the scope of republican ambiguities - liberty being 
Jeopardised by the means needed to secure It.
Chapter 4 is a systematic examination of the fields of controversy in the en­
counter between republicanism and the proto-liberal discourse of the English and 
Scottish Enlightenment. Natural rights, interest and institutional architecture, 
commercial and ‘polite’ society, progress, and moral sense were key categories in 
the challenge of the fragility of liberty argument by Locke and, above all, by Hume, 
but also in the defence and restatement of the theme by republicans, including 
Ferguson. Also, I emphasise the work of Thomas Paine and Thomas Reid as further 
important transmitters of republican discourse across the Atlantic.
In Chapter 5 ,1 go on to offer a pointed reconstruction of the themes of the con­
stitutional debate in America. The work of various Anti-Federalist writers, Jeffer­
son, and the authors of The Federalist Papers form comers of a discursive triangle. 
Typical positions may be found here, on the problem of having virtue and securing 
it in a large republic; on determining the political level for securing libertas; on the
84. Hansen (1991).
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dangers or promises of a rural, commercial, or industrial economy; on the possibil­
ity of a legislative science, economising on virtue; and on federal constitution 
building as a distinct form of contingent and democratic political deliberation. Cut­
ting (comers) through an immense literature, my message is that participants to 
this debate disagreed very little about ends, but much about means.
Finally, in Chapter 6, the work of Tocqueville is interpreted as an implicit cri­
tique of the illusions of American liberalism, including the hopes placed in consti­
tutional architecture and the private virtue of a market-based civil society. 
Tocqueville formulated a republicanism for modem, democratic society where the 
very condition of enjoying equal liberty in several ways was both a danger to this 
liberty and, at least in America, harboured the potential for alleviating this danger.
After these historical chapters Chapter 7 clears the way for a synthesis by dis­
cussing and dismissing four influential but mistaken representations of the ration­
ale of the republican tradition. In the context of answering the question of the dif­
ference between republicanism and liberalism, I also confront here the very impor­
tant but, I believe, problematical representation of republicanism as a doctrine of 
‘resilient liberty’, proposed by Phillip Pettit.
Chapter 8, the heart of the thesis, contains my condensed proposal to view re­
publicanism as an argument about the fragility o f liberty. Its four dimensions - arti­
fice, space, political autonomy, solidarity/patriotism - are developed in some detail, 
with references back to individual republican figures. This is also the place for a 
further specification of exactly which historical developments in liberalism (or ‘lib­
eralism’) constitute points of disagreement between the two traditions.
In the Conclusion, I draw together the main claims of the thesis. I also return 
to the question o f the relevance of republicanism as an empirical challenge to politi­
cal theory. Related to this, I look at whether the republican challenge to liberalism 
is a serious one for liberals, and Rawlsians in particular. I conclude that it is.
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Chapter 2:
Inventing the Res Publica
1. Introduction
Since the publishing of J.G.A. Pocock’s magisterial The Machiavellian Moment and 
the early debates it triggered, republicanism, civic humanism, and classical repub­
licanism have come to live their own life as academic buzz-words. In much the 
same manner as community, civil society, and recently citizenship, the terms have 
an aura of generously encompassing vagueness and commendability. Republican­
ism is all somehow about Joyful participation in the things of the polis, tinged with 
nostalgia for the moral clarity of times long gone.
But although a number of authors through history have used the vocabulary of 
res publico, virtue, corruption, and liberty to denote somewhat different things in 
rather different historical contexts, it still makes sense to speak of a family resem­
blance between them. This resemblance is constituted by a single, fairly clear and 
common-sensical argument, about the connection between civic virtue and civic 
activity, and the common liberty of citizens. I am claiming that this prima facie ar­
gument for citizens' participation in political affairs is the heartland of republican 
theoretical history. I further claim that the republican tradition has been burdened 
with well meaning friends seeking to enlist it in projects alien to its main concerns. 
Pocock, for all his brilliance, is one of them. Thus, disentangling republicanism 
from other creeds has become a pressing task. I see no other way of doing so, and 
of claiming with any confidence that one meaning of republicanism is any more 
right than any other, than engaging the historical sources.
I start with a brief outline of what is the matter with the extremely influential 
picture of republicanism which is presented by Pocock. After this, I seek to recon­
struct a more viable picture of the republican tradition, starting in this chapter 
with the invention of the republican problématique in Greece, and continuing with 
Rome and the Italian Renaissance. I do not try to trace exact lines of influence or 
points of synthesis and revision of any of the key concepts and segments of politi­
cal discourse. Instead, I aim at a pointed and didactic exposition of what I consider 
to be the defining argument of a distinct tradition of political thought. It tries to 
crystallise and highlight what, often in the nature of things, is overlaid in the works 
of historians of ideas by several layers of scholarly analysis of textual detail. This 
core, briefly, is about what 1 have chosen to call the fragility of liberty. 'Liberty' is 
the legally constituted and mutually recognised status of equal citizens that en­
ables them to live in freedom and security in a state. And ‘fragility* refers to the re­
quired measures to sustain and protect this liberty through time, in particular 
such that have to do with the instillment and exercise of civic virtue.
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The former idea is not my personal discovery. It has been highlighted in a se­
ries of articles and books by Quentin Skinner, particularly in relation to Machia- 
velli, and later by Maurizio Viroli, covering related historical ground and extending 
the story to the work of Rousseau.1 The claim to merit of what follows is the ambi­
tion to trace this argument in a systematic fashion all the way to the present, in a 
manner that sharpens some of the points, and also in a manner which may directly 
inform more analytical theoretical inquiry. I try to do so by looking at the great va­
riety of ways in which the problem of the fragility of liberty posed itself to thinkers 
as diverse as Machiavelli, Montesquieu, Rousseau, Jefferson, and Tocqueville. The 
problem of liberty - in what manner was it fragile, what was its significance to begin 
with, and which types of civic virtue were needed and realistically available to sus­
tain it - was different in a context of warring city-states, royal absolutism, the af­
termath of the French or the American revolution, and modem mass society, and 
from different social perspectives. The development of republican thought is seen 
as a widening of perspectives on the fragility of liberty, but also as a series of more 
or less explicit revisions or criticisms by one theorist of his predecessors. Some of 
these criticisms were directed against certain types of liberal individualism or pre- 
liberal 'passive* accounts of negative liberty and citizenship. And late republican­
isms must be appreciated in the context of, and as challenges to, various forms of 
Enlightenment universalism, strong natural law doctrines, and the use of new 
theories of beneficial political institutions, civilising ‘commerce* and ‘moral sense*. 
And this is the case, even as republican themes were progressively formulated in­
side these very theoretical contexts.
2. Representing Republicanism. Pocock and Civic Humanism
Thomas Jefferson’s famous statement that liberty is bought at the price of eternal 
vigilance represents a prudent and common-sensical attention to the manner in 
which individuals acting politically, together with others, may try to make the 
achievement of newly won common liberty lasU or to reinstall it where it has been 
lost or is in jeopardy. To Jefferson and others, such acts could also be honourable, 
worthy, educating, even at times admitting of a special time-transcending beauty. 
Yet, they would achieve this moral or existential premium as a by-product of their 
more tangible and immediate object. Hannah Arendt delightfully recounts Jeffer­
son’s mentioning of the “public happiness" of the debate on the Senate floor, ig­
noring his repeated statement o f preference for a peaceful, private life.2
The theme of the non-obviousness in historical time of the republic and the 
citizen’s security within it is present already in Aristotle and other Greek writers, 
and it is prominent in Roman writings, in particular Cicero. It receives its classical
1. Skinner (1978; 1983; 1986; 1990; 1998); Viroli (1988:1992).
2. Arendt (1973:126-27).
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formulation in the Renaissance synthesis of Greek thought on popular self- 
government with the Roman, proto-modem, individualist understanding of legal 
citizenship as libertas. And this Renaissance synthesis, in changing embodiments 
and contexts, remained as the core of later republican thought.
But this is not how republicanism is usually presented. A part of the reason for 
this is a long-standing misunderstanding, or at least highly partial understanding, 
of the ‘liberty of the ancients’. Long before Constant, Hobbes, in a famously scorn­
ful passage, noted that the participation of Athenians and Romans in popular 
commonwealths made them no more free from their many masters, than the people 
of Constantinople were free from their few. Constant also believed that the liberty of 
the ancients, and he did not distinguish much between the Greeks and the Ro­
mans, “consisted in an active and constant participation in collective power" 
whereas modem freedom consists of "peaceful enjoyment and private independ­
ence", and “enjoyment of security in private pleasures". He argued that this share 
in popular sovereignty in the small republics of ancient times indeed had a real 
significance, “the exercise of this will was a vivid and repeated pleasure", for which 
the ancients would "make many a sacrifice", in order to have an “awareness of his 
personal importance". Isaiah Berlin’s later, somewhat broader statement of the di­
chotomy also saw the Stoic "inner citadel" and Aristotelian self-government as pre­
cursors of romantic versions of “positive liberty".3 All three, in addition, thought of 
the violently arbitrary and unlawful rule of popular revolutions, whether Cromwel­
lian, Jacobit, or Bolshevik. Yet, they all overlooked the importance in Rome, Ath­
ens, and the Italian Renaissance of legal citizenship as the protection of the indi­
vidual by the walls of the city.
The oversight, I believe, had to do with the Enlightenment discovery of repre­
sentative democracy and natural individual rights, the temptation to overstate the 
radical nature of their newness, and hence the degree o f break with the ancient 
past. However, today the oversight is also connected to a tradition of interpretation 
which includes the distinguished historian of ideas, J.G.A. Pocock. This tradition 
stresses the importance of a political way of life exclusively in terms of its moral 
value in itself for those lucky enough to participate in it. The Machiavellian Moment 
in contemporary political theory and history of political ideas, is also a Pocockian 
moment. Pocock’s book synthesises, in highly sophisticated form, a view of the 
Renaissance reception and transmission of classical republican ideals and lan­
guage as primarily Aristotelian. As such, It marks the departure point for a large
3. Hobbes, Leviathan, 11,21; Constant, Liberty o f the Ancients Compared with that 
o f the Modems, Political Writings (pp.316-17). Berlin seriously misread Rousseau, 
taking him to mean by liberty "the possession by all ... of a share in the public 
power which is entitled to interfere with every aspect o f every citizen’s life", and also 
believed, at this stage of his writings, negative liberty to be “comparatively modem" 
(Berlin 1969b: 162-63,129, italics added).
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number of scholars who have sought to deepen, qualify, or refute the historical im­
portance of this picture of Aristotelian civic humanism, all however accepting the 
terms o f meaning given to them by Pocock.
Pocock, like his great predecessor in Renaissance studies, Hans Baron, is in­
deed aware of the ongoing existence of a Roman conception of legal citizenship. But 
he emphasises what, following Baron, he calls ciuic humanism, as a distinct political 
discourse which is different from a jurisprudential and philosophical one.4 Accord­
ing to Pocock, the main arguments of the Renaissance consist of ideological con­
ceptualisations of the fragility and particularity in time and space, not of common 
liberty, but of politics as a renewable, truly human way of life that equips partici­
pators with the means to address the moral health of their selves. As regards the 
ideal, if not the exact content and proper arenas, of this life, there is nothing much 
new under the sun. At stake, in The Machiavellian Moment is the possibility of 
continuing such a way of life, and the path to gloiy is to found a republic with this 
sole end in mind. We need to take a look at the paradigmatic themes introduced 
with Pocock*s rediscovery of civic humanism in order to appreciate some significant 
cross-purposes and misplaced conceptual polarities.
In Pocock’s version, the ideal of the vivere civile, and the general re-elevation of 
the vita activa over the vita contemplative^ was reasserted by Renaissance human­
ists as a response to the gradual discovery of the secular particularity of time and 
history, the modem notion “that each of the phenomena of history existed in its 
own time, in its own right and in its own way", and the departure from medieval 
belief in timeless universals and Christian eschatology. The political side to this 
was a departure from belief in “the existence among men of the hierarchical order 
existing in heaven and in nature", where change could only be conceived in linear 
teleologies of “degeneration or recovery" in the great scheme of things, and where 
“(ajffiliation with the empire ... was affiliation with the timeless". The (Florentine) 
republic, by contrast, “did not reflect by simple correspondence the eternal order of 
nature", nor was there any doubt of its secular finitude. Hence, "[tjo affirm the re­
public ... was to break up the timeless continuity of the hierarchic universe into 
particular moments: those periods of history at which republics had existed ... and 
those at which they had not". The Greek ideal of a political life, “participation and 
action in a social structure which made such conduct by the individual possible", 
was a way of rendering meaningful this particularity of time, even when it Involved 
the recognition that virtue could always only be partly realised, subject to the 
secular dangers of corruption. Culminating in Machiavelli, the principal parameters 
of political thought became stability and corruption in political institutions, and a 
re-politicised virtue came to refer to the heroic enterprise of securing the existence 
of the republic for as long as possible - in the sense of a self-reinforcing civic life. It
4. Baron (1966; 1988a); Pocock (1975:3-80).
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was in this context, too, that Polybius' and Aristotle’s doctrines of mixed govern­
ment (in contrast to natural hierarchies) were rerived, in Machiavelli as the utilisa­
tion of conflict and ambition, balancing the potentially disruptive quests for secular 
gloiy, and as the employment of natural capacities for virtue of different types of 
individuals, e.g., innovative state craft or military vigour.5
However, the contrast and incompatibility between what Pocock calls a virtue 
and a law paradigm is emphasised. The contract is laid out in an unusually explicit 
manner in a central 1981 article. Inside the “natural-law paradigm", the
individual is looked on as inhabiting a cosmos regulated by rational and 
moral principles, essential to its being, which are the nature of nomos".
To “these philosophically perceived or divinely revealed systems 
manmade bodies of jurisprudence are assimilated ... Philosophy and 
faith become modes of cognizing and acknowledging law, with the result 
that jurisprudence gives access to all but the most sublime forms of 
intellectual experience
This world view is pitted against the “civic humanist mode of discoursing about 
politics", which “entails the affirmation that homo is naturally a citizen and most 
fully himself when living in a vivere civile", According to Pocock, neither in Guicci­
ardini nor Machiavelli does the language of law appear, "least of all as a tool of 
normative political theory". Indeed, the two vocabularies are “markedly discontinu­
ous with one another because they premise different values, encounter different 
problems, and employ different strategies of speech and argument". Acknowledging 
the existence of a Jurisprudential advocacy of Italian independence from the late 
thirteenth century, as shown by Skinner, he still maintains that the libertas fa­
voured in this discourse was of an essentially negative order, relative to the libertas 
o f the republicans, and that the two remained separated. And so it remained for a 
very long time, according to Pocock. He supposed “a dialogue between the concepts 
of Virtue* and ‘right*, and between their implied postulates, to have gone on over 
some centuries in the context of a European political discourse imagined as widely 
distributed in space and relatively stable over time”. Pocock’s view of what was the 
Aristotelian discursive matrix which was picked up in the Renaissance as a pro­
gressive civic humanism is elaborated in The Machiavellian Moment Aristotle here
may be read as the originator of a body of thought about the citizen and 
his relation to the republic, and about the republic (or polls) as a 
community of values; and this is the approach which reveals its 
importance to humanists and Italian thinkers in search of means of 
vindicating the universality and stability of the vivere civile (...) the polls 
or republic was the association within which all particular associations
5. Pocock (1975:53-57); cp. Arendt (1958b; 1961).
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Ipursued their particular ends. Association with others, and participation 
in the value-oriented direction of that association, formed both a means 
to an end and an end - or good - in itself5
In the following chapters, Pocock’s argument is constantly present.
3. ‘Republicanism1 and 'Liberalism* -  A More Complicated 
Relationship
Pocock’s interpretation of republicanism as civic humanism is unfortunate for sev­
eral reasons. First of all, it is conspicuously biased towards a specific type of classi­
cist anti-modemism. Pocock admits in the central 1981 essay that he “allows his 
language to become Arendtian”. The Arendt he has in mind is the influential 
transmitter of classicist Bildung and Hellas nostalgia, of the fully human Vita Ac- 
two, untainted by the petty concerns of material interests and the private realm. 
Indeed, Pocock is
interested in the possibility that jurisprudence can be predominantly 
social, concerned with the administration of things and with human re­
lations conducted through the mediation of things, as opposed to a civic 
vocabulary of the purely political, concerned with the unmediated per­
sonal relations entailed by equality and by ruling and being ruled
But as we shall see, these ideas of Pocock, which he sees as a call through the 
centuries for “the moral stability of the human person", are only half, or less than 
half, of the picture, a serious distortion even of Aristotle’s republicanism, and cer­
tainly of that of Machiavelli and later thinkers.7
But also Pocock’s view of liberalism is peculiarly biased. He criticises the Mac- 
Pherson school of political historiography for being too partial in its sources o f 
ideological explanation, for dating the emergence of Lockean possessive individu­
alism too early, and for seeing It as historically inevitable.8 Yet, he concurs with the 
traditional Marxist identification of liberal with bourgeois, and of the language of 
natural rights and legality generally with provisions for security in acquisition, pos-
6. Pocock (1975:67, 1981a:353-6).
7. Pocock (1981a:360; 1975:550). Towards the end of The Machiavellian Moment 
Pocock summarises how, “(i)n terms borrowed from or suggested by the language o f 
Hannah Arendt, this book has told part of the story of the revival in the modem 
West of the ancient ideal of homo politicos... who affirms his being and his virtue by 
the medium of political action” (Pocock 1975:550). Pocock, I believe, somewhat 
misunderstands The Human Condition and Arendt’s work in general. Arendt was 
not really very Aristotelian, and her ‘civic humanism* was allowed its play - unruly, 
at times - only inside the broader framework of republicanism proper, to which she 
contributed. See Canovan (1992).
8. MacPherson (1962:160-93).
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session and transfer of wealth, even as he grants that this form of possessive indi­
vidualism long predates early capitalism. The problem with this liberalism and with 
the language of rights was that “because it defined the individual as rights-bearer 
and proprietor, it did not define him as possessing a personality adequate to par­
ticipation in self-rule". Indeed, because inimical to virtue, it was associated with 
moral poverty and a generally banausic way of life.9
Liberalism in the end had to accommodate civic humanism’s ideal of virtue as a 
fully human life by redefining it as manners, the infinite diversity of refinement and 
enrichment of the personality made possible by commerce, sociability, and the divi­
sion of labour. This could legitimise a liberalism of state authority guaranteeing 
"the liberty of the individual’s social behaviour, but (it) had no intention whatever 
of impoverishing that behaviour by confining it to the rigorous assertion of ego- 
centred individual rights". Yet, even this liberalism had its bad conscience, in the 
knowledge that “what was diversification for some was specialisation for others". 
Civic humanism thus, via Adam Smith’s analysis of the division of labour (and, in 
another branch, via Rousseau’s indictment of the salon) found a new embodiment 
in the early Marx’ analysis of alienation.10
Defining the intellectual territory of liberalism so narrowly leaves more space 
for civic humanism, but it also makes Pocock’s position vulnerable to criticism. As 
we shall see, such criticism has come from various authors Insisting that Locke 
and the language of individual (natural) rights remained very much alive and well. 
However, it has also led to a serious misunderstanding of the continuing language 
of civic virtue, which was not only, although this is part of the picture, a spill-over 
into terms associated with economic activity and private life. Pocock’s theoretical 
adversaries, whether Marxist or representatives of a peculiar American tradition of 
moralistic historiography, given to mourning the decline of the “soul of American 
Politics",11 share his narrow conception of liberalism and the notion that rights and 
virtue are incompatible. However, the concerns of early modem liberalism were not 
so terribly different from those of Renaissance republicanism,12 as regards their 
substantial value ideal - freedom from fear, the ability to go about one’s business in 
one’s own way, enjoying the fruits of one’s labour in peace. Nor was the language of
9. Locke, writing, as Peter Lasslett established, before The Glorious Revolution, 
was a “First Whig who never became a True Whig", whose language never con­
verged with the Commonwealth men (Pocock 1985c:229). Pocock notes that, “(I] am 
intrigued by the connection we seem to be uncovering between law, liberalism, and 
bourgeoisie (...) Civil Law ... presents us with possessive individualism in a form 
long predating early modem capitalism", and “(t)o write the history in law-centered 
terms ... is largely equivalent to writing it as the history of liberalism" (Pocock 
198 la:360-61,363).
10. Pocock (1975:51-52; 1981a:363-67).
11. AS one work criticising Pocock is entitled (Diggins 1986).
12. Shklar (1989); Tuck (1979:74).
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1individual rights initially disconnected from a moral context of obligation and mu­
tuality. What changed was primarily the analysis of the conditions favouring these 
values.
In investigating the history of ideas it is difficult to see why we could not start 
with the hypothesis that republicanism continued as a competitor to various liber­
alisms and that far from seeing a radical break, we should expect republican 
themes to overlap with them. We would expect them, then, to be discussed, dis­
missed, integrated, forgotten, or recovered because presenting an account of civic 
virtue as still necessary for the sake of private liberty, security, and property. There 
is no incoherence in a discourse which allows the satisfactions of private security 
and holds out the promise that sometimes political participation may lead to higher 
ends and higher meanings, because concerned with the greater good o f securing 
the liberty of alL Nor is it incoherent to expect patriotic practices to be held in very 
high esteem by all, even though few would wish to practice them as a way of life, 
and even, when practising them occasionally, would do so for less dignified rea­
sons.
This is the leading idea of the following pages. They do not contain a new an­
swer to when and to what extent one ideological discourse was replaced by an­
other, a language of the political good life giving way to the language of rights and 
property. The implication is that this question is wrongly put, and that a revision o f 
republican revisionism is needed. Disputes over whether or not the American revo­
lution and early history is republican or Lockean, and disputes about the degree of 
republicanism in individual writers, such as Jefferson, Madison, Smith, or even 
Locke himself, and about how far, into the English and Scottish Enlightenment for 
instance, the language of virtue may be traced, really must begin with a revision of 
the conceptual cross-purposes and prejudices that still abound, and a reconceptu­
alisation of the historical discontinuities to be studied in the first place. Increas­
ingly, commentary is questioning the incompatibility between civic humanist val­
ues, whose vast importance as a revaluation of the vita activa over the vita contem­
plative} was the important theme of Baron’s writings on the Renaissance,13 and con­
cern with legal matters. Far from existing as two independent and discontinuous 
discourses from Cicero onwards they are regularly intertwined aspects of the same 
problem.14 Even the modem revival of natural law occurred as much in conjunction 
as in conflict with post-Renaissance republicanism. Again, this is more easily visi-
13. See Baron (1988b; 1988c).
14. See, for instance, Riesenberg (1969). Unlike Pocock, Baron does not, in fact, 
reach any conclusions about incompatibility with legal language. Another classical 
account, which takes the reader from Cicero to Algernon Sydney, stresses the im­
portance of legal institutions (Fink 1962). Importantly, jurisprudential thought of 
the Renaissance was concerned with civil, more than natural law, and with the 
conditions of creating it. Justice and liberty, for secular purposes, was a thing of
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ble when resisting the prejudice that natural rights represent an intensely indi­
vidualistic and ‘possessive’ liberalism which simply could not have a deeper his­
torical or psychological insight into either the moral texture of the person or the 
nature of political institutions.15 Finally, the advent of commercial society and po­
litical economy, while seriously challenging republican world views, also produced 
the setting for a new republican analysis of liberty and civic virtue under modem 
conditions.
So, to anticipate, the fault lines between ‘republicanism' and ‘liberalism’ are 
blurred. Distinguishing between civic humanism and republicanism (or between 
early or classical republicanism and modem republicanism) does not really help, if 
the contemplation of Baron’s civic vocabulary of the virtuous and worthy man 
comes to imply that any important political discourse of institutions and republi­
can ways of life ever existed which was exclusively about the cultivation of such 
virtue. Noting how republicanism becomes more and more ‘liberal’ may be useful, 
when we talk about how the austerity and martial nature of political virtue 
changed, or how republicanism became reconceived in the context of a civil society 
based on commerce, or how libertas became reformulated in the language of com­
prehensive individual (natural) rights. But, again, it does not help if the exercise, 
comes to suggest that it was ever about anything else but a species of negative lib­
erty.16
The questions to be asked in order to trace discontinuities that matter are not 
about when and how republican discourse was diluted with individual natural 
rights or the acceptance of commerce. Instead, they concern when and how the 
language of virtuous citizenship became associated with the dangers of passion 
and social disruption. Or, with the advent of capitalism, they are about when and 
how the republican problematic was given essentially new answers that denied the 
importance even of a residually defined political virtue. This happened when virtue 
became privatised and marketised, conceived in terms of beneficially pacifying or 
moralising effects of market behaviour or even in terms of the public benefits of 
private vice, or, finally, in terms of the development of pluralism, civility, and taste 
in society. They also concern new evaluations of the role of a proper architecture of 
political institutions checking concentrations of power in civil society, and the pos­
sible point where such institutional engineering completely parted company with 
the notion that even the best of artifices requires citizens to support it. Above all, 
they concern when, how, and to what extent the very argument about the temporal
the city, not derived from a natural order (Tuck 1979:40).
15. Haakonssen notes that in "Locke, Montesquieu, Rousseau, Price, most of the 
Scottish Enlightenment thinkers and the American founders ... elements from both 
traditions go hand in hand" (Haakonssen 1993:570-71: cp. Haakonssen 1991). 
More generally, see Shapiro (1990:166-203).
16. Isaac (1988:350-55); Burtt (1992:3-9); Sinopoli (1992:3-15).
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precariousness of political communities was forgotten, because such communities 
came to be seen, in various theories of progress, as products of an economic- 
material evolution conditioning specific social and juridical forms, or as products of 
human reason and reasonableness benignly shaping the course of history. Repub­
licanism was seriously absent to the extent that political discourse came to be con­
ducted in a self-sufficient language of justification, of rationalist derivation of rights 
and state legitimacy in abstraction from an empirically based theory of their secu­
lar foundation in popular sovereignty and a political community, let alone from the 
moral notion that rights might bear some relation to non-trivial obligations to a 
specific community.
Judging the relative ideological impact of the republican or the ‘liberal’ moments 
at any specific point is history is difficult and not of first importance here. As noted 
in the Introduction, I am indeed suggesting that we view this encounter as a series 
of conceptually mediated disputes regarding more or less converging aspects and 
argumentative figures of political thought, which are typically associated with, or 
develop into something associated with ways in which we use the term ‘liberalism’. 
Again, we shall be concerned with presences and differences, the detail and diver­
sity of republican arguments throughout history as it meets a variety of implicit or 
explicit counter arguments.
4. The Classical Departure
The republican argument receives a very clear formulation in the Renaissance, and 
most obviously in the work of Machiavelli. But it has classical roots, insofar as the 
most general idea of the political community as a co-operative enterprise for the 
sake of common security is clearly visible in both Aristotle and Cicero. Both Greek 
and Roman political thought are rich universes, often difficult to access, and each 
has given rise to a wealth of interpretations. Even so, it is my contention in the 
what follows that each of these universes are not as entirely alien as often pre­
sumed, and that central authors in each their historical contexts make recognis­
able claims which tend to get lost in much commentary. Above all, and to antici­
pate, neither Greek nor Ciceronian republicanism were species of a ‘neo- 
Aristotelian’ communitarianism.
4.1 Athens. The Classical Conception o f  the Polis
Let us start with ancient Greece, and more particularly the Athenian Polis. Here, 
one of history’s very first recognisably democratic systems was installed by Solon 
and developed and refined in the following centuries. The primacy o f politics in this 
political way of life has often been described in terms of the importance of an ago­
nal quest for recognition and fame. Paul A. Rahe, citing a number of classical 
sources, insists on the alien character to a modem mind o f their concern with hon­
ourable and self-sacrificing action and their corresponding contempt for material 
gratification and privacy. The fear of exile, for instance, was not primarily motivated
by its physical insecurity and lawlessness, but by one’s being unable to hear the 
herald calling the citizens to the assembly, unable to speak and act in the company 
of equals.
This is the Arendt story of politics. Or rather, it is the version of The Human 
Condition as this work is usually read. At stake here is the existence of a public 
space where individual and authentic actions could be performed, seen, judged ac­
cording to uniqueness or greatness, and remembered through the centuries, thus 
bestowing immortality on the ‘doers of deeds and speakers of words*. Or, if the ex­
istential-heroic gloss is replaced by an emphasis on a clearly defined moral cosmos 
of duties and obligations, it is also MacIntyre’s and Sandel’s story of politics. Rahe 
goes on to insist - using heavy artillery to drive home a not unfamiliar point - that, 
“no Greek thinker ... ever elaborated a public-spirited political philosophy grounded 
in liberal principles".17
However, there is reason to doubt whether the secure enjoyment of material se­
curity and personal liberty was of so little significance after all, even in a culture 
where a happy life, for male citizens, was lived inside boundaries of cultural 
meaning whose comprehensiveness is alien to modems. Rahe cites an illuminating 
exchange from Xenophon between Socrates and Aristippus, where the former ridi­
cules the latter’s longing for a peaceful and easy life, enjoying an unpolitical liberty 
{eleutheria) between slavery and rule. Socrates attacks the idea of pleasure for its 
own sake and the failure to be concerned with the good of the community, and 
points out that even the enjoyment of material pleasures loses its value in the ab­
sence of the esteem of one’s fellows and knowledge of own achievement. But Rahe’s 
reading of the passage misses important points: Socrates rhetorically asks Aristip­
pus whether he wants to belong to the class of the ruled as he has no taste for the 
sacrifices of ruling, and the following exchange takes place:
“Nay," replied Aristippus, “for my part I am no candidate for slavery; but 
there is, as I hold, a middle path in which I am fain to walk. That way 
leads neither through rule nor slavery, but through liberty, which is the 
royal road to happiness." “Ah," said Socrates, “if only that path can avoid 
the world as well as rule and slavery, there may be something in what 
you say. But, since you are in the world, if you intend neither to rule nor 
to be ruled, and do not choose to truckle to the rulers -  I think you must 
see that the stronger have a way of making the weaker rue their lot both
17. Arendt (1958b; 1977:30-35); Robinson (1995); MacIntyre (1985:121-45); Rahe 
(1992:48); Riesenberg (1992:3-55). Greek democracy meant that up to one fifth of 
the free citizen population at a time (which did not include women, slaves, or for­
eigners) would take part at the assembly meetings (taking place monthly or more 
often) and to an equally impressive extent in popular jury duties, in public delib­
erations and decisions about common affair. For details, see Hansen (1991). For a 
good short description, see Homblower (1992).
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Lin public and in private life, and treating them like slaves (...) [I]n private 
life do not [also] brave and mighty men enslave and plunder the 
cowardly and feeble folk?"18
Rahe suggests that the Greeks had not yet understood the possibility of Aristippus* 
middle path. But the point seems to be that whereas Socrates and others could 
certainly conceive of such liberty, they held it to be practically impossible to ob­
tain. ^
If we abstract for a moment from the testimony of Greek thought and look at 
the historical context, including the geo-political condition of a small rural society 
progressively growing more prosperous through imperialism, the more striking fact 
is the invention of a new type of collective, cooperative security. In such surround­
ings, personal security could only be enjoyed in strict adherence to the common 
good of national survival and under the condition of induced propensities, through 
religion, education, and a structure of motivation and sanction based on shame 
and honour, to suffer sacrifice and hardship. Such an armed barrack existence, 
apart from being sweet-ened with the possibility of fame and recognition, still en­
tailed equal protection under law. and was surely better than the serfdom and des­
potism suffered by the peasant population of Ithaca before Solon. In the words of 
Xenophon’s Socrates, responding to his obstinate interlocutor who sees no differ­
ence between the voluntary hardship enjoyed by the virtuous ruler and that of the 
ruled:
“What, Aristippus," exclaimed Socrates, "don’t you think that there’s just 
this difference between these voluntary and involuntary sufferings, that 
if you bear hunger og thirst willingly, you can eat, drink, or what not, 
when you choose, whereas compulsory suffering is not to be ended at 
will?"20
While Athens was very far from providing anything like modem freedom rights, 
popular participation was not just a question of honour and fame. The remote 
Greek experience is too easily assimilated to romantic modem ideas if we fail to 
recognise polis institutions as a system of government with an instrumental pur­
pose which was so important that assembly attendance was paid. This purpose in­
cluded control with leaders, impeachment of unsuccessful generals, passing of 
laws about economical, religious, and military affairs, decisions about the granting 
of citizenship status, the rare ostracism or worse o f those, like Socrates, perceived 
to threaten the morals of the city, and economic measures to distribute wealth to |
citizens in need. Some of this is alien and unpleasant to a modem mind (and cer- 1i
t
__________________________  i
18. Xenophon, Memorabilia, II,i, 11-13.
19. Rahe (1992:1,36).
20. X e n o n h o n . Memorabilia, l l . i .1 8 .
tainly far from later day communitarianism).21 But it also describes a political real­
ity whose rational and causal structure we do not have to leap into an entirely dif­
ferent moral universe to understand.22
In recent years ancient Greece scholarship has seen a number of revisionist 
interpretations. The work of Mogens H. Hansen deserves particular attention.23 
Hansen dismisses a number of traditional views that overstate the contrast be­
tween Greek and modem conceptions of politics. It is not true that the Greek city 
state was a total fusion of state and society. The polis was a political structure - 
political institutions and constitutions, the variety of which was famously studied by 
Aristotle - which, while having religious elements, was in principle secular. And. in 
contrast to later Italian city states, it was not based on an economic structure of 
guilds.24 But most significantly, Hansen demonstrates two things. First, he recon­
structs the existence of liberty and equality as a conceptual pair, tied to the ideol­
ogy of democracy, but understandable by all Greeks, whose meanings are not so far 
from modem imaginations after all. Secondly, he shows the systematically different 
evaluations of these values by democratic ideologues and more conservative phi­
losophers, including Aristotle,
Liberty, or eleutheria, had both negative and positive aspects. First, it could 
mean the status, in a society, of not being a slave (i.e., a status shared by metics). 
Secondly, it could mean the freedom of a specific polis, i.e., vis-à-vis potential for­
eign invaders. Thirdly, and most importantly, it was a constitutional concept which 
had to do "both with political participation in the public sphere and with personal 
freedom in the private sphere".25
Contrary to received views in political theory and history of ideas, Greek 
eleutheria entailed codified legal restrictions on state trespassings on citizens and 
on citizens’ conduct towards one-another in a number of areas, including the pro­
tection of person, property, the home, and freedom of speech. The often noted ‘fail­
ure* of the Greeks to distinguish between public and private and to show concern 
for the inviolability of the latter is also a somewhat mistaken interpretation. While 
the ‘private’ affairs of the oikos were less the affairs of the inviolable individual 
(certainly not women, children, or slaves) than the affairs of family life and busi­
ness, Hansen shows that the polis only regulated a limited number of activities. A
21. On this point, see Phillips (1993:122-48).
22. As suggested by MacIntyre (1985:126-30).
23. In particular Hansen (1991).
24. Hansen (1991:64).
25. Hansen (1991:76). Aristotle himself stated that "'Ruling and being ruled in 
turn’ is one element in liberty ... one which all democrats make a definitive princi­
ple of their constitution. Another is to live as you like. For this, they say, is a func­
tion of being free, since its opposite, living not as you like, is the function o f one 
enslaved ... {F)rom it has come the ideal of ‘not being ruled*. Not by anyone at all if 
possible, or at least only in alternation" (Aristotle, The Politics, 1317a40-bl6).
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Adifference to modem liberal democracy and, as a matter of emphasis, to Roman lib- 
ertas, may have been a certain volatility in private “rights’. Even inside relatively 
stable constitutional frameworks and various institutional safeguards, they may 
have been subject to some vacillation of popular opinion and to the power of rheto­
ric in the assembly. But even here modem receptions are likely to be biased by the 
anti-democratic sentiments of Aristotle and Plato.26
Equality in Athens was essentially the political equality of status enjoyed by 
citizens. It was primarily constituted, according to Hansen, as the equality of op­
portunity to speak in the assembly. As in modem liberalism, the two values of 
equality and liberty often came to converge as "equality o f liberty".27 Thus, whereas 
isonomia and, more important according to Hansen, the more specific isegoria (the 
equal right to speech in public assembly) corresponded to aspects of constitutional 
liberty in its participatoiy aspect, also privacy-freedom was equal.28
Liberty and equality as democratic values were comprehended by all Athenians. 
But they were also contested values. The democrats claimed that only democracies 
were characterised by the rule o f law and its protection of the (equal) liberty of the 
citizens.29 On the other hand, moderates like Aristotle tried to depict liberty, or at 
least the democratic conception hereof, as unrestrained license.30 In a similar vein, 
reminding us of Burke’s (mis)rendering of the Jacobin rights of man and citizen, 
equality was imputed to mean a postulated natural equality which ought to trans­
late to equality in all matters of life, or to mean that the authority of age or wisdom 
would not be respected. However, the democrats really saw it as an opportunity 
concept which also served as a basis for that agonal, competitive spirit which re­
mained central to the polis culture.3*
Hansen's discussion of the various aspects of liberty and equality in Athens is 
extremely important. But his account does not quite take the last step to note that 
one aspect of liberty, i.e., political and participatory liberty as well as the general 
liberty (from invaders) of the polis, as secured by patriotic citizens, was conceived 
as instrumental to the enjoyment of another, i.e., the enjoyment of private liberty.32
26. Hansen (1991:76-81).
27. Hansen (1991:81).
28. Also, according to Raaflaub, intrinsic to eleutheria was not only “Gleichwertig­
keit jeder Stimme der Beschlussfassung und ... das Recht der freien Meinung­
säusserung" but also the “auf den geschribenen und deshalb allgemeinverbindli­
chen Gesetzen beruhende Rechtsgleichheit." Indeed, “Id]ass der Geringe, wenn er 
im Recht ist, gegen den Grossen aufzukommen vermag, auch dass ist Freiheit" 
(Raaflaub 1984:544-45).
29. Hansen (1991:74).
30. Aristotle, Politics, 1310a22-39.
31. Hansen (1991:81-85).
32. However, according to Raaflaub, the Greek concept of liberty or freedom, 
eleutheria, while clearly different from the Roman libertas, arose from early 
democratic conviction “dass die ‘Herrschaft der Wenigen*. Sklaverei für die Vielen
We noted the theme in Xenophon, but it is visible also in one of the most famous 
classical sources, Thucydides* rendering of Pericles’ funeral speech:
Our constitution is called a democracy because power is in the hands 
not of a minority but of the whole people. When it is a question of set­
tling private disputes, everyone is equal before the law; when it is a 
question of putting one person before another in positions of public re­
sponsibility, what counts is... the actual ability which the man possesses 
... And just as our political life is free and open, so is our day-to-day life 
in our relations with each other. We do not get into a state with our next- 
door neighbour if he enjoys himself in his own way (...). When our work 
is over, we ... enjoy all kinds of recreation for our spirits ... in our homes 
we find a beauty and a good taste which delights us every day and drives 
away our cares. Then the greatness of our city brings it about that all 
good things from all over the world flow in to us (...) This, then, is the 
kind of city for which these men, who could not bear the thought of los­
ing her, nobly fought and nobly died ... it was the courage and gallantry 
of these men, and of people like them, which made her splendid (...)
Make up your minds that happiness depends on being free, and freedom 
depends on being courageous33
The nature of this democratic ideological discourse of fourth century Athens, and 
the contestation of the values of democracy in general, seems to have been some­
what lost to us, although no particular force of hermeneutical imagination is re­
quired to appreciate it. It seems obvious that Greek political thought was habitually 
concerned with categories of value many of which, if by no means all, were also 
those of the modems, and that chief among them were conceptions o f legal citizen­
ship rights, protection of privacy, and general welfare.
But internal differences are illuminating. Hansen claims that eleutheria in the 
specific democratic and constitutional sense was dismissed by aristocrats and oli­
garchs.34 However, an early, more generic conception of what came to be called lib­
ertas by the Romans was more widely shared, also by Aristotle. Whereas the latter 
disagreed with the democratic ideal of equal liberty (for what he stressed were une­
qual individuals), we shall see that he was centrally concerned with constitutional 
arrangements, conceptions of justice, and notions of political community that place
bedeute und das deshalb Freiheit für die Vielen nur durch beharrliches Festhalten 
and der direkten Regierungsbeteiligung (was damals mit Herrschaftsinhabe 
gleichgesetzt wurde) zu bewahren sei. Der demokratische Freiheitsbegriff Athens 
war deshalb notwendigerweise auf die aktive Beteiligung aller Bürger an der 
politischen Mitbestimmung fixiert” (Raaflaub 1984:544-45).
33. Thucydides, History o f the Pelopponnesian Wdr.II.37-43.
34. Hansen (1991:76).
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him at the beginning of the republican tradition. As we proceed to examine Aris­
totle’s thought, it is, however, worth remembering that his was the more moderate 
and conservative voice in a dialogue which also had a radical, democratic partici­
pant. Differences certainly concerned the nature of common liberty. But they were 
also, in a way which started a lasting radical-versus-conservative republican dia­
lectic, about the manner in which such common liberty was best secured. Against 
the democratic ideology of political equality in self-government, Aristotle expressed 
the aristocratic fear of democracy as mob rule and stressed the idea of the mixed 
regime which, historically and in terms of influence on the early republican tradi­
tion, was to carry the day.
4.2. A  More Political Aristotle
Rahe advises us to look up the classics themselves rather than later day historians, 
and has in mind Aristotle in particular.35 But there is reason to question the tradi­
tional way of approaching this author and his dictum about man as a ‘political’ 
animal. We need to appreciate that what he had to say makes sense, not only in 
terms o f an ethics of substantia] virtues and the good life (the existence of which is 
obvious), but also in terms of the political condition of the time - particularly in 
terms of the political significance of democracy and other forms of government.
The typical renderings of Aristotle36 share the interpretation of politics as the 
only truly human way of life (in Pocock, via Arendt, a way of life which transcends 
necessity and allows ‘freedom’). It is a medium for the pursuit of excellence and the 
common enactment of substantial virtues. Politics and ethics are intertwined so 
that the point o f politics is to promote the good life, and to do so directly and in an 
integrated manner: indeed politics, when it goes well, is an end in itself, and the 
polis is an entity with a telos of shared human virtue. As a troubling parenthesis, if 
it takes an ideal city to produce virtuous individuals, Aristotle’s political writings 
and his sobering reflections on the conditions of the best regime would seem to be 
a council for utter despair. In fact, most commentary on the integrated Aristotelian 
politics and ethics subordinates the former to the latter, largely ignoring the severe 
political constraints on the actualisation of even remotely ideal conditions for eth­
ics.37
35. Rahe (1992:29.34-35).
36. Sabine (1973:102); MacIntyre (1985:146-64); Pocock (1975:66-76); Nelson 
(1996: 53-67).
37. However, in the fourth book of the Politics, Aristotle dismisses, for practical 
purposes, the utopian contemplation both of the absolutely ideal state, and of the 
best in the circumstances. He is perfectly ready to inquire into the conditions of an 
existing constitution, “both how it could come into being, and how once in being it 
may last longest“, and its piecemeal and popularly approved improvement, i.e., “the 
introduction of a system which the people will be easily persuaded to accept, and 
will easily be able to bring in. starting from the system they actually have" (Aris­
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Against this, Bernard Yack has recently presented a more political reading in a 
quite remarkable and tightly argued book. I cannot discuss its exegetical details 
here, but the overall picture is compelling. Yack concludes that Aristotle's ideas 
about politics “have been obscured by overly romantic and moralistic interpreta­
tions":38
In Aristotle’s conception, political community is instrumental to the good life 
and virtue rather than an integral part of it. It is often ignored that community 
(kofnonikon) is a generic term used to refer to social groups generally, including 
business groups and religious groups. Such groups are composed of significantly 
different individuals who are bound to each other, not in terms of a collective iden­
tity, but in terms of things (interests, goods, activities) that they share and cooper­
ate about. Members of a certain type of community may indeed share an important 
part of their identity which predisposes them, in some cases, to have special con­
cern for each other. But communities are not, as was perhaps more the case in the 
Platonic ideal state, criticised for this reason by Aristotle, closed systems of rules, 
and individuals are not constituted by their communities to the extent that its par­
ticular common good determines their behaviour.39 Rather, different individuals 
may have a stable idea of *who’ people like themselves are, and still experience 
conflicts, mistrust, or envy. And for this reason, all communities require their dif­
ferent forms of friendship [philidj and justice.40
So, too, do political communities. Neither Athens nor any of the smaller city- 
states were small and homogeneous enough to be face-to-face societies, and there 
was no question of individuals measuring and interpreting the value of their own 
existence in terms of the collective life or moral telos of the poiis. Aristotle is quite 
clear about what were also historical facts, namely that joining together heteroge­
neous individuals, households and villages in a larger community facilitated a more 
secure and self-sufficient way of life, and that such tangible objectives were the ori­
gin of the poiis (even as it also became the condition for the good life or human 
flourishing).41 The phUia peculiar to political communities, distorted by contempo-
totle, Politics, 1288b).
38. Yack (1993:281). I draw a great deal on Yack’s account in the following.
39. Plato’s views about unity in the state, and the virtues of plurality, are dis­
cussed by Aristotle in Politics (1260b27-1262b36).
40. “[I]n every community there is supposed to be some kind of Justice and also 
some friendly feeling. At any rate people address those who are on the same ship or 
serving in the same force with them as friends; and similarly those with whom they 
are otherwise associated. But the term of the friendship is that of the association, 
for so also is the term of their form o f justice’’ (Aristotle. The Nicomachean Elthics, 
1159b24-30).
41. “[WJhile the state came about as a means of securing life itself, it continues in 
being to secure the good life" (Aristotle, Politics, 1252b29-30); and “[political asso­
ciations ... are believed to have been originally formed and to continue in being for
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rary commentators,42 is far from either brotherhood or family ties, let alone com­
radeship in virtue. Unlike the perfect friendship based on goodness between good 
men, i.e., virtue friendships, political friendship is a species based on common ad­
vantage, classified along with that of fellow-voyagers and friendship with foreigners 
(with whom one may conduct trade). And this is so even in perfect political friend­
ships, whose homonoia, or ‘concord’ is still only an agreement between good men 
about what best secures common advantage.43
This does not mean that such friendship is necessarily as fragile and fleeting as 
the momentary trust of a business transaction. The common advantages of political 
community are more like a shared fate, essential goods of a long-term nature, the 
appreciation of which is likely to strengthen mutual concerns, even propensity to 
sacrifice, not unlike a Tocquevillean self-interest ‘rightly understood’. Moreover, 
justice, which is the second major social bond in all communities (but which is an 
acquired disposition emerging from practice and actual interaction, rather than 
naturally forthcoming), may help. Political justice is the formalised and institution-
the sake of advantage, for it is this that lawgivers have as their object, and people 
say that what is to the common advantage is just" (Aristotle, Ethics, 1160a 10-13).
42. MacIntyre (1985:155-59).
43. Aristotle, Ethics (116 lb  15-16), and even more clearly, in the Eudemian Ethics 
(1242-1243a). For instance, “in the household (oikia) are first found the origins and 
springs of friendship, of political organisation and of justice” (Eudemian Ethics, 
1242a9). Aristotle also notes the distinction, among civic friendships, between 
those that are legal and those that are moral in which latter "recriminations most 
occur, the reason being that it is contrary to nature” (Eudemian Ethics, 1242b 17. 
italics added). Also, when the passage about how ”[f]iiendship also seems to be the 
bond that holds communities together, and lawgivers seem to attach more impor­
tance to it than justice”, may be read to mean, contra modem liberalism, that states 
need strong emotional bonds as well as neutral institutions and laws, it must be 
noted that this friendship is concord (homonoia), and
[tjhere is said to be concord in a state when the citizens agree about 
their interests, adopt the same policy, and put common resolves into ef­
fect. Thus concord is concerned with practical ends, and among these 
only with such that are important, and can be achieved by both parties 
(i.e., democratic and oligarchic parties!, or by the whole body of the citi­
zens ... (as] when the citizens unanimously decide that offices shall be 
elective ... (or) as when the people and the upper classes both think that 
the best men should govern; for in this way they all get what they want.
This concord is evidently ...friendship between citizens o f a state, because 
it is concerned with their interests and living conditions (Aristotle, Ethics, 
1155a23-24; 1167a23-b4, italics added).
Finally,
Civic friendship is ... based on utility, and fellow citizens are one an­
other’s friends in the same way as different cities are ... nor... do citizens 
know one another, when they are not useful to one another, their friend­
ship is a ready-money transaction (Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics, 1242b 14- 
15).
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alised rules of mutual obligation, of what is due. Again, somewhat against the ten­
dency of communitarian interpretations of Aristotle.44 justice is not derived from 
the substantial common good of the Polis. Clearly. Aristotle has developed such a 
conception of the good life in his ethical writings. However, when discussing the 
nature of the best regime which is most conducive to such a life (towards the end of 
The Politics), political justice is strangely absent from his concerns. The reason for 
this. Yack claims, is that the best regime is a model arrangement. It describes the 
objectively best conditions, such as wealth, equality, and unlimited leisure, for 
leading a good life for the part of a community which is best capable o f doing so, all 
in wilful abstraction from such states of affairs and conflicts that lead to the need 
for justice in the first place. One possible implication is to have in the state a large 
class of labourers who are not citizens, even though they, unlike natural slaves and 
women, possess rationality.45
Unlike what is commonly believed, at least for political purposes, Aristotle did 
not have a traditional natural law doctrine with a set of intrinsically right standards 
for conduct or institutions, which actual regimes approach more or less.46 Rather, 
political justice is the conception of a reasonable and acceptable mutual regulation 
of obligations and proper conduct which emerges from the deliberative, but also 
power-based, collective efforts of particular political communities. The quality of 
such efforts should be evaluated according to whether and how they further the 
common good of the community. This common good is rather indeterminate. Al­
though ethical knowledge of the good life is an important limiting condition, it can­
not be stipulated in abstraction from the relations of power and the possibilities of 
compromise between different classes for the sake of social peace, in those actual, 
highly imperfect, political communities which Aristotle is nevertheless quite willing 
to subject to piecemeal reform. Hence, unlike justice in the family, which is dic­
tated by paternal authority or by custom, and unlike Aristotle’s more limited con­
ception of distributive justice (often generalised to be the Aristotelian doctrine of 
political justice), political justice is disputed terrain. Political justice capitalises on
44. MacIntyre (1985:244).
45. Yack (1993:168-69).
46. According to Yack (1993:140-49), the distinction between conventional and 
natural right is rather that between the merely socially agreed conventions about 
such things where, before regulation, one would be indifferent, such as the sacri­
fice of a goat or the size of a ransom, and on the other hand the regulation of mu­
tual obligations in a community. As reasoning creatures we are naturally disposed, 
once we live in political communities, to aim at such regulations, but they are not 
eternally and universally valid. While much of Yack’s argument on this issue is 
sound, passages in The Ethics still suggest that Aristotle does recognise natural law 
in a more determinate sense: first, as regulations of the most important political 
things, but such which admit of a single best form in each particular set of circum­
stances, and second, the immutable law which the gods “presumably" recognise, 
but which is of little consequence to man (Aristotle, EXhics. 1134b24-1135a6).
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the natural capacity of man to form law-ordered political communities and be so­
cialised by such law, but also on his capacity for reasoned speech - the means of 
the necessary deliberation which leads to the best possible conception of justice.47
How does all this square with Aristotle’s teleology? Yack plausibly suggests that 
the polis is not natural in the manner usually taken for granted in readings o f Ar­
istotle. A  more political reading of Aristotle also receives its persuasiveness from 
dissolving an otherwise extraordinary contradiction between a biological-organic 
idea of the polis, and the actual analysis of constitutions and conditions of the good 
life, where Aristotle would seem to be led to the conclusion that no polis has ever 
reached its form. This contradiction disappears if we assume that some of Aris­
totle’s organic metaphors about the polis are indeed metaphors. Aristotle’s descrip­
tion of the best regime is an empirical generalisation of the best conditions for the 
good life, not of the inherent telos of political communities. The polis is ‘natural’ 
only in the more limited sense that it is the contingent outcome of a universal pro­
pensity of humans to form self-sufficient communities, and in the sense that it is 
the condition for individuals to further develop their potential in the direction o f a 
fully human life of virtue (rather than to degenerate, in the absence of law and jus­
tice, to the “worst of all animals"). It is simply very difficult to make sense of Aris­
totle’s comparative institutional studies and his entire approach, unless we allow 
for an element of indeterminate, constructive human effort (law-making, definition 
of justice) to get the political community started - after which, because of the po­
tential for justice and philicu the polis may then function as an organised, ‘organic* 
entity.48
47. "In the state, the good aimed at is justice; and that means what is for the
benefit o f the whole community". While different groups or classes advance differ­
ent claims to merit (eligibility for office, share in political power), based on for in­
stance birth or wealth, "something more is needed besides: I mean justice and the 
virtue that is proper to citizens". Such justice, and its peculiarly political virtue is 
also a prudential necessity: “For without these additions it is not possible for the 
state to be managed". Also, “Ib]y ‘right’ we ought to mean ‘equally* right, i.e., right 
with respect to the benefit of the whole state and the common interest of the citi­
zens" (Aristotle, Politics, 1282bl5-1283a22). Again, whereas this contingent mix­
ture receives a definite content in Aristotle’s own middle-of-the-road version, he is j
also clear about the almost endlessly different requirements of different institu- I
tions. He does not, of course, a la some modem day discourse ethics, hold that the j
outcome of deliberation is right or true by definition or through some procedural I
rule. Rather, he is making a political point about necessaiy legitimation and con- j
sent in diverse communities.
48. Yack supports his claims with a discussion of the organic vocabulaiy in the I
beginning o f The Politics in the context of Aristotle’s metaphysical and zoological I
writings (Yack 1993: 90-96). They are also quite generally supported by Aristotle’s I
praise of political founders and lawgivers and their practical skill to which large I
parts of The Politics testify, e.g., “(ajmong all men ... there is a natural impulse to­
wards this kind of association; and the first man to construct a state deserves credit
i
Moreover, as there is no naturally perfected polis, there is no intrinsic connec­
tion between such a polis and human perfection, and no a priori reason to assume 
either that only perfect political circumstances may facilitate human flourishing, or 
that such flourishing takes the exclusively political form of active self-government. 
While ruling and being ruled in turn clearly makes for very good circumstances - by 
facilitating the equality of condition and the maximum moral training derived from 
the exposure to legislative deliberation and law, the alternative interpretation al­
lows us to make sense of the otherwise peculiar fact that Aristotle, despite slim 
chances of realising a perfect regime, nevertheless assumes the possibility of culti­
vating the virtues and leading the good life, and, constantly in the ethical writings, 
appeals in a common sense manner to shared knowledge about its components. 
Aristotle’s less than perfect Athens, and several other city states, seem to have 
permitted the development of virtue - at least for some.
The koindnikon and phiiia intrinsical to living the good life, invoked by contem- 
porary readers of Aristotle, was of the utmost importance to him and to his time, 
but it was not the stuff of political community and political friendship. Aristotle did 
have an ‘Aristotelian* (naturalist, virtue based) ethics, but it was only linked to his 
political theory in the sense that the latter was an instrument for creating the con­
ditions for the former. These conditions were stability, security, constitutional poli­
tics, justice, the rule of law, and a set of educational and cultural factors leading to 
a cooperative political community, capable of civilising and pacifying the inevitable 
conflicts in all existing societies - in Aristotle’s time as well as ours. Aristotle was 
far to realistic and in line with the common sense of his time to believe that rela­
tively large numbers of individuals with different interests and backgrounds would 
be capable of a sense of mutual obligation and restraint, let alone be willing to go to 
war for each other, in the name of anything less tangible than an experience of 
mutual advantage and dependency. Although political action was worthy and nec­
essary, and although the best and most stable regime was one which had a popular 
element in it, it was not itself the good life. And while Aristotle’s ethics has been 
and remains a challenge to modem conceptions o f individual autonomy and reflec­
tive life-plans, and one easier to integrate into a Christian-scholastic hierarchy of 
values determining the worthy and natural life, it is not so much opposed to private 
negative liberty, as anterior to, or even compatible with, a premodem, non- 
individualistic conception of it: the ‘local’ small-group life of phiiia and quest for 
human perfection, legally secured through some degree of equal citizenship and 
mutual respect for justice, all behind the protective walls of the polis.
Following other commentators of his day and the evidence available to him 
about what was prudent political science, Aristotle conceived of the polis in what
for conferring very great benefits’* (Aristotle. Politics, 1253a 29-30).
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was to modem eyes a quite collectivist and unitary fashion. But he also invested it 
with a recognisable, early republican element.49 The security and political order 
necessaiy for the practice and learning of virtue was a matter of prudently bal­
anced political institutions. It also depended on the rule of law and on the exis­
tence, partly as a result of law, of what we would call a political culture of habitual, 
reciprocal acknowledgement of obligations. The exact nature of the legal- 
constitutional artifice and the concomitant political ethos of a political community 
was not derived from natural law, whether or not Aristotle entertained such a con­
cept, but a much more worldly and contingent matter. Aristotle did not have Ren­
aissance-style intuitions of political fragility and change, and his analysis of plural 
systems remained relatively static. But he did approach a republican idea of the 
instrumentally necessary virtue of citizens, and one which went beyond the duty to 
fight for the cause of national survival which was a commonplace in antiquity:
First, the merits of a popular element in a mixed regime based on law derived 
above all from the danger of despotism, or more generally the propensity of any 
single stratum (the ‘one’, ‘few* or ‘many’) to rule in its own interests, if unchecked. 
The need for balance, by a moderating democratic element, was necessary to pre­
vent even lawful regimes from degenerating, as they would by their usual fashion.
Secondly, over and above the balancing of interests, there was an appeal to an 
essentially political type of justification, the rhetorical deliberation of citizens about 
the most reasonable and soundly working conception o f justice, in the form of con­
crete laws and regulations, its quality depending on the availability and nature of 
institutions of self-government, arenas for reasoned speech.
Finally, Yack presents a plausible account of Aristotelian justice doctrine as not 
just a question of institutions, but also of personal behavioural dispositions. 
Moreover, he distinguishes between the mere propensity to respect rules of justice, 
and a more important political virtue (Aristotle’s general virtue of Justice) o f seeking 
the political common good, actually furthering justice, and being on the guard, in 
everyday intercourses and as a citizen of the polis, against injustices.50
Aristotle’s conception of civic virtue and general view of the practice o f politics 
testified to his concern with what was to become a main theme of the republican 
tradition, namely political moderation. As we shall see. Enlightenment critics of the 
tradition would tend to ignore or deny this aspect, insisting on the unruly, pas­
sionate, and decidedly immoderate character of classical ideals and political reali­
ties, rhetorically reserving moderation for themselves, 'the modems’. However, if 
the classical cardinal virtue of moderation or temperance referred to the person’s 
balanced control o f his bodily desires. Aristotelian political thought, as most Greek
49. Ironically, much of Yack’s book is a polemic against what he - focusing on the 
communitarian and civic humanist (mis)representations - sees as (civic) republican 
misreadings of Aristotle, i.e., those focusing on shared political identity.
50. Yack (1993:163).
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thought, was very much about the need to balance competing wants and demands 
of different natural groups in a society. As we shall see. this ambition was also Ma- 
chiavelli’s. But of course his ‘moderation’, with its acceptance of instrumental, 
princely cunning, and beneficial iumultt was rather more humanist and modem.
4.3. The Res Publica and Libertas at Rome. Cicero
It has been suggested51 that a main difference between Greek and Roman republi­
canism was the former's celebration of political activity as a road to personal virtue 
and fulfilment - i.e., Pocock’s reading of the entire tradition - where the latter had 
more instrumental concerns. The type of reading of Aristotle and his time endorsed 
above suggests that this contrast is exaggerated. The Ciceronian praise of a patri­
otic life for the sake of the common good, but also in quest for personal glory, ech­
oes Greek values. And the ultimate concern in politics with liberty in its most basic 
sense of collective security and equality under law was also at the heart of Aris­
totle’s writings.
The much vaster scale of the Roman res pubiica and the necessary coexistence 
of quite heterogeneous cultures necessitated an importantly different set of political 
and legal practices and institutions, as well as a different legitimising political dis­
course. For most of its history, Rome was never externally threatened, and the 
need for a spirit of martial vigour was less pronounced than in Greece. Also, while 
all had to practice the state religion and while interference with the lives of citizens 
was hardly absent, both the ideal of an undisturbed sphere of family and house­
hold and the legal institutions to protect them were emphasised to a higher degree 
than in the Greek world. Rome understood itself as, and for long periods of time 
succeeded in being, the distributor of peace and security to its citizens and to for­
eigners with whose countries treaties were signed. This included a significant 
amount of indifferent tolerance of such private diversity that did not disrupt public 
morality. Also in marked contrast to Greece, the equality of citizens in the republic 
was strictly equality under the law. It did not in fact or ideal extend to political 
equality in active self-government, isonomia. The causal link between the exercise 
of civic duty and the enjoyment of citizenship was more latent and ambiguous, def­
erence to experience and authority in affairs of state was more pronounced, and 
social hierarchy and class-consciousness among the nobility was more politically 
potent than in Athens.
Most important for our purposes is the idea of a delineated and collectively 
guaranteed citizenship status which was first invented in Roman law. This political 
concept of Libertas was the recognisable beginning of an early modem conception 
of liberty as a formally codified, protected sphere around each individual citizen. 
The paradigmatic background of the concept was the difference between the citi­
51. Burtt (1990:23).
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zen, who was unsubjected to anyone’s dominium, and the slave. It was not at all 
uncommon in Rome for a slave to enjoy a relatively pleasant life without material 
worries. Yet. this ‘freedom’, however wide at any one time, was always enjoyed at a 
master’s discretion, without legal guarantees. A slave could not be a citizen, and 
hence could not enjoy the legal status of personal immunity from encroachment 
from other citizens, the security of areas of unimpaired action, and the guaranteed 
empowerment to certain, limited political activities, which this entailed. The libertas 
of a citizen, of an unsubjected individual, consisted in the capacity to ‘possess’ 
such ‘rights’.52
The Roman libertas was closely linked to civilas. It was by virtue of belonging to 
a political community (Rome) that one could enjoy it, and because of this it was es­
sentially equal and reciprocal. Liberty as the legal assurance of being able to enjoy, 
to avoid, or to perform certain things - and not just the contingent state, dependant 
on power and luck, of actually enjoying, avoiding, or performing them - was bought 
at the necessary price of respecting the same assurance for other members. Liber­
tas corresponded to the spaces that were secured for each citizen by the mutual 
guarantees or insurances, formulated as civil law, the tacit acceptance of which 
defined membership of the political community. Cicero, completely in line with the 
common understanding of these matters, sharply distinguished between libertas 
and licentia The latter was only mistaken for the former by fools, or claimed as 
their ’liberty’ by arrogant nobles wanting to be above the law. Libertas was con­
ceptually linked to the notion of constraint, not so much, as one might think, to a 
stoic moral idea of self-restraint, but more to the collectively imposed constraint 
and discipline of the law.53
52. Wirszubski (1950:1-3). The inverted commas signal that Roman libertas can­
not, strictly speaking, be rendered as bundles of rights, if these are taken in their 
modem sense or senses, as claim-rights, liberty-rights, powers, or immunities, 
whatever the contested intricacies of either meanings (Jones 1994). On the complex 
origins of modem rights in medieval interpretations of Roman law and the compli­
cated development and related meanings of ius and dominium, see Tuck (1979). 
While the Romans probably had no subjective concept of right in a modem sense, 
their use of objective conceptions of ‘what is right’ in a certain type of situation, 
specifying the proper legal relations between parties, clearly ensued in a hitherto 
unprecedented and thickly textured degree of legal regularity and protection, 
making up an enforceable citizenship status.
53. Wirszubski (1950:3-15). Cicero’s antidote to Hobbes* liberty as the 'silence of 
the law’ was the belief that we are "slaves of the law" in order that we may be free 
(legum ... idciro omnes send sumus, ut liberi esse possimus). Indeed, “law is the 
bond which serves ... our privileges in the commonwealth, the foundation of our 
liberty, the fountain-head of justice", Cicero, Pro CluenUo (p.146). Licentia, by con­
trast, is when “the insatiable throats o f the people have become dry with the thirst 
for liberty", and when without masters and laws the relations of citizens are re­
duced to anarchy. “[F)rom this exaggerated licence, tyrants spring up as from a 
root.... [L)iberty itself reduces a people who possess it in great degree to servitude",
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It follows from this Roman understanding of liberty as legal citizenship that it 
depends directly on the political structure of the state for its amount, its content, 
and its continued existence. A free people or a free state was defined in terms of 
sovereignty, i.e., the absence of external dominion which was not a problem for 
Rome, and in terms of the existence of a res publica. Negatively, as a necessary 
condition which alone might lead to anarchy, this meant the absence of internal 
domination (of a king). Positively, it meant the existence of a republican constitu­
tion. Cicero repeatedly talked of the republic as a “partnership in justice" where 
justice, closely linked to libertas as a common good, was the existence of and re­
spect for equitable laws. The origin of republics was caused by the rational desire of 
individuals to enjoy the security and liberty which was only realisable on the con­
dition of equality under the law.54
As noted, the libertas of the Romans was not extended to Greek isonomia even 
if the notion made sense to them. Cicero, for instance, could occasionally use lib­
erty to denote the government of the republic by the popuius, and link it to what he 
considered a familiar (Greek, democratic) argument about the maintenance of col­
lective security, as well as to refer to a state where the popuius did not partake di­
rectly in political affairs, but enjoyed equal rights under the law. The res publica 
was the “property of the people" and had its “beginning" in the decision to live to­
gether in justice and common advantage, but Roman evaluations of how this was 
best achieved were different from the Greek ones. Political equality would not re­
spect the authority, superior intelligence, and dignitas of people like Cicero himself, 
in the crucial tasks of either framing constitutional laws so that they did not con­
flict with the eternal natural law (whose content could only be grasped in its most 
general outline), or handling the momentous decisions of war and peace. And, for 
reasons inherent in democracy - to Cicero the spectre of mob rule - it was likely to 
lead to chaos and license. On the other hand, kingships and aristocracies did not 
recognise the need to give the subjects “a share in the administration of justice and
Cicero, De Re Publica, 1,66-68.
54. “(A) commonwealth is the property of a people (est ... res publica res populi). 
But a people is not any collection of human beings brought together in any sort of 
way, but an assemblage of people in large numbers associated in an agreement 
with respect to justice and a partnership for the common good (coetus multitudinis 
iuris consensu et utHitatis communione sociatus)", and “nothing can be sweeter than 
liberty; but If it is not the same for all, it does not deserve the name of liberty (si 
aequa non est, ne libertas quidem esi)". “For what is a state (ciutios) except an asso­
ciation or partnership injustice? (iuris sodetasP and “a free people [liber popuius) ... 
desires its own safety" (Cicero, De Re Publica 1,39,47,49). "For what people have 
always sought is equality of rights before the law. For rights that were not open to 
all would be no rights" (Cicero, De Officiis, 11,42). For the close connection generally 
between iustilia equal rights under law, and basic physical security, see De Officiis 
11,39-42.
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in deliberation”. Such regimes might in principle respect justice, but their element 
of “slavery for a people" was as unwise as the lack of dignitas in democracies, from 
the point of view of stability: “before each of them lies a slippery and precipitous 
path leading to a certain depraved form that is a close neighbour to it".55
Cicero’s solution - via Polybius56 and corresponding to the Roman arrange­
ments even when the republic was most ‘democratic’ - was a version of Aristotle’s 
mixed regime which had a decidedly conservative and elitist flavour. The small 
amount of political power granted ordinary citizens effectively amounted to the ap­
peasement needed to maintain the position of the aristocracy with their superior 
cfignitos. In developing its elements, details of which do not concern us here, Cicero 
appealed to the historical experience of his own Rome, even when adding his own 
relatively minor suggestions in De Legibus. The concern with the practically possi­
ble under non-ideal circumstances, and with the common good as a ‘reasonable* 
compromise between classes was not unlike that of Aristotle. For instance, Cicero 
noted the dangers of governance in the unbalanced interest of a single group and 
the popular demand for fairness and equity in return for their support.57
55. Cicero, De Re Publico, 1,43-44. For the difference between Roman and Greek 
understandings generally, see Raaflaub (1984). For Cicero’s rendering of the Greek 
argument, e.g., in De Re Publico, “in aristocracies the masses can hardly have their 
share of liberty", "... that all who are slaves whether to a king or to an aristocracy 
are deprived of liberty” and “popular governments ... (attract us] by their freedom", 
cp. in De OJJiciis, “a free people, where all enjoy equal rights before the law", and in 
De Legibus, "let the people have their ballots as a safeguard of their liberty (libertos)
"Therefore every people, which is such a gathering o f large numbers as 1 have 
described, every city, which is an orderly settlement of a people, every common­
wealth, which as I said, is *the property of the people* (omnts res publico, quae, ut 
dixi, populi res est), must be governed by some deliberative body (consilio) if it is to 
be permanent. And this deliberative body must, in the first place, always owe its 
beginning to the same cause as that which produced the State itself**. But "when all 
the power is in the people’s hands, even though they exercise it with justice and 
moderation, yet the resulting equality itself is inequitable, since It allows no dis­
tinction in rank”, Cicero, De Officus, 1,88; De Re Publico, 1,41-43,55; De Legibus, 
111,39.
56. On this relationship, see Fink (1962:5-8).
57. Cicero [De Re Publico, 11,55). “Therefore I consider a fourth form of government 
the most commendable - that form which is a well-regulated mixture of the three I 
have mentioned at first. [A]t the periods of which I have been speaking, the gov­
ernment was so administered by the senate that, though the people were free, few 
political acts were performed by them, practically everything being done by the 
authority o f the senate and in accordance with its established customs ... But after 
a short period, in about the sixteenth year of the republic ... an event occurred 
which in the nature of things was bound to happen: the people, freed from the 
domination of kings, claimed a somewhat greater measure of rights (juris) ... For 
you must keep in mind a fact that... unless there is in the state an even balance of 
rights, duties, and functions, so that the magistrates have enough power, the 
councels o f eminent citizens enough influence, and the people enough liberty, this
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The twist given by Cicero and other members of his class to the doctrine of 
mixed government must be seen against the background of the severe struggles 
that took place in the Roman republic until it was superseded by the libertas 
Augusti, the degeneration of libertas to the safety of citizens at the contingent dis­
cretion of a benevolent dictator. While Cicero acknowledged popular concerns, his 
own appeal to dignitas over political and social levelling was typical of the views 
among Roman nobility which, perhaps, lead to the civil strife that eventually dis­
credited the ideal of libertas to many citizens.58
However that may be, the Ciceronian ideal of politics and conception of civic 
virtue allocated one place to the ordinary citizen and quite another to the states­
man. Both were important elements in the great project of arresting the decline of 
the Roman republic, and in the more general project of “the formation and preser­
vation of states“.59 The virtue of the ordinary citizen, on which Cicero spent little 
time, consisted in obeying the laws and fighting in wars. But in Cicero’s world the 
quality of the populace crucially depended on the virtue of the statesman. It was he 
whose knowledge of political forms and their tendency to decay allowed the best 
formulation of law, and he who dispensed justice and respected the rule of law so 
as to win the support of the populace. Moreover, only he, by setting a personal ex­
ample, could shape or fortify the customs and public opinion which, at the risk of 
shame, would make citizens respect justice in actual conduct.60
kind of government cannot be safe from revolution". “[A]nd always, when the ple­
beians have been so weakened by the expenditures brought on by public calamity 
that they give way under their burden, some relief or remedy has been sought for 
the difficulties of this class, for the sake of the safety of the whole body of citizens". 
But, “as a result of the injustice of these rulers (the second decemvirate] there was 
a great insurrection, followed by a complete change in the government", Cicero. De 
Re Publico, 1,45,11,56-57.59,63.
58. This view is taken by Wirszubski (1950:31-91).
59. Cicero, De Re Publica, 11,64. Also, “(bjut though the republic, when it came to 
us, was like a beautiful painting, whose colours, however, were already fading with 
age, our own time not only has neglected to freshen it by renewing the original col­
ours, but has not even taken the trouble to preserve its configuration and ... gen­
eral outlines", De Re Publica, V,2.
60. For instance, the statesman “should be given ... no other duties than ... one ... 
of improving and examining himself continually, urging others to imitate him, and 
furnishing in himself... a mirror to his fellow-citizens by reason of the supreme ex­
cellence of his life and character". With his knowledge of politics he should be able 
to orchestrate a harmony as “in the music of harps and flutes" as also “a state (is] 
made harmonious by agreement among dissimilar elements, brought about by a 
fair and reasonable blending together of the upper, middle and lower classes ... 
What the musicians call harmony in a song is concord [concordia) in a state, the 
strongest and best bond of permanent union in a commonwealth; and such con­
cord can never be brought about without the aid of justice". And “the governing 
statesman strengthens this feeling in commonwealths by the force of public opin­
ion and perfects it by the inculcation of principles and by systematic training, so
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Cicero’s model statesman61 was at the heart of an ideal of politics for the select 
few, and of his statement of the superior value of the active life “of state craft and ... 
great enterprises [which] is more profitable to mankind and contributes more to ... 
greatness and renown” compared to “the life of [philosophical] retirement” which is 
“easier and safer". Its content was described in austere tones of sacrifice and dan­
ger, and its tasks should only be undertaken by the person who had been strictly 
educated in the prudential and moral aspects of its exercise. Yet, for the tiny mi­
nority who aimed to secure the material benefits of safety and common liberty 
without pausing to enjoy it for themselves, the call of duty was sweetened and 
transformed into a love of the fatherland by the dual reward of worldly recognition 
and fame and by the “eternal life of happiness" evoked in Scipio's dream. This fa­
mous passage depicts a hereafter, earned by
all those who have preserved, aided, or enlarged their fatherland ... For 
nothing of all that is done on earth is more pleasing to ... God ... than the 
assemblies and gatherings of men associated in justice, which are called 
States (ciuttotes). Their rulers and preservers come from that place [the 
heavens], and to that place they return62
Cicero may have underestimated the aspirations of ordinary citizens and the dis­
ruptive nature of class conflict. He was certainly optimistic in asserting that 
“[n]ature has implanted in the human race so great a need for virtue and so great a 
desire to defend the common safety [communen saluteni) that the strength thereof 
has conquered all the allurements o f pleasure and ease”.63 Nevertheless, the Ro­
man ideology of the res publica as a partnership in justice and common liberty and 
the ideal of virtuous activity to sustain it, crystallised in his writings, exercised a 
tremendous influence on Renaissance and later political thought. However, later 
writers came to emphasise the limitations of a traditional conception of virtue and 
the reliance on the wisdom and sense of duty of a few individuals. Yet, also the ar­
gument from the point of view of the ordinary citizen, about the need for political
that shame deters the citizens from crime" {Cicero, De Re Publica. 11,69,V,7).
61. Which loomed larger in his writings than the question of the ‘best regime* 
(Nicgorski 1991).
62. Cicero, De Offlciis, 1,70; De Re Publica, VI. 13). Cp. Cicero, De Offlciis. 1,69-85: 
11,31. Also, "[L]ove justice and duty, which are indeed strictly due to parents and 
kinsmen, but most of all to the fatherland (pairia)**. And, stating the rational core of 
the republican idea of patriotism  as sacrifice for the sake of a common good of lib­
erty as security, even if the latter is only enjoyed as a momentary refuge for the 
man of action, “I could not hesitate to expose myself to the severest storms ... for 
the safety o f my fellow-citizens, and to secure, at the cost of my own personal dan­
ger, a quiet life for all the rest. For, in truth, our country has not given us birth and 
education without expecting some sustenance, as it were, from us in return”, 
Cicero, De Re Publica, 1,7-8,VI, 16.
63. Cicero, De Re Publica, 1,1.
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activity to check one's rulers, which Machiavelli and the later tradition was to em­
phasise, was already found in a rudimentary form in the Roman tradition. It may 
be found in the recognition that the masses should have “enough (political] rights 
to found freedom"64 for the balance of interests of the mixed government to work for 
the security of all. It was also latent in the concern about the need of leaders to 
court the favour of free citizens, casting their non-secret vote.
5. Renaissance Republicanism
Political experience of republican liberty was only renewed with the rise of the city 
states of the mid-northern Italian peninsula. The economic and political back­
ground for the emergence of cities capable of militaiy independence and political 
authority sufficiently strong to challenge feudal structure need not concern us 
here. At any rate, around the beginning of the twelfth century a large number of 
city states had emerged which challenged the European norm in medieval Chris­
tendom of the superiority of hereditary monarchy. These republics aimed to check 
rulers misusing their power by an increasingly wide-spread and ingenious system, 
whereby a non-resident of the city was elected as the executive podestà for a lim­
ited period by the body of the citizens, advised by a larger and a minor council, and 
held accountable for his actions at the end of his tenure. The experience with re­
publican self-government took place and was shaped against a very real, and con­
stantly returning danger of conquest and subjugation by a succession of German 
invaders and, eventually, by the one-time ally of the papacy.65
Recent scholarship on the political thought of the period has revolved to a large 
degree around Hans Baron’s famous thesis of the quatrocento birth of civic human­
ism as a very late and completely novel attempt to create a justifying ideology of the 
city state at a time when internal strife and class-divisions (the rise of a new class 
of merchants challenging the still quite oligarchic nominations of the podestà) had 
brought all but a few city states (notably Milan and Florence) to accept the seem­
ingly more ordered and peaceful arrangement of a single signore. The new ideology, 
according to this view, arising in the most dangerous hour, contained a new vali­
dation of political life, a new discovery of Roman political thought, and an unprece­
dented attempt to challenge the orthodoxy of divinely sanctioned monarchical 
rule.66
The work of Quentin Skinner67 caused this sequence of events to be ques­
tioned. Without denying its richness and also certain new emphases and styles of 
argument, it was at least as important to show the manner in which ‘civic human-
64. Wirszubski (1950:83).
65. A  general introduction to the history of the period is Brucker (1983).
66. Baron (1988b; 1988c).
67. In particular Skinner (1978).
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ists’ such as Bruni, and later Machiavelli continued an already existing discourse 
of republican legitimation whose core was a revival of the Roman idea of libertas.
5.1. Medieval Republican Discourse and the Rise o f Civic 
Humanism
The political claims made by the city states against their would-be invaders essen­
tially invoked the Roman notion of liberty as, first, independence (the absence of 
foreign domination and servitude), and, secondly, republican self-government. With 
the latter they implied the popular election and control of magistrates, and the ex­
istence of republican constitutions specifying the equal rights and duties of citizens 
before the law, above which no one was permitted to place himself. Moreover, the 
legal justification of this conception of equal liberty in self-government was in place 
as a result of the radical reinterpretation of the Roman civil Law of Justinian which 
had hitherto been seen to underpin the total sovereignty o f an emperor, in casii the 
heir to the Holy Roman Empire. Already by the late twelfth century and the begin­
ning of the thirteenth century, jurists (Azo of Bologna and later Bartolus of Sasso- 
ferato) had developed new readings. First, they posited the right to yield power in 
the rulers who were de facto and not merely dejure  able to be obeyed in a given 
territory - thus subversively claiming that the Roman Codex should be accommo­
dated to the actual existence of a plurality of sovereign states, rather than the other 
way round. Secondly, they (re)invented a doctrine of popular sovereignty and origi­
nal consent where the latter, crucially, did not entail abdication of sovereignty by 
the people, but the right, in the absence of just rule, to retain it.68
9uentin Skinner has plausibly pointed out two sources of political theory 
aimed at vindicating republican liberty in the face of the turn towards the Signori 
around the end of the thirteenth century, both of them providing many of the 
themes of later civic humanism and Renaissance political thought generally.
The first was the development o f rhetorics, first as an art o f letter writing and (later) 
public oratory, aimed at pupils embarking on official careers. Gradually, the focus 
on formal skill shifted, so that teachers of rhetorics came to view themselves as 
commentators on civic affairs. Two new literary genres, city histories and political 
advice-books for magistrates, became the media, still subordinated to the formal 
rhetoric casuistry, of an ideology stressing the need for citizens to rise to defend 
their liberty and the potential, in contrast to previous history stressing divine 
providence, for the good leader to lead such efforts, by effectively using rhetorical 
skills. This Italian Art Dictaminis was transformed in a humanist direction with the 
growing influence o f French rhetoric studies which had turned to classical texts, in 
particular Cicero. This early humanism used the classics not just for instrumental
68. Skinner (1978:6-12; 1993:390-95). For historical evidence on the content of 
fourteenth century citizenship states, see Riesenberg (1969).
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purposes, but in search for style and literary culture which was seen to have a 
value in itself. Thus, it was to enrich and enhance the propaganda effect of political 
writing, by beginning to link the art of governing well with the art of speaking well, 
and by linking the patriotic willingness to fight for the liberty of the city with a civi­
lised and public way of life.
Maurizio Viroli has pointed out how, in the influential writings of Brunetto 
Latini (around 1260), the art of politics to be pursued by the elected podestà o f the 
city was closely modelled on a long established Ciceronian ideal, also elaborated by 
John of Viterbo, where the stable existence of peace, justice and civility - the com­
mon good for the sake of which “a people gathered to live in the same place under 
the law" - was brought about and continually secured by the skills of rhetoric per­
suasion of a virtuous ruler (justice being the most important of his virtues), who 
made citizens decide to stay together in the first place and to refrain from immod­
erate claims against one another. The civilising significance of reasoned, rhetorical 
speech - to a lesser extent also for the citizens, who might deliberate on the merits 
and virtue of the ruler seeking office - came about to Latini, for whom Aristotle’s 
Ethics was now available in Latin, by a fusion of the civil wisdom of Roman political 
thought with the early appropriation of an Aristotelian language of politics as the 
most noble human activity.69
Moreover, this body of writing contained the first (re)statements of the fragility 
of liberty, concerning the causes of republican vulnerability and the methods o f se­
curing its survival. Again echoing Cicero and other Roman writers, the twin dan­
gers that loomed large were faction, internal envy and competition and dominance 
by the upper classes, and, secondly, excessive private wealth. Such dangers could 
be remedied only by a commitment by all citizens to bypass individual interests for 
the sake of the common good of peace and security of the city as a whole. This also, 
against Ciceronian orthodoxy, introduced the problem of how to secure civic virtues 
in public office, and the problem of their proper range and nature in the heart of 
the ruler. However, all these suggestions were significantly made in abstraction 
from questions of the institutional machinery of politics, which were considered of 
secondary importance.70
The second forerunner of renaissance republican discourse had its origins in the 
late introduction of scholastic political philosophy in Italy through the work of 
Ptolemy of Lucca, Bartolus of Saxoferrato, Remigio of Girolami and, particularly, 
Marsiglio of Padua. Marsiglio and the others were building on the Thomist recon­
ciliation of Augustinian Christianity and Aristotelian celebration of civic life, but 
they placed the latter’s insight in what they recognised as a more appropriate his­
torical context, namely the Italian city republic, rather than the monarchy which
69. Viroli (1992:26-30).
70. Skinner (1978:28-48).
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was still taken for granted by Aquinas, although he had departed from the tradi­
tional view of kingly power as natural lordship for fallen sinners. These writers 
went on to praise republican government and a more radical version of the latent 
popular consent theory of Aquinas as best suited, under the circumstances, to 
promote the highest Aristotelian and Christian goal of pax and concordia. Agreeing 
so far with the rhetorical authors, they were, however, less inclined to see private 
wealth as a problem, and less prepared to give up the connection between tradi­
tional nobility and virtue. Yet, also they stressed the danger of civic faction.
The scholastic writers went easier on Cicero and Scipio's dream and drew in­
stead on passages of Aristotle’s newly available Politics which denied politics the 
absolutely highest standing among human activities. Their focus was not on the 
best art of persuasion or education of virtue, but on the institutional science of 
constitutional balancing, with elements of periodic elections of magistrates, strictly 
delimited executive discretion according to law, and mechanisms securing respon­
siveness and accountability of the rulers to the ruled. In this literature, according 
to Viroli, the focus “was no longer the ruler but rather the constitution and the 
collective life of the city. Political inquiry shifted from the duties and qualities of the 
political man to the assessment of the comparative merits of political regimes". 
However, the scholastic touchstone of a good political community, more ambitious 
than Cicero’s civil peace and protection of private security and property, was the 
aditional furtherance, for which the former was a necessary condition, of a virtuous 
collective life in a richer moral (Christian) sense. The scholastic argument for re­
publicanism was a counter attack on apologists of princely rule and on the more 
orderly liberty it was held to promise. Not only might popular government be ren­
dered more tranquil through the right institutional measures; the same measures 
were also a better safeguard against the potential arrogance of signori who were 
bound, sooner or later, to forget their duties towards Justice.71
In what, then, consisted the often celebrated novelty o f Renaissance political 
thought on the republic? The difference was not the conception of republican lib­
erty as independence and constitutional self-government, securing and defining 
civic equality under the rule of law, which was asserted, by the civic humanists of 
the quatrocento, “in a traditional and well-established way".72 An additional argu-
71. Skinner (1978:49-65; 1993:395-402); Viroli (1992:33).
72. Skinner cites from Bruni’s Laudatio Florentinae Urbis, as the “overriding merit 
of Florence’s constitution ... that ‘it makes it equally possible for everyone to take 
part in the affairs of the Republic’" so as to “guarantee that ‘everything is directed 
to the greatest possible extent towards maintaining the liberty as well as the 
equality of all its citizens’. They are free to criticize as well as to control their gov­
ernment and ‘no one has to stand in awe of anyone else’s power or capacity to do 
them harm’. And they are free from any danger of being enslaved by a tyrannical 
regime, since the involvement of all the citizens ensures ‘that the control of the city 
is always prevented from falling into the hands of one or a few people’" (Skinner
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ment for republican liberty was added: Not only was republicanism the only safe­
guard of liberty, this liberty in turn, enjoyed as a way of life by all citizens, was the 
precondition for greatness. This was a secular ideal to be measured by values 
which were quite at odds with the scholastic idea of virtuous living as pious con­
templation, whereby the just republican ruler, receiving his reward in Heaven, was 
a Christian man who left his study on the call of duty rather than for the sake of 
honour and fame.
The heart of the humanist movement informing the Renaissance was a new 
historicism or sense of discontinuity in relation to previous, classical times, which 
was prompted by the rediscovery of a large number of hitherto lost classical works. 
In contrast with the earlier teachers of rhetorics who used classical texts for their 
own eclectic purposes, attempts were now made to understand, regenerate, and 
imitate the forms and cultural terms (literary, artistic) of meaning now perceived to 
belong to a radically different era - but one which was superior in value. Petrarch 
was a key transitory figure in the rediscovery of a cloic Cicero, and in the eventual 
complete reversal of the previous, scholastic reading of this author which, mis­
leadingly. emphasised passages in his work which celebrated a contemplative and 
philosophical life. What was rediscovered and immediately turned into an ideal to 
be pursued in rhetorical education and, through this, in individual development of 
what was now seen as a human capacity, was the image of a crowning virtue pos­
sessed by the vir virtutis, or ‘truly manly man*. The nature of this ideal involved, on 
the one hand, a new belief in the creative and intervening powers of the strong and 
virtuous individual, capable both of moulding himself and of leaving his mark on 
the world. On the other hand, it involved a more secular understanding of history, 
where divine providence was largely replaced by Fortuna and the contingent at­
tempts to master it. Civic humanism, then, involved a potentially more optimistic 
view of the capacity of individuals to master their own fate, also in the realm of 
politics, and the God-like glory and honour to be legitimately expected by those 
who did so.73
While the basic idea of republican liberty of the humanists was shared by their 
predecessors, the novel elements brought to the political discourse of the Renais­
sance by Bruni and his followers should be noted. While the notion of virtue as un­
connected with birth and the anti-Augustinean sanctioning of the quest for patri­
otic glory as a value in itself aligned the concerns of earlier teachers of civic rheto­
ric with those of the humanists, the latter introduced a significant shift. The appeal
1978:77-78).
73. Skinner (1978:77-101). For the influence of Cicero, see Baron (1988b). Ac­
cording to Agnes Heller, the “chief consideration [for ‘Renaissance Man*] was how 
fa r he had placed his own stamp on the world ... shape[d] his own destiny, and not 
just in an ethical sense. The dialectic o f man and destiny became the central cate­
gory of a dynamic concept of man" (Heller 1978:9).
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to make politics a glorious way of life and to attain the flourishing of manly virtues 
- for the sake of both liberty and greatness - was addressed not only to a political 
elite of potential podeste, but to the citizenry at large. The republican government 
Bruni had in mind, was a Govemo Largo, not the otherwise celebrated elected oli­
garchy o f Venice. And a major factor in the preservation of republican liberty, now 
introduced, was a citizens’ army, as opposed to mercenary troops. While the rele­
vance of personal security under law was present, it was at times overshadowed by 
what, in the circumstances, Bruni perceived to be a more compelling appeal to the 
honourable activity of governing oneself (and not just being independent), and to 
the generated spin-offs, in particular in the fields of culture and arts, consisting in 
great accomplishments by great men.
But Bruni and the humanists, despite their sense o f contingencies, also intro­
duced a certain negligent complacency as regarded questions of political machinery 
and institutions. They did so in the highly optimistic appeal to an extraordinary 
and selfless willingness in the ordinary citizen to sacrifice himself for the sake of 
honour and glory; and in the downplaying of both the dangers of faction and the 
corruptive effects of wealth and power. These themes were to come back with a 
vengeance in Machiavelli’s darker account.
5*2. Machiavelli
Whatever the modernity of Machiavelli’s conception of (republican) politics, the 
continuity of the argument about liberty and self-government arguably overshad­
owed the differences in the gradually more ‘democratic’ conceptions of the nature, 
locus, and scope of civic virtue. One may argue, with Baron, that a new political 
vocabulary appeared with the civic humanist turn to a politics of honour, glory, 
and fame, and, with Pocock, that it was transmitted to posterity through Machia­
velli. But, as in Cicero, the heroic vocabulary of meaning for man’s secular pur­
suits, in both Machiavelli and Bruni, was still inseparably linked to the common 
good of all of libertas in a free state. Bruni was trained in rhetorics and law, and he 
advocated greatness and liberty.
Thus, it makes a great deal of sense to see the shining moment of civic hu­
manism as an ideological move of legitimation, a touch of glory to political necessity 
that served to link the awareness of liberty with an appeal to the self-consciously 
felt superiority of the happy few (the Florentines), who possessed it and were ad­
mired by others for the accomplishments - artistic, economic, or military - flowing 
from the fountains of a free-spirited and independent people. The bifurcation, sug­
gested by Pocock, between a legal and a civic meaning of libertas ignores the man­
ner in which collectively secured citizenship in a political community is a straight­
forward precondition both for the private life of easy enjoyment and for the civic or 
artistic life o f great accomplishment.
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Pocock’s account of a Renaissance discovery of an ideological conception of 
secular time in terms of the fragility and contingent character of the republic cap­
tures an essential aspect of the mental geography of the period. But to see the fra­
gility-of the republic exclusively in terms of a virtuous way of life, as opposed to. 
and even threatened by, the corruptive language of law and right, is misleading. 
Indeed, it is exactly in the legal language of the period that the fragile and unnatu­
ral nature of the political condition is highlighted. Renaissance uneasiness with 
natural law or natural rights was predicated on an intense contrast, typical of 
Quatrocento humanism, “between civilisation, for which ... a city was essential, and 
the rude and barbaric life of a pre-civilised people“. Of concern here were not tradi­
tional assumptions of the restraints of universal reason addressing untutored hu­
man nature, but the contingent civil laws imposed by human collectivities upon 
themselves, in the form of beneficial “social compacts ... necessary for the survival 
of a society", in order that they might even begin to enjoy the safety of liberty under 
the equal protection of law.74
What we see in Machiavelli is a move towards a statement of the argument 
which is more robust than that of the humanists, as well as the less dynamic ver­
sion of the scholastic authors. Less emphasis was placed on intrinsic gratifications 
and cultural by-products of the activity of self-government, more is placed on the, 
now intensely Roman, understanding of the superior importance, Jor most people, 
of security of person, property, and a peaceful private life, as well as on the general 
wealth and good fortune of the community that follows from this. Most importantly, 
although this well-ordered state of affairs might at times be enjoyed under a good 
prince, ruling with just laws in the common interest, Machiavelli undertook a sus­
tained analysis to establish that liberty in private affairs was best secured by politi­
cal liberty and civic virtue, despite the many dangers and problems this involved.
Machiavelli knew that, while only few men wanted power and glory, most indi­
viduals preferred “enjoying what one has, freely and without incurring suspicion ... 
the assurance that one's wife and children will be respected, the absence of fear for 
oneself. The necessity of linking this general interest in security of home and 
hearth with civic virtue, as “that common advantage ... which results from a self- 
governing state" was at the heart of Machiavelli’s argument.75 In this, and in the 
closely linked conception of republican liberty as absence of external or internal 
dominance and existence of republican constitution and self-government, we are 
on well-charted territoiy. The wars that must be waged to secure liberty, while al­
lowing the virtuous man his fame, first of all present the spectre, vividly portrayed 
in some of Machiavelli’s literaiy work, of anarchy, fear and lawlessness, and the 
loss of prosperity and property.
74. Tuck (1979:33,38).
75. Machiavelli, The Discourses, 1,16, cp. 11,2.
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Pocock’s notion that Machiavelli was unconcerned with law is difficult to 
maintain. States were created to begin with, again a familiar theme introduced 
early in the Discorsi, in order to have security and peace, and this in turn was fur­
ther facilitated if “a prince [were] to give them a constitution" (the virtue of whose 
content was the measure of his own virtue as a founder of cities), or if the people 
alone could agree to begin “to live as a community under laws [legg$”.7&
In Machiavelli, the ‘negative’ aspect of republican liberty, which was installed 
through constitutions and laws and secured by some measure of popular political 
power, was closely linked, much like in Cicero, to a number of ways in which citi­
zens could enjoy civic equality, not just in the exercise of their right to vote or, oc­
casionally, to deliberate, but to enjoy the same civic status. Being a citizen meant 
not to be interfered with unlawfully by the powerful; the absence of subjurisdic­
tions in the city, controlled by gentiluomini and having the same chances, based on 
merit, of social mobility and entiy into public office. Machiavelli’s very early notion 
of a state (stato) as an instrument to be seized and used for the purposes of its 
holder unless rigidly checked corresponded to the historical background where 
nepotism was a major and very immediate concern for the newly risen classes, and 
certainly for the ambitious Machiavelli himself.77
But Machiavelli’s Florence, struggling, eventually in vain, for its survival, was 
not the strong and stable republic which Bruni at least convinced himself to be
76. Further, the chaotic license often attributed to popular rule, according to Ma­
chiavelli, is an outcome of the absence of law, and hence “anyone who does not 
regulate his conduct by laws [leggìi will make the same mistakes as the masses are 
guilty o r  (Discourses, 1,58). In the Istorie Fiorentine, Machiavelli distinguished be­
tween seruiiù (the lawless rule of the nobility), licenza (the lawless rule of the peo­
ple), and actual liberty under law, libertà, with the latter, interestingly, being a pos­
sible (if not a regular) feature also o f some heavily oligarchic governments. Free 
cities were “bene ordinate”:
Vero è che quando pure avviene (che avviene rade volte) che per buona 
fortuna della città surga in quella un savio, buono e potente cittadino, da 
il quale si ordinino leggi per le quali questi umori de’ nobili e de* popolani 
si quietino, o in modo si ristringhino che male operare non possino, 
allora è che quella città si può chiamare libera e quello stato si può 
stabile e fermo giudicare (Machiavelli, Istorie Fiorentine, IV, 1).
As in Cicero and in the later tradition, the ‘negative*, Roman-legal, core point of lib­
ertas as a bastion against government arbitrariness and breaches of civil peace, is 
apparent. On Machiavelli’s various uses of libertà and related terms, see Colish 
(1971). More generally, it has been shown that the word ordini and the related 
terms modi, leggi, costate and constituzioni may be found 761 times in the Discorsi 
and also, to a slightly lesser extent, are prominent in Machiavelli’s other work (J.H. 
Whitfield, Discourses on MachiaueUi (Cambridge: Heifer, 1969), pp. 141-63, cited in 
Parel 1990:533).
77. Machiavelli, Discourses, 1,16,1,55; 111,28; That this was the nature of the link­
age between law, citizenship rights, and the prevailing civism of the Tuscan cities is 
demonstrated by Riesenberg (1969).
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seeing. Apart from the unprecedented sophistication and detail of his analysis. Ma- 
chiavelli introduced a quite novel degree of sanguinity and realism to republican 
discourse. He was intensely sensitive to the frailty of human nature and to the ob­
stacles to motivating a body of citizens to virtue. One may say that he turned the 
fragility of liberty argument against earlier republican writers’ cherished assump­
tions in a dialectical manner, by showing the civic preconditions of sustaining a 
fragile liberty to be themselves intensely fragile, and to be so in ways so far uncon­
fronted. Machiavelli saw that self-interest and fear were the rational components of 
a political common interest of citizens, but he also saw that this rationality needed 
guidance and reminding. Most individuals by nature, while egoistic and prone to 
cheating, did not behave rationally. They were always likely to choose easy gratifi­
cations and short-term solutions, all to their own ruin. And they were certainly not 
likely to be moral and susceptible to respond to the call of duty.
Machiavelli himself subscribed to ideals of manly pursuit of glory. But unlike 
the more complacent humanists, he could see both that such pursuits were poten­
tially dangerous for the republic, and that the ideals they incorporated might be 
necessary as factors of motivation. Moreover, while the ultimate goals of the repub­
lic were clear, the means to seek them and the conditions for their prevalence were 
not. Machiavelli’s critique of the Ciceronian ideal ruler, who, far from following the 
righteous path of dispensation of justice, must also know how, and be prepared, 
not to be just, is notorious. The Machiavellian dialectic of the lion and the fox will 
not, however, be discussed here. It corresponds to a more general notion of the po­
litical universe, also after some republican order has been installed, as naturally 
fraught with conflicts. These had to be managed through prudence and compro­
mise, and the common good of liberty had to be established and secured in often 
roundabout ways, none of them leading to perfect harmony.
A  free state or republic, in Machiavelli’s view, was a state that was able to de­
fend itself against invaders and internal despotism, and hence capable of providing 
security and prosperity for its citizens. Such a state would stand the best chance of 
remaining free, if the citizens were sovereign. The populace in power, if disciplined 
by leaders and in particular by laws and public customs, was likely to be “stable, 
prudent and grateful", less susceptible to rash opinions and reckless action than 
princes, and more suited, all things considered, to sustain what princes had insti­
tuted of laws and institutions. They would be so all the more because, unlike the 
nobility, they were more interested in liberty than domination, both by virtue of 
their umori and because they could not so easily come to dominate.78 The Discorsi
78. "If we ask what it is that the nobility are after and what it is the common people 
are after, it will be seen that in the former there is a greater desire to dominate and in 
the latter merely the desire not to be dominated. Consequently the latter will be more 
keen on liberty since their hope of usuiping dominion over others will be less than in 
the case of the upper class. So that if the populace be made the guardians of liberty.
"N
abounds with other, more specific advice on how to keep citizens in shape.79 If a 
republic was in disorder, although the chances might be slim, “a good man" might 
be able to make a difference, either as a truly eloquent citizen, capable of inspiring 
and persuading, instilling hope and determination in the hearts of his fellows, or, 
in the rare cases of a "good man ready to use bad methods", as a redeeming prince 
with insight into the Machiavellian dialectic of liberty and liberation, of politics and 
reason of state.80
Yet, the virtue of citizens, even helped and supported by all these measures, 
could not be easily acquired, nor even maintained, once mobilised. In order to im­
bue the populace with the virtue needed to found republics (in Machiavelli, willing­
ness to fight in wars, exercise of political prudence as sovereign citizens, and vigi­
lant control of signori) and to keep it in existence as long as possible, other meas­
ures were needed to prevent or counterbalance tendencies towards corruzione. Cor­
ruption, to Machiavelli, was the tendency of citizens to either forget or fail to recog­
nise their obligations, or simply to free-ride on the efforts of other citizens.81 One 
should always expect citizens to be easily tempted by petty rewards and short term 
gains. They would also be more feeble-minded, or, as a result of Christian teach­
ings, “humble and contemplative", rather than men of action.82 Corruption though, 
again starting in Machiavelli, may also refer to the general political culture o f a 
country, where there might be more or less taste for liberty, awareness of its fragil­
ity, and determination to defend it. Two measures countering corruption, discussed 
by Machiavelli, involved the controlled mobilisation of passion and identification 
with the city. One was the use of pagan religious rites. The other was participation 
in civic life, by which, in this context. Machiavelli mainly had in mind military 
service:
it is reasonable to suppose that they will take more care of it, and that, since it is im­
possible for them to usurp power, they will not permit others to do so" (Discourses, 
1.5).
79. To note a few: Outlets for civic discords (which may then, crucially, be benefi­
cial) must be provided (Discourses, 1,4); inequality (existence of an idle gentry) must 
be checked, lest citizens be alienated (1,55); public indictments of individuals com­
mitting offences against the state may pre-empt other such attempts through fear, as 
well as provide scape goats that take out the steam of public passions (1,7); leaders 
must take care to show gratitude to citizens (1,28-32); ancient customs must be re­
spected (1,37).
80. Machiavelli, Discourses, 1,18,58; Ehnmark (1986).
81. "That common advantage which results from a self-governing state is not rec­
ognized by anybody so long as it is possessed ... for no one admits that he incurs 
an obligation to another ..." (Discourses, 1,16). According to Skinner (1986:243), 
this “is simply a failure of rationality". This is only so, of course, if we talk of collec­
tive rationality. In game-theoretical terms, the problem is exactly that corruption is 
individually rational. Whether or not the collective efforts of the others will sustain 
liberty, one’s own individual contribution is unlikely to make a difference.
82. Machiavelli, Discourses, 1,42; n.2,60.
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Machiavelli's precious Rome partly owed its long life as a republic to the or­
chestration by its leaders of a pagan religion which served to link the fate of the pa­
tria and its particular history and possible future with the (possible) favour of dei­
ties and with the performance of rites. If religion was to support civic virtue, it had 
to be a civic religion. Christian teachings, according to Machiavelli, promoted a 
passive and contemplative character and would channel people’s best sentiments 
in an otherworldly direction.83 Numa, in introducing a religion of his own making 
(pretending “to have private conferences with a nymph who advised him about the 
advice he should give to the people"), knew "how much religion helped in the con­
trol of armies, in encouraging the plebs, in producing good men, and in shaming 
the bad". According to Machiavelli, Numa was only doing what every legislator did, 
realising that, while new laws and institutions were in the interest of the people, 
and while it was tn the people’s own interest to make sacrifices for the common 
good, this might not be readily grasped by the many.84 Religion installed fear in 
citizens; but it was also a manner of securing allegiance and dedication to the fa­
therland as a common good, by making rites and rituals have "the basis of its life 
rooted in some one of its [the country’s] main institutions".85
As regards the second measure, Machiavelli had a distaste for professional sol­
diers which became a standard element of the republican tradition for centuries to 
come.86 The part-time soldier with his private home, family, and occupation, on one 
hand, would be the best and most reliable soldier as he would fight bravely and 
wish to end the war in order to return home. On the other hand, he would also be 
the best citizen, being confirmed through fighting of the great value and fragility of 
his city and of the cooperative character of its defence. Military service directed the 
energy of the citizen-soldier towards the preservation of the republic and provided a 
noble Image of self-sacrifice for the common good of the fatherland that could serve 
as an inspiration for civic virtue.
83. Beginning In Roman times, and continuing throughout the middle ages, the 
word patriotism lost its meaning of emotional attachment to a particular and temporal 
fatherland, and was given a Christian meaning, as the allegiance to the Augustlnian 
eternal City of God. With the renaissance and the development of city states, the old, 
classical, meaning of patriotism began to come back, with Machiavelli detaching it 
completely from its Christian connotations (Dietz 1989).
84. "Nor in fact was there ever a legislator who, in introducing extraordinary laws 
to a people, did not have recourse to God, for otherwise they would not have been 
accepted, since many benefits of which a prudent man is aware, are not so evident 
to reason that he can convince others of them. Hence wise men, in order to escape 
this difficulty, have recourse to God. So Lycurgus did, so did Solon, and so have 
many others done who have had the same end in view" (Machiavelli, Discourses, 
U l ) .
85. Machiavelli, Discourses, 1,11-12.
86. Pocock (1975:195-218).
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In I ’Arte della Guerra, Machiavelli laid out the motivational structure. In Rome, 
a large number of individuals, including a great many foreigners, were granted civic 
rights and armed. Being of independent means and private occupation, they were 
able to link their understanding of their own private good with that of the city. Be­
cause of this, and in gratitude for their citizens’ status, they devoted themselves to 
the patrin.&7 In Pocock’s words, this was a state of “equality" - not in terms of strict 
economic equality or absence of political authority - but "a state of affairs in which 
all look to the public good alike”.87 8 In Aristotle, citizens discuss common affairs, 
each from their own perspective. But all perceive a link between their private good 
and that of the city, and eventually develop a sense of identification and love of the 
city which then serves them in battle. In Machiavelli’s theory of motivation to civic 
virtue, while he notes the rational core of citizen’s enjoyment of rights and security 
of livelihood, there is more emphasis on the immediacy of war and danger than on 
deliberation or more peaceful citizens' pursuits. This, incidentally, also commits 
him to the view that civic virtue requires a policy of military expansion.
For Machiavelli the problem of motivation, to summarise, entailed the need to 
mobilise belonging and identification with the patria as a way of reminding citizens, 
who quite well know what it is they most prefer,89 of the fragility of these goods, of 
the need for sacrifice to enjoy them, and of the manner in which their enjoyment as 
a “common advantage which results from a self-governed state“90 presupposed 
solidarity and cooperation, and suggested the need for gratitude and allegiance to 
the particular republic which facilitated it. One way of providing it was to link this 
fragility to a sense of sacredness, divine direction, and potential favour; another 
was based on the most concrete experience of the fragility of the republic in war, 
which made civic virtue a noble ideal to aspire to in itself.
Machiavelli’s account was both the pinnacle and the swan-song of Renaissance 
republicanism. But it is a mistake to see this fact as a reflection of a changing con­
ception o f what was the basic good to be furthered in politics. Pocock has seen a 
difference between Machiavelli, the advocate of ‘positive’ liberty, and his contempo-
87. “A prince, who would reign in security, ought to select only such men for his 
infantry as will cheerfully serve him in War, when it is necessary, and be glad to 
return home after it is over. This will always be the case with those who have other 
occupations and employments by which to live“ (Machiavelli, The Art o f War, p.21).
88. Pocock (1975:209).
89. A prince installing himself in a populace that has been kept in servitude, re­
marks Machiavelli, faces two demands. One is the desire for revenge, which is eas­
ily satisfied. The other is freedom. Ordinary citizens, again, “who demand but to 
live in security ... can easily be satisfied by introducing such institutions and laws 
as shall, in conjunction with the power of the prince, make for the security of the 
public as a whole. When a prince does this, and the people see that on no occasion 
does he break such laws, in a short time they will begin to live in security and 
contentment“ (Machiavelli, Discourses, 1,16).
90. Machiavelli, Discourses, 1,16.
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raiy Guicciardini, the advocate of ‘negative’ liberty.91 However, the Dialogue on the 
Government o f Florence, written very much up against the Discorsi does not diverge 
at the level of political ends, but rather as regards the proper means and the overall 
evaluation of what is the possible ‘second-best’ in any relevant set of circum­
stances. Guicciardini’s analysis led him to believe that a measure of power abuse 
and favouritism must be accepted for the sake of the stability that only a single 
ruler or a restricted group of people could secure, at least under conditions pre­
vailing in his and Machiavelli’s Florence.92 Accepting this may certainly have come 
easier to Guicciardini, as a banker who had no personal interest in civic equality. 
His was an aristocratic temper, and he was less inclined to consider the prefer­
ences of the ordinary citizen, although by no means in favour of princely rule and 
unmerited privilege.
But the main difference between him and Machiavelli lies in the evaluation of 
the possible role of the people. At one level, the difference regarded the possibility 
or danger of ignoring the voice of the people and the degree of trust in the collective 
wisdom and prudence to be found there. In the dominating voice of Guicciardini's 
Bernardo, this trust was indeed low.93 At a deeper level, the difference consisted in 
Machiavelli’s completely new acceptance of conflict as the inevitable material and 
medium of the generation of political legitimacy and stability. Machiavelli’s en­
dorsement. in the Discorsi of civic conflict in Rome as positively beneficial for the 
health of that republic and the quality of its laws is well known. The acceptance of 
conflict was far from complacent. However, in the discussions of the Istorie Floren­
tine. Machiavelli reaches a seemingly opposite verdict, the discord and strife of 
Florence being exactly the cause of its troubles.94
Clearly, there were conflicts and conflicts. Certain behaviour patterns of egoism 
and jealousy were constants of human nature: people would seek civic equality, 
and then more substantial equality - partaking in le robe, property and wealth. Or
91. Pocock (1981a:356).
92. Guicciardini, like Machiavelli. had no illusions whatsoever about what this 
meant, for instance in the case of Cosimo di Medici (Guicciardini, Dialogue on the 
Government o f Florence, pp.24-35).
93. For instance, “apart from lacking the necessary secrecy and speed, all matters 
that have to be decided by many people suffer in addition from irresolution, since 
very often there is no agreement and one man’s point of view is not another’s" ... 
“Where many people are involved in discussion, there is a danger of corruption: for 
as private individuals who do not hold the common interest as their own, they can 
easily be corrupted by promises and princely gifts" ... Th is is why I say that the 
decisions of popular governments are unsound, not only initially, in their begin­
nings, but in every stage they go through right up to the end" ... “I think the people 
make more mistakes, because they consider things less, understand less, know 
less" (Guicciardini, Dialogue, pp.62-66). On Guicciardini’s complex position, see Vi- 
roli (1992:178-200) and Silvano (1990).
94. Bock (1990).
they would, if they could, try to dominate other groups, or at least make sure not to 
be dominated themselves.95 Certain conflicts of interest between classes, certain 
basic aspirations and umori of each that the others would only respect reluctantly, 
were built into the fabric of the political universe. These tendencies were rules of 
the game, but the way they manifested themselves was not given. What was not 
necessary, although difficult to avoid, was the degeneration of conflict into violence, 
popular participation in government into mob rule, the ambition of the strong into 
oppression. No one group, with its rational and natural interests (the people in lib­
erty and security, the nobles in honour) must be allowed to overstep its limits, 
threaten another unduly, and secure privilege and power entirely for itself. This 
was the stuff of Machiavelli’s version of Aristotle’s moderation.
In good conflicts, reasoned demands and desires were forwarded in a civic, 
peaceful manner, subjected to deliberation and compromise, thus fine-tuning the 
law and the common good. Bad conflicts arose when the aspirations of groups, for 
lack of good laws, leadership, or whatever cause, got out of hand: or alternatively,96 
as a result of the private or dan-based quests for office and privilege for oneself and 
one’s amici through modi privati, a tendency which was squarely condemned by 
Machiavelli. An example of both aspects of the latter in Florence’s history was the 
revolt of the Florentine woolworkers, the Ciompi.97 Unlike other commentators, Ma- 
chiavelli perceived the material background and complete rationality of the events. 
He condemned the ambition of the Ciompi to exclude their enemies from any politi­
cal power (thence causing further resentment). But he also saw that this exclusion 
was a revenge for past injustices and the unwillingness of the other classes to meet 
the most minimal needs of the plebs.98
Machiavelli offers no blue-print solutions. There will aluxn/s be conflict, be­
cause of the different interests and dispositions o f different types of individuals, 
and there will always be egoism and disregard for the common good. Conflicts may
95. “Ancient writers were of the opinion that men are wont to get annoyed with 
adversity and fed up with prosperity, both of which passions give rise to the same 
effects. For, whenever there is no need for men to fight, they fight for ambition’s 
sake, and so powerful is the sway that ambition exercises over the human heart 
that it never relinquishes them, no matter how high they have risen. The reason is 
that nature has so constituted men that, though all things are objects of desire, not 
all things are attainable; so that desire always exceeds the power of attainment, 
with the result that men are ill content with what they possess and their present 
state brings them little satisfaction” (Machiavelli, Discourses, 1,37).
96. This distinction is shown by Bock (1990:196-7), in an important discussion of 
conflict in Machiavelli.
97. Bock (1990:193-96).
98. Machiavelli’s most famous treatment o f conflict appears in Discourses, 1,2-5. 
Discussing the disrupting conflict which arose from the agrarian laws at Rome, 
Machiavelli significantly refuses to change his overall opinion. The conflict might 
have come anyway, it was brought about by a failure to pacify the material aspira­
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be civilised and domesticated and egoism may be checked through poRtièal meas-g 
ures. but achieving this cannot be reduced to a question of which gr)Suj^hou|^ 
govern, or how a right Polybian balance is achieved. Machiavelli’s type of softfttóíi is 
novel because dynamic and conflict-accepting: The people must protect itself from 
its rulers, but the political community must also be protected from the people's 
partiality. Civic virtue must be guided, passions tempered, and legitimate interests 
must be recognised through the right laws, avoiding privilege, enforcing the com­
mon interest, institutionalising rational solutions and compromises. At the same 
time such laws are themselves the outcome of virtue, and there is no absolutely 
safe and certain way to enter the virtuous circle of a political culture of mutual 
trust and common advantage.
The compromise, expressed legally as a constitutional settlement, was a dis­
pensation of working, secular fairness, giving something to everybody, defending 
the weak and minimising the possibilities of the strong to dominate and exercise 
their greed (but also rendering safe their position and enjoyment of glory). This is 
what is entailed in Machiavelli’s notion of justice, not used often," as that first im­
portant ‘basic framework* of political order which must be in place in a republic, 
although it is temporarily violated by the good ruler who must be able to subsume 
it, as a principle of action, to more important virtues. And closer to Machiavelli’s 
more usual language, it is the content of the bene commune,9 100 or the common sen- 
sical but loosely delineated notion of a state of affairs, brought about by law and 
ordini and secured in the last resort by citizens themselves, where partial interests 
and egoism is not allowed to reign, where everybody in their different natural sta­
tions may enjoy, be sure to enjoy, and appreciate the enjoyment of, a great good 
that transcends whatever more or less legitimate claim they may continue to have 
about a distribution of powers, honours, or offices, more favourable for themselves.
The bene commune of shared liberty, whatever its specific constitutional and le­
gal content, is a more political, less transformative notion of legitimacy than Rous­
seau’s volunté générale, and unburdened both with the latter’s moralism and its 
Romantic conception of a culturally and spiritually unified people. To a significant 
extent, it leaves groups and individuals as they are, extracting only a necessary de­
gree of civility and willingness to compromise, but claiming also their loyalty and 
sacrifice in the name of a common interest that transcends remaining (class) differ­
ences - a common good which Machiavelli, to convince Guicciardini and others o f 
his station, contrasted to the servitude o f all under a foreign power.
tions of the plebs, and aggravated by retrospective legislation (Discourses, 1,37).
99. But see Machiavelli, Allocution to a Magistrate, and, for commentary, de Grazia 
(1989: 190-94), Parel (1990).
100. For the meaning of Machiavelli’s bene commune, and its close relation to jus­
tice, liberty, and (civic) equality, see de Grazia (1989:157-93).
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With Machiavelli’s hyper-sensitivity to the dangers and contingencies of politics 
the republican discourse lost its remaining humanist and classical innocence. Ma- 
chiavelli’s optimum political state, the point when a city may enjoy ‘happiness’, was 
one of peace, liberty, and danger. Like his predecessors he developed the theme of 
liberty’s dependence on civic virtue: states had to be created, conquest and signori 
resisted, good customs and the spirit of laws reinforced, the remembrance of foun­
dations maintained and renewed. But such virtue in turn was fuelled by a passion 
and tendency to partiality which threatened to render the cure almost as danger­
ous as the disease. Securing the right, rational passion - with a constant human 
nature little given to rationality - was the point; but such a sentiment was a thor­
oughly artificial product which, although nourished in the citizen militia, itself had 
to be domesticated and channelled in the right direction. It would be so domesti­
cated by being based on workable constitutional compromises balancing opposing 
interests and preserving the collective rationality so easily forgotten by individuals, 
by reinforcement through good laws which were seen as such by the people, and by 
being hedged in by customs and norms of public civility, tranquillising political 
conflicts.
Machiavelli's ultimate concern was a united Italy, although his writings do little 
to suggest the character of such a polity. But it was Guicciardini and his pessimis­
tic views on popular political (in)competence that fit the political moods of the 
times. In later political contexts in France, Britain, and the United States, the re­
publican discourse of the fiagility of liberty came to deal with somewhat different 
problems. Among them, questions of size and numbers and increasing ambiguity 
about the content of civic virtue became important. We look at these matters in the 
following chapters.
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Chapter 3:
Republicanism in the Early Modern State
1. Introduction
The eclipse of the Italian city state did not bring total extinction to republican self- 
government. It survived in various forms in independent cities of Northern Europe. 
However, after Machiavelli, republican theoretical discourse lay practically dormant 
for more than a hundred years. In this chapter, we look at three important stages 
of its modem revival. Here, republicanism becomes formulated in the radically dif­
ferent context of the centralised, post-feudal modem state. In Britain, the discourse 
became a doctrine of rebellion, but also a way to legitimise a political order which 
was installed to protect individual rights, including property rights. Both aspects 
were easily adaptable for export to the New World. British republicanism also 
marked the beginning of a discourse, which had Montesquieu as its classical repre­
sentative, which tried to meet and accommodate itself to the new language and re­
alities of commercial society. Finally, Rousseau confronted Montesquieu’s verdict 
that classical republicanism was unfit for a modem age of large states, making a 
backward-looking argument in favour of a liberty enjoyed in Spartan simplicity. But 
Rousseau also formulated an egalitarian individualism which saw the prime danger 
to be not Montesquieu’s modem despotism, as much as the unresponsiveness of 
states failing to cater for the security, property, and general welfare of the least of 
their number.
Before looking at each of these republican moments, consider Pocock’s account 
of the period, beginning with the English revival. To Pocock, Harrington was the 
key transmitter of republicanism to Britain. As “the theorist of the commonwealth 
of participatory virtue", he would mourn the loss of “fulfilment in the practice of 
active self-rule". According to Pocock, Harrington was not concerned with property 
and land out of ’possessive individualism*.1 Rather, the significance of property had 
become an extension of the concern with arms in antiquity and in Machiavelli, 
“[G]od’s Englishman was now zoon politikon in virtue of his sword and his freehold", 
and
land was acquired ... in order ... to found families or oikoi based on the 
security of inheritance, which set the sons free to bear arms and cast 
ballots in the muster of the commonwealth. As with Aristotle, the end of
1. MacPherson (1962:160-93).
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land is not profit, but leisure: the opportunity to act in the public realm 
or assembly, to display virtue2
The period from the fall of the Italian city states to some time before the Glorious 
Revolution. Pocock acknowledges, was dominated by a “law-centred, king-centred, 
and God-centred thinking“ out of which slowly emerged radical Calvinist revisions 
of celestial and temporal authority, and questions of when, and in the name of 
what, a ruler might be resisted. Here, Ciceronian natural law became progressively 
transformed into a language of popular sovereignty, individual rights as self­
ownership and contract. But not only was this “populism" distinct from the lan­
guage of virtue, its classical formulation in Locke, according to Pocock, signalled 
the end rather than the beginning of its important age. From “1688 to 1776 (and 
after), the central question in Anglophone political theory was not whether a ruler 
might be resisted for misconduct, but whether a regime founded on patronage, 
public debt, and professionalisation of the armed forces did not corrupt both gov­
ernors and governed; and corruption was a problem in virtue, not in right”. To Po­
cock, liberalism as a dominant political idiom was not so much a part of the revo­
lutionary foundations of modem states as is commonly believed, and the very doc­
trine of individual rights, because of its incompatibility with accounts of man's ca­
pacity for self-knowledge, self-development, and a fully human life, had to fight for 
its survival.3
In post-Lockean England, “for a century and a half, from the Bill of Exclusion 
through the American Revolution to the First Reform Act, the secret of English gov­
ernment, and the matter of English political debate, was ... the role of patronage, 
or, as its enemies termed it, corruption"; and "this was to be discussed in terms of 
the relation of property to personality“.4 The danger was "less the encroachment of 
the executive’s constitutional powers on those of the legislative", but rather "its ca­
pacity to bring the members of the legislature, and of society in general, into per­
sonal, political, and economic dependence upon it". In Andrew Fletcher, Charles 
Davenant and others who supported Country (or old Whig) views against the Court 
and the entrenched monied interests around the crown, Pocock traces, in several 
stages, concerns with the danger of luxury and cultural specialisation, as endemi- 
cal to liberty and moral independence, and with a standing army financed through 
public debt. Credit, as opposed to land, "symbolised ... the power of opinion, pas­
sion and fantasy in human affairs". Trenchard’s and Gordon’s influentially polemi­
cal Cato’s Letters advanced “a distinctly Machiavellian and neo-Harringtonian cri­
tique of corruption and of the republic which is its opposite". Having accepted as
2. Pocock (1975:386,390,397; 1981a:357; 1985b:31). See also Pocock (1971a).
3. Pocock (1981a:363-64).
4. The problem of 'patronage*, after the Glorious Revolution, arose from the in­
troduction of a system of public credit, with private lenders of capital to the gov­
ernment incurring dependence on the state for returns and expected favours.
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Inevitable the existence of trade and the impossibility of a landed commonwealth. 
Pocock notes that their criticisms (of exclusive trading companies, a parliament 
populated by investors and landowners incurring dependence through debt) con­
tained few practical suggestions, only moralising calls. However, the point of this 
(monarchical) republic was to secure that men might be “equal in their opportunity 
of virtue”. Unpolished virtue, it is granted, was now recognised as having to be 
transformed into politeness, and commerce, properly regulated, would do that. The 
price to be paid for this was “admission that we are governed by our fantasies and 
passions”, however, these passions “now appear as the pursuits of private and par­
ticular goods, familiar to us from the whole tradition of Aristotelian politics and 
ethics", each of them competing but also transformable (when people were forced 
by political institutions to take a longer view) into “the passion for pursuing the 
public good”. And finally, these blind passions of men could at least momentarily 
become focused and rationalised by the discipline of a civic activism whose isono- 
mia counteracted the corrupting influence of inequalities of fortune, thus “bringing 
men out of the cave into the sunlight".5
Pocock’s Montesquieu and Rousseau are cut from much the same cloth. They 
too, in each their way. exemplify a civic humanism intensely occupied with the 
conditions of personal authenticity in a modernity characterised by “a chaos o f ap­
petites ... flourishing in a world of rapid and irrational change”. Montesquieu basi­
cally counts as a member of this Anglican family of backward looking civic republi­
cans. While repeating and developing the themes of commerce and passion as con­
ducive. under certain specified conditions of pluralism and competition for power, 
to a free society (England) and to a refined civilisation, he also recognises and la­
ments the fact that “the ultimate incompatibility remained. Commerce had taken 
the place of fortune; the republic could not control its own history forever or resist 
its own corruption”.6
Finally, Rousseau, who is only briefly referred to in Moment, was the
Machiavelli of the eighteenth century, in the sense that he dramatically 
and scandalously pointed out a contradiction that others were trying to 
live with (...) it was his role to insist that the contradiction [between 
virtue and culture] was intolerable precisely at the moment of personal 
existence7
It is useful to note Pocock’s description of late civic humanism in contrast to the 
picture that he paints of the court discourse with which it was competing. The lat­
ter was founded
Pocock (1975:452,468-472; 1985d:66-67).
Pocock (1975:486,493).
Pocock (1975:504).
5.
6. 
7.
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1upon an ... credit as a measure of economic value and of a psychology of 
imagination, passion, and interest as the mainsprings of human 
behaviour. In the place of virtue it stressed the ego’s pursuit of 
satisfaction and self-esteem, and was beginning to explore theories of 
how the diversities of passionate and self-interested action might be 
manipulated and coordinated, or might magically and mechanically 
coordinate themselves, into promoting a common good no longer 
intimately connected with the inner moral life of the individual8
With the exception of Rousseau, I think that Pocock vastly overestimates the degree 
to which the republican concern with alienation and authenticity was moral in its 
character, and that he underestimates the republican recognition of passion, ego­
ism, and personal interest as an inevitable background to civic virtue. He misses 
the way that commerce, ‘fantasy’, and polite society are often perceived as much 
more than a poor substitute for Aristotelian wholeness of character, so that no 
clear break in the discourse of human values occurs between for instance Cato’s 
Letters or Montesquieu and those that Pocock consider to be their opponents. And 
while Pocock highlights significant contrasts between the different means to secure, 
protect, and further human value - the power of a mechanically checked executive 
or the workings of an invisible hand as opposed to the mobilisation and preserva­
tion of civic virtue - he fails to acknowledge the towering evidence in the republican 
writers of the period, including Rousseau, of common libertas as the constant, 
shared concern.
2. Early English Republicanism
What was the nature of anglicised republicanism? In the pre- and postrevolutionary 
writings of English republicanism, three exemplary high points stand out, although 
the period was densely populated with political voices. With Harrington’s Oceana 
(1656), the Italian Renaissance was imported to England. With Cato’s Letters (1720- 
1724) by John Ttenchard and Thomas Gordon, and with Algernon Sidney’s Dis­
courses Concerning Government (1698), republicanism was being prepared for ex­
port to America. The latter writer, executed in 1683, fifteen years before his work 
was published, also provided republican discourse with a noble martyr, often re­
ferred to by American writers.
I believe Pocock’s picture is deficient in several, by now familiar respects. In 
their different ways, Harrington, Sidney, and the authors of Cato’s letters were 
seeking means to safeguard a republic o f common liberty, rather than lamenting a 
bygone age o f Aristotelian virtues. Their contexts and agendas were somewhat di­
verging. Harrington, implicitly calling upon Cromwell to institute an agrarian re­
public, was one of the first to suggest a form of representative system of govem-
8. Pocock (1975:487).
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ment with extended suffrage and division of powers, coupling this (unlike the more 
radical levelers? before him) with an Aristotelian analysis of (landed) property’ and 
political equality as the basis of political power and stability, and with a classical 
and Machiavellian analysis of mixed government and the natural dispositions of 
classes.
Sidney, opposing absolute monarchy after the restoration in 1660 and refuting, 
like later on Locke, Filmer’s Patriarcha on the paternal legitimacy of kings, com­
bined a radical republican defence of self-government and rights of resistance as 
the bulwark of constitutionalism with an early individualist account of natural lib­
erty and derived rights which is close in some ways to the Second Treatise.
And Cato, writing some time after the Glorious Revolution and marrying Sid­
ney’s republicanism to a defence of constitutional monarchy, combined complete 
acceptance of the beneficial effects of commercial society with a spirited attack on 
political corruption and unaccountable magistrates abusing their powers and posi­
tions in a such society for personal gain.
In each their contexts and with slightly different emphases these authors com­
bined a clearly republican language of active citizenship and fragile political order, 
of virtue and corruption, with acceptance of commerce and private interest, recogni­
tion of natural law, and doctrines of popular sovereignty and consent, all of which 
entangled republican discourse much more with ‘liberal* ideas than Pocock and 
others have been inclined to admit. We return to this point in the following chapter. 
Here, without embarking on any comprehensive exposition of the respective politi­
cal projects of the three authors, a number of points may be made.
First, the equal liberty they sought was libertas. Harrington, on the first page of 
Oceana distinguished between ancient and modem prudence, the former being
an art whereby a civil society of men is instituted and preserved upon 
the foundation of common right and interest, or (to follow Aristotle and 
Livy) it is an empire of laws and not of men
as opposed to the modem art “whereby some man, or some few men, subject a city 
or a nation, and rule it according unto his or their private Interest".9 10 Directed, not 
least, towards the monarchical apology and impatient anti-republicanism of Hob­
bes. Harrington stressed the difference between liberty "by the laws" and liberty 
"/rom the laws", the latter being insecure individual licentia, the former being the 
legal status of independence and immunity that a commonwealth of citizens, de­
pending on its prudence, was able to institute for itself.11 Sidney, echoing Harring­
9. Wooton (1992).
10. Harrington. The Commonwealth o f Oceana, The Political Works of James Har­
rington (p.161).
11. The passage is worth quoting:
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ton and Machiavelli, noted the absurdity of Filmer’s view that kings placed above 
law could ever govern “/or the people’s good, and the preservation o f their liberty", as 
the blessings of a good king could not be relied upon:
he is a slave who serves the best and gentlest man in the world ... and he 
does serve him if he must obey his commands, and depends upon his 
will
and ( *
we have no other way of distinguishing between free nations and such as 
are not so, than that the free are governed by their own laws and 
magistrates according to their own mind...(and] Ih]e is a free man who 
lives as best pleases himself, under laws made by his own consent12
To Cato, finally
Liberty is to live upon one’s own Terms; Slavery is to live at the mere 
Mercy of another; and a Life of Slavery is ... a continual State of 
Uncertainty and Wretchedness, often an Apprehension of Violence, often 
the lingering Dread of a Violent Death
The authors return, in a similar vein, again and again to the contrast between ar­
bitrary power and the common liberty secured by constitutional law.13
Nor was the purpose of liberty under law an unfamiliar one. To Sidney “the 
ends of government” principally included the “preservation of the whole people ... 
the defence of the liberty, life and estate of every private man", and meeting them
The mountain hath brought forth, and we have a little equivocation! For 
to say that a Lucchese hath no more liberty or immunity from the laws of 
Lucca than a turk hath from those of Constantinople, are pretty different 
speeches. The first may be said of all governments alike, the second of 
scarce any two; much less of these, seing it is known that whereas the 
greatest bashaw is a tenant as well o f his head as o f his estate, of the will 
of his lord, the meanest Lucchese that hath land is a freeholder of both 
and not to be controlled but by the law; and that framed by every private 
man to no other end (or they may thank themselves) than to protect the 
liberty of every private man” (Harrington, Oceana, pp. 170-71, italics 
added).
Pocock significantly, but highly unconvincingly, wants the passage to show that 
"the vocabulary o f the law [sic] is almost wholly lacking from Harrington’s dis­
course -  he held that there was in the human animal something ... which required 
fulfillment in the practice of active self rule" (Pocock 1981a:357).
12. Sidney, Discourses Concerning Government, 111,19. In his Court Maxims, Sidney 
developed a comprehensive doctrine o f religious toleration and freedom of con­
sciousness which was close to Locke (Houston 1991:122-30). As noted by Houston, 
championing this particular set of private immunities fits poorly with Pocock’s and 
others’ insistence that (English) republicans were exclusively concerned with ’posi­
tive’ liberty.
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entailed that “publick safety be provided, liberty and propriety secured, justice ad­
ministered, virtue encouraged, vice suppressed”.13 4 Trenchard and Gordon spoke, in 
Lockean language, of liberty as.
the Power which eveiy Man has over his own Actions, and his Right to 
enjoy the Fruit of his Labour, Art and Industry, as far as by it he hurts 
not the Society
By leaving people alone “they will take care of themselves, and do it best", not least 
in the area of religious freedom and freedom of conscience and speech. Liberty in­
cludes “thinking, saying, and doing what we please", even practising honest com­
merce whereby populations will increase in number and wealth and individuals 
may
grow ... as rich as we can. without any other Restrictions than that by all 
this we hurt not the Publick, nor one another ... (Thesel are the glorious 
Priviliges of Liberty; and its Effects, to live in Freedom, Plenty and
Safety15
Secondly, virtue was not a question of displaying innate human excellences or ca­
pacities in political activity. Rather, it consisted of the types of dispositions that 
helped to secure the commonwealth. The structure of civic virtue conducive to this 
was a mixture of old and new features:
Harrington, Pocock’s neo-Machiavellian par excellence, in some ways departed 
the most from his mentor, not by stressing the tendency to selfishness and short­
sightedness of individuals (certainly also acknowledged by Machiavelli), but in pro­
posing a rather static machinery of counterbalancing self-interest. Retaining the 
classical language of mixed government and distinct humori of the nobles and the 
people (only the former being destined to lead and deliberate), and stressing the 
necessity of agrarian laws preserving the equalisation of freehold property in Eng­
land, Harrington made much less of the Machiavellian analyses of popular activ­
ism, the need to counter corruption through renewal of civic virtue, or Machiavellfs 
famous endorsement of civic strife and passion.16
Harrington had in mind a distinct system of government for Cromwell as The 
Great Legislator to install. Magistrates would be elected by secret ballot, and fre­
quent rotation in office would help ensure that they remain uncorrupted. Most im­
portantly, he constructed a mechanism which he believed would further the com­
mon interest of the commonwealth despite the inherent tendency of all individuals 
to pursue their own. Essentially equating reason with interest, and “right reason" 
with “the reason of mankind" which, in turn, was “the interest of popular govem-
13. Trenchard & Gordon, Cato's Letters, 62; cp. 23,24,25,33.
14. Sidney, Discourses, 111,21; cp. 1,10,11,20.
15. Trenchard & Gordon, Cato’s Letters, 62.
16. For similar conclusions, see Sullivan (1994:76-87) and Burtt (1990:30).
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ment", he proposed a mechanism of ‘dividing and choosing’ to create a beneficial 
structure of public transparency in lawmaking. An aristocratic senate would delib­
erate and propose legislation, and an indirectly elected body of popular representa­
tives would accept or reject it:
The wisdom of the few may be the light of mankind, but the interest of 
the few is not the profit of mankind, nor of a commonwealth; wherefore, 
seeing we have granted interest to be reason, they must not choose, lest 
it put out their light: but as the council dividing consisteth of the 
wisdom of the commonwealth, so the assembly or council choosing 
should consist of the interest of the commonwealth
and, in The Prerogative o f Popular Government
because eveiy man hath an interest what to choose, and that choice 
which suiteth with every man’s interest excludeth the distinct or private 
interest or passion of any man, and so cometh up onto the common and 
public interest or reason17
While Harrington employed the categories of republican discourse and identified 
virtue as whatever was needed to secure the common liberty of all, his view of hu­
man nature and his hedonistic moral psychology put him rather apart from previ­
ous writers. Virtue, equated with securing the common interest (or the balancing of 
the distinct interests of the one, the few, and the many), appears to have been a 
mechanically generated systems resource, where the pursuit of private interest was 
hedged and channelled. All but lost here were notions of corrupt and egoistic citi­
zens trying to better themselves, seeing their own interests as linked with that of 
all, and aspiring to enjoy the esteem of fellow citizens by defending the latter. In 
several ways, Harrington’s mechanically perpetuated system of mutual surveillance 
was closer to the spirit of seventeenth century rationalist constructivism than to 
Machiavellian secular humanism.
Also Sidney and Cato were aware of the force of private interest, yet their con­
clusions were significantly different. Sidney squarely noted that,
all governments are subject to corruption and decay; but ... absolute 
monarchy is by principle let onto ... it; whereas mixed or popular 
governments are only in a possibility of falling into it: As the first cannot 
subsist, unless the prevailing part of the people be corrupted; the other 
must certainly perish, unless they be preserved in a great measure free 
from vices
His virtuous citizenship consisted in popular self-government, though not in a 
sense “where the people in themselves, and by themselves, perform all that belongs
17. Harrington, Oceana (pp. 171-73); The Prerogative o f Popular Government The 
Political Works of James Harrington (p.416).
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to government, I know of no such thing, and if it be in the world, have nothing to 
say for it". As the sensible aim of all must be to "set up those who seem to be best 
qualified", an uncorrupted populace would "never advance unworthy men. unless it 
be by mistake, nor willingly suffer the introduction of vices". Apart from choosing 
wise representatives, popular vigilance was necessary to protect citizens from the 
arbitrariness of magistrates, and to resist unjust rulers "breaking the yoke he lays 
upon them ... [and] trust one another in ... [a] generous design for the recovery of 
their liberty.18
Like Harrington, Sidney stressed the importance of constitutionalism and sepa­
ration of powers to check corruption. He appealed to the ancient liberties of the 
Magna Charta, which he saw as guaranteeing the legislative powers of parliament 
and as placing the king under the rule of law.19 But unlike Harrington, and in radi­
cal opposition to his statically perfect political architecture, Sidney developed a 
doctrine of revolution whereby the people, subject to the same limitations (last re­
sort, continued abuses) as in Locke’s parallel statement, retained sovereign discre­
tion to change the shape of government, which they had, at any rate, instituted 
themselves.20
However, civic virtue, to Sidney, was more than popular prudence in the elec­
tion of magistrates, resistance against unjust rulers, and the propensity of these 
magistrates and rulers to honour the trust placed in them. Like Machiavelli, he 
also lauded martial courage and vigour against the corruption of weakness and 
laziness. However, his conception of virtue was also linked to personal honesty and 
integrity, as evidenced particularly in the propensity to respect the rights and lib­
erty of others.21
Civic motivations in Sidney’s account were different from Harrington’s. Rather 
than equating ‘interest’ and ‘reason’, he placed the former alongside the private 
passions that corrupt the judgement of magistrates and people alike. Acknowledg­
ing the force of both narrow self-interest and those blind passions which places 
men in a condition no better than slavery, he after all maintained, again rather like 
Locke, that “reason ... is his nature”. And, as in Locke, natural reason was also 
practical reason, according to which it is irrational to make oneself an exception to 
a general rule.22
18. Sidney, Discourses, 11,19.
19. Sidney, Discourses, 111,8,13-14,27.
20. Sidney, Discourses, 111,36.
21. Sidney, Discourses, II, 21-23.
22. [RJeason enjoins every man not to arrogate to himself more than he al­
lows to others, nor to retain that liberty which will prove hurtful to him; 
or to expect that others will suffer themselves to be restrain’d, whilst he, 
to their prejudice, remains in the exercise of that freedom which nature 
allows. He who would be exempted from this common rule, must shew
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The chief and crucial difference to Locke was that Sidney insisted on integrat­
ing the account of natural and divinely installed reason in a republican discourse 
of virtue and corruption. Sidney was not appealing to a community of virtue as rea­
son, but only hoped to protect the public realm from the effects of the free reign of 
passion. The corrupting effects of unaccountable power in a monarchy were certain 
and would occur, with few and saintly exceptions, in the case of the ruler himself. 
But a corrupt ruler would also, in turn, see to it that his people were kept corrupt 
through strategies of courtly distribution of honours and favour, and by always 
placing vanity and personal interest above that of the public. The propensity to act 
with reason rather than be driven away by one’s passions and private interests 
should be facilitated, apart from constitutional balancing, by the impartial and 
cooling discipline of law.23
However, Sidney also retained a Machiavellian view of dispositions to virtue. 
The more martial and pagan virtues of public vigilance and civic courage, unlike 
those of self-restraint and impartiality, inherent in a free and active way of life, 
were themselves contingent products of such a life, which socialised citizens to 
curb their fears and their inclinations towards easy pleasures. Just as liberty in a 
state and from the bellicose ambitions for empire of other states required men that 
were not docile sheep tended by a good shepherd king, falsely pretending his pri­
vate interest to be theirs as well, so the willingness to defend the common liberty 
was a consequence of the, by now familiar, linking of private interest, public inter­
est, and the public esteem placed on valiant action for the common good of all. 
Sidney emphasised, first, the familiar republican theme of incalculating virtue 
through education and the creation o f a structure of expectations,
man naturally follows that which is good, or seems to him to be so. 
Hence it is that in well-govem’d states, where a value is put upon virtue, 
and no one honoured unless for such qualities as are beneficial to the 
publick, men are from the tenderest years brought up in a belief, that 
nothing in this world deserves to be sought after, but such honours as 
are required by virtuous actions: By this means virtue itself becomes 
popular24
Secondly, in a section which makes much of the Machiavellian argument from the 
Arte della guerrcu and broadens it to encompass not only military, but also civil af­
fairs, Sidney noted that.
for what reason he should be raised above his brethren (Sidney, Dis­
courses, 11,20).
See Houston (1991:133-34), and Locke, Second Treatise, 11,5.
23. Sidney, Discourses, 11,19. On this point see Houston (1991:147-57).
24. Sidney, Discourses, 11,25.
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men can no otherwise be engaged to take care of the publick. than by 
having such a part in it, as absolute monarchy does not allow; for they 
can neither obtain the good for themselves, posterity, and friends, that 
they desire, nor prevent the mischiefs they fear, which are the principal 
arguments that persuade men to expose themselves to labour or dangers
and
in a popular or mixed government... [e]very one has a part... all changes 
are prejudicial to all: whatsoever any man conceives to be for the publick 
good, he may propose in the magistracy, or to the magistrate: the body of 
the people is the publick defence, and every man is armed and 
disciplin'd: The advantages of good success are communicated to all, and 
everybody bears a part in the losses. This makes men generous and 
industrious; and fills their hearts with love to their country: This, and 
the desire of that praise which is the reward of virtue, raised the Romans 
above the rest of mankind25
Cato echoed Sidney (who was quoted at length) in the account of virtue as includ­
ing honesty, natural reason and law abidingness, all helped along by constitution­
alism and the rule of law. But Trenchard and Gordon also repeatedly argued 
against too much, or the wrong kind of political moderatiOTU to the effect that 
“[plolitical Jealousy ... in the People is a necessary and laudable Passion”, and that 
an excited popular opinion was nevertheless usually capable of sound judgement, 
even in single cases, in the face of gross power abuses such as the South Sea 
scandal. They also placed a specific emphases on the political importance of free­
dom of speech and of the press as means of securing public criticism and scrutiny 
of the executive.26
Trenchard and Gordon Joined both Sidney and Harrington in acknowledging 
people’s natural inclination towards selfishness, but followed a middle road be­
tween the two’s accounts of civic motivations. Like Sidney, they stressed the link 
between private and public interests, not as a matter of institutional design pre­
venting or taming passion (Harrington), but in terms of a spirit of rational patriot­
ism, shared by all, given the right circumstances. Patriotism thrived on the experi­
ence o f liberty, as no “Men in Bonds ever fight bravely, but to be free". As a concept 
it is simply defined as “one Man’s Care for Many and the Concern of every Man for 
All", and linked to the rational understanding that one’s duty is also, in the long 
run, one’s own interest, as
Every Passion ... is selfish in some Degree ... (...) when we call a Man 
disinterested, we should intend ... that the turn of his Mind is towards
25. Sidney, Discourses, 11,21.
26. Trenchard & Gordon, Cato's Letters, 33.
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the Publick, and that he has placed his personal Glory and Pleasure in 
serving it. To serve his Country is his private Pleasure; Mankind is his 
Mistress, and he does good to them by gratifying himself57
However, Cato's Letters in another respect, and in most places were closer to Har­
rington than Sidney, namely in their rather facile assumption about the potential 
accommodation of the most important private interests with those of the public,27 8 
and correspondingly on the futility and irrelevance of any moral transformation or 
education in the motivation to civic virtue. Like Sidney and Machiavelli, they did 
stress the politically beneficial effects of a private craving for public esteem, but the 
normative horizon in the former writers, of civic maturity and ultimate sacrifice, 
was all but gone.
Cato's Letters also in one more way signalled a significant change of emphasis. 
Both Harrington and Sidney retained the traditional concern that civic equality 
must be protected through economic independence, but corruption avoided by pre­
venting excessive wealth, all with the help of Harrington’s agrarian law.29 
Trenchard and Gordon were more ambiguous. They did allude to the virtues of 
Harrington's agrarian law, and to the dangers and imbalances of accumulated 
property. But they also portrayed the ability to prosper and even grow rich through 
trade as one of the beneficial effects o f liberty, and one that did not necessarily 
jeopardise this liberty.
The third and last point to note about the English republicans, and one which 
severely blurs the contrast conventionally made to liberalism, was the emergence 
in all of these writers of doctrines of consent, natural law, and natural liberty in a 
state of nature. These elements are part of an individualised and moralised lan­
guage of popular sovereignty which is new to republican discourse.
Harrington's language was still rather traditional in its emphasis on naturally 
differentiated groups with each their virtue and each their capacity for judgement. 
Yet, his discussions of the common interest of mankind as ‘right reason’, coupled 
with his appeals to scripture, suggests an embryonic idea of certain extrapolitical 
standards of equity.30
Interestingly, however, the new doctrines were most evident in Sidney, who was 
otherwise the more classical of the three republicans. Throughout the Discourses
27. Trenchard & Gordon, Cato’s Letters, 33,36,40,62.
28. Burtt (1990:31) also makes this point.
29. Harrington, Oceana (pp.X80ff).
30. Harrington, Oceana (pp. 172-73). Wettergren (1988:673-79) has attempted to 
show that Harrington’s work contains an early theory, a mixture of Hobbes, 
Grotius, and Hooker, of natural law and natural rights, but the case may be over­
stated. At any rate, there seems to be a degree of contrast between Harrington on 
the one hand and Sidney and Cato on the other.
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he repeatedly stated that man is naturally free and endowed by God with reason;31 
that government receives its only possible legitimation through the consent of the 
governed who place their trust in elected magistrates to protect their liberty;32 that 
once this trust is violated, the people as individuals protecting their interests have 
a right to change their magistrates or revolt;33 and that natural liberty, although 
rendered secure and valuable under the rule of law, is strictly speaking diminished 
in society.34
All this suggests, again, that the Pocock tradition is simply wrong in assuming 
that a republican virtue language was incompatible with appeals to a trans- 
historically legitimated, inherent value of the individual, or with a derived natural 
and equal capacity for reason. Sidney’s position, in many ways so close to Locke, 
significantly highlights the fusion of republicanism with natural law - and not, 
again, a necessary tension or conflict between the two - which was to feed into 
American republican discourse. The institution of government through consent was 
the attempt to secure, in real history, whatever approximation to man’s natural lib­
erty of which humanly inadequate reason was capable. Sidney’s doctrine of revolu­
tion was neither a reduction to ‘original principles* in the classical sense of check­
ing cyclical corruption through the renewal of a mythical beginning that instituted 
liberty along with political life as such, nor was it a strictly Lockean appeal to an 
immutable set of individual rights, established by contract but conforming to divine 
will, which had been wronged. Rather, it was the application of popular prudence 
to the task of new beginnings, securing the, by now morally conceived, right to lib­
erty of all humans, under changing political circumstances.35
The crucial difference between Locke and Sidney, here, was in the manner that 
natural reason, natural right(s) and the significance of God as creator were con­
ceptualised. As summarised by Houston,
where Locke drew attention to the sheer fact that God created men and 
women, Sidney pointed to the fact that he created them free; when Locke 
relied on God’s workmanship to link men and women to a fairly robust 
theoiy of natural law, Sidney pared the claims of “God and Nature" to a 
minimum36
Locke installed for liberal posterity a moral vocabulary of universal rights and du­
ties, also closely connected to his innovative theoiy o f property (of which there is no 
trace in Sidney). Those were rational derivatives of how God’s intentions for man
31. Sidney, Discourses, 11,20,111,33.
32. Sidney, Discourses, 1,20,11,5-6,11.20.111,9,13.
33. Sidney, Discourses, 111,20,36.42.
34. Sidney, Discourses, 1,10.
35. This point is also persuasively made by Houston (1991;218).
36. Houston (1991:112-13). Houston builds his argument here on the Locke 
scholarship of John Dunn and James Tully.
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could be instituted in civil society. Unlike Locke, whose work is discussed in the 
next chapter, Sidney was not really interested in moral grounding of values. He 
merely appealed to the for him self-evident fact that God’s intention could not have 
been for some men to be the slaves of others, or for some individuals to make 
themselves exceptions to the basic enjoyment of security and self-directedness that 
eveiybody rationally preferred. Exactly what should be the constitutional structure 
of mechanisms and rights securing this natural liberty, was an open and historical 
question. And popular consent, rather than an original and determinate act of 
contractual subsumption under rational principles, was a recurring dispensation of 
popular prudence in political designs;
the wisdom o f man is imperfect, and unable to foresee the effects that 
may proceed from an infinite variety of accidents, which according to 
emergencies, necessarily require new constitutions, to prevent or cure 
the mischiefs arising from them, or to advance the good that at first was 
not thought on (...) Changes ... are unavoidable, and the wit of man can 
go no farther than to institute such, as in relation to the forces, 
manners, nature, religion or interests of a people and their neighbours, 
are suitable and adequate to what is seen, or apprehended to be seen
While “God ... hath left all things to our choice, that are not evil in themselves”, 
there are however “some universal rules ... in politics ... which ought to be ob­
served: and wise legislators adhering to them only, will be ready to change all oth­
ers as occasion may require, in order to the publick good” . They are about “justice, 
charity and truth, which having its root in God is subject to no change".37 As we 
shall see in the following chapters, this politically contingent use of natural law and 
constitutional consent theoiy is closer to Jefferson, Paine, and Madison, than it is 
to Locke.
3. Montesquieu
According to Judith N. Shklar, “Montesquieu did for the latter half of the eight­
eenth-century what Machiavelli had done for his century, he set the terms in which 
republicanism was to be discussed”.38 In many ways, Montesquieu was a key figure 
(like Hume) In the Enlightenment critique of the classical republicanism of ‘the An­
cients*. In other ways, his work stands at the beginning of a new, modem era of re­
publicanism for which, at any rate, The Spirit o f the Laws became a standard refer­
ence and theoretical resource. As we shall see, the positions of Rousseau, the Fed­
eralists, and Tocqueville are all in different ways reactions to, or elaborations on, 
the views of Montesquieu.
37. Sidney, Discourses, 1,6,11,17.
38. Shklar (1990:265).
In one respect, Montesquieu’s agenda was similar to that of Machiavelli. Like 
the latter, Montesquieu connected liberty to the value of personal and private secu­
rity and the absence of fear. Political liberty (the term used, somewhat confusingly 
in light of later conventions, by Montesquieu) was not the same as license or inde­
pendence (“doing what one wants"). Nor was it to be confused with self-government 
(“the power of the people has been confused with the liberty of the people"). In 
Montesquieu it meant two different, but closely related things:39
First, as a constitutional-legal concept it was “the right to do everything the 
laws permit", or the state of affairs when “[a] constitution can be such that no one 
will be constrained to do things that the law does not oblige him to do or be kept 
from doing things that the law permits him to do". This equality of all citizens un­
der the law and protection from arbitrary power was a function of the basic con­
stitutional arrangement of a state, and it was approximated, according to Montes­
quieu, only in England. Main elements defining such liberty included the separa­
tion, in a number of ways, of legislative, executive and judiciary powers, frequently 
convened representative bodies, some aspects of mixed government such as more 
than one chamber, absence of permanent professional armies, and, most impor­
tantly, the existence of an independent judiciary and the use of codified law.40
Secondly, whether what was established with constitutional arrangements be­
came translated to freedom “in fact and not in right" in "its relation to the citizen" 
was another story. From the latter’s point of view, liberty “consists in security or in 
one’s opinion of one’s security". Freedom in this sense could be a function of mores 
and manners and specific civil laws, and above all it was dependent on the nature 
and working of criminal law and legal proceeding. It was not only a matter of the 
private spaces of legally defined immunity, but also - making this a part of the very 
definition of liberty was a conceptual novelty - of the subjective experience of ‘safe’ 
liberty.41
Montesquieu's departure from the political universe of Machiavelli was after all 
significant. As summarised, again, by Shklar,
Machiavelli’s contempt was directed at the incompetence of the petty 
rulers of the Italian city states, while Montesquieu excoriated the 
absolute monarchy created by Louis XIV. His great fear was not political 
impotence, but despotism, a regime to which Spain was rapidly 
descending and to which Fiance might fall prey42
In Montesquieu’s contemporary universe, coercive political (and religious) authori­
ties could only too easily establish themselves, and do so, not just as the transient
39. Montesquieu, Spirit o f the Laws, XI,2-3.
40. Montesquieu, Spirit o f the Laws, XI,3-4,6.
41. Montesquieu, Spirit o f the Laws, XII, 1.
42. Shklar (1990:265).
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1tyrannies of individual Renaissance princes, but using modem, administrative ap­
paratuses, and being capable of creating and maintaining effective institutions of 
interference and surveillance. This negative frame of reference, real existing (Span­
ish. Asian) despotism rather than pre-political chaos, made Montesquieu include 
the former as a separate category of government, towards which both republics and 
monarchies were prone to drift. Indeed, “despite men’s love of liberty, despite their 
hatred of violence, most people are subjected to this type of government". Com­
pared to the difficult task of legislators engineering and maintaining a moderate re­
gime “a despotic government leaps to view, so to speak ... as only passions are 
needed to establish it, everyone is good enough for that".43
But despotism was also related to a psychological state of mind. It was charac­
terised by fear (cratnte) as an individually and socially paralysing state of forebod­
ing, arresting the will, making all enjoyment of life impossible. While the avoidance 
of fear was central to Machiavelli as well, Montesquieu’s sensitivity towards the 
several dimensions of private security marks an Enlightenment departure from the 
elitist moral universe of Renaissance Man - the risk-taking vir virtutis. Hence, 
Montesquieu was concerned with minimising the coercive and cruel aspects of 
punishment, with the social and cultural consequences of specific laws in terms of 
experienced security or insecurity, and with the comparative science of how and 
where one form of legislation rather than another would be appropriate. Generally, 
he wished to exclude from civil law all reference to punishable religious crimes, re­
strictions on the liberty of thought, speech, and writing, as well as ‘crimes against 
nature* in the spheres of family relations, private conduct, even sexual affiliation. 
Punishments should fit the ‘nature’ o f the crime, and often public ridicule and 
shaming might serve. Finally, Montesquieu was opposed to the authority of the 
church whose strategic nourishing of prejudice, intolerance, ignorance, and threats 
of condemnation all contributed towards a public climate of passivity, isolation, 
impotence and fear - all in turn further facilitating despotic forms of government.44
Also, while Machiavelli ambiguously maintained the need and the danger of 
martial spirit, Montesquieu unequivocally regarded this type of passion negatively. 
Always dangerous in republics (conducive to Rome's downfall), the obsession with 
gloiy through imperialistic enterprises was found at every European court and had 
regularly devastating consequences for civil populations.
Although Montesquieu considered republican government a highly relevant 
category in a theory of comparative law, and although he was far from untouched 
by the images of moral purity and simplicity readily available from his own classi­
cist background, he was also quite unequivocal in his dismissal of a political order 
based on republican virtue as a viable modem option. In the ancient republic -
43. Montesquieu, Spirit o f the Laws, V, 14; Shklar (1987:85).
44. Montesquieu, Spirit o f the Laws, VI, 12, XII,4-30, XIV, XIIX.
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Montesquieu significantly referred to Sparta and Crete - it was clear that a govern­
ment based on widespread and frequent popular participation in the election of 
leaders and even the shaping of laws, presupposed a public ethos or principle of 
virtue, defined as “love of the homeland Ipairiel. that is love of equality". And the 
carrier of this political virtue, fhomme de bien politique, was “the man who loves the 
laws of his country and who acts from love of the laws of his country“. Moreover,
political virtue is a renunciation of oneself, which is always a very 
painful thing (...) This love [of laws and fatherlandj. requiring a 
continuous preference of the public interest over one’s own, produces all 
the individual preferences; they are only that preference
and,
Virtue ... is a feeling and not a result of knowledge (...) The less we can 
satisfy our particular passions, the more we give ourselves up to 
passions for the general order. Why do monks so love their order? Their 
love comes from the same thing as makes their order intolerable to them 
(...) Love of equality ... limits ambition to a single desire ... of rendering 
greater service to one’s homeland than other citizens ... At birth one 
contracts an immense debt that can never be repaid45
In his description of the ancient republic, Montesquieu introduced what was to be­
come orthodoxy: that republican government required circumstances which were 
difficult to secure even in Rome and Greece. Chief among them was very limited 
size - although this in turn made it militarily vulnerable - or, when this was not 
possible, the form of a federation of small republics. Secondly, the population had 
to remain homogeneous in culture and moeurs as well as in level of wealth. Also, 
the purity of its patriotic passion had to be reinforced through public education, 
raising “a whole people like a family*’, making sure that they would “pay a singular 
attention to each other**.46 While “things were done in those governments that we 
no longer see and that astonish our small souls”, and while the “natural place of 
virtue is with liberty”, Montesquieu was not so ambiguous as to see the liberty of 
the ancients as something worth craving for modems. He clearly had no taste him­
self for the tight-knitted fabric of a Spartan society where common security was 
bought with the loss of privacy and individuality. And civic paganism, Machiavelli’s 
solution, was hardly desirable to Montesquieu, the believer in science and ration­
alism.47
But even on their own terms, the ancient republics exhibited serious weak­
nesses. Virtue was easily corrupted either by taste for luxury, by exaggerating the 
love of equality, or by the advent of militarism as in Rome. And direct democracy
45. Montesquieu, Spirit o f the Laws, authors foreword, IV,5, V,2-3.
46. Montesquieu, Spirit o f the Lotos, IV,7-8, V,4-6, VIII, 16, IX, 1-2.
47. Montesquieu, Spirit o f the Laws. IV,4, VII.39.
was much more likely to produce instability and faulty decisions than representa­
tive forms.48 49Moreover, in a large republic these dangers would increase enor­
mously: “interests become particularised; at first a man feels he can be happy, 
great, and glorious without his homeland; and soon, that he can be great only on 
the ruins of his homeland". Montesquieu's prime example of the dangers of modem 
reliance on ancient ways, exposed and unstable to begin with, was the previous 
century’s Cromwellian terror, that “fine spectacle ... the impotent attempts of the 
English to establish democracy among themselves ... [where] ... those who took 
part in public affairs had no virtue":
When that virtue ceases, ambition enters those hearts that can admit it, 
and avarice enters them all. Desires change their objects: that which one 
used to love, one loves no longer. One was free under the laws, one 
wants to be free against them. Each citizen is like a slave who has 
escaped from his master’s house ... The republic is a cast-off husk, and 
its strength is no more than the power of a few citizens and the license of 
all«
Appeals to the republican ethos were positively dangerous in the mouths of popular 
despots like Cromwell as well as absolutist kings and their courtiers, who claimed 
to serve the common good of justice with the selfless virtue of the good prince. 
Hence, Montesquieu’s analysis of the conditions and varieties of republican gov­
ernment may also be seen as a successful injection of scepticism into the contem­
porary political discourse. And with this, Montesquieu marks a crucial turning 
point in the republican history of ideas.
Montesquieu was certainly a republican thinker in terms of his diagnosis of the 
problem. As in Cicero and Machiavelli, liberty was liberty under law. But not just 
any law would do. Good laws which promoted liberty better - or, perhaps, promoted 
a better liberty - were like “those large nets in which fish swim, while believing 
themselves to be free". Despite Montesquieu’s deist acceptance of natural law, his 
discussions of the relation between divine right, political right (i.e., constitutional 
law), and civil right in each society, all placed him at a long distance from Locke’s 
derivation of natural rights, let alone the latter’s state of nature abstractions. Lib­
erty was conceptually anchored in the universal wish to be free from arbitrary 
power and fear, and to enjoy the personal security which is a precondition of any 
form of happiness. But it was also strictly a phenomenon of positive law, relative to 
the circumstances and history of a given people. Finally, this liberty was an artifi­
cial creation whose durability in time depended on conditions and legislative inge­
nuity, which, as Montesquieu put it in connection with the ‘moderate* government
48. Montesquieu, Spirit o f the Laws, 11,2,111,3, IV,5, VH1.2,12.
49. Montesquieu, Spirit o j the Laws, III,3, VIII, 16.
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he thought he saw in England, was something “rarely produced by chance, and 
which one hardly dares leave to prudence".50
Montesquieu’s point of departure remained republican as he asked which in­
stitutional and social forms and which popular traits of character were likely, un­
der different conditions, to keep states from slipping into despotism, pioen that 
monarchy as known in continental European forms was especially prone to do so, 
and given that previous republics, democratic as well as aristocratic (Venice), were 
fragile, imperfect, and less than hospitable to the full range of modem, private lib­
erties in the first place.
What were these conditions?
First of all, we already noted that Montesquieu stressed a set of considerations 
about constitutional architecture, the division of powers, and popular checks on 
institutions. While always important in a republican context, it is the content and 
detail of such considerations that makes them novel. This concern with institu­
tional design came to constitute the most influential part of Montesquieu's theo­
retical heritage, taken up, developed, and changed to fit quite different circum­
stances, in the Federalist Papers in particular. However, it was also in the trans­
formation of the myth of the great legislator that the start of the science of political 
constitutionalism took place. With it some of Montesquieu's original insights were 
soon to be threatened: insights about the contingent and fragile affair of fitting 
constitutional measures to the circumstances and customs of a country, and about 
securing their durability with the right type of citizen mentality.
Hence, secondly, Montesquieu broke new ground in his analysis of the impor­
tance, content, and legislative process of civil law. He highlighted not only that law 
makes for security and liberty and that different laws do so differently. He was also 
concerned with the complex relationship between legislation and social and cul­
tural mores. Montesquieu’s often noted ‘relativism*51 consisted in the notion, pur­
sued throughout L'Esprit des tois, that existing mores and customs (themselves in 
turn partly shaped by the climate, landscape and material conditions of a country) 
might be more or less conducive to liberty. This constrained the law-maker. Some 
mores were beneficial in one place but not in another. Some were best left alone, 
others must be subtly furthered or protected, all suggesting a different ‘fit’, between 
countries, and over time. Particularly important was the existence and the type of 
religious feeling (Christianity being more conducive to moderation), the concern 
with civic equality (as in Rome and Athens when their mores were still pure), and 
the development of ‘commercial spirit* (as, in different ways, in Marseilles, The 
Netherlands, and of course England).52
50. Montesquieu, Pensees, no. 1787, Oevres completes (p.1035).
51. For instance Shklar (1987:91).
52. Montesquieu, Spirit o f the Laws, XIX-XXIV.
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Conversely, the deep-rootedness or sacred character of some customs, whether 
conducive to liberty or not, made them difficult or dangerous to change, indeed the 
attempt to do so was likely to be experienced as the “tyranny ... of opinion, which is 
felt when those who govern establish things that run counter to a nation’s way of 
thinking". None of this, however, constituted a ‘communitarian’ recognition, let 
alone advocacy, of institutions and laws that “express" the culture of a people.53 
However, it did point in the direction of concerns, stressed in a quite different con­
text by the Anti-Federalists in America, that republican self-government must be 
understood in terms of the particularity of place: local conditions and sensitivities 
of liberty that were likely to be ignored in a ‘large republic*.54
Yet, it is also true for Montesquieu that “customs of a slave people are part of 
their servitude; [and] those of a free people are part of their liberty". Despite diffi­
culties and dangers, legislation, including constitutional legislation, was important 
in view of “the character that ... [is] formed from it, and the manners that result 
from it". Mores and manners are not completely immutable, but. they should be 
changed indirectly, for instance by promoting other mo-res through legislation. 
This sociology o f liberty significantly foreshadows the work o f Tocqueville.55
In Montesquieu, “law deals with men as they exist in history, and at its best it 
is reason applied to the nature of things".56 Legislation becomes an ongoing and 
contingent affair, a question of human prudence. It bears upon real and experi­
enced liberty as security, but it is also crucially Important in the shaping, promot­
ing, and channelling of mœurs and manners conducive to liberty. This concern 
Montesquieu found missing in what he saw in classical writers, quite unfairly in 
the case of Machiavelli, as exclusive reliance on citizens* virtue at the expense of 
legislation.
Thirdly. Montesquieu subtly but deliberately started to question the received 
hierarchy of values regarding the good and virtuous citizen. In doing so he also re- 
represented, and to a significant degree misrepresented, the place and meaning of 
civic virtue. In Cicero and Machiavelli, we saw that civic virtue was based on a 
mixture of rational self-interest in securing the structures of common liberty 
(stressed by Machiavelli) and moral reason, the call of duty (stressed by Cicero) - 
helped along by the motivational force of love of country or city, the latter in turn 
secured by identification based on myth, political ritual, and political participation. 
In Montesquieu’s representation, the last part becomes prominent. Clearly, he rec­
ognised that ancient republics enjoyed liberty in the basic tv-alls of the city’ sense 
of mutual protection against arbitrary rule and foreign conquest, and resisted the 
notion (later to be found in Constant) that the ‘liberty of the ancients’ was an alto-
53. Taylor (1989:165-66).
54. Montesquieu, Spirit o f the Laws, XIX,3.
55. Montesquieu, Spirit o f the Laws, XDC27.
56. Shldar (1987:72).
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gether different concept.57 However, the virtue needed to secure this mutual pro­
tection was described as a selfless and self-denying commitment to the community, 
a second nature experienced as the point and meaning of a human life. Hence, the 
Troglodytes of the Lettres persanes did not think that “virtue is ... such as to cost 
us anything, and should not be considered a wearisome exercise“,
They described the delights of pastoral life and the happiness of a 
situation that was always adorned by innocence ... They would give each 
other presents, and the giver always thought that the advantage was 
his58
And in VEsprit des lois Montesquieu painted a quite different picture of the civic 
motivations of the ordinary citizen than the one we saw in Machiavelli: In order to 
secure the survival of the republic, citizens were needed who loved their common 
liberty, even though “the only advantage o f ... [this] liberty was glory". And the force 
of this love was “passions for the general order", described as “a feeling and not a 
result of knowledge".59
Although the basic concept of liberty was the same. Montesquieu wished to 
give it a concrete legal content, as well as a socially experienced value for the mod-. 
em individual, which made the classical republic a very poor second best, and not 
even a stable bulwark against despotism (Montesquieu’s position here is in stark 
contrast to what we shall see in Rousseau). Indeed, the selfless civic passion and, 
as stressed in VEsprit des lois, the thirst for glory, were likely to be part of the 
problem.60 As shown by Hirschman, this placed Montesquieu at the beginning of a 
transformation of political discourse where the advent of commerce and acquisition 
became associated with a beneficially cooling mentality of calculation and modera­
tion. Against the traditional republican fear of corruption of pure mores through 
acquisition and wealth, the virtues of self-sacrifice and martial gloiy became recon­
ceptualised as *hot* passions that were better replaced by ‘interest*.61
57. Hence, already in the Lettres Persanes’ tale of the TYoglodytes, “wanting to cut 
oneself off from ... [the common interest] is the same as wanting to ruin oneself*, 
and the perishing of the first (unvirtuous) Troglodytes is described as a result of 
lack of cooperation for mutual benefit (Montesquieu, Persian Letters, XII).
58. Montesquieu, Persian Letters, XII. Cp. quotes on page 119.
59. Montesquieu, Spirit o f the Laws, VIII, 16, V,2.
60. Manent (1994:379-80).
61. Hirschman (1977:70-81), cp. Deserud (1991). In fact, Montesquieu also called 
the spirit of commerce a “passion", indeed "heated", and claimed that “reason ... 
never produces great effects on the spirits of men", and, still echoing classical re­
publican discourse, individual “ardor for enriching ... oneself* is associated with 
following one’s "own caprices and fantasies". Yet, self-interest promotes a (rational- 
egoistic) zealous concern with one’s own liberty, and a generally beneficial propen­
sity to deliberate and reason - whatever the quality of each person reasoning 
(Montesquieu, Spirit o f the Laws, XIX.27).
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According to Montesquieu, although commerce and affluence would have been 
detrimental to the civic virtue of military republics like Sparta,
when democracy is founded on commerce, it may very well happen that 
individuals have great wealth, yet that the mores are not corrupted. This 
is because the spirit of commerce brings with it the spirit of frugality, 
economy, moderation, work, wisdom, tranquillity, order, and rule. Thus, 
as long as this spirit continues to exist, the wealth it produces has no 
bad effect62
Also, commerce would destroy “destructive prejudices”, create “gentle mores", in 
place of barbarous ones, spread “knowledge of the mores of nations", and replace 
hostility between countries with a love of peace, based on interdependence, a cal- 
culative spirit and a "feeling for exact justice".63
Did Montesquieu then completely do away with the republican language of ac­
tive citizenship? Did he think passion for glory was the only danger, and that quiet 
commerce, private acquisition, and honouring of contract was the cure? Hirsch- 
man’s conclusion, while important, is only half the picture. ‘Gentle’ mores were 
very much part of the intersubjective sense of security which Montesquieu saw as a 
part of liberty. However, Montesquieu did in fact recognise the need for vigilant citi­
zens checking political power. Only, he reinvented the motivational argument by 
pointing to a set of civic dispositions and character traits developing, as he discov­
ered in England, with the spirit o f commerce.
The effects on political socialisation arising from commerce and. as in England, 
coupled with a mixed constitution and representative government, would be sev­
eral. The concern with private property would bring with it a beneficial independ­
ence of spirit and sense of civic equality, detrimental to empty flattering and polite­
ness, greatly diminishing the importance of rank and social hierarchy, and replac­
ing it with respect for "wealth and personal merit".64
Also important would be the restless concern with how political decisions had a 
bearing on one’s own interests, a tendency to shift one's loyalties from one com­
peting party to another, with leaders always in danger of losing the favour of any 
particular group. The power of leaders would be “remade daily" as an uneasy trust, 
they “would often be obliged to justify their conduct”, and even “be people of some­
what greater honesty". The vigilance of citizens would consist in a habitual urge to 
“talk much about politics". Everybody, “in order to enjoy liberty", would
be able to say what he thinks and because, in order to preserve it, each 
must still be able to say what he thinks, a citizen in this state would say
62. Montesquieu, Spirit o f the Laws, V,6.
63. Montesquieu, Spirit o f the Laws, XX, 1 -2.
64. Montesquieu, Spirit o f the Laws; XDC27.
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and write everything that the laws had not expressly prohibited him from 
saying or writing
The important point was not the quality of what would be said and written, or 
“whether individuals reason well or badly“, but the fact that they did so at all.65
People would be constantly worrying about imagined rather than real abuses of 
executive power. Unlike ancient, direct-democratic forms, such popular anxieties 
would not lead to political disruption, but be checked by the higher enlightenment 
of the legislative institutions. However,
empty clamors and insults ... would ... have the good effect of stretching 
all the springs of the government and making all the citizens attentive.
But, if those terrors arose on the occasion of the overthrow of 
fundamental laws ... [o]ne would soon see an awful calm, during which 
everything would unite together against the power that violated the laws 
(...) small interests would cede to greater ones (...) [and] there would be a 
revolution that would not change the form of the government or its 
constitutions, as revolutions formed by liberty are but a confirmation of 
liberty66
Despite the differences noted, Montesquieu’s analysis of civic equality, popular 
vigilance, and the beneficial effects on politics of conflict seems to take him a little 
closer to Machiavelli after all. Indeed, Montesquieu’s departure from the republican 
argument is easily exaggerated. He challenged what he and his time considered to 
be the classical republican values and understanding of the requirements of civic 
virtue. His reversal of the traditional view of commerce was certainly radical. Yet 
the reason why he noted, already in Lettres persanes, that a republic had better 
commercialise itself was that selfless sacrifice was a much less robust form of civic 
disposition than one based on moderate wealth and self-interest.67 After all, the 
Netherlands, like Athens but unlike Sparta, were commercial republics, and in 
England Montesquieu described a type of rational patriotism, significantly couched 
in commercial metaphor, which we, unlike himself, can nevertheless recognise:
This nation would love its liberty prodigiously because this liberty would 
be true; and it could happen that, in order to defend that liberty, the 
nation might sacrifice its goods, its ease, and its interests, and might 
burden itself with harsher imposts than even the most absolute prince 
would dare make his subjects bear
In order to preserve its liberty, it would borrow from its subjects, and its 
subjects, who would see that its credit would be lost if it were
65. Montesquieu, Spirit o f the Laws, XIX,27.
66. Montesquieu, Spirit o f the Laws, XDC.27.
67. Montesquieu, Persian Letters, Appendix,3.
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conquered, would have a further motive to make efforts to defend its 
liberty68 -
However important the blessings of geographic and climatic circumstance England 
enjoyed to begin with, the beneficial effects of the spirit of commerce found there 
were meant by Montesquieu to be generalisable - all to be fitted with the right or 
best possible laws and constitutional architecture in different places. England was 
the commercial republic, which “hides under the form of a monarchy"69 which 
Montesquieu was seeking all along, because it was much better at securing a lib­
erty fit for modems, one that offered more than the security of the monk or the 
Spartan citizen warrior, but also because it provided for the development of a type 
of robust virtue which, while not to be graced by that name, would be no less effec­
tive and worth striving for, in fact more so.
This reconceptualised theme of commerce and virtue - and the virtue of com­
merce - was destined to become yet one more of the discursive battlegrounds of 
modem republicanism. Tocqueville, in particular, was to take the inherent ambi­
guities and tensions between commerce, materialism and civic spirit to a higher 
level of reflection than either Montesquieu or any of those American writers who 
followed the latter. By contrast, some liberal theorisers of the beneficial effects of 
private vice and unbridled egoism in a purely economically conceived civil society 
came to take it outside its republican framework. In the next chapter we shall take 
a closer look at these discussions.
4. Rousseau
Rousseau’s work in many ways was a response to Montesquieu and to what Rous­
seau considered a too hasty dismissal of the classical tradition. In many ways, 
Rousseau wanted to create politically exactly that world o f ancient moral simplicity, 
equality, and spontaneous benevolence and sacrifice which Montesquieu, after all, 
considered well lost with the rise o f the modems. Thus, Rousseau’s favourite his­
torical exemplars, from Sparta to Crete (but not Athens), and his conjectural blue­
prints for ‘uncorrupted’ places like Corsica and Poland, were rhetorical devises em­
ployed to reverse the hierarchy of values which theorists like Montesquieu, Hume, 
and many of Rousseau’s contemporaries were erecting.70 Politeness, refined man­
ners, the division of labour and its facilitation o f diversified cultures of consump­
tion and luxury, and above all the social stratification of human value and dignity 
which was the inevitable outcome of modernity, were abhorred, consciously ana­
lysed, and theoretically resisted by Rousseau, who contrasted these phenomena
68. Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, XDC27.
69. Montesquieu, Spirit o f the Laws, V, 19.
70. I return to this reversal of values in the next chapter.
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with “the picture of the simplicity which prevailed in the earliest times" where men 
“were innocent and virtuous."71
Charles Taylor has highlighted the way in which Rousseau may be seen as an 
early theorist of ‘the politics of recognition*. According to this perceptive analysis. 
Rousseau’s work was driven by an urge to achieve a more dignified and meaningful 
sense of selihood in a world of dissolving hierarchies and changing fortunes. Such 
self-identity and sense of worth, inescapably dialogical and negotiable in character, 
depended upon the existence of significant others, and misrecognttion was con­
stantly possible,72
This was indeed a modem malaise.73 Bom from the introduction of property, 
and developing with the growth of commerce, the division o f labour, and the urban 
refinements of the arts and sciences, it was depicted by Rousseau as an intolerable 
condition of men bowing to the most superficial and ridiculous whims of fashion, of 
inability to demonstrate or believe in one’s own inner worth, of impossibility of real 
friendship, and of everybody being unfree or independent, or, as we would say, in­
authentic:
There prevails in modem manners a servile and deceptive conformity; so 
that one would think every mind had been cast in the same mould (...)
We no longer dare seem what we really are, but lie under a perpetual 
restraint; in the meantime the herd of men, which we call society, all act 
under the same circumstances exactly alike (...) What a train of vices 
must attend this uncertainty! Sincere friendship, real esteem, and 
perfect confidence are banished from among men. Jealousy, suspicion, 
fear, coldness, reserve, hate, and fraud lie constantly concealed under 
that uniform and deceitful veil of politeness
The modernity of Rousseau, of course, consisted in his recognition of the ambiguity 
of “the promptings of our nature". The alleviation of modem inauthenticity was not, 
after all, a return to ‘nature*, but a step forward to a decidedly artificial, politically 
created and maintained collective life, where the experience of manly independence 
and the feeling of equal worth which Rousseau found in Sparta could be rein­
stalled, and where men could live in “the sweet society of...fellow-citizens", and 
again find “their security in the ease with which they could see through one an­
other". Politics, and political culture in a comprehensive, total (some have said to­
talitarian) sense, was used to recreate a universe of dignified simplicity, with a 
minimal division of labour, where no one expected or demanded to be recognised as 
anything but a citizen, and for this reason could look everybody else comfortably in
I 71. Rousseau, A Discourse on the Arts and Sciences in The Social Contract and Dis- 
t courses (p. 18).
i 72. See Taylor (1992b:30-37).
i 73. Taylor (1991).
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the eye. Esteem, recognition, and honour was still important, but a well-ordered 
republic served to distribute it relatively equally. By being all alike in one’s sub­
stantial citizenship status, and by confirming the former and enacting the latter 
through the general will and patriotic service, it was possible to avoid domination 
by the opinion of others. Thus, to make a long story short, the quest for rural sim­
plicity which was an instrumental devise in the republican tradition, devised to 
maintain the civic independence of self-governing citizens, assumed a distinctly 
modem (and anti-modernist), proto-romantic, value-in-itself dimension in Rous­
seau.74
Yet, while this is recognised - and some version of the story is to be found in all 
readings of Rousseau - we should note that this early communitarian persona was 
not alone in Rousseau’s oeuvre. Indeed, it can be read as closely connected to a 
more republican Rousseau. Thus, Maurizio Viroli has suggested that we read 
Rousseau’s work as an attempt to combine a contract theoretical, rationalist lan­
guage, drawn from a contemporary discourse of rising moral individualism, with a 
republican language of virtue and of the problems of generating such virtue. One 
language was employed to show how a political order could be Just, legitimised for 
moral individuals. This was the language of the general will. It is a mistake to see 
this theme as a foreshadowing of ‘direct democracy’ or the like. Rather, it was a 
justificatory device, in part a thought experiment that appealed to enlightened, 
universalised self-interest. Another language was employed when addressing the 
problem of preservation of the republic. This was a “language, based on the notions 
of common identity and belonging".75 Identity and belonging, part of a well-ordered 
life for modem individuals, were also some of the means which were needed to 
maintain a well-ordered republic.76
The republican argument linking liberty, law, and virtue has been overlooked in 
most readings, famously by Constant and Berlin,77 which ascribe to Rousseau a 
‘positive’ concept of freedom - meaning a share in public power and moral self­
legislation. The crucial point which is missed, here, is Rousseau’s distinction be­
tween moral and civic or political liberty.78 Again, as in Montesquieu and Machia- 
velli, the latter is not mere collective political self-government. Nor is it Hobbesian 
absence of constraint or the silence of law. The latter would be what Rousseau with 
Montesquieu calls independence, and what the tradition termed license. Such inde­
pendence was enjoyed by individuals in Rousseau’s natural state before the social
74. Rousseau, Discourse on the Arts and Sciences and A Discourse on the Origin of '
Inequality, in The Social Contract and Discourses (pp.6,32); Taylor (1992b:44-51). j
75. Viroli (1988:13).
76. The title of Viroli’s book is Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the Well-Ordered Sod- .
ety. |
77. Constant, Liberty o f the Ancients (p.316); Berlin (1969b: 162-63). [
78. On the nature of Rousseau’s concept of liberty see also Viroli (1988: 148-87), to f
i
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compact. In this state of self-sufficient and harmonic pastoral anarchy, before the 
introduction of property and inequality, independence did not entail the slavery of 
some under the lordship of others:* 79
One should never confuse independence and freedom. These two things 
are so different that they are actually mutually exclusive. When everyone 
does what he likes that often means doing something which annoys 
others and they cannot fairly be described as being free. Liberty is not so 
much a question of doing what you want as not being forced to do what 
others want: even less so does it involve making others subservient to 
ourselves80 81
Rousseau, firstly, conceived of liberty in terms of a/ree people*' As in Machiavelli, 
Cicero, and Aristotle, a free people is one that is sovereign and self-governing, and 
not subjected to the will of a single ruler or ruling group, nor to that of a foreign in­
vader. As in Machiavelli, we find in Rousseau the empirical argument that also in­
dividual liberty (including its sense of freedom from constraint) is only secure un­
der conditions of self-government. Only with popular sovereignty is it possible to 
prevent that rulers put themselves above the common interest: only a vigilant citi­
zenry may keep potential tyrants and invaders at bay.82
Secondly, in Rousseau, as in Cicero, Machiavelli. and Montesquieu, liberty is 
conceptually linked to law. Liberty is first and foremost a condition of not being 
subject to the will and whims of others, and the defining opposite of liberty is ser­
vitude. As such, it is made possible and indeed constituted by the unarbitrariness 
of law and by the condition of equality under the law for all citizens, high and low, 
weak and strong. Although political liberty cannot then be defined as "doing what 
you want", this does not imply, pace Berlin’s positive liberty, something like ’doing 
what is right*. It means simply observing the necessary and reasonable constraints
whose discussion I am indebted.
79. For the complexities of the status of the state of nature in Rousseau, see 
MacAdam (1989).
80. Rousseau, Lettres écrites de la montagne, in Oeuvres complètes, vol. 3, p.841, 
ed. B. Gagnebin and M. Raymond, Paris: Bibliothèque de la Pléiade. 1959-69, cited 
from Viroli in his own translations (1988:150-51).
81. "[A] free people obeys, but it does not serve, it has leaders but no masters: it 
obeys the laws, but it obeys only the laws, and It is due to the strength of the laws 
that it does not find it necessary to obey men" (Lettres écrites de la montagne, in 
Oeuvres Complètes, p.842, cited in Viroli 1988:152).
82. Rousseau continually warns the Polish people that the liberty they long for 
comes at the price of vigilance. After the long war against Russia, "exhausted by 
your country’s trials, you sigh for peace [tranquüiiié]. Peace seems to me easy to 
come by, what is difficult, to my way of thinking, is to keep it, and liberty along 
with i t ... [The patriots] would like to combine the sweets of freedom with the peace 
and quit that accompany despotism. They wish, I believe, for two things that can-
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on one’s conduct, so as not to trespass on others. This is simultaneously the pre­
condition for a similar restraint on behalf of these others. Hence, a person who is 
free in Rousseau’s sense, is someone who is allowed to do. and who knows that no 
one, unpunished, will attempt to prevent him from doing, all the things that the 
law permits:83
We must remember two provisos. Although legality as such - even tyrannical 
laws - might provide some safety and predictability, Rousseau presupposed that 
the law applied equally to all and that no one put himself above the law. Hence the 
infamous formulations about the complete submission of the individual with his 
rights to the will of the community. Secondly, the law was presupposed to mirror 
the common good of all:
The sovereign power, albeit entirely absolute, entirely sacred, and 
entirely inviolable, does not and cannot exceed the limits of the general 
conventions, and ... every man can fully dispose o f the part of his goods 
and freedom that has been left to him by these conventions. So that the 
sovereign never has the right to burden one private individual more than 
another, because then the matter becomes individual, and its power is 
no longer competent84
Concretely, the type of liberty Rousseau had in mind, again completely in the tra­
dition from Machiavelli, first of all consisted of the obvious goods of security of per­
son and property. This liberty, says Rousseau, “is actually preferable to what it was 
beforehand":
What man loses by the social contract is his natural liberty and unlim­
ited right to everything he tries to get and succeeds in getting; what he 
gains is civil liberty and the proprietorship of all he possesses ... we must 
clearly distinguish natural liberty, which is bounded only by the strength 
of the individual, from civil liberty, which is limited by the general will; 
and possession, which is merely the effect of force or the right of the first 
occupier, from property, which can be founded only on a positive title
Men, as they become citizens, exchange “to their advantage an uncertain, precari­
ous mode of existence for another that is better and safer ... their force ... for a right 
that the social union renders invincible".85
not keep house together" (Rousseau, The Government o f Poland, p.3).
83. Rousseau follows quite closely Montesquieu’s “Liberty is the right to do eve­
rything which the laws allow: and if a citizen were allowed to do what is forbidden, 
there would be no more liberty because the others would also have this same right" 
(Montesquieu, Spirit o f the Laws, XI,3).
84. Rousseau, The Geneva Manuscript 1,6.
85. Rousseau, Geneva Manuscript 1,6; The Social Contract 1,8.
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Thirdly, however, also the veiy formulation of the common good, or the content 
of civil liberty, became a problem of potential dominance. Before Rousseau, who 
employed the rationalist language of Enlightenment individualism, this was not an 
issue. The law was the limit of the city, from wherever its sovereignty derived. 
Rousseau parted company with the earlier republican tradition in his stipulation 
that a person was only completely free in a situation where the law not only pre­
vented others from placing himself in servitude, but where the law itself did not 
constitute subjection. It would do so, according to Rousseau’s hyper-individualist 
argument, unless everybody, unanimously, took part in formulating the law. This 
was why he considered the inhabitants of the British Isles to be mere slaves who 
alienated their power through representation and long parliaments. Here, civil lib­
erty shaded into moral liberty:
We might, over and above this, add, to what man acquires in the civil 
state, moral liberty, which alone makes him truly master of himself: for 
the mere impulse of appetite is slavery, while obedience to a law which 
we prescribe to ourselves is liberty.86
This liberty was obtained only when individuals were able, in a manner foreshad­
owing Kant, to ask and answer the right question, as described in the architecture 
of the general will. In principle, all could become free in this regard, because of 
Rousseau’s optimistic Enlightenment assumption that the structure of the right 
was somehow clear to all. Moral liberty could be obtained by the person who was 
willing, not so much to deliberate with himself or indeed with others, but rather to 
see and listen with his heart to the obvious and transparent needs of all.
This ability to have an open heart was of course linked to Rousseau’s ideal of a 
simple, well-ordered life. Moral liberty was not so much a question of autonomy in 
any strong sense of self-legislation, let alone collective self-government, an ideal 
that is often mistakenly associated with Rousseau.87 Rather, it was linked to a 
communitarian and rural vocabulary of restraint and moderation. While Rous­
seau’s conception of liberty and social contract foreshadows Kant and later Kantian 
liberals, his ideas of individualism, civil and moral, put him in a different, rather 
less liberal league. The civil rights enjoyed by the happy but simple peasant free­
man could not have appealed to sophisticated Parisian phUosophes. We noted how, 
to Rousseau, Genevan bom citizen and always prone to idyllise this background, 
the Spartan austerity of such a life was a condition for moral dignity in a depraved 
modem world, although he knew that others did not see it this way. Civil liberty 
was a necessary, but by no means a sufficient condition for moral liberty. But the 
latter, in turn, was also a precondition for the former. In line with Spartan antiq-
86. Rousseau, The Social Contract 1,8.
87. A  recent sophisticated formulation of this ideal is Gould (1988).
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uity, Rousseau held an approximation towards moral liberty and its battery of self- 
restraints as necessary for the republic.88
A precondition, indeed a constitutive part of this civil liberty, was the willing 
exercise of a civic virtue and willingness to sacrifice which could be expected to 
come forth because this was a rational mode of conduct:
Their life itself, which they have dedicated to the State, is constantly 
protected by it: and when they risk or lose it for the State's defense, what 
are they then doing that they did not do more often and with greater 
danger in the state of nature when, waging inevitable fights, they defend 
at the risk of life that which preserves it for them? It is true that 
everyone has to fight, if need be, for the homeland, but also no one ever 
has to fight for himself. Don’t we still gain by risking, for something that 
gives us security, a part of what we would have to risk for ourselves as 
soon as our security is taken away?89
The civic virtue required by Rousseau may be summarised. First, there was the Ma­
chiavellian need for vigilance, keeping an eye on the rulers, and exhibiting courage 
in the defence of the country against internal and external enemies. The choice of 
magistrates must be made carefully and prudently. But secondly, civic virtue was 
an everyday thing. The ability of each citizen to will and subscribe to the laws was 
not only the condition of moral liberty. Just as importantly, it was the condition for 
a good citizenry, and hence the working of these laws. Whatever the quality of the 
law, what
is impossible is to make laws that the passions of men will not corrupt ... 
and to foresee and evaluate all the forms this corruption will take is. 
perhaps, beyond the powers of even the most consummate statesman90
Citizens must show moderation, respect the rights of others, and help see to it that 
such rights actually translate into just treatment, also o f the weak. To do so they 
must constantly confirm in their respective hearts the content of the laws.91 Such
88. As did Montesquieu. The difference between him and Rousseau was the lat­
ter’s happy willingness to accept these conditions.
89. Rousseau, Geneva Manuscript, 1,6.
90. Rousseau, Government o f Poland (p.3).
91. From the point of view of the legislator and statesman, while “it is good to 
know how to deal with men as they are, it is much better to make them what there 
is need that they be. The most absolute authority is that which penetrates into a 
man's inmost being, and concerns itself no less with his will than with his actions 
(...) they would feel that the greatest support of public authority lies in the hearts of 
the citizens, and that nothing can take the place of morality in the maintenance of 
government. It is not only upright men who know how to administer the laws; but 
at bottom only good men know how to obey them” (Rousseau, A Discourse on Politi­
cal Economy in The Social Contract and Discourses, p.129).
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confirmation, in turn, would be helped by a number of austere life-style require­
ments. To this effect, Rousseau would suggest what now. as in his own time, seems 
draconian measures. Moreover, he would laud the moral premium obtained from 
them on independent grounds.
Again, the motivational argument looks much like that of Machiavelli. Rous­
seau took as his point of departure, *men as they are’. Even when suitably social­
ised they would still have a natural and legitimate self-interest, which should in­
deed be the basis of civic motivation. He held out the promise, not only of the moral 
autonomy of participating in the general will, but also of a peaceful and orderly life 
in the security of law. And he was quite aware that the austerity of the former life, 
in order to persuade, at the very least needed to be sweetened by the comforts of 
the latter.92 Thus, a first condition for making citizens was that individuals did in­
deed enjoy these comforts, the security of rights in person and property.
In A Discourse on Political Economy Rousseau highlighted the importance of civil 
liberty in a social context that may usefully be contrasted to that of Montesquieu. 
While the latter was appealing to the independent man o f letters or commerce, 
wishing to defend his liberty against a monarch of despotic bend, Rousseau’s audi­
ence was quite different. He asked rhetorically:
does not the undertaking entered into by the whole body of the nation 
bind it to provide for the security of the least of its members with as 
much care as for that of all the rest? Is the welfare of a single citizen any 
less the common cause than that of the whole state? It may be said that 
it is good that one should perish for all. I am ready to admire such a 
saying when it comes from the lips of a virtuous and worthy patriot vol­
untarily and dutifully sacrificing himself for the good of his country: but 
if we are to understand by it, that it is lawful for the government to sac­
rifice an innocent man for the good of the multitude, I look upon it as 
one of the most execrable rules tyranny ever invented93
92. A  measure of pessimism may be noted in Rousseau as regards his belief in 
the willingness of modems to pay the price of liberty:
Liberty is a food that is good to taste but hard to digest. It sets well only 
on a good strong stomach. I laugh at those debased peoples that let 
themselves be stirred up by agitators and dare to speak of liberty without 
so much as having an idea of i t ... Proud, sacred liberty! If they but knew 
her, those wretched men; if they but understood the price at which she 
is won and held; if they but realised that her laws are stem as the 
tyrant’s yoke is never hard, their sickly souls, the slaves o f passions that 
would have to be hauled out by the roots, would fear liberty a hundred 
times as much as they fear servitude (Rousseau, Government o f Poland, 
p.30).
93. Rousseau, Discourse on Political Economy (p. 132).
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To Rousseau, the glory of Rome was “the regard [the] government paid to the indi- 
viduaT. Leaders were advised to “|s]how respect ... to your fellow-citizens, and you 
will render yourselves worthy of respect”, and to take care not to abuse the law or 
the spirit of the law. "What is most necessary, and perhaps most difficult, in gov­
ernment, is rigid integrity in doing strict justice to all, and above all in protecting 
the poor against the tyranny of the rich”.94 Also, states should take care to avoid 
the dangers and miseries of conquest as well as arbitrary or inequitable taxation of 
property. Most generally, it was,
one of the most important functions of government to prevent extreme 
inequality of fortunes; not by taking away wealth from its possessor, but 
by depriving all men of the means to accumulate it; not by building hos­
pitals for the poor, but by securing the citizens from becoming poor95
Not only was inequality a source of corruptions, such as the taste for luxury, jeal­
ousy, and indifference towards the common good. It was also a main reason that 
the letter of law did not always translate to reality, as when the rich and powerful 
would much easier obtain justice when they needed it, or get away with exemptions 
when they needed that, while the case was the opposite for the poor.96
Yet, these matters, important as they were, “will be inadequate, unless rulers 
go still more to the root of the matter".97 As in Machiavelli, this core of common 
sensical appeal to enlightened collective interest was not expected to cany the day 
unaided. Citizens were short-sighted, susceptible to petty pleasures and corrup­
tion. Lawgivers could not count on the allegiance of citizens if the latter did not 
enjoy their liberty, but liberty would not come about or be defended in the first 
place, unless the strings of political belonging and identity were played.98 The me­
dium for this was patriotism;
94. Rousseau, Discourse on Political Economy (pp. 133-34).
95. Rousseau, Discourse on Political Economy (p. 134).
96. Are not all the advantages of society for the rich and powerful? ... Is not 
the public authority always on their side? If a man of eminence robs his 
creditors, or is guilty of other knaveries, is he not always assured of im­
punity? Are not the assaults, acts of violence, assassinations, and even 
murders committed by the great, matters that are hushed up in a few 
months, and of which nothing more is thought? But if a great man him­
self is robbed or insulted, the whole police force is immediately in mo­
tion, and woe even to the innocent persons who chance to be suspected 
(...) How different is the case for the poor man! The more humanity owes 
him, the more society denies him. Every door is shut against him, even 
when he has a right to its being opened: and i f  ever he obtains justice, it 
is with much greater difficulty than others obtain favours (Rousseau, 
Discourse on Political Economy, p. 147).
97. Rousseau, Discourse on Political Economy (p. 147)
98. There can be no patriotism without liberty, no liberty without virtue, no 
virtue without citizens; create citizens, and you have everything you
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the feeling of humanity evaporates and grows feeble in embracing all 
mankind, and ... we cannot be affected by the calamities of tartary or 
Japan, in the same manner as we are by those of European nations. It is 
necessary in some degree to confine and limit our interest and 
compassion in order to make it active. Now, as this sentiment can be 
useful only to those with whom we have to live, it is proper that our 
humanity should coniine itself to our fellow-citizens, and should receive 
a new force because we are in the habit of seeing them, and by reason of 
the common interest which unites them. It is certain that the greatest 
miracles of virtue have been produced by patriotism: this fine and lively 
feeling, which gives to the force of self-love all the beauty of virtue"
Although Socrates was more virtuous than Cato, Rousseau remarks that the for­
mer succeeded only in persuading a few and in dying for truth, while the latter 
“defended his country, its liberty, and its laws“. Citizens should be “taught by the 
one, and led by the other ... for no people has ever been made into a nation of phi­
losophers, but it is not impossible to make a people happy".9 100
Rousseau’s patriotism could be generated by a number of means and policies. 
One was the formation of a citizen’s army, as we saw in Machiavelli.101 Still, patri­
otism was only a happy by-product here, and Rousseau did not have, like Machia­
velli, an argument in favour of militarism for the sake of virtue. Apart from The So­
cial Contract, Rousseau developed his themes in much detail in The Government o f 
Poland. Approvingly, he started by noting that.
All these legislators of ancient times IMoses, Lycurgus, and Numa] based 
their legislation on the same ideas. All three sought ties that would bind 
the citizens to the fatherland and to one another. All three found what 
they were looking for in distinctive usages, in religious ceremonies that 
invariably were in essence exclusive and national, in games that brought 
the citizens together frequently, in exercises that caused them to grow in 
vigour and strength and developed their pride and self esteem: and in 
public spectacles that, by keeping them reminded of their forefathers*
need: without them, you will have nothing but debased slaves, from the 
rulers of the state downwards (Rousseau, Discourse on Political Economy, 
p.135).
99. Rousseau, Discourse on Political Economy (p. 130).
100. Rousseau. Discourse on Political Economy (p.131).
101. [T)he state’s true defenders are its individual citizens, no one of whom 
should be a professional soldier ... That is how they handled the military 
problem in Rome: that is how they handle it now in Switzerland: and 
that is how it should be handled in every free state (...) because people 
always fight better in defence of their own than in defence of what be­
longs to others (Rousseau, Government o f Poland, p.81).
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deeds and hardships and virtues and triumphs, stirred their hearts, set 
them on fire with the spirit of emulation, and tied them tightly to the 
fatherland102
Rousseau started with the upbringing of infants and education of children.
The newly-born infant, upon first opening his eyes, must gaze upon the 
fatherland, and until his dying day should behold of nothing else. Your 
true republican is a man who imbibed love of the fatherland, which is to 
say love o f the laws and of liberty, with his mother’s milk. That love 
makes up his entire existence103
Public games, exercises, and free-air spectacles gave inhabitants of the country ex­
periences of communality, both in the sense of partaking in a collective enterprise 
and in the sense of being exposed to the eyes of their fellow citizens and the possi­
bility of public disapprobation. The great events of the nation’s history and the sac­
rifices of patriots should be solemnly commemorated with frequent intervals.
All should have a peculiar national flavour, drawing upon, for instance, Polish 
traditions, or inventing new ones. National costumes, national history taught in the 
schools, a distaste for travelling, a specific national paraphernalia of civil religion 
were all part of the picture. Indeed, in The Government o f Poland, patriotism be­
came an "invariably exclusive and national” affair. It was also characterised by 
Spartan severity. Luxury, idleness, gambling, unnecessary adornment, feminine 
traits, and excessive privatism must be discouraged or banned.104
In The Social Contract, some scope was left for private (religious) opinion. Civic 
religion here, in fact in contrast to Christian religions, in particular Catholicism, 
was seen as capable of accommodating different groups. Although Judaism as well 
as Christianity claimed to be universal, this was exactly the problem, because they 
could not tolerate other religions. Historically, according to Rousseau, pagan relig­
ions were peculiar to different countries, yet tended to be respectful o f the other 
gods being likewise to other countries. They were beneficial by linking "the divine 
cult with love of the laws, and, making countiy the object of the citizen’s adoration, 
teachlingl them that service done to the state is service done to its tutelary god".105 
Still, Rousseau conceded,
it is bad in that, being founded on lies and error, it deceives men, makes 
them credulous and superstitious, and drowns the true cult of the 
divinity in empty ceremonial. It is bad again, when it becomes tyrannous
102. Rousseau, Government o f Poland (p. 8).
103. Rousseau, Government o f Poland (p. 19); cp. Rousseau, Discourse on the Arts 
and Sciences (pp.20-21).
104. Rousseau, Government o f Poland (pp. 10-24).
105. Rousseau, The Social Contract 111,8.
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and exclusive, and makes a people bloodthirsty and intolerant, so that it 
breathes fire and slaughter106
Yet, Rousseau agreed with Machiavelli that Christian religion, even the ‘true one* of 
the Gospels, while making people virtuous, also made them unworldly. Rousseau's 
suggestion was,
a purely civil profession of faith of which the Sovereign should fix the 
articles, not exactly as religious dogmas, but as the social sentiments 
without which a man cannot be a good citizen or a faithful subject (...)
The dogmas of civil religion ought to be few, simple, and exactly worded, 
without explanation or commentary. The existence of a mighty, 
intelligent, and beneficient Divinity, possessed of foresight and 
providence, the life to come, the happiness of the Just, the punishment of 
the wicked, the sanctity of the social contract and the laws: these are its 
positive dogmas. Its negative dogmas I confine to one, intolerance107
Rousseau optimistically thought that we could have it both ways: while appeals 
were made to religious feeling and passion, their object was still reasonable. And 
while civil religion was linked to patriotic love of country, it did not necessarily in­
volve intolerance. All this evaporated in the older Rousseau's draconian prescrip­
tions for Poland, where the initial project of liberty itself seemed to be Jeopardised. 
Here, identification with the community came at the enormous price that each in­
dividual became very little else than a citizen, and a fiercely nationalistic one at 
that.10»
Leaving aside the radical nature of Rousseau's measures, particularly in Po­
land, we should remember the core of his Intuition: that citizens, in order to show 
civic virtue, must identify with a concrete political community, and with a bounded 
group of people which, in some respect, they ‘see*, and cooperate with. But for this 
identity to ensue, liberty must already be secured, and the measures of identifica­
tion must, in turn, appeal to the value of this liberty:
Let our country then show itself the common mother of her citizens; let 
the advantages they enjoy in their country endear it to them; let the 
government leave them enough share in the public administration to 
make them feel that they are at home; and let the laws be in their eyes 
only the guarantees of the common liberty109
These elements, the reliance on a strong state that embodies and enacts the com­
mon good of a universal and homogeneous citizenry, and the willingness to de-
106. Rousseau, The SocidL Contract III,8.
107. Rousseau, The Social Contract 111,8.
108. Taylor (1992b:44-51).
109. Rousseau, Discourse on Polfticai Economy (pp.133-34).
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mand total identification with this state from the citizens, were to inform French 
political Jacobinism, and with it the dark side of the modem republican heritage. 
Rousseau’s ideas about civic identification were particularly ambiguous. He did not 
advocate a return to. or a revival of, genuine national traditions and feelings, but, 
on the contrary, the instrumentalisation of the artifice of symbols. Thus, while fore­
shadowing contemporary theorists of nationalism and national identity as well as 
the agents of cultural assimilation, he also, on the other hand, promises us that 
collective identity is not necessarily a closed and determinate affair.
Say what you like, there is no such think nowadays as Frenchmen, 
Germans, Spaniards, or even Englishment - only Europeans. All have 
the same tastes, the same passions, the same customs, and for good 
reason: not one of them has ever been formed nationally110
110. Rousseau, Government o f Poland (p.l 1).
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Chapter 4:
Republicanism in the Discourse of 
British Enlightenment
1. Introduction
In the chapter following this, we shall trace republicanism as it crossed the Atlantic 
from Britain to the New World, and was accommodated in the process to the radi­
cally different reality of a new, large, and unprecedently democratic nation. How­
ever. the history of this geographical and theoretical transition is intimately linked 
to the history of Enlightenment political thought, including strands of theory that 
developed into what we now call liberalism. Thus, it is also linked to conceptual 
and theoretical encounters in which distinct aspects of the republican view of poli­
tics were challenged and reformulated. These encounters facilitate our appreciation 
of the historical boundaries of the republican argument. Just as they help us un­
derstand the nature and causes of its eventual eclipse. To trace these develop­
ments, we need to look at a number of figures of the British Enlightenment, in par­
ticular John Locke and the demonstrably anti-republican David Hume. We also 
deal with the illuminating injection of republican themes into Enlightenment 
thought on commerce, progress, and civil society in the other Scottish authors 
Adam Smith and Adam Ferguson, who both, like Hume, took up themes that we 
have encountered in Montesquieu.
As we shall see in the next chapter, it is difficult to claim that American 
thought was not ‘liberal’, if we connect this term with a set of its conventionally as­
sociated ideas and concepts such as natural rights, state of nature, toleration, or 
commercialism. However, to speak of ‘liberalism’ in the eighteenth century may 
mislead us. In particular, with the exception of Hobbes, whose provocatively mod­
em works had little impact, much early liberalism was closely tied to a universe of 
religious devotion, Christian duty, and social obligation - as distinct from the more 
radical doctrines of moral, social, and economic individualism, which appeared at a 
much later date. This was certainly the case with Locke. Hume, whose work stands 
at the beginning of another great tradition of liberal rejection of republican as­
sumptions, was protoliberal in a different, more sceptical, anti-democratic, and 
conservative sense.
Liberalism, 1 would be inclined to argue, is best regarded as an artefact of the 
next centuiy. Of course, exactly what liberalism consists of can be endlessly de­
bated, as can the historical date of birth of any one of its constitutive ideas. Such a 
debate does not per se concern us here, and it is therefore better to speak, for the 
time being, of a number of distinct conceptual frames and fields of debate that rose 
to prominence with the European Enlightenment. All of these (along with others 
which I do not discuss) eventually assumed various forms which we now call ‘lib-
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of whatever conventionally agreed liberal credentials. Some have already been 
hinted at in the writings of Montesquieu and the early English republicans. I pro­
pose to cut through many layers of ideological complexity in order to concentrate 
on these new forms of argument as conceptual ‘bottles’ into which either old or new 
wine could be poured. All of them constituted challenges of a new age to the stan­
dard assumptions of republican discourse as it had been carried out in the past. As 
such, their content is obviously important to us. But they also became conceptual 
frameworks inside which republicanism could be modernised or modified, at least 
for a time, in manners suitable for an emerging world of commerce, democracy, and 
individualism.
The debates concerned the nature of natural rights and political authority; the 
taming of interest and faction by the means of institutional measures; the gradual 
invention of a conception of civil society primarily based on the benign effects o f 
commerce; the idea of progress in societies and individuals; and the rise of a new 
moral psychology based on natural ‘sympathy’. Each debate became part of the 
American ideological landscape and in doing so had primarily British origins. As I 
introduce and discuss these five protoliberal themes of the British Enlightenment, 
my aim is to anticipate or to set the scene for later discussion of the manner and 
degree to which they were reflected in the American constitutional debate.
2. Natural Law, Political Authority, and Natural Rights
Locke’s conceptualisation of natural rights and related doctrines of state of nature, 
trust, and consent have been seen to epitomise the liberal departure from republi­
canism. According to this view, and granting the soundness of the observation that 
as "to political ‘first principles/ a great many Americans, including the constitu­
tional founders, relied on Lockean notions of natural right," the case for republi­
canism in America does seem slim.1 Yet, such a conclusion is too hasty:
First of all, Locke’s ’liberalism’ was not as inherently hostile to republican ide­
ology as commonly assumed. This is not the place for a comprehensive exposition 
of Locke’s thought.2 However, it is clear that Locke’s Whig advocacy of the Glorious 
Revolution was not much influenced by republican virtue doctrine. His virtues were 
Christian and private rather than martial or civic, and he was little concerned with 
patriotism.3 On the other hand, Locke’s doctrine o f self-ownership no doubt con­
1. Sinopoli (1992:70).
2. See Tully (1993); Dunn (1969; 1990b); Laslett (1963); Berlin (1964).
3. For Locke’s thoughts on the traditional Christian virtues, on the virtue of jus­
tice (keeping compacts and civil laws), civility (“outward expression of goodwill and 
esteem or at least no contempt or hatred”), and on the conventional element in de­
termining what is regarded as virtue or vice, see essays on ‘Obligation of Penal 
Laws', ‘Morality*, ’Virtue B, and ‘O f Ethics in General’ (Locke, Political Essays, 
pp.235-37,268-69,287-88,297). Locke’s virtuous citizen was veiy much the man 
who devoted himself to “honest and usefull industry" or “honest labour" and
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tained the seeds of strong modem subjective rights theories, both as regards the 
right to freedom of consciousness and the right to the unlimited fruits of one’s la­
bour. But to associate such theories with Locke himself or with the discourse of 
natural rights at the time in general would be unhistorical, as would the implied 
notion of an inherent conflict between private life and rights and, on the other 
hand, virtue, duty, and the common good of the commonwealth, be it spiritual or 
material:4
Locke’s toleration, and the claim that “(n]obody .... neither single persons, nor 
churches ... nor even commonwealths, have any just title to invade the civil rights 
and worldly goods o f each other, upon pretence of religion", was the result of a life's 
thought on the relation between religious faith and civil magistracy.5 Although pro­
viding important conceptual tools, it entailed no unlimited freedom of conscience in 
a modem sense of a right to pursue any ‘conception of the good’, whatever It be. It 
is often forgotten that Locke’s toleration was not extended to unbelievers.6
Locke’s conception of natural rights was primarily religious and God-centred; 
indeed “[t]he duty of mankind, as God’s Creatures, to obey their divine creator was 
the central axiom of John Locke’s thought".7 8In the absence of a reliable, compre­
hensive body of scholastic doctrine, natural rights were still matters of natural law. 
They were the instruments needed by men, endowed unlike animals with reason 
and the capacity for moral agency, to comprehend the will of God, understand its 
obligatory nature, and follow it to the best of their ability, accepting no civil or ec­
clesiastical authority.6
avoided becoming “a useless member of the commonwealth" (‘Labour’, in Locke, Po­
litical Essays, pp.327-28). A  manuscript on 'Amor Patriae’ ends with the specula­
tion that the Christian man, contemplating his eventual departure from the world, 
“will be much more indifferent to the particular place o f his nativity". Finally, even 
given the right to resistance which should not be taken lightly, Locke’s call for civic 
virtue and patriotism, when it appears, is a call for temperance, union, and alle­
giance to the rightful king (‘On Allegiance and the Revolution’}. As already noted, 
the difference to Sidney, whose “book on government ... I never read" ('Some 
Thoughts Concerning Reading and Study for a Gentleman’), is clear (Locke, Political 
Essays, pp.275,306-313,352).
4. Haakonsen (1991).
5. Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration (p.31).
6. Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration (p.64).
7. Dunn (1983:119).
8. God having given man above other creatures ... a knowledge of himself 
which the beasts have n o t ... he cannot but conclude that he has that 
knowledge and those faculties ... for some use and some end (...) moral 
actions are only those that depend upon the choice of an understanding 
and free agent" (‘Law of Nature' and ‘of Ethics in General’, Locke, Political 
Essays, pp.270,300).
On Locke’s conception of natural law, see the 'Essays on the Law of Nature’ (Locke, 
Political Essays, pp.79-133).
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The purpose of government was the effective institution of a condition of peace 
where such rights could best be secured, and the exercise facilitated of their corre­
sponding duties to oneself, to God, and to fellow Christians. Civil peace, of course, 
was also a good in itself, as men "besides their souls, which are immortal ... have 
also their temporal lives here on earth" with its possible “comforts and happiness**, 
however "frail and fleeting". Neither temporal nor eternal happiness could be s e ­
cured but by the industry and effort of individuals themselves, but it could be fa ­
cilitated by “entering into societies, grounded upon their mutual compacts o f a s ­
sistance".9
The fruits of such compacts, i.e., "procuring, preserving, and advancing o f c iv il 
interests", namely “life, liberty, health, and indulence of body; and the possession 
of outward things, such as money, lands, houses, furniture, and the like",10 a lon g  
with Locke’s famous labour theory of property and doctrine of tacit consent to th e  
existence of money11 have been seen as evidence of Locke’s ’possessive individual­
ism’. 12 Yet, the consensus in Lockean scholarship has always been adverse to M ac- 
Pherson’s Marxist thesis. Avoiding such reductionism, it is however true that Locke 
was centrally concerned with political economy and trade. Money and property 
rights, along with deliberate national policies stimulating demographic growth, 
trade, and the prevention of idleness among the poor were part of a project o f n a ­
tional economic recovery and state-building. But Locke’s property rights were n o t  
’libertarian’, he had no real problems with taxation, and he was “a patron of m in i­
mal government only in certain, if crucial, ways", i.e.t the area of religion.13
Generally speaking, and certainly when it comes to the debate over ‘liberalism’ 
versus ‘republicanism’, we have been prone to read far too much quasi-Hobbesian 
‘atomism* into late seventeenth and eighteenth century natural rights theory. F o r  
Locke, the language of state of nature was not a means to present, let alone to a d ­
vocate, the radical self-sufficiency of the individual. It was a way to conceptualise 
the divine purpose of men as God’s workmanship and the absolute moral obliga­
tions that followed from this state of affairs in any society. It was a way to establish 
a basic egalitarian case against all pretensions of civil or ecclesiastical magistracies 
to possess any form of divine authorisation. Above all. it was an attempt to secure - 
Locke was not always quite sure if  he succeeded - the absolute and rational foun­
dation of morals as accessible, in principle, to all men who were given to behold 
God’s light within them.
Finally, liberty, to Locke, was a species of Ubertas in our narrow sense. Civil lib­
erty, unlike Hobbes’ ‘silence of the law’, and over and above the law of nature with
9. Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration (pp.57-58).
10. Locke. A Letter Concerning Toleration (p. 18).
11. Locke, Second Treatise, V.25-51.
12. MacPherson (1962).
13. Goldie (1997:xxvii).
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which it must not conflict, was constituted by positive law and civ’ll government, 
and based for its exact content, legitimacy, and command of voluntary obedience, 
on the consent of citizens.14 As anticipated in our discussion of Sidney, the lan­
guage of consent and Locke’s idea of an “executive power of the law of Nature"15 
was not necessarily at odds with republicanism, although Locke’s own particular 
employment of that language certainly was. In view of its later radical interpreta­
tion, it is worth noting that Locke wished the doctrine of consent to legitimise the 
restoration of a rather conservative mixed constitution with king, nobles, and a 
representative body, and the return to the liberties of the celebrated ‘Ancient Con­
stitution’.16 Once in place, and providing the king was a reasonably just one. there 
was little use for either Sidney’s civic virtue or the occasional modification of the 
constitution.17
When the discourse of natural rights, consent, and state of nature became em­
ployed in America, its political context was different and much more radical, and its 
details were not always strictly Lockean. Before pursuing this point in the following 
chapter, it is well worth remembering that Locke and the natural law tradition gen­
erally was only one of two main conceptions of individual rights and duties at the 
time, the other being the sociological and historical jurisprudence that grew out of 
the Scottish Enlightenment with Hume and Smith as its main figures.
Neither Hume nor Smith believed that the moral architecture of human socie­
ties depended for its existence or binding force on the sanction of a deity, the exis­
tence of which at least Hume did not believe in. Against Locke’s doctrine of ration­
ally accessible, fixed natural rights and obligations, Hume pointed out the manifest 
empirical diversity of such conceptions among all those individuals who had not 
read the Second Treatise, yet were capable of reason. The state of nature was “to be 
regarded as a fiction, not unlike that of the golden age", as was the idea that politi­
cal obligations and rights of resistance might derive their authority from an original
14. Locke’s definition, significantly, comes in the section ’Of Slavery’:
The liberty of man in society is to be under no other legislative power but 
that established by consent in the commonwealth, nor under the 
dominion of any will, or restraint of any law, but what that legislative 
shall enact according to the trust put in It. Freedom, then, is not what 
Sir Robert Filmer tells us: ‘A  liberty for every one to do what he lists, to 
live as he pleases, and not to be tied by any laws’; but freedom of men 
under government is to have a standing rule to live by, common to every 
one of that society (...) not to be subject to the inconstant, uncertain, 
unknown, arbitrary will o f another man (Locke, Second Treatise, V,22).
15. Locke, Second Treatise, II, 13.
16. Locke’s views, undeveloped in the Second Treatise, may be sampled from “the 
Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina* which he co-authored or at least strongly 
recommended (Locke, Political Essays, pp. 160-81).
17. For somewhat more radical readings of Locke, see Wolin (1992) and Dienstag 
(1996a;1996b).
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(tacit) promise. To presume such consent to have taken place was as absurd as the 
notion of a realistic possibility of an actual choice for the average man in the first 
place. Moreover, "why are we bound to keep our ux>rd?". Hume provocatively 
asked.18
Hume’s bottom line was that, along with other virtues, “justice takes its rise 
from human conventions". Such artificial virtues or duties, unlike the natural du­
ties which arise by “instinct or immediate propensity" are based on rational insight, 
helped along by processes of indoctrination in society, into the “necessities of hu­
man society, and the impossibility of supporting it, if these duties were neglected". 
By this, Hume had in mind scarcity and limited sympathy, the perception of a 
common interest in legal security of property and contract and stability of political 
authority, recognition of the sources of the latter including the possession of prop­
erty, and habitual political obedience. Yet, the exact content of property rights and 
political authority was an empirical and historical matter, although with opinion 
inclining towards old and settled legal forms.19
Smith’s related view emphasised the manner in which basic prudential dispo­
sitions towards the acceptance of authority would take on different historical forms 
as psychological propensities to modesty and restraint would be balanced in inde­
terminate ways by a more rational quest for individual utility, the latter sensitive to 
changing distributions of social power.20
Between them, Smith and Hume introduced a potentially far-reaching, conven­
tionalist, and distinctly modem trait in liberal political thought. Within the bounds 
of certain constants of human psychology and conditions of collective existence, 
both accepted the basic historical contingency of moral and legal forms. Hume was 
aware that public opinion might change, and that disputes over the relations of 
property and authority were particularly dangerous in this regard, and he certainly 
thought it as his duty to be among those who argued the soundness of opinions 
supportive of established authority. Locke was painfully aware of the difficulty and 
danger of not having a stable moral foundation of human societies which was ac­
cessible to the reason of at least the most worthy searchers. By contrast, Hume 
and Smith were, on the whole, both remarkably confident of, and may be said to 
have overestimated, the stability over time and the potential consensus across so­
cial classes, of the relatively conservative social relations and legal forms that they 
favoured. Smith’s relative complacency on behalf of a conventionalist morality 
seems particularly misguided in his age of rapid economic development and
18. Hume, A Treatise o f Human Nature, III.2.2 (p.545); Political Essays (‘Of the 
Original Contract*, p.197); also Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence (A), V, 115-19.
19. Hume, A Treatise o f Human Nature, 111,2,2 (p.545); Political Essays (’Of the 
Original Contract*, pp. 195-96).
20. For Smith, the key passages are in Lectures on Jurisprudence (A), V, 119-27.
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emerging social mobility, not least in view of his historical sociology of relations of 
dominance, dependency, and property, set out in the Wealth of Nations.21
When it came to first principles, there really is no denying that the American 
tradition became overwhelmingly conceptualised in a tradition of God-sanctioned 
individual rights, complete with conventional vocabularies of state of nature, con­
tract, and consent. But we shall see that this tradition was often rather un-Lockean 
in its concern with public opinion and political legitimacy, in its radical and demo­
cratic thrust, and in the introduction with some authors, notably Jefferson and 
Paine, of a relatively conventionalist and pluralist political constitutionalism. In 
their deliberations over the historical meaning and consequence of first principles, 
which were coupled to a republican language of democratic self-government, 
Hume’s ‘opinion’ became rather more political than the latter would have wished. 
When we turn to the discussion of the shape of libertas in America, in order to ap­
preciate these matters we shall need to say a few words about two authors who, 
along with the earlier works of Sidney, were key transporters of a political rights 
discourse to America which was peculiarly tailored to the New World and Its new 
men. and which had distinct republican aspects - I have in mind Reid and Paine. 
For now, we turn to other important ‘liberal* challenges to republicanism.
3. Interest, Faction, and Institutional Architecture
If Scottish sociological jurisprudence had less purchase in America than the lan­
guage of natural rights, the effects of Hume’s views on institutional design are diffi­
cult to overlook.22
Hume's work was one of the most important articulations of a key anti- 
republican argument. Several of his political essays explicitly considered standard 
republican views about the need for civic virtue to check the corruption of even the 
best of political institutions. Hume’s answer amounted to saying that civic virtue is 
very often more of a problem than a solution, and that the natural propensities of 
man may be put to better use inside a deliberately constructed machinery o f gov­
ernment which renders virtue redundant.
Hume’s position on virtue may usefully be contrasted to that of Harrington and 
to Trenchard & Gordon’s Cato's Letters. We already noted how these authors, and 
most particularly Harrington, had reduced the republican language of virtue to one 
of rational self-interest in security, but cut lose from the normative horizon o f sac­
rifice and honour which was retained in Sidney. We also noted a distinctly un- 
Machiavellian complacency regarding the possibility of constructing a self- 
perpetuating system of self-interest. To Cato, the world was very much governed by 
passions and egoism which had to be controlled. Only, varieties in “the Genius of
21. Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes o f the Wealth o f Nations; Dunn 
(1983:133-35).
22. Draper (1982).
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passions and egoism which had to be controlled. Only, varieties in “the Genius of 
political Constitutions’* were likely to produce different outcomes of virtue and lib­
erty in different places. Making things significantly easier for themselves by largely 
ignoring Harrington’s levelling agrarian law. they assumed the feasibility of 
schemes that effectively equated or inter-linked the interests of the governed and 
their representatives, thus rendering civic virtue a relatively simple matter of con­
trolling and occasionally punishing the corrupt.23
Like Trenchard and Gordon, also Hume started from Harrington. But while the 
authors of Cato's Letters could confidently state that “[plolitical Jealousy ... in the 
People is a necessary and laudable Passion",24 Hume was much less prone to rely 
on classical virtues:
The ages of the greatest public spirit are not always eminent for private 
virtue. Good laws may beget order and moderation in the government, 
where the manners and customs have instilled little humanity or justice 
into the tempers of men
A man who loves only himself... without public spirit, or a regard to the 
community, is deficient in the most material part of virtue. But this is a 
subject which needs not be longer insisted on at present There are enow 
of zealots on both sides who kindle up the passions of their partizans, 
and under pretence of public good, pursue the interests and ends of 
their particular faction. For my part, I shall always be more fond of 
promoting moderation than zea l... 25
Hume certainly agreed with the Harringtonians that political prudence demanded 
the institutional balancing of interests, assuming as a general"political maxim, that 
every man must be supposed a knave", even if he was an honest man in his private 
affairs. But his observations of political and religious unrest in Europe made him 
far more keenly aware that more dangerous sources of faction arose from differ­
ences over principle, “especially abstract speculative principle", be it disagreement 
over'the sources of political authority, or the particularly vicious conflicts over 
Christian doctrine. Hume also lauded the truly patriotic, but “moderate and con­
sistent" exercise of criticism and “a suitable degree of zeal", and favoured freedom of 
the press (but not “the unbounded liberty of the press [whichl ... is one o f the evils, 
attending ... mixt forms of government") as a check on political authority to that 
end. Even so, by intuition and temper, Hume was inclined to stress the hazards of 
all sorts of new “enthusiasm" and irresponsible political and religious leaders who
23. Ttenchard & Gordon, Cato's Letters, 13.
24. Trenchard & Gordon, Cato's Letters, 33.
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were capable of arousing the mob, turning newly acquired liberties into dangerous 
license.25 6 27
But also as regarded the politics of interest. Hume placed a different, more con­
servative emphasis. He disagreed with Harrington’s view that only a relatively 
egalitarian (agrarian) republic was feasible in the long run in Britain, were liberty to 
be preserved. In an age of commerce (which Hume, as we shall see, welcomed for 
other reasons) large inequalities of property and corresponding inequalities in the 
capacity to wield political influence were inevitable. This somewhat changed the 
structure of the problem of interest. Hume’s disagreement with Harrington’s view 
that government was founded on property was not over the importance of private 
interest and the politics of jealousy of property as such, but over the nature of the 
institutional balance between relations of property and power. Where Harrington’s 
political mechanics in Oceana were about the balancing of the stable interests of 
the different natural orders of society, Hume’s science of government was aimed at 
a more subtle functional balancing of different parts and groups in the political 
system, capitalising on certain universal human propensities to power and self- 
interested action, but also relying on the popular ‘opinion of interest’ and the 
'opinion of right' to property and authority, which we already noted. Such opinion, 
in Hume’s view, was after all antecedent to interest, and, again, generally suppor­
tive of tried and established forms, even as property relations changed in civil soci­
ety.22
But if Hume relied on public opinion of a conservative bent, he also believed 
that steps towards a more democratic, republican order were likely to jeopardise 
the stability of such established conceptions of authority. Hume was afraid of 
situations where passions of religion and party would seize the minds of the many. 
But he was equally afraid that people’s opinions of their interest would change. By
25. That Politics May be Reduced to a Science’, Hume. Political Essays (pp.l 1-12, 
italics, added). Note the rhetorical hijack of the traditional republican virtue of mod­
eration.
26. ‘Of the Liberty of the Press’, ’Of the Independency of Parliament’, ’Of Parties in 
General’, That Politics may be Reduced to a Science*. ‘Of Superstition and Enthu­
siasm’ (Hume, Political Essays, pp.3,14,24.36,46). According to Hume,
such is the nature of the human mind, that it always Jays hold on every 
mind that approaches it; and as it is wonderfully fortified by an 
unanimity of sentiments, so it is shocked and disturbed by any 
contrariety. Hence the eagerness, which most people discover in a 
dispute; and hence their impatience of opposition, even in the most 
speculative and indifferent opinions. This principle, however frivolous it 
may appear, seems to have been the origin of all religious wars and 
divisions (‘Of Parties in General*, Hume, Political Essays, p.37)
27. For Hume’s discussion of Harrington see the essays ‘Of the Origin of Govern­
ment’ and Whether the British Government Inclines More to Absolute Monarchy, 
or to a Republic’, in Political Essays.
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historical chance, England had found a system of government which, if properly 
understood and maintained, could be rendered stable. But the legitimacy of its re­
lations of property and political authority had no solid moral foundations, and 
Hume had no illusions whatsoever about the arbitrary and violent original acquisi­
tions of both. He had only prudential arguments to offer in their favour and was 
intensely aware that such arguments would have less purchase if the people grew 
out of their established habits of allegiance. This Humean fear of faction, in par­
ticular the faction of the licentious, passionate or - perhaps most importantly - 
property-envious majority, in a less than perfect world, was to become prominent 
in parts of the American debate, in Madison and particularly in Hamilton.28
So were many of the particulars of Hume’s discussion of a science of politics 
which favoured liberty, and which was based on assumptions of private interest 
and love of dominion. The first aspect of this was Hume’s resolute debunking of 
classical republican references. Much like Montesquieu, whose (republican) con­
cern with the importance of law he shared, Hume believed that the world had never 
before seen as much individual liberty - of the press, o f religion, o f property rights, 
and against arbitrary taxation - as was currently enjoyed under the constitutional 
English monarchy. This was not the result of a return to ‘ancient’ popular liberties, 
stolen by the Stuarts and now restored by the Parliament. Instead, Hume saw it as 
the outcome of a peculiar balance which emerged from the Glorious Revolution. 
Now, the Crown, though possessing immense wealth as well as constitutional ex­
ecutive powers, still depended on the parliament for finance. And, making deliber­
ate play with conventional republican understandings o f mixed government Hume 
argued that despite the king’s formal veto, the parliament "whenever it pleased, 
might swallow up the rest, and engross the whole power of the constitution", were 
it not for the king’s chief countervailing resource, the creation of personal client 
relations through the extension of offices and privileges to both houses of parlia­
ment. Thus, Hume’s provocative assertion that,
We may ... give to this influence what name we please; we may call it by 
the invidious appellations of corruption and dependence; but some 
degree and some kind of it are inseperable from the very nature of the 
constitution, and necessary to the preservation of our mixed govern­
ment29
Secondly, although “AUTHORITY and LIBERTY" were in principle always in conflict, 
Hume was favourably disposed to a strong, central political authority as a guaran­
tee of lawfulness. Men being often inclined to seek their narrow interests “by fraud 
or rapine", they must “endeavour to palliate what they cannot cure". They need
28. Diggins (1986:53,61).
29. ‘Of the Independence of Parliament', Hume, Political Essays (pp.25-26).
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magistrates, whose peculiar office it is to point out the decrees of equity, 
to punish transgressors, to correct fraud and violence, and to oblige 
men. however reluctant, to consult their real and permanent interests. In 
a word, OBEDIENCE is a new duty which must be invented to support 
that of JUSTICE; and the tyes of equity must be corroborated by those of 
allegiance30
Given the right conditions, Hume was rather less afraid of abuses of power in a 
monarchy than in a republican government. By and large, against Machiavelli who 
on this point was in error on account of “his having lived in too early an age of the 
world, to be a good judge of political truth", Hume was of the opinion that
It may now be affirmed of civilized monarchies, what was formerly said in 
praise of republics alone, that they are a government of Laws, not of 
Men. They are found susceptible of order, method, and constancy, to a 
surprising degree. Property is there secure; industry encouraged; the 
arts flourish31
The reasons for this Hume found in the relative incentive structures or relations of 
“jealousy" of the two forms. In a monarchy.
a legal authority, though great, has always some bounds, which 
terminate both the hopes and pretensions of the person possessed of it:
The laws must have provided a remedy against its excesses: Such an 
emminent magistrate has much to fear, and little to hope from his 
usurpations: And as his legal authority is quietly submitted to, he has 
small temptation and small opportunity of extending it farther32
A monarch would always have to be afraid of the eventual erosion of the public 
opinion on which his authority rested, and Hume made much of the potential of 
monarchies to learn and to redress their abuses of power which were really results 
of mistaken interest.33
However, if England were a republic,
and were any private man possessed of a revenue ... even a tenth part as 
large as that of the crown, he would very Justly excite jealousy; because 
he would infallibly have great authority in the government: and such an 
irregular authority, not avowed by the laws, is always more dangerous 
than a much greater authority, derived from them. A  man, possessed of 
usurped power, can set no bounds to his pretensions: His partizans have
30. ‘Of the Origin of Government’, Hume, Political Essays (pp.21-22).
31. ‘Of Civil Liberty’, Hume, Political Essays (pp.51,56).
32. 'Whether the British Government Inclines More to Absolute Monarchy, or to a 
Republic’ (Hume. Political Essays, p.30).
33. ‘Of Civil Liberty’, Hume, Political Essays (pp.56-57).
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liberty to hope for everything in his favour: His enemies provoke his 
ambition ... every corrupted humour in the state naturally gathers to 
him34
Thirdly, from his general thoughts on the balancing of interest Hume derived a blue 
print “Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth". This was a conception of a representative 
republic based on a critique of Harrington’s Oceana, which was to be very influen­
tial in America, and which Hume himself believed was a useful thought experiment 
“that we may be able to bring any real constitution ... as near it as possible, by ... 
gentle alterations and innovations". Hume’s general idea, which was to be adopted 
in The Federalist Papers, nos. 10 and 51. was that
a republican and free government would be an obvious absurdity, if the 
particular checks and controuls, provided by the constitution, had really 
no influence, and made it not the interest, even of bad men, to act for the 
public good35
Such “checks and controuls" were the means to tab and exploit the propensities of 
men, organised in parties, to act according to “the separate interest of each court, 
and each order”, forgetting their private honour which is otherwise “a great check 
upon mankind". Once prudently instituted, they would render less important the 
transient propensity to virtue of historical individuals, indeed
so little dependence have they on the humours and tempers o f men, that 
consequences almost as general and certain may sometimes be deduced 
from them, as any which the mathematical sciences afford us36
Hume’s “Perfect Commonwealth” featured such ideas as an indirectly elected sen­
ate with executive powers combined with directly elected local county representa­
tives with legislative powers, with the senate proposing and debating, and with the 
presumably less wise and more easily swayed representatives only debating in their 
“separate bodies”; fairly stiff property requirements limiting electors to the classes 
of “freeholders of twenty pounds a-year in the country, and all the householders 
worth'500 pounds in the town parishes” (“not by an undistinguished rabble, like 
the ENGLISH electors, but by men of fortune and education"); a system of decen­
tralised county legislation where “(ejveiy county is a kind of republic within itselT; 
a “court of competitors” serving as inspector and controller of the senate; and pow­
ers of expulsion in the senate of “any factious member”. The Commonwealth could
34. *Whether the British Government Inclines more to Absolute Monarchy, or to a 
Republic’, Hume, Political Essays (p.30).
35. ‘Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth’, That Politics May Be Reduced to a Science’, 
Hume, Political Essays (pp.5,221-22).
36. That Politics May Be Reduced to a Science*, ‘Of the Independence of Parlia­
ment’. Hume, Political Essays (pp.5,24-25).
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avoid the dangers of both “combination" of majorities in the senate against the 
people, and “factions" of separate interests, because of the relatively limited num­
ber and powers of the former, its annual reelection, the existence of the court of 
competitors, and the powers of expulsion. All this added up to a situation where 
the “chief support of the BRITISH government" would be “the opposition of inter­
est", and all served to dispel the
common opinion, that no large state, such as France or Britain, could 
ever be modelled into a commonwealth, but that such a form of 
government can only take place in a city or small territory37
As we shall see, the federalist side in the American debate was to make a number 
of central Humean points about interest, internal checks and balances, the dan­
gers of factions and majorities, and the possibility of a large, representative repub­
lic. But we shall also see that even this framework could be combined, although it 
certainly was not always, with a surviving, if chastened, language of civic virtue 
and the common interest, which was all but lacking in Hume.
4. The Discourse on Commerce and Civil Society
Hume’s and Montesquieu’s transformations of the political theory of interest were 
part of a larger intellectual reversal, already noted in the previous chapter, of the 
old republican theme of the dangers of commerce, luxury, and corruption of virtue. 
These ideas provided the building blocks for new notions of ‘civil society’ which 
were to challenge important aspects of the republican liberty argument.
Eighteenth century writers found many effects of commerce that commended it 
in its own terms. The wealth, the alleviation of poverty and illiteracy, the cultural 
and scientific progress, and the innovation and refinement of sea-trading nations 
like the Netherlands and Britain could not help being noticed. But in addition, dis­
tinctly political arguments were advanced, i.e., arguments not just about the com­
patibility of commerce and liberty (which republicans might now be willing to 
grant), but also about commerce as a, possibly more effective, way to advance lib­
erty. At its most general, Smith, momentarily forgetting Montesquieu, claimed that 
“Mr Hume is the only writer who ... has hitherto taken notice" of the fact that
commerce and manifactures gradually introduced order and good 
government, and with them, the liberty and security o f individuals38
In our context, several closely linked aspects of the emerging discourse on com­
merce and civil society may be noted.
First, of all, commerce was linked to the cooling o f passion. Albert Hirschman 
famously traced the manner in which economic self-interest evolved as a beneficial
37. ‘Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth*. Hume, Political Essays (pp.223,225-29,232).
38. Smith, Wealth o f Nations, III,4 (p.412).
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social disposition from the general and much older idea of “taming" certain danger­
ous and disruptive passions and vices with less dangerous ones, i.e.,
that one set o f passions, hitherto known as greed, avarice, or love o f lucre, 
could be usefully employed to oppose and bridle such other passions as 
ambition, lust fo r power, or sexual lust39
To Hume, all human volition was a result of passion, but the strongest passion of 
all was that of “acquiring goods and possessions for ourselves and our nearest 
friends". This passion was “insatiable, perpetual, universal, and directly destructive 
of society". It was also, however, a constant predisposition which could be checked, 
as we have seen, by institutional architecture. There were other, more fleeting, but 
all the more violent and potentially disturbing passions, including "enuy and re­
venge" which “tho’ pernicious ... operate only by intervals, and are directed against 
particular persons". In Hume’s political essays this was nevertheless what made 
such sentiments, along with the passions of religious and political enthusiasm, so 
much more dangerous. Hume’s relative optimism about the possibility of political 
navigations on the assumption of self-interest depended on his belief that commer­
cial society would render the more violent passions increasingly rare.
Among the several aspects of the idea, probably most important was the notion, 
classically formulated by Smith, that the "natural eifort of every individual to better 
his condition, when suffered to exert itself with freedom and security” was a con­
stant, predictable, widespread, and thus a calculable passion, and for this reason 
indeed “the most reasonable". Indeed, whatever their virtuous intentions, It might 
be positively dangerous if too many individuals acted with idealistic zeal for the 
public interest rather than following the (group)interest of the crowd. According to 
Stewart, another of the Scottish philosophers, “were everyone to act for the public, 
and neglect himself, the statesman would be bewildered", not least because 
“[e]veryone might consider the interest of his country in a different light".40
This was a potentially far-reaching rebuttal of the old language of patriotism. 
Not only could the counterbalancing of interests guarantee order and liberty, the 
exercise of patriotic virtue could be presented as a part of the problem. Against the 
republican mainstream including, here, even Montesquieu, the rational, common- 
interest core of patriotism was effectively subdued - for the sake of a habitual and 
essentially passive allegiance - by equating patriotism with religious disputes over 
principles that were “utterly absurd and unintelligible".41
39. Hirschman (1977:41, italics in original).
40. Smith, Wealth of Nations, IV,5,b,43 (p.540); ‘Of Parties in General’, Hume, Po­
litical Essays (p.36); Sir James Stewart, Inquiry into the Principles o f Political Oecon- 
omy, ed. by A.S. Skinner. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966, Vol. I. 
pp. 143-44, cited from Hirschman (1977:50)
41. ‘Of Parties in General’, Hume, Political Essays (p.36).
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By contrast, the art of making money in the marketplace now often was de­
scribed. not only as less morally deplorable in the first place because of emerging 
understandings of the beneficial economic effects of trade and accumulation for in­
vestment, but as a rational, calm activity of self-control, to be distinguished from 
the senseless greed for riches that cannot wait, and which may be self-defeating in 
the long run.
Apart from taming more dangerous passions, commerce also brought new vir­
tues with them. Trade required and helped produce networks of trust, between na­
tions and between individuals, and it put a premium on punctuality and the re­
spect for contract. With the rise of modem political economy where trade was no 
longer seen as a zero-sum game, frugality and a spirit of restless entrepreneurship 
and innovation were assimilated with the older ethic of work to form an emerging, 
robust and modem ‘capitalist* ideal of socially beneficial private activity, which was 
to be prominent in America.
But if such ‘bourgeois’ virtues effectively reversed the old republican conception 
of civic virtue (which is not to say that the two could not be combined, as indeed 
they were), the emerging discourse of commercial society also heralded an entirely 
new set of social or civil virtues. Since Montesquieu, civility or ‘politeness’ had be­
come part of a standard contrast between modem commercial nations which pos­
sessed it, and ancient or less developed, ‘rude’ nations which did not. Commerce 
became seen as a form of interaction which required and generated its own form of 
social competences, and these in turn became part of a wider conception of the 
proper social intercourse of a 'civil society'.
To Montesquieu,
Commerce cures destructive prejudices, and it is an almost general rule 
that everywhere there are gentle [doux\ mores, there is commerce ... 
Commerce has spread knowledge of the mores of all nations everywhere; 
they have been compared to each other, and good things have resulted 
from this42
To Hume, nothing was more conducive to “politeness and learning, than a number of 
neighbouring and independent states, connected together by commerce and policy". 
Such interaction produced a tendency to competition and self-criticism in all the 
arts and sciences, where “contention and debates sharpened the wits of men“.43
Montesquieu, noting that "[t]he more people there are in a nation who need to 
deal with each other and not cause displeasure, the more politeness there is", dis­
tinguished between the politeness of a free people busy with its own interests, and 
the "politeness that is founded on idleness", between "the politeness of moers”
42. Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, XX, 1.
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(found in Britain) and “that of manners [celle des manieres)" (found in France). 
Hume thought that the effects of commerce in a republic were most likely to be in 
the fields of sciences and useful inventions. In a monarchy, where often the liberty 
was abridged “of reasoning, with regard to religion and politics, and consequently 
metaphysics and morals ... the most considerable branches of science", Hume, less 
negatively inclined than Montesquieu even towards French absolutism, considered 
the ground more fertile for the development of “a refined taste", because an indi­
vidual had to make himself “agreeable, by his wit. complaisance, or civility”.43 4
Politeness was linked to the arts o f conversation and gallantry:
Among the arts of conversation, no one pleases more than mutual 
deference or civility, which leads us to resign our own inclinations to 
those of our companion, and to curb and conceal that presumption and 
arrogance, so natural to the human mind45
Hume then took the further step of considering not just commerce, but also luxury. 
a result of trade and industry in a free country. In stark contrast to republican dis­
course, his verdict was favourable. A  quarter of a century before, in his The Grum­
bling Hive (later defended in The Fable of the Bees), Bernard Mandeville had 
shocked his contemporaries with his image of a bee hive where, "every Part was full 
of Vice / Yet the whole Mass a Paradise”. Some of Mandeville’s ideas vaguely fore­
shadowed Hume’s institutional balancing of self-interest ("This was the State’s 
Craft, that maintain’d / The Whole of which each Part complain’d / ... / Parties di­
rectly opposite / assist each other, as ‘twere for Spight”). But in claiming that "The 
worst of all the Multitude / Did something for the Common Good”. Mandeville’s 
main point was about the socially beneficial impact of luxury.46
Hume paid lip service to the conventional distaste with Mandeville’s text by 
distinguishing between “innocent” and “vicious luxury", the latter being such grati­
fications which engross “all a man’s expense, and leaves no ability for such acts of
43. ‘Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences’, Hume, Political Essays 
(p.64, italics in original).
44. ‘Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences’, Hume, Political Essays 
(p.69, italics in original); Montesquieu, Spirit o f the Laws, 3.XDC.27.
45. ‘Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences’, Hume, Political Essays 
(pp.69-70).
46. Luxury, said Mandeville,
Employe’d a Million of the Poor, / And odious Pride a Million more: /
Envy itself, and Vanity / Were Ministers of Industry / Their darling Folly, 
Fickleness, / In Diet, Furniture and Dress, / That strange redic’lous 
Vice, was made / The very Wheel that turn’d the Trade / ... / Thus Vice 
nurs'd Ingenuity, / Which join’d with Time and Industry, / Had carry’d 
Life’s Conveniencies, / It’s real Pleasures, Comforts, Ease, / To such a 
Height, the very Poor / Liv’d better than the Rich before, / And nothing 
could be added more (Mandeville, The Fable o f the Bees, pp.24-26).
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duty and generosity as are required by his situation and fortune". Vicious luxury 
was treated cursorily as a lesser social evil than the “sloth" and “idleness" which 
would follow from a total abolition of luxury. Instead Hume stressed that as "men 
become acquainted with the pleasures of luxury and the profits of commerce ... 
their delicacy and industry, being once awakened, cany them on to farther im­
provements". Thus,
The mind acquires new vigour; enlarges its powers and faculties; and by 
an assiduity in honest industry, both satisfies its natural appetites, and 
prevents the growth of unnatural ones47
Moreover, "refinements in the mechanical arts ... commonly produce some refine­
ment in the liberal". Such refinement was directly linked to growth in social vir­
tues, social differentiation, and "humanity":
The more these refined arts advance, the more sociable men become (...)
They flock into cities; love to receive and communicate knowledge; to 
show their wit or their breeding; their taste in conversation or living ... 
Curiosity allures the wise; vanity the foolish; and pleasure both. 
Particular clubs and societies are every where formed (...) it is impossible 
but they should feel an increase of humanity, from the very habit of 
conversing together ... Thus industry, knowledge, and humanity, are 
linked together by an indissoluble chain ... peculiar to the more 
polished, and ... the more luxurious ages48
Not amor patriae, people’s courage in war "in defense of their country and their lib­
erty” would be jeopardised, by the spread of luxury. In a further radical challenge 
to republicanism, Hume claimed that,
if anger, which is said to be the whetstone of courage, loses some of its 
asperity, by politeness and refinement; a sense of honour, which is a 
stronger, more constant, and more governable principle, aquires fresh 
vigour by that elevation of genius which arises from knowledge49
Hume’s reversal of the republican language of virtue, corruption, and patriotism 
was part of a broader Enlightenment attempt to show that the ‘modems’ were after 
all more civilised than the ‘ancients*, their liberty worth more and more securely 
enjoyed. In standard republican terms, virtue and patriotic sacrifice was associated 
with a fragile and easily corruptible frame of mind, of maturity, independence, and 
rational understanding and love of one’s country. This language was discredited by 
Montesquieu, Hume, and French philosophers from Voltaire to Constant, who, with
47. ‘Of Refinements in the Arts*, Hume, Political Essays (pp. 101,106-7,113).
48. ‘Of Refinement in the Arts’, Hume, Political Essays (p. 107).
49. ‘Of Refinement in the Arts’, Hume, Political Essays (p. 109).
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varying degrees of respect for the ancients were keen to show the dangers of 
Hume’s political or religious ‘zeal’, or to imply, in the words of Constant against the 
Jacobites, that “the victories won by the austere republicanism of antiquity over 
natural inclinations, became the pretext for the unrestrained eruption o f selfish 
passions”. As ancient civic virtue became equated at best with backward rusticity, 
and at worst with one-eyed fanaticism and dangerous passion, its superior modem 
counterpart became the civility or politeness of general enlightenment, taste, and 
cosmopolitan enjoyment of diversity. This virtue was still 'public', but the arena of 
its typical daily exercise became the social and cultural interchanges of the new 
‘civil society’, the club, the salon, or the park.50
Hume’s affair with Mandeville aimed to demonstrate the unexpected origins of 
recognisable social virtues in civil conduct. However, his complacency about the 
civilising effects of commerce was not shared by such figures o f the Scottish En­
lightenment as Adam Ferguson and Adam Smith, who remained far more sensitive 
to republican arguments.51 To Smith, who used a language which we may recognise 
from Montesquieu and particularly Rousseau, commerce was associated with the 
capricious and fantastic, with childishness and vanity, and with the tendency for 
visible riches to become the objects of a hollow worldly esteem. In Smith’s account 
of the origins of commercial society from the unintended effects of the actions of 
different social classes, “the most childish vanity was the sole motive of the great 
proprietors” who were bent on acquiring “the wantonness of plenty ... trinkets and 
baubles, fitter to be the playthings of children than the serious pursuits o f men". 
But even the calculated, goal-oriented self-interest of “merchants and artificers” 
who were “much less ridiculous” did not really signify a greater degree o f reason or 
enlightenment. Hume’s polite society was depicted remarkably differently by Smith. 
While recognising that upward social mobility was a safety vault in a Humean 
world of ‘opinion’, in his Theory o f Moral Sentiment he could still ask
to what purpose is the toil and bustle of this world? what is the end of 
avarice and ambition, of the pursuit of wealth, of power, and 
preheminence? ... From whence ... arises that emulation which runs 
through all the different ranks of men, and what are the advantages 
which we propose by that great purpose of human life which we call 
bettering our condition? To be observed, to be attended to, to be taken 
notice o f with sympathy, complacency, and approbation, are all the
50. Constant, The Spirit o f Conquest and Usurpation and their Relation to European 
Civilisation, 11,8. The cultural history of this ‘polite’ or ’civil* urban culture is traced 
by Sennett (1986).
51. See in particular Winch (1978) and essays in Hont & Ignatieff (1983).
156
advantages which we can propose to derive from it. It is the vanity, not 
the ease, or the pleasure, which interests us52
Nevertheless. Smith was to make the further and far-reaching move of analysing in 
detail the independently beneficial, unintended effects of private vice (although he 
spoke now of ‘interest’) in the economy, thus making it possible for less subtle po­
litical economists to suggest that an invisible hand enabled economics, in 
Hirshman’s words, to "go it alone", and that a state with more than night watch­
man functions was more of a problem than a solution. Here, "the natural interests 
and inclinations of men coincide ... exactly with the political interest”.
Without any intervention of law, therefore, the private interests and 
passions of men naturally lead them to divide and distribute the stock of 
every society ... as nearly as possible in the proportion which is most 
agreeable to the interest of the whole society53
Eventually such ‘market liberalism’ could also be presented in a less depraved and 
Mandevillean light, as a right-anarchist economic civil society of free, spontane­
ously interacting contractors with no need for politics, let alone civic virtue.
The father of modem economics certainly did not himself draw such conclu­
sions, nor should the early American reception of laissez-faire be interpreted in the 
light of ideological components that were only added in the next century. But what 
came to be found in America, as we shall see, was a new republicanism of limited 
government, where a traditional language of the dangers o f (excessive) commerce 
was employed, not without tensions, alongside a language o f libertas which linked 
civic virtue to enjoyment of the maximum freedom of the individual from the state 
to pursue his private economic affairs.
5. The Idea of Progress
The discourse of commerce and civil society was part of a more general Enlighten­
ment challenge to the most basic presumptions of republican political cosmology. 
This challenge was constituted by the idea of progress. The republican conception 
of political time that came out of the Renaissance has already been discussed. We 
recall the Polybian and Machiavellian analyses of the cyclical movements of virtue, 
corruption, and decay of political artifices and civic spirit alike, which statesmen 
and citizens could only delay for a while. We also noted the corresponding tendency 
to view history as a repository of essentially timeless exemplars.
The Enlightenment saw a whole range of attempts to rationalise political con­
tingency by conceptualising political institutions, forms of social life, and various
52. Smith, Wealth o f Nations, III,4 (pp.421-22); Smith, Theory o f Moral Sentiments, 
I,iii,2,l; cp. Montesquieu, Spirit o f the Laws, XIX.27.
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human capacities and propensities as outcomes of historical processes of steady 
progress. Such progress philosophy, not all of which was liberal and some of which 
has been likened to secular eschatologies,53 4 was united by
the assumption that a pattern of change exists in the history of 
mankind, that this pattern is known, that it consists of irreversible 
changes in one direction only, and that this direction is towards 
improvement from ‘a less to a more desirable state of affairs’55
As already glimpsed, the writers of the Scottish Enlightenment primarily used eco­
nomic, materialist models of progress. Much like Hume. Smith saw modem forms 
of social organisation, including property, law, and state as characteristic of the 
last of four stages of a historical process driven by the human propensity to truck 
and barter. The stages were treated as ideal types of empirical correlations between 
modes of subsistence and forms of authority, and shifts between them depended 
upon the (unintended) effects of complicated chains of social action, economic be­
haviour, and scientific invention. The Scottish political economists hardly viewed 
these developments as automatically leading to progress in political institutions. 
Hume was as concerned as any about the fragile and historically contingent insti­
tutions that had come out of the British revolution. But although, like Smith, he 
refused to regard the legal and political forms of his contemporary society as re­
flecting a larger moral order, and despite his thoughts about ‘opinion’, he did re­
gard them as functional to the most important interests of the new commercial so­
ciety in which he was living, where “the encrease of commerce ... threw such a bal­
ance of property into the hands of the commons“.56
The British thinkers were of an empiricist and sceptical bent, and their political 
experience made them expect and welcome gradual rather than revolutionary 
change. Also, despite Hume’s concern with political institutions and laws, they did 
not share the more radical hopes for immediate human improvement through ra­
tional legislation that were tended by many of the French philosophes. What they 
did share, apart from their reliance on the all but inevitable and beneficial devel­
opment of commerce and industry, was the belief in the steady increase in science.
53. Hirschman (1977:103); Smith, Wealth o f Nations, IV,7,c (p.630), also VI,5.b 
(p.540).
54. See Becker (1932).
55. Pollard (1968:v, citing Charles Van Doren, The Idea o f Progress, New York, 
1967).
56. “Where luxury nourishes commerce and industry, the peasants, by a proper 
cultivation of the land, become rich and independent; while the tradesmen and 
merchants acquire a share o f the property, and draw authority and consideration 
to that middling rank of men, who are the best and firmest basis of public liberty 
(...) They covet equal laws, which may secure their property, and preserve them
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Hume, Smith, and Ferguson, as Locke before them, all thought that human nature 
and man’s most basic propensities were constant. Only their fund of common 
knowledge gradually improved, by accumulated experience, by the diffusion of 
trade and innovation, and by rising education. All agreed with Ferguson that
When nations succeed one another in the career of discoveries and 
inquiries, the last is always the most knowing. Systems of science are 
gradually formed ... the history of every age ... is an accession of 
knowledge to those who succeed57
If the Scots stressed the application of elite knowledge to prudential institutional 
design or to understanding the workings of the economy, most of the French, with 
possible exceptions like Voltaire, were rather more optimistic in their hopes for a 
more general spread of enlightenment to the common man, allowing him to free 
himself from the tutelage of religious prejudice and superstition, to act in the best 
knowledge of his own interests, and even to increase, by rational means, the sum 
of individual and social happiness. Eventually, some philosophers took the last 
step of believing that progress would happen “not only in knowledge, in wealth or 
in social organisation alone”, but also “in the character and nature of human be­
ings themselves".58 The most uncompromising statement of the belief that also vice 
and evil was a product of ignorance and prejudice which, once dispersed by sci­
ence, need not return, was that of Condorcet, who claimed, in the Esquisse d'un 
tableu historique de progrès de Vesprtt humain, that
People cannot become enlightened about the nature and development of 
their ethical sentiments, the principles of morality, the natural needs to 
which their actions conform, or their own interests, either as individuals 
or as members of a society, without also making progress in moral con­
duct which is no less substantial than that made within science itself59
from ... tyranny" (‘Of Refinement in the Arts’, Hume, Political Essays, p.112). For 
Smith’s view, see Winch (1978:70-102).
57. Ferguson, An Essay on the History o f Civil Society. 1,5 (p.33).
58. Pollard (1968:68).
59. Condorcet, Esquisse d’un tableu historique de progrès de Vesprit humain, 
Dixième époque (pp.226-27) (own translation). Condorcet rhetorically asked,
L’intérêt mal entendu n’est-il pas la cause la plus fréquente des actions 
contraires au bien général? (...) Cette conscience de sa dignité qui 
appartient à l’homme libre, une éducation fondée sur une connaissance 
approfondie de notre constitution morale, ne doivent-elle s pas rendre 
communs à presque tous les hommes, ces principes d’une justice 
rigoureuse et pure, ces mouvements habituels d’une bienveillance active, 
éclairée, d’une sensibilité délicate et généreuse, dont la nature a placé le 
germe dans tous les coers, et qui n’attendent, pour s’y  développer, que la 
douce influence des lumières et de la liberté?
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Condorcet’s vision of progress was perhaps the most radical Enlightenment de­
parture from republican political cosmology. It constituted the early high point of a 
larger, optimistic counter discourse that may be traced in utilitarians from 
Helvetius to Bentham, in much of the Kantian tradition, and in liberal idealism 
from Hegel to Hobhouse. The details of this do not concern us here. What needs to 
be noted, however, is that even inside this relatively hostile ideological environ­
ment, it is still possible to discern more or less republican emphases, in the Scot­
tish Enlightenment as well as later, in the New World.
6. The Naturalisation of Virtue: Sympathy and Moral Sense
If Newton and the rise of science was a main source of Enlightenment beliefs in 
progress, and contemporary improvements in commerce, wealth, and - at least in 
Britain - political liberty was another, a third was the moral psychology of Locke.
Locke introduced the idea that human nature was constant and predictable, 
and that moral habits could be moulded by inducements and education within the 
limits of a sensationist psychology that linked individual well-being with a measure 
of sympathy for others. We noted already the transformation of civic virtue into the 
civility and politeness of society, and the bourgeois virtues of frugality, enterprise, 
and economic trustworthiness. British empiricist moral psychology enabled the 
further belief that the virtue of which individuals were capable was a 'natural* or at 
least a relatively stable outcome of social life as such - including commercial inter­
action - and not a fragile element of personal character which was constantly 
threatened by the corrupting temptations of power, wealth, and the ease of a pri­
vate life. It was the development o f these Lockean ideas from Hutcheson to Smith 
and Hume, rather than the French rationalist tradition, which became influential 
in American political thought. We shall see that they coexisted, here, in some ten­
sion with the earlier, republican discourse of political motivation.
In Locke’s own rather crude formulation, virtue arose from the moulding of he­
donistic sentiments, and the problem of failure of morality was a problem of failure 
of rationality. Although our propensity towards instant pleasures often prevented 
us from understanding that moral action was to our own good (i.e., eternal salva­
tion), virtue as a form of self-discipline could be inculcated (in children) by means 
of rewards, shaming, and habituation.60 Hutcheson developed a much more opti­
mistic conception of utilitarian altruism which postulated the existence of a moral 
sense which caused individuals to equate their desires and feeling of pleasure with
60. For instance, “He that has no Mastery over his Inclinations, he that knows not 
how to resist the importunity of present Pleasure or Pain, for the sake of what Rea­
son tells him is fit to be done, wants the true Principle of Vertue and Industry; and 
is in danger never to be good for any thing", (Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning 
EXLucatiaru 45, italics in original). The relevant paragraphs are no. 38-66.
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the good of their community.61 Finally, the more sanguine moves of Hume and 
Smith were to distinguish between natural propensities to limited benevolence and 
sympathy for the sufferings of immediate others and on the other hand the artificial 
virtues of justice, observation of which had to operate in more subtle ways, as sec­
ond-order gratifications. Thus to Hume, once the moral norms of justice had been 
established, as based on the reciprocal interest in security of property.
tho’ in our own actions we may frequently lose sight of that interest, 
which we have in maintaining order ... we never fail to observe the 
prejudice we receive ... from the injustice of others (...) ^Injustice still 
displeases us; because we consider it prejudicial to human society ... We 
partake of ... uneasiness by sympathy; and as every thing, which gives 
uneasiness in human actions ... is call'd Vice, and whatever produces 
satisfaction, in the same manner, is denominated Virtue; this is the 
reason why the sense of moral good and evil follows justice and injustice
Although these artificial virtues, which worked as motivations because of our con­
cern with the opinions of others (“the sentiments they entertain of us" and “publick 
praise and blame"), may be attempted "forwarded by the artifice of politicians", in 
doing so these politicians only “extend the natural sentiments beyond their original 
bounds; but still nature must furnish the materials, and give us some notion of 
moral distinctions".62
In Smith’s more sophisticated, less immediately utilitarian version, which was 
influenced by stoic universalism, sympathy concerned the approbation of the mo­
tives of an agent, as well as the feelings of gratitude of the person who was the ob­
ject of the action. This feeling it was possible to share by assuming the role of the 
"spectator", or the “tribunal within the breast":
Generosity, humanity, kindness, compassion, mutual friendship and 
esteem, all the social and benevolent affections, when expressed in the 
countenance or behavior even towards those who are not peculiarly
61. For Hutcheson’s views, see Sinopoli (1992:60-63). At the beginning of his Sys­
tems o f Moral Philosophy (book I, chapter I), Hutcheson discusses the view that.
When the soul is calm and attentive to the constitution and powers of 
other beings, their natural actions and capacities of happiness and misery, 
and when the selfish appetites and passions and desires are asleep, *tis 
alleged that there is a calm impulse of the soul to desire the greatest hap­
piness and perfection of the largest system within the compass of its 
knowledge.
And Hutcheson starts his discussion by claiming that
Our inward consciousness abundantly testifies that there is such an im­
pulse or determination of the soul, and that it is truly ultimate, without 
reference to any sort of happiness of our own.
62. Hume, A Treatise o f Human Nature, 111,2,2 (pp.550-51).
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connected with ourselves please the indifferent spectator ... His 
sympathy with the person who feels those passions, exactly coincides 
with the concern for the person who is the object of them63
Recently, attention has been brought to the degree to which moral sense psychol­
ogy of Lockean, Humean, and Hutchesonian origin permeated early American po­
litical discourse.64 But we shall see that also this Enlightenment departure from 
republican assumptions is only half the story. It cannot entirely account for the 
continuing importance to many of the founders of avoiding the dangers of corrup­
tion and enabling the best of men’s propensities - however ‘natural’ their original 
seeds in the potential of humans - to be nurtured and preserved in politics. That 
this was so may also be glimpsed in the work of Adam Ferguson.
7. A Scottish Interlude: Ferguson's Republican Civil Society
All aspects of the liberal or proto-liberal discourses of natural rights, institutional 
architecture, commerce, softening o f passions, human progress, and moral sense 
psychology had their American manifestations, some of which we shall encounter 
as we proceed. But even as they did, we shall see that important republican argu­
ments and conceptions of politics and liberty survived, at least for some time and 
in some authors, inside the general framework o f the American Enlightenment.
But illuminating ambiguities were visible already in the European writers. 
Rousseau’s unequivocal, open-eyed rejection of polite society and doux commerce in 
the name of a staunch, Spartan republicanism has been discussed already. But 
there were other authors who were more ready to accept the superiority of the 
modems in terms of wealth and material comforts, political institutions, knowledge 
and science, and docile manners, and even willing to be reconciled to the prospects 
of an inevitable decline of dignity and human autonomy in that one-dimensional 
life of specialisation and private consumption which Rousseau so despised. Yet 
these authors nevertheless still had their doubts about the political soundness and 
stable future liberty of societies with diminishing civic virtue.
Adam Smith deplored the alienating effects of the new division of labour, so 
important to the generation of wealth, and did so also on independent political 
grounds. In a discussion of modem and ancient education, he noted as an effect of 
the division of labour, whereby “the employment of the far greater part... comes to 
be confined to a very few simple operations”, that such individuals had become
not only incapable of relishing or bearing a part in any rational 
conversation, but of conceiving any generous, noble, or tender 
sentiment, and consequently o f forming any just judgment concerning 
many even of the ordinary duties of private life. Of the great and
63. Smith, Theory o f Moral Sentiments, I.ii.4.2,111.2.31.
64. Sinopoli (1992:39-82).
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extensive interest of his country he is altogether incapable of judging; 
and unless veiy particular pains have been taken to render him 
otherwise, he is equally incapable of defending his country in war65
However, it was above all Ferguson who stood out as the author who combined a 
set of mainstream Enlightenment analyses of the civilising effects of commerce and 
general social prosperity on institutions, manners, and science, with a republican 
analysis of corruption. Ferguson’s contribution was important as a bridge in the 
transfer of republican discourse into the new framework of civil society. All o f his 
views may be seen as conscious republican attempts to resist implications of the 
ideas about civil society which were advanced in particular by Ferguson’s friend 
David Hume.66
Ferguson accepted the prevailing moral sense framework of his time and ar­
gued that while man was partly motivated by a sense of “interest" in the “preserva­
tion of our animal nature”, he was also an inherently social creature, equally 
guided by a natural sense of “disinterested benevolence" and prone to seek the 
numerous comforts of living in groups, i.e., the manner in which, contra Rousseau, 
they always had lived. While employing a Smithean moral psychology of approba­
tion, sympathy, and sense of justice (“[ajs actors or spectators, we are perpetually 
made to feel the difference of moral conduct"), Ferguson was more on the Hutche- 
sonian than the Humean side in claiming that often “love and compassion are the 
most powerful principle of the human heart”, that to a person “of an affectionate 
mind ... he himself, as an individual, is no more part of the whole that demands his 
regard", and that “public utility [is] the great object at which the actions of men 
should be aimed”.67
But in claiming that true happiness consists in actions for the common good. 
Ferguson used Scottish moral sense language to describe a conception of the per­
son which was different from that of Locke or Hume. Although self-preservation 
and benevolence were equally ‘natural’, they were so in the sense of a human po­
tential for self-development to virtuous conduct. While "the desire of self- 
preservation be more constant, and more uniform", the others constitute a “plen­
tiful source of enthusiasm, satisfaction, and joy". Benevolence and sacrifice, 
moreover, was a more robust source of satisfaction, because it enables a manly life 
of “active exertions". Indeed, the “most animating occasions of human life, are calls 
to danger and hardships, not invitations to safety and ease", and he who never 
tasted the former “is a stranger to half the sentiments of mankind". Interestingly, 
much of the first half of the Essay takes us about as close as we get to a Pocockian 
civic humanism of manly self-exertion and moral growth though action as a value
65. Smith. Wealth o f Nations, V, 1 ,f (p.782).
66. On the wider issue of the influence of republican discourse in the Scottish 
Enlightenment, see Robertson (1983).
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in itself. This virtue was not ‘natural* in the sense of a stable human motivation in 
all societies. It could not merely be inculcated by education and habituation 
through ordinary social interaction. Rather, its existence or nonexistence was 
treated to a republican analysis of collective and individual corruption. The sources 
of such corruption were many, modem societies evidently encouraging lower and 
more immediate pleasures, and Ferguson, eventually, was less optimistic about the 
motivating force of a pure “zeal for the public", and more inclined to appeal to the 
“jealousy of rights which pertain to themselves" and fondness of personal “inde­
pendence".67 8
Unlike Hume, and without his scepticism of moral epistemology, Ferguson 
combined the analysis of moral sentiment with a notion of natural equality in civil 
society before the institution of property, to reach an idea of natural rights (“to de­
fend their persons, and to act with freedom [and] ... maintain the apprehensions of 
freedom, and the feelings of the heart"). But if such liberty was naturally befitting 
all men, the conditions of its realisation and its exact historical form was a matter 
of historical variations over the well-known idea of libertas as equal liberty under 
law:
Law is the treaty to which members of the same community have agreed, 
and under which the magistrate and the subject continue to enjoy their 
rights, and to maintain the peace of society (...) The laws of his particular 
society intitle him perhaps to a determinate station, and ... a certain 
share in the government of his country (...) Where the citizen is supposed 
to have rights of property and of staUon, and is protected in the exercise 
of them, he is said to be free; and the very restraints by which he is 
hindered from the commision of crimes, are a part o f his liberty
Inside this frame, different countries had been “led to differ in the interpretation of 
the term", and in particular different opinions had been held on whether or to what 
extent “a new division of property" was needed "as the foundation of freedom", 
Ferguson himself being inclined, against Hume, to assume that laws favouring a 
greater degree of equality were both possible and desirable in a commercial society, 
"inspiring moderation ... and stifling the passions by which mankind are prompted 
to mutual wrongs".69
While presenting a fairly detailed and in many ways conventional conjectural 
history of progressing stages from ‘rude’ or barbarian to ‘civilised’ society, 
Ferguson’s comparison of the ancients and modems was also more ambivalent 
than that of Hume. All things considered, there was no doubt that modem society 
with its material comforts, refinement, science, art, and civilised manners was a
67. Ferguson, Essay, 1.2; 1,6 (pp.20,36,39,41).
68. Ferguson, Essay, 1,4; 1,6-7; VI,4 (pp.28,39,41,47,245).
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better place to be. Above all, while ancients republics had their spells of liberty, 
and while savage tribes had often no need for it. Ferguson agreed with his contem­
poraries that the legal institutions and the public order of the British in particular 
had reached “a point of perfection ... never before attained in the history of man­
kind". Yet his causal analysis differed, again, from that of Hume. First, he chal­
lenged the automatic equation of commerce (and luxury and art) with the develop­
ment of cool and polite manners. Instead, he saw compassion, moderation, formal­
ity. and restraint in civil conduct as stemming from the norms of mediaeval chiv­
alry and honour, blended with Christian teachings. Secondly, while recognising the 
importance of institutions which "combine to balance each other", so that the 
“public interest is ... secure ... because each, in his place, is determined to preserve 
his own", he also voiced strong scepticism about the claimed perfection of political 
institutions:
If national institutions, calculated for the preservation of liberty, instead 
of calling upon the citizen to act for himself, and to maintain his rights, 
should give a security, requiring, on his part, no personal attention or 
effort; this seming perfection of government might weaken the bands of 
society, and, upon the maxims of independence, separate and estrange 
the different ranks it was meant to reconcile
Ferguson was willing to “congratulate our species on their having escaped from ... 
barbarous disorder and violence, into a state of domestic peace and regular policy", 
and certainly like his friend Hume lauded “as the keystone of civil liberty" the ha­
beas corpus laws of Britain. But "it requires a fabric no less than the whole political 
constitution of Great Britain, a spirit no less than the refractory and turbulent zeal 
of this fortunate people, to secure its effects", indeed “the influence of laws... in the 
preservation of liberty ... is, in reality, the influence of men resolved to be free".69 70
Inside the overall framework of human progress from rudeness to civilisation, 
Ferguson would still stress, in republican fashion, that the life span of any one 
state was a contingent matter. Even if Polybian cyclical assumptions were uncalled 
for, there were still abundant reasons to speculate about “the grounds of incon­
stancy ... the sources of internal decay, and the ruinous corruptions" that still 
threatened, also “in the supposed condition of accomplished civility"71
Chief among the sources of corruption were, first “a discontinuance of the 
scenes in which the talents of men were hapily cultivated", and secondly “a change 
in the prevailing opinions relating to the constituents of honours or of happiness”. 
Regarding scenes, Ferguson shared Smith’s concern with “the separation of profes­
sions”, fearing that "society is made to consist of parts, of which none is animated
69. Ferguson, Essay, 1,6; III,6 (pp.38,150-52).
70. Ferguson, Essay, 111,2; III.6; IV,3; V.4; VI,5 (pp. 124,159-60.182,214,249,252).
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with the spirit of society itself*. Against Hume, he stressed the importance of politi­
cal activity in republican party politics (or, in monarchies, in “courtly assemblies") 
where “men are obliged to court their fellow-citizens, and to employ parts and ad­
dress”, where they “find ... a school for discernment and penetration”, and learn to 
think themselves “well placed in every company”.71 2
The danger of chaining popular political activity through institutional means 
was all the greater, because “the political spirit” and sentiments of patriotism re­
quired constant reminding and renewal. Although “desire of public safety, is ... a 
powerful motive of conduct ... it operates most, when combined with occasional 
passions, when provocations inflame”.73
Regarding opinions, the danger of corruption was constituted by the changing 
standards of personal merit that followed with inequalities of fortune. Not luxury, 
accumulated wealth, or social inequality per se was the problem, as its significance 
was anyway a historical and relative matter. However, if
the disparities of rank and fortune which are necessary to the pursuit or 
enjoyment of luxury, introduce false grounds of precedency and 
estimation; if, on the mere considerations of being rich or poor, one order 
of men are, in their own apprehension, elevated, another debased ... the 
one becoming mercenary and servile: the other imperious and arrogant 
... the whole mass is corrupted74
Ferguson’s analysis was a sustained attempt to recast the emerging discourse of 
commercial civil society, using republican terms. In doing so, Ferguson made two 
moves. First, he would occasionally use civil society as a generic term for all the 
changing types of social and political organisation. In this sense, society was al­
ways ‘civil’, as humans had always lived together in groups, and different forms of 
social organisation, political ‘superstructures* (another term invented by Ferguson), 
and dominant character traits evolved in different material circumstances.
However, secondly, he also insisted on paying attention to the original meaning 
of ciuil and civilised (and polite/polished} as denominating a manner of organising 
and conceptualising a society of citizens vis-à-vis the state. This was relevant in a 
modem age where, unlike in ancient times, it had become possible and necessary 
to make “a distinction between the state and its subjects”, and to view society in a 
political aspect while yet recognising the historicity of both citizenship and virtue. 
Etymologically,
71. Ferguson, Essay, V, 1 (p. 199).
72. Ferguson, Essay, IV,3; V,3; VI. 1 (pp.182,206-7,226).
73. Ferguson, Essay, V.2-3 (pp.200,210).
74. Ferguson, Essay, V,3 (p.237).
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polished ... originally referred to the state of nations in respect to their 
laws and government (and men civilized were men practiced in the duty 
of citizens]. In its later applications, it refers no less to their proficiency 
in the liberal and mechanical arts, in literature, and in commerce (and 
men civilized are scholars, men of fashion and traders)75
In retracing the meaning of ‘polished’ or ‘civil'. Ferguson might be seen as siding 
with the old conception, and with the ancients against the modems. In reality his 
position was more complex. We saw that Hume took very seriously the republican 
problématique, yet believed that a new commercial society could be ’civil' in the 
sense that the sentiments and behaviour of the tradesman, the courtier, and the 
conspicuous consumer were conducive to securing a quality liberty' fit for modems. 
Ferguson, while denying this, was acutely aware of the beneficial effects of com­
mercialism, and of the need to study the inevitable interplay between the various 
aspects of civil society in their relation to liberty. In Ferguson's vision, the very 
point of analysing the history of civil society was to consider the relationship, not 
just between the state and civil society, but between society and citizens In their 
‘economic’ and their ‘political’ aspects, including the political consequences of the 
former.76
In Ferguson’s modem civil society,
[i]n the bustle of civil pursuits and occupations, men appear in a variety 
of lights, and suggest matter of inquiry and fancy, by which conversation 
is enlivened, and greatly enlarged. The productions of ingenuity are 
brought to the market; and men are willing to pay for whatever has a 
tendency to inform or amuse
But the “boasted refinements ... of the polished age. were not divested of danger". If 
they were combined with a policy “not merely to prevent injustice and error, but to 
prevent agitation and bustle", which “by the barriers they raise against the evil ac­
tions of men, would prevent them from acting at all", then dangerous corruption 
was in sight. Civility did entail a measure of docility and cooling, a state of “greater 
tranquillity". Thus, the "manners of rude nations require to be reformed. Their ... 
dissensions are the operations of extreme and sanguinary passions". Part of this 
reformation was the introduction of a stout and valiant attention to the rules and 
formality of public intercourse - which Ferguson did not associate with commcr-
75. Ferguson, Essay, IV,4; V,1 (pp. 190,195). The bracketed words are added In 
the 1768 edition of the Essay.
76. This ambition was different from Hegel’s bifurcation of a realm of economic 
particularity and another realm (the state) of political universalism, each populated 
with different individuals (a bifurcation which was continued in Marx's analysis of 
capitalism and proletarian revolution out of). It is equally at odds with the new idea 
of civil society as a ‘third’ sphere, beyond both state and economy (e.g.. Avineri 
1968, 1972; Cohen & Arato 1992; Oz-Salzberger 1995:xix).
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cialism as such. Another was the mildly agitated exchanges of opinion in the “de­
bates that subsist among men of integrity", quite far from "unanimity" which “is to 
be considered as a danger to liberty”, although "respect to ... laws, are the points in 
which mankind are bound to agree”.77
We shall see that the ambiguity of modem civil society, as analysed by the 
author who invented the term for posterity, was also a theme of the American de­
bate, although the full force of its republican dialectic of civic virtue and commerce 
was only fully articulated in the work of Tocqueville.
8. From Natural Law to American Republicanism: Reid and Paine
The American founders were well versed in authors like Locke, Sidney, Hume. 
Smith and Montesquieu. However, two additional authors, one Scottish, the other 
English, both of them susceptible to republican discourse, were prominent in 
America. The moral and natural jurisprudential works o f one, Thomas Reid, influ­
enced a generation of intellectuals of the founding period. Those of another, the 
widely circulated political pamphlets of Thomas Paine, popularised a democratic, 
rights-based argument for self-government on the eve of the revolution, in which 
Paine himself participated. A  brief look at these authors, the direct influence of 
whom I do not attempt to trace, provides us with a further key to how natural law 
and natural rights discourse informed the first principles of the American revolu­
tion.
8.1. Reid
In our discussion of Locke, we emphasised that the association of eighteenth cen­
tury natural law theory with doctrines of moral self-sufficiency, let alone with the 
advocacy of a ‘possessive individualism’ doctrine was a serious mistake. This is 
certainly true o f Reid, and with him much of the early natural rights discourse in 
America. To Reid, the purpose of a human life, the reward for which was eternal 
happiness, was the performance for their own sakes of one’s duties, i.e., duties to 
oneself (exercising the virtues of prudence, temperance, and fortitude), to God 
(proper worship), and to fellow men (the virtue of justice). Each was really a subset 
of the general duty to perform one’s offices as one was called to by the Almighty, 
that is, as a matter of natural law, apprehended by human reason. Rights and du­
ties, by and large, were two sides of the same coin (as “wherever there is Duty and 
Obligation on one hand, there must be a corresponding Right perfect or imperfect 
on the other”), and Reid’s duties constituted a Christian jurisprudential language 
capable of integrating classical (Stoic) conceptions of virtue.78
77. Ferguson, Essay, 1,10; V,3,5; VI,5 (pp.63,208-9,219,252).
78. Reid, Lectures and Papers on Practical Ethics (p.193). See Haakonssen (1990: 
1991), by whose reading I am inspired.
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Reid's restatement of natural jurisprudence informed American conceptions in 
at least three important ways. First, Reid differed from Smith and Hume, not only 
in the departure from moral conventionalism and scepticism, but also in his con­
ception of what rights and their corresponding duties might do. Rights were not 
merely for regulating a society characterised by scarcity and limited sympathy. Civil 
society, no doubt, had a prudential foundation in the general interest in security 
and welfare. But civil laws, because parts of “the human constitution point that 
way“ also facilitated and encouraged man’s moral development in a moral commu­
nity, indeed provided the exercise of the “Love of ones Country".79
This led Reid to believe that formal justice all but exhausted the actions indi­
viduals ought to perform. Against conventional distinctions between imperfect and 
perfect rights, where only the latter could be legally enforced, had moral priority, 
and were indispensable for society, Reid claimed that imperfect rights, which re­
ferred to legitimate claims on some positive action on behalf of others (i.e., charity), 
had equal moral force as an obligation, and could and ought to be legally en­
forced.80 More importantly, and much more influential in writers like Jefferson, was 
the optimistic idea that the system of personal rights and duties, which was de­
rived from natural law and manifested in free action, was in essential concordance 
with, indeed aimed to express the interests of, the commonwealth at large. Liberty 
and the common good were not in conflict. Reid’s understanding of contract theory, 
which denied the possibility that historical origins (of property or social relations) 
had anything to do with legitimacy, enforced this belief. Consent, in his view, could 
be understood as an 'implied* moral acceptance and undertaking of the duties be­
fitting a certain station or office.
Secondly, Reid strongly opposed Humean scepticism and advocated a doctrine 
of common sense which became immensely influential in America. The fundamen­
tals of morality were self-evident, they did not “require deep or subtile reasoning to 
discover them". When appeals were made, in the new democratic world, by Jeffer­
son, Paine, Madison, or various Anti-Federalists, to the 'rights of man’, neither 
Humean scepticism nor Locke’s agony about secure foundations of natural rights 
had any place.81
However, thirdly, not all rights were equally fundamental. Reid was also part of 
the origin of the American habit of distinguishing between more or less inalienable 
and more or less natural rights. Natural rights were the right to life, liberty, and the 
free use of reason and judgement. Certain rights were ‘adventitious’, presupposing 
human action, and chief among these were property rights. Most importantly, 
property rights were conceptualised as derivative from and instrumental towards 
the natural or innate rights. But Reid made a point about stressing that property
79. Reid, Practical Ethics (p.249).
80. Reid, Practical Ethics (p. 198).
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was a very circumscribed and contingent right, thus setting the scene for a political 
contestation, advocated by Jefferson in particular, of the proper shape of the liber- 
tas of specific historical communities. Man’s right to property was not merely a 
right “to appropriate to his own use from the common Store what is necessary to 
his present Subsistence and comfort and hurts no other person”. One of its main 
reasons was that it “put it in a mans Power to do good to others” and “promote the 
happiness of human Society”. In general “private Property ought to yield to the 
publick Good when there is a repugnancy between them", and this, to Reid, could 
imply restrictions on entail and private monopolies. Also, very much contra Hume's 
conservative constitutionalism, restrictions on property might serve the legitimate - 
Harringtonian - political purpose of ensuring the stability of the republic and its 
constitution by the means of “Agrarian Laws or other Means of that kind". 81 2
8 .2 . Paine
Paine’s contributions were equally significant. First, it was very much through his 
writings that the republican notion was spread of the rights of a people or a nation 
to self-government. Paine coupled traditional natural rights to a republican analy­
sis of legitimate resistance to tyranny and slavery. By emphasising the collective, 
aggregate nature of the executive power of the law of nature in society, ‘civil rights’ 
very much became the right of a people to form its constitution. Thus, in Common 
Sense and The Crisis, arguing that a “government of our own is our natural right", 
Paine advocated a radical republican secessionism, which relied on the powerful 
rhetoric of resistance to "slavery upon earth". He appealed to the general unrea­
sonableness of the rule of a single, unelected person, and to the need, in particular, 
for the Americans to throw off the yoke of the British monarchy which had abun­
dantly demonstrated both Its inability to protect the distant shores of its colonies 
and its unwillingness to sanction laws that did not favour Britain. The former colo­
nies, by contrast, had demonstrated the economical and financial ability to assume 
their moral right to self-government. Hence the need to seize the day, "that peculiar 
time which never happens to a nation but once", avoid the danger of the “popular 
disquietudes" of “the desperate and the discontented” paving the way for some 
“desperate adventurer to try his fortune", in order to create a republican constitu­
tion in America, and establish between young and previously divided and quarrel­
ling colonies a “concord (which)... fixes a memorable era for posterity to gloiy in".83
Secondly, a part of the emphasis on popular and national “sovereignty” also - in 
The Rights o f Man which was written after both the American and the French revo­
81. Reid, Practical Ethics (p. 192).
82. Reid, Practical Ethics (pp.205-8).
83. Paine, Common Sense. Political Writings (pp.28-29,35); The Crisis, Political 
Writings (p.41).
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lutions (in 1991-92) - was associated with the right of each living generation to es­
tablish its own form of government. While Paine had no quarrel with affirming “a 
system of principles as universal as truth and the existence of man’*, he firmly be­
lieved that "that which a whole nation chooses to do. it has a right to do”. We know 
that "circumstances of the world are continually changing, and the opinions of men 
change also; and ... government is for the living and not for the dead”. Thus.
[o]ne of the greatest improvements that has been made for the perpetual 
security and progress of constitutional liberty is the provision which the 
new constitutions make for occasionally revising, altering, and 
ammending them84
To Paine, as to many American intellectuals, such beliefs accorded well with a wide 
spread deism which dismissed traditional biblical orthodoxy. God was now often 
seen as a benign but remote deity who had put people in the world with a purpose, 
endowing them with equal dignity and a capacity for reason, but had withdrawn 
without express command as to how to order human societies. Paine’s political op­
timism and complacent Enlightenment belief in reason and human perfectibility 
competed with darker, Puritan views of man’s fallen nature and moral complexity, 
but the result was essentially the same - that men were entrusted with much dis­
cretion in ordering their political affairs.
Thirdly, Paine - by his life’s example no less than through his writing85 - epito­
mised the levelling impulse of the American revolution. As we shall see, there were 
more and less conservative or democratic voices in the constitutional debate, also 
across the Federalist-Anti-Federalist divide. But even conservatives had to contend 
with views like those of Paine, as voiced against his intellectual arch enemy Ed­
mund Burke, to the effect that everybody (or, at any rate, every white male) could 
know their own interests and govern themselves, and that they were equally en­
dowed with a right to do so, because all “of one degree". Concretely, Paine repre­
sented the more general shift evident in American republican discourse away from 
the traditional advocacy of forms of mixed government, which now became associ­
ated with Britain (“an imperfect everything, cementing and soldering the discordant 
parts together by corruption, to act as a whole"), towards ideas of government 
strictly by the people. To Paine, the modem approximation o f Athenian ‘direct’ de­
mocracy was a system of representative democracy which recognised no differences 
in the natural orders of men.86
Fourthly, if Reid stressed the self-evident nature of morality, Paine believed 
that the ends of government were so obviously shared by all that their best and
84. Paine, The Rights o f Man, parts I and II, Political Writings (pp.56-58.140- 
41,192).
85. See Keane (1995).
86. Paine, The Rights o f Man, I (pp.77,138).
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only guarantee was a politically active populace, attentive to their own good. Thus, 
“for a nation to love liberty, it is sufficient that she knows it: and to be free, it is 
sufficient that she wills it". What was needed was the love of country of determined 
citizens standing their ground in battle, inspired, unlike the "summer soldier and 
the sunshine patriot”, by “so celestial an article as freedom”. In times of peace, it 
was popular, representative government. The ends of such government consisted in 
“securing freedom and property to all men. and above all things the free exercise of 
religion, according to the dictates of conscience". Also, good government was lim­
ited government, “[i]t is but few general laws that civilised life requires ... all the 
great laws of society are laws of nature". Paine spoke for the independent artisan, 
trader, or immigrant free-holder, i.e., the self-made and self-reliant men in pursuit 
of the happiness which, in Paine’s own experience, was provided for so abundantly 
in a socially open-textured new country such as America.
Although favourable, like all the Founders, to Adam Smith’s invisible 
hand economics, Paine did not envisage a society o f acquisitive individual­
ism. Indeed, rather like Jefferson, he was too optimistic to perceive of any 
serious disjunctures between the individual pursuit of happiness and the 
common good (the “RES-PUBUCA or PUBLIC BUSINESS'). Paine had no pre­
monitions about sinister majorities, as arising for instance over unequal re­
lations of property. Acting collectively, he claimed, a “nation can have no in ­
terest in being w r o n g ” .87
87. Paine, Common Sense (p.28); The Crisis (p.41); The Rights o f Man, I and II 
(pp.59,157. 169,185).
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Chapter  5:
Republicanism  and A merican democracy
1. Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to excavate and discuss republican arguments as 
they were formulated in the last great historical setting of republican thought, 
which was eighteenth century America. This setting, it should be noted at the out­
set, was dramatically different from any previous context of republican discourse. 
Several historical components contributed to the distinct flavour of American po­
litical thought.
First of all, the socio-economic situation of the colonies, with their large num­
bers of freeholders and absent feudal structures, had created a social levelling 
which was unprecedented In the Old World. Americans had come to see themselves 
as fundamentally equal in their predicament as oppressed subjects of the British 
crown. The War of Independence created a revolutionary democratic ideology, 
based on doctrines of natural rights and just resistance against tyranny, which be­
came enshrined in the various state constitutions which were created in 1776-77 
under the umbrella of the Confederation. In terms of civil and political rights, and 
(apart from the status of black slaves, Indians, and women) in terms of inclusive- 
ness and equality of citizenship, America’s was the first really democratic republi­
canism.
Moreover, while many state constitutions were fashioned after versions of the 
old doctrine of mixed or balanced government, it soon became difficult to Justify 
second chambers with reference to distinct social interests, competences, or Ma­
chiavellian umort Instead, they and other political forms became seen as so many 
instruments of a republican government which was by and for the whole people, 
but which, for practical reasons, had to employ devices of representation. Before, 
either democracy had denoted an aspect of a republican government or it had been 
a derogatory term of its degeneration. Now all political arguments had to be Justi­
fied in terms of the rights, interests, and sovereignty of an undivided popolo. Also 
more conservative writers, to whom the democratic spirit constituted a threat more 
than a promise, had to couch their reservations about direct popular forms in these 
normative terms.1
The content of liberty and rights which the young American people came to see 
as their birth right was considerably shaped by the colonial experience. Liberty 
above all was the personal, self-sufficient independence of the Individual, particu­
larly against the tyranny of unjust taxation, undeserved aristocratic privilege, and 
arbitraiy, unaccountable rule. Secondly, because of the great many immigrants
1. Wood (1992:91-98).
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arbitrary, unaccountable rule. Secondly, because of the great many immigrants 
who had fled from religious oppression in Europe, liberty was intimately associated 
with freedom of religion and toleration. Both aspects were originally conceptualised 
to require a limited government, consisting exactly of the mutually delegated func­
tions and powers that were essential to secure liberty - or indeed, in radical Anti- 
Federalist versions, only such functions and powers which the people could exer­
cise directly themselves. In both ways, American discourse soon became distinctly 
national concerned with its own role as heralder of good tidings and beacon of 
hope for the world. The American discourse, even more than previous ones, was a 
republicanism o f foundation and national consolidation.
A third characteristic aspect of the American context was size. The vast terri­
tory and the colonial division into quite heterogeneous and even unconnected 
states could not but revive the old debate about smallness and homogeneity as a 
condition of republican liberty. American republican discourse was to centre 
around the question of the possibility of a national, federal consolidation, and 
whether, or to what extent, (new) republican forms o f identification and virtue 
could be expected at this level. Also, as a new theoretical problem of size, typical of 
a democratic political culture, the discourse of republican liberty was connected to 
the difficulty of adequate representation of diverse legitimate interests. Possibly the 
greatest theme of the American debate became the tension between local liberty on 
the one hand and the dimensions of liberty which required federal consolidation on 
the other.
Our discussion of American thought traces the manner in which the new vo­
cabulary of natural rights, balancing o f interests, and commerce was given new re­
publican interpretations on the American scene. In particular, we look at the fa­
mous debate between Anti-Federalist opponents to the new constitution and its 
Federalist defenders. Among the latter were voices (Paine and Jefferson) who are 
best described as democratic radicals. But the most distinctive figure was the more 
conservative Madison, who invented a new, sceptical-realist ‘economy of virtue’. 
Madison’s work consciously engaged with the republican tradition, it reformulated 
many of its themes in sophisticated ways, but it also made amendments and addi­
tions, and required new assumptions, that became the beginning of the eclipse of 
republicanism. Others, notably Hamilton, and to a lesser extent Adams, con­
sciously departed from the republican tradition. Both of the latter figure less 
prominently in our account.
Before embarking on these matters, we need to consider again Pocock’s influ­
ential view of the American debate, and some of the debate that it has provoked.
2. Pocock's America and the Critique of Humanist Revisionism
English republican discourse, according to Pocock, was mirrored in the anti- 
Hamiltonian debates of post-revolutionary America, about the dangers and corrup­
tion arising from a modernising commercial ‘aristocracy’ and the strong executive
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government needed to support it. Again, property was not. in the dominant com­
monwealth thinkers - who included, in Pocock’s view, “nearly all articulate Ameri­
cans of the Revolutionary generation" - conceived in terms of a natural. Lockean 
right to acquisition, but rather as a guarantee of civil independence or. conversely, 
dependence and corruption. The great American heritage was not the liberalism of 
individual rights (or of possessive individualism), but the heroic and self­
consciously backward-looking attempt to give a fresh start to a truly political way of 
life in active self-government, in defiance of European corruption. The American 
revolution was “the last great act of the Renaissance ... emerging from a line of 
thought which staked everything on the renovation of virtue". Nor was the Anti- 
Federalist defeat the beginning to the end. Even the political science of balancing 
interests in the tenth Federalist is seen by Pocock as a largely successful attempt to 
make sure that “interests do not corrupt", allowing the authors to employ republi­
can rhetoric in the service of “an artifice no longer founded in virtue". The other 
main attempt to reconcile virtue and commerce, that of Jefferson, saw “the preser­
vation of a yeoman commonwealth as the secret of virtue’s maintenance”, even as 
he accepted the need for commerce as "independence through exchange relations”, 
exemplified in the ideal of the small entrepreneur. Indeed “an expanding agrarian 
society [could] absorb an expanding commerce". The Machiavellian (or Pocockian) 
moment comes to rest in the myth of the frontier and in Jefferson’s ultimate recog­
nition that even America’s capacity to supply the foundations of virtuous inde­
pendence were not infinite. Yet, the language of virtue, according to Pocock. lives 
on rhetorically in American politics, in the periodically renewed denunciations of 
“venality in public officials, the growth of a military-industrial complex in govern­
ment, other-directedness and one-dimensionality in individuals ... a ll... continuous 
with those used in the classical analysis of corruption."2
2. Pocock (1975:522,533,548; 1985d:272*73). The key reference points of the 
early consensus on the liberalism of the American founding period are Louis Hartz 
(1955>and, for the radical interpretation, Charles Beard (1913). Before Pocock, the 
liberal inteipretation was challenged by Bernard Bailyn (1967) and Gordon Wood 
(1969). But they did not, as is usually assumed, quite share Pocock’s view. Wood, 
closest to Pocock’s idea of civic humanism, saw the republican tradition as largely 
ending with the revolution. Bailyn, in his analysis of the numerous pre- 
Revolutionary pamphleteers, does not seem to find incompatibility between a re­
publican language of virtue and corruption and the fact that they almost all “cited 
Locke on natural rights", and were concerned with liberty in the context of consti­
tution and law, and the danger of central government power abuses on private citi­
zens. “liberty being passive" (Bailyn 1967:27,74). Lance Banning, another impor­
tant supporter of a republican reading of American history, highly influenced by, 
and a pupil of, Pocock, has retreated somewhat from his earlier position (Banning 
1978; 1986). The literature on American republicanism is by now immense, useful 
summaries being Shalhope (1976 and 1982) and, more recently, Onuf (1989) and 
Rodgers (1992). For more general discussion and many references, see also Acker­
man (1991:cpt. 1,2,7-9), Ball (1988:47-79,169-70), and Book III of Rahe (1992).
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In the context of American political thought, Pocock’s civic humanist history 
has met with much criticism. Isaac Kramnick. following in the footsteps of C.B. 
MacPherson, has convincingly, if somewhat one-sidedly, suggested the existence, 
from about 1760 onwards, of a politically important Lockean language of a new, 
disenfranchised and mobile, middle class of artisans and manufacturers, claiming 
rights of representation and careers open to talent. The claims were made in the 
name of ideals of economic industry and innovation, celebrating the just material 
rewards of the hardworking capitalist entrepreneur.3
Joyce Appleby notes how not only the possessive individualist theme, but also 
ideals of moral independence were transmitted into American liberalism, for in­
stance in Jeffersonian transformations of Anti-Federalist classical republicanism. 
Appleby’s American liberalism is a more recognisable set of doctrines than those of 
either Kramnick or Pocock. There is no reason, here, why individuals, pursuing 
their happiness in private or in the life of business, cannot also be independent 
and autonomous, all things which, in Pocock’s vocabulary, are exclusively associ­
ated with the pursuit of civic virtue.4
Kramnick and Appleby have strong cases against Pocock. Writers depicted by 
Pocock as lamenting classical corruption were really often criticising impediments. 
to progress; his classical men, steeped in the writings o f the ancients, most often 
used these to cast light on a future they clearly perceived to be not only different, 
but better. Yet, both these authors stay within Pocock’s terms which presuppose 
the existence of an inherited language of civic humanism, concerned with the con­
ditions of a fully human life. This language is merely put in a less prominent place 
- in Kramnick less prominent than Appleby. Pocock’s critics here basically claim 
that liberalism, as a capitalist ideology or, alternatively, a language of autonomy 
and moral progress, tuos able to offer something which more than outweighed the 
uncertain benefits of self-development, authenticity, and a life of self-government, 
which for various reasons had an increasingly anachronistic and nostalgic air 
about it. Pocock thought this transformation took place much later and much more 
ambiguously (from virtue to manners) but the conceptual concord is nevertheless 
striking between these three major commentators.
In dismissing Pocock’s conception o f virtue as manifestly anachronistic, and in 
focusing exclusively on the new liberal language of virtue, Kramnick and Appleby 
overlook the continuing existence o f a discourse about forms of civic action and 
dispositions which are necessary for the republic, and not just worthy sentiments 
of a bygone age. We may better understand the point o f this remaining language of 
civic virtue if we regard it as answers, not so much to what constitutes a fully hu­
3. Kramnick (1982; 1990).
4. Appleby (1992:324-27). This work by Appleby contains a number of essays 
challenging Pocock and other revisionists.
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man life, as to what is necessary to preserve political orders, not for the sake of 
more virtue, but for the sake of liberty.
The works of Appleby and Kramnick. which offer valuable perspectives on as­
pects of the genesis of American intellectual history, are typical of an almost uni­
versal flaw in the literature on the founding period, and particularly the debate over 
the respective place of ‘republicanism* (or ‘civic humanism') and ‘liberalism'. On the 
one hand, it is relatively easy to establish that the first principles of the American 
founding, without any exceptions at all, were about natural, individual rights, pri­
vate liberty and security, and never about the value in itself of a virtuous life of po­
litical participation. The following pages establish this, I believe, beyond doubt. On 
the other hand, the many commentators who focus on the language of natural 
rights, contract, and state of nature theory either see this as evidence of early, vic­
torious 'liberalism' (by which they mean many different things) which basically de­
feated the language of virtue, possibly relegating it to a minor Anti-Federalist 
fringe, or giving it non-political, individualist meanings.5 Or they recognise what is 
considered to be a transformed, instrumental language of virtue, domesticated and 
brought into the service of liberal values. The typical strategy here is to reserve a 
place for virtue in early liberalism, or less illuminatingly to speak of a radically dif­
ferent ‘liberal* republicanism, which had a completely new normative content, and 
whose conception of the content and psychology of virtue was at any rate substan­
tially changed. Most authors simply assume that Enlightenment authorities like 
Montesquieu and Constant were right that the political aspirations of the ancients 
were o f a different order.6 Others combine their analysis with reconstruction of 
Greek and Renaissance thought which accept much of the civic humanist picture 
which has been constructed by the Pocock school.7
In congruence with the discussions of the previous chapters, the notion of the 
newness of ‘instrumentalism* has to be rejected. Also, apart from the continuity of 
Itbertas as the object of virtue, towards the end of this chapter I suggest that, the 
many new ideological influences notwithstanding, the difference between ’classical* 
and ‘modem’ (American) virtue is exaggerated. This conclusion relates to one more 
basic problem of much of the literature. It seems to me that Pocock’s dubious idea 
of independent discursive paradigms, complete with terms and universes of mean­
ing which are mutually incompatible, is paralleled by many of his critics. These 
writers show, often convincingly, the existence of new meanings of old terms - in 
casu the republican terms of virtue and corruption. But too often it is assumed that 
new ideological elements, whether of Calvinist, or Enlightenment rationalist, or
5. E.g., Appleby (1992); Kramnick (1982; 1990); Dienstag (1996a); Dlggins (1986).
6. E.g.. Ackerman (1991:27-33); Ball (1988:47-56); Habermas (1994b); Sinopoli 
(1992:3-15,146-55). Sinopoli’s distinction between *weak* and 'strong* republican­
ism is not helpful either.
7. E.g., Pangle (1988:48-72); Rahe (1992:3-54).
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capitalist-entrepreneurial, or Scottish moral sense origin were islands to them­
selves in the discourse. It becomes possible to challenge these \iews once we use 
our theoretical searchlight, i.e., that republicanism was constituted by a specific 
argument whose rational core and common sensical persuasiveness allowed it to 
ilourish in a diversity of ideological gardens.
3. Revolutionary Values;
"Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness"
Contrary to the tradition of interpretation associated with such figures as J.G.A. 
Pocock and Gordon Wood, the first principles of the participants to the American 
founding were really much the same. Although political struggles were also dis­
putes over good concepts - words like ‘virtue’, ‘patriot’ and ‘true’ republicanism 
which all commentators from Paine to Hamilton had to employ - it is not true that 
liberty as a substantial term of value “acquired new meaning”. Wood notes that the 
Anti-Federalists defended a “classical conception of politics” whose ideas of “mixed 
constitution and ... proportioned social hierarchy” entailed a conception of “a sim­
ple and harmonious system”. We shall see that Wood certainly has a point in the 
sense that a break does occur, epitomised by Madison’s writings but also visible in 
many Anti-Federalists, in the gradual change to more modem, pluralist concep­
tions of a complex society of competing social interests and cultural diversity, and 
corresponding conceptions of political dangers. Many Americans had some diffi­
culty understanding that the political will and conception of the common good of all 
the people would be in conflict with the rights of minorities. But Wood’s claim is 
simply incorrect, if it is taken to imply that society was seen as a homogeneous 
whole or “organic chain”, to which individual interests were to be sacrificed, or that 
by liberty they meant “public of political liberty, the right of the people to share in 
government" - as distinct from liberty in the sense of the “personal or private, the 
protection of rights against all governmental encroachments”.8 Anti-Federalists 
were not all backward-looking yeomen of simple creeds (a number of them were 
slaveowners); and the Federalists were not all members of a proto-capitalist oligar­
chy which eventually stole the American revolution. In the words of Storing, the 
disagreements between Federalists and Anti-Federalists, and inside these camps, 
“were not the deep cleavages o f contending regimes”, but
the much less sharp and clear-cut differences within the family, as it 
were, of men agreed that the purpose of government is the regulation 
and thereby the protection of individual rights and that the best
8. Ball (1988:55); Wood (1969: 608-9); cp. Sinopoli (1992:134).
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instrument for this purpose is some form of limited, republican 
government9
To take a few, representative examples, according to one of the most able oppo­
nents of the constitution, the Federal Farmer,
There are certain unalienable and fundamental rights, which in forming 
the social compact, ought to be explicitly ascertained and fixed - a free 
and enlightened people, in forming this compact, will not resign all their 
rights to those who govern
And to Agrippa,
Civil liberty consists in the consciousness of that security jin their 
persons and property], and is best guarded by political liberty, which is 
the share that every citizen has in the government
To be sure, a main reasons for distrusting the outcome of the Philadelphia Con­
vention was the danger that people of different states “be so situated, or have such 
different opinions that they cannot agree in ascertaining and fixing them ... to live 
under one system of laws”. But the Federal Farmer was not making a virtue of this 
fact, or making a ‘civic humanist' call for states to be vehicles of distinct traditions 
of collective life of moral development. He was basically arguing the common- 
sensical point that, on account of the different interests, experiences and circum­
stances of the states, it could be argued “they can agree to no words by which ... to 
ascertain and establish many ... of these rights”. But this did not prevent him or 
most other Anti-Federalists from eventually being chief champions of a bill o f 
rights, or from arguing its indispensability on the grounds that, however much the 
financial, military, and judicial powers of the new federal state derived from the 
people, they did so in circumscribed manners and might grow to menacing propor­
tions and constitute a real danger, not only to ‘the people' - but to minorities of in- 
diuiduals of this people, including populations of states whose concerns were re­
mote from the legislature in Washington with its "limited ... human capacities". In 
the words of Agrippou "|i]t is ... as necessary to defend an individual against the 
majority in a republiek as against the king in a monarchy". Differences certainly 
existed as to the type of activities that individual rights were perceived to be good 
for, and as to the degree of certainty with which they were perceived to be available 
and secure. But as we shall see, the really big differences were in the perceptions of 
the relevant locales and formats of liberty, and in how its enjoyment was facilitated 
and made to last in the first place.10
9. Storing (1981:5).
10. The Federal Farmer in Storing, The Complete Anti-Federalist (2.8.19-20); and 
Agrippa (4.6.30; 4.6.73). As all the Anti-Federalist pamphlets and speeches cited 
are contained in Storing’s useful and authoritative collection, I shall identify them
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Jefferson, the main representative of Enlightenment optimism in America, for­
mulated a view which was quite typical, of liberty as a collective endeavour of a 
people securing certain individual liberties which were inscribed in the nature of 
things, in “conformity with the moral sense and reason of man“. Thus,
[elvery man. and every body of men on earth, possesses the right of self- 
government. They receive it from the hand of nature. Individuals exercise 
it by their single will; collections of men by that of their majority11
To Jefferson, America with its union had established an unprecedented political 
mutualism in the world, where “every man, at the call o f the laws, would fly to the 
standard of the law, and would meet invasions of the public order as his own con­
cern“. Jefferson, like most of his contemporaries, saw America as “the world's best 
hope”, the bearer of a "holy fire ... confided to us by the world”. In the Inauguration 
Address as president of the new republic, he spoke to a majority when he outlined 
the liberty of “a happy and prosperous” people as constituted by the attainment of 
internal peace, rather than the divisions and strife between states, and by the 
happy separation and capacity for self-defence, vis-à-vis the political havoc of 
Europe. In a much similar vein, only emphasising that liberty was always both by. 
and from an ‘energetic’ state, Madison talked of securing the people "against exter­
nal and internal danger” and providing “prompt and salutary execution of the laws 
... as well as ... repose and confidence in the minds of the people”. Jefferson also 
had in mind, for the entrenchment of a bill of right, the familiar republican “pro­
tection against standing armies” as well as "restriction against monopolies”.12
What was the promise of such liberty? Like Paine, Jefferson advocated a limited 
government “which shall restrain [citizens] from injuring one another, which shall 
leave them free to regulate their pursuits of industry and improvement, and shall 
not take from the mouth of labour the bread [they have] earned”. Apart from secu­
rity in one’s person under habeas corpus and trial by jury, security of possessions 
was a precondition for that pursuit of happiness which very much consisted in the 
legitimate enjoyment of the fruits of hard labour, the recognition of which reflected 
a common perception of European arbitrariness, inequality, and wastefulness. 
America was also to be a haven from religious persecution. Both Madison and Jef­
in the remainder of the chapter using Storing’s system of reference. The first num­
ber in each bracket refers to the volume number.
11. Jefferson, Opinion on the Constitutionality of the Residence Bill, July 15, 
1790; Opinion on the Treatises with France, April 28, 1790, The Papers o f Thomas 
Jefferson (17:195 and 25:613).
12. Jefferson, Inauguration Address, March 4, 1801, The Life and Selected Writ­
ings o f Thomas Jefferson (p.323); Jefferson to Rev. Samuel Know, February 12, 
1810, LAfe and Writings (p.600); Jefferson to Madison, December 20, 1787, Republic 
of Letters, I (p.512); Federalist no. 36 (p.243). (Unless Hamilton’s authorship is 
noted in brackets, all cited numbers of The Federalist are by Madison).
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ferson worked tirelessly for the cause of toleration, Madison helping to pass a re­
vised Bill for Religious Freedom (written by Jefferson) in the Virginia Assembly, af­
ter which he wrote to Jefferson that “I flatter myself have in this country extin­
guished for ever the ambitious hope of making laws for the human mind”.13
Religious freedom and freedom of consciousness generally were valuable in 
themselves, conducive to public peace, and essential for the welfare of the perse­
cuted coming to America from Europe. Along with freedom of speech and freedom 
of the press, they were also conducive to education, science and general enlight­
enment. Finally, Jefferson and Madison advocated education (Jefferson took pride 
in having founded the University of Virginia and spent much time and many private 
letters advising young people on the proper course of their education), the diffusion 
of books and newspapers, and public debate, for political reasons. Together they 
constituted that “bar of public reason“ which was the best remedy against public 
“error of opinion". To Madison, “[pjublic opinion ... sets bounds to every govern­
ment, and is the real sovereign in every free one".14 Even Hamilton granted that 
"[a]ll governments ... depend, in a great degree, on opinion", nothing that “the laws 
which control the community receive their tone and spirit from the public wishes". 
America was fortunate that the “minds of the people are exceedingly enlightened 
and refined".
Rights to enjoy a fulfilling private life, to Jefferson, came with corresponding 
duties, and not only to observe the “written law". A “tour of duty, in whatever line 
he can be most useful to his country, is due from every individual". The highest 
duty of a citizen was “of saving our country when in danger". However, public duty 
was strictly circumscribed. Always personally relieved at the close of a period of po­
litical service, which he found to be “inseperably linked together" with “private mis­
ery". Jefferson thought that although “we are made in some degree for others, yet, 
in a greater, are we made for ourselves," and
it were contrary to feeling, and indeed ridiculous to suppose that a man 
had less rights in himself than those of his neighbours, or indeed all of 
them put together. This would be slavery ... Nothing could so completely 
divest us of that liberty as the establishment of the opinion, that the 
State has a perpetual right to the services of all its members15
13. Jefferson, Inauguration Address. March 4, 1801, Life and Writings (p.323); 
Madison to Jefferson, January 22, 1786, Republic o f Letters, I (p.323).
14. Jefferson, Inauguration Address, March 4, 1801, Life and Writings (pp.322- 
24); Madison, in National Gazette, December 19, 1791, The Papers o f James Madi­
son (14:161); Hamilton, Speech to the New York Ratifying Convention, June 21, 
1788, The Papers of Alexander Hamilton (5:36).
15. Jefferson to Colonel James Monroe, May 20, 1782, Papers (6:184); Jefferson 
to Madison, June 9, 1793, Republic o f Letters, II (p.780); and Jefferson to J.B. 
Colvin, September 20, 1810, Life and Writings (p.606).
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Charles Beard in 1913 offered an influential ‘economic*, i.e., Marxist and possessive 
individualist interpretation of the intent of the framers.16 Beard's presentation of 
the Federalists as an American thermidor was anachronistic already by ascribing a 
rising, progressive and levelling impulse to the Anti-Federalists. There was. in this 
sense at least, no stolen revolution. This, incidentally,17 explains that the authors 
of the Federalist Papers had no particular need to disguise their concern with prop­
erty rights, i.e., the smoking gun of Federalist no. 10. Still, some founders had more 
conservative views concerning property than others. The inappropriateness of a 
Beardian reading is clear in the case of Jefferson. Apart from his general taste for 
rural simplicity of manners as conducive to moral maturity, good character, and 
particularly to patriotic spirit, Jefferson had further reasons to consider economic 
inequality problematic. In a famous letter to Madison, written while an ambassador 
to France, Jefferson commended on the waste of human resources and the “num­
berless instances of wretchedness" arising from the conservative property laws of 
old European monarchies. While “conscious that an unequal division of property is 
impracticable", Jefferson thought that "legislators cannot invent too many devices 
for subdividing property". In particular, heavily progressive taxation struck him as 
more in accordance with natural law.18
No such sentiments were shared by Jefferson's chief antagonist, Hamilton. The 
latter’s professed republican "regard for those liberties, in defence of which the 
people have fought" was coupled to an almost Caesarean distrust of the “turbulent 
and changing" people. His reasons for championing the causes of independence 
and federal union were primarily linked to national economic modernisation, i.e., 
the development of trade and industry with the instrument of a strong central gov­
ernment. His aristocratic sentiments were shared by Adams, according to whom 
the rich “have as clear and as sacred a right to their large property, as others to 
theirs which is smaller", and that disturbing this order o f affairs, as a purely demo­
cratic government would certainly do, would create an anarchy where nobody’s 
rights were safe. Thus, “the rich ... ought to have an effectual barrier in the con­
stitution against being robbed, plundered, or murdered".19
Hamilton’s co-author of the Federalist Papers, Madison, was certainly less radi­
cal than Jefferson, and notoriously afraid that the “landed interests" (not Jeffer­
son’s small freeholder) and the propertied classes generally would be overwhelmed 
in elections by the advocates of “levelling schemes". However, although far more
16. Beard (1913).
17. See Ackerman (1991:219-21).
18. Jefferson to Madison, October 28. 1785. Republic o f Letters, I (p.390).
19. Hamilton, Speech to the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention, June 18, 
1787; Speech to the New York Ratifying Convention, June 21, 1788, Papers (4:200, 
5:44); Adams, A Defense o f the Constitution o f Government o f the United States of 
America, Vol. Ill, Letter 6, Fifth Argument (p.294).
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attentive than Jefferson to the beneficial effects of some inequality of property and 
the blessings of commercial capitalism. Madison’s work hardly calls for Beardian 
interpretations. Madison appreciated Hume’s political arguments for stable rela­
tions of property and held certain conservative views about the superior political 
wisdom and moderation of the propertied segments of ‘the people'. But this was 
only part of the picture. Liberty was also liberty from the abuses of property, and 
he granted that “there are various ways in which the rich may oppress the poor; in 
which property may oppress liberty”. Moreover, although Madison perceived the 
chief danger to the republic to consist in tyrannical majorities, it was certainly not 
only the security of property rights against the levelling mob that he had in mind in 
his famous analysis of factions, a point to which we return below. Madison’s rea­
sons for not advocating a Bill of Rights at the time of the Convention were tactical 
and linked to his theory of political pluralism; he certainly shared the objectives of 
the Bill’s many advocates.20
4. American Conceptions of Republican Self-Government
What was the status of the Ubertas instituted by the Americans? As noted, their 
Lockean vocabulary is difficult to ignore. However, once we abandon civic humanist 
readings, the scholarly demonstration of contract and state of nature theory in 
writers like Jefferson, Madison, or Adams hardly constitutes a formidable challenge 
to republican interpretations of the founding.21 Nor does the identification of a ten­
sion between a 'republican' language of ancient or well-established historical rights 
of a national community or a locality, and on the other hand 'liberal' natural rights. 
Rights language could of course be put to many uses, and the appeal to a golden 
past (e.g., hard-won rights to self-government in the states), or to individual or local 
group aspirations or interests that were perceived to be legitimate (e.g., ‘rights' of 
slave owners) were some of them. Yet, the bottom line is that Federalists and Anti-
20. Madison, Speech to the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention, 1787, Note to 
Speech of the Right of Suffrage, ca. 1821, The Complete Madison (pp.37,45). See 
also Koch (1966:27-32). It is worth noting that, by 'property’, apart from its “par­
ticular application", Madison had in mind something broader. Thus,
its larger and juster meaning ... embraces every thing to which a man 
may attach a value and have a right; and which leaves every one else the 
like advantage. (...) In [this] sense, a man has property in his opinions 
and the free communication of them. He has a property in his religious 
opinions, and in the profession and practice dictated by them. He has 
property very dear to him in the safety and liberty of his person. He has 
an equal property in the free use of his faculties ... In a word, as a man is 
said to have a right to his property, he may be equally said to have a 
property in his rights (Madison, in National Gazette. March 27, 1792, 
Papers (14:266-68)).
21. Although articles making such relatively obvious points continue to appear, 
e.g., Dienstag (1996b).
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Federalists alike, of various stripes, were largely in accordance in their use of a 
moral language which emphasised that (white, male) man had been endowed by his 
creator with a basic human dignity, capacity for reason, and equality of worth, was 
entitled to direct his own affairs, and that American man enjoyed his abode in the 
place where this promise would be realised. However, as this natural rights lan­
guage became the universal language of justification, it was fitted to a republican 
frame of political self-government, which distinctly stressed that men. bom free 
and equal, must live in society, and that this carried important moral as well as 
political consequences.
Some general features, foreshadowed in the discussion of Reid and Paine, 
characterised this framing. Firstly, in all writers - even in those like Hamilton who 
merely paid occasional lip service - emphasis was placed on political rights and the 
pooled exercise of each man’s executive law of nature as the collective self-defence 
of a people against power.
A second feature concerned the very meaning of rights. We noted that ‘liberal’ 
rights foundationalism of either libertarian self-ownership or radical moral self-dir­
ection was a late product, rather than the original point, of the natural rights lan­
guage of the eighteenth century. The rights declared by the Americans were still 
seen as instrumental towards the widely shared value ideal of an intentionally 
moral Christian life of duty towards one’s fellows, in reasonable personal security, 
and with due enjoyment of secular happiness. As life, liberty and some form o f 
freedom of consciousness {the latter often of a more circumscribed nature than fa­
voured by Jefferson and Madison) were regarded as a first precondition for such a 
life, it was equally ‘self-evident* that certain material means for the pursuit of hap­
piness were required. The important point is that ‘rights’ were both timeless expres­
sions of the equal dignity and divine purpose of man, and the established political 
currency of temporally and territorially bound legal requirements towards these 
ends. In their later sense, they did not derive from abstract philosophical deduc­
tion, but from the good sense and concrete collective needs expressed by the people 
that were to be regulated by them. And opinions of the conditions and difficulties of 
such popular expression differed.
Thirdly, and closely related, the act of consent in the early American tradition, 
came to have a rather more active flavour than in Locke. It was more than a matter 
of electing, tacitly accepting, or rightfully resisting an entrusted governor. Consent 
implied a constructive relationship of political will where the people in its entirety 
helped shape the indeterminate historical form of the political community, and with 
it their own liberty, binding themselves collectively in a mutual covenant for the 
future. ‘Rights’ and the will of the people, expressing their rational view of the 
common good, were not in principle seen to be in conflict - although conceptuali­
sations of how to gain access to the people at its best varied greatly, marking points
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of divergence in debates over the proper modes and levels of self-government. Three 
main positions - of the Anti-Federalists, of Jefferson, and of Madison - stand out.
4 .1 . Anti‘Federalist Localism
The Anti-Federalists, in all their diversity, tended to assume that the self- 
government - rights nexus required a small republic. A number of reasons were ad­
vanced for the virtues of smallness, all to be discussed below. The main point in 
the present context is the emphasis on the danger of centralised legislation being 
unable to reflect the peculiar situation of each state. Listen again to Agrippa, the 
spokesman of a federal Bill of Rights, cited above. The “object of every just govern­
ment is to render the people happy, by securing their persons and possessions 
from wrong“. However, for this purpose
there should be local laws and institutions; for a people inhabiting vari­
ous climates will unavoidably have local habits and different modes of 
life, and these must be consulted ... The idle and dissolute Inhabitants of 
the south, require a different regimen from the sober and active people of 
the north [Agrippa was from Massachusetts]. Hence ... the necessity of 
local governments, who may enact, repeal, or alter regulations as the cir­
cumstances ... require (...) It becomes still more needful when the local 
manners are formed, and usages sanctified by the practices of a century 
and a half. In such a case, to attempt to reduce all to one standard, is 
absurd in itself, and cannot be done but upon the principle of power
Not only climate and manners, but also “unequal distribution of property, the tol­
eration of slavery, the ignorance and poverty of the lower classes" marked a con­
trast between the South and, on the other hand “the care that is taken of educa­
tion", preserving “small and nearly equal estates, equality of rights", and even “re­
ligion and good morals". It was “plain, therefore, that we require for our regulation 
laws, which will not suit the circumstances of our southern brethren, and the laws 
made for them would not apply to us".22
Much of Agrippa’s argument concerned the fact of complexity in the economic 
infrastructures of the states and the potential arbitrariness of federal laws in such 
areas as taxation, property and contract relations, the regulation of commerce and 
customs, and the central administration of courts. In the quoted passages, we rec­
ognise, secondly, a Montesquieu-inspired point about different geographical 'fits’ 
between climate, moers, institutions, and laws, best conducive to liberty, where the 
author seems to accept that the fruits of liberty may include a great variety o f sub­
stantial ways of life. Thirdly, beneath the rhetoric, he also expresses a localist fear 
that the good republican forms of Massachusetts (economic equality, virtue based 
on religion and education, industry etc.) will be destroyed by alien laws, aimed at
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1the administration of lesser (Southern) souls. It is this fear, finally, which takes Ag- 
rippa down a nativist path, reserving a state right to regulate immigration "to keep 
their blood pure ... from the foreign mixtures".23
Other Anti-Federalists voiced similar fears. The Federal Farmer concluded that 
“one government and general legislation alone, never can extend equal benefits to 
all parts of the United States" on account of different "laws, customs, and opin­
ions". A New York commentator. Cato noted “the variety o f ... climates, productions, 
and commerce, the difference of extent, and numbers of inhabitants ... the dissi­
militude of interests, morals, and policies", as reasons why the great goals of “gen­
eral welfare, and ... blessings o f liberty to you and your prosperity" could not be 
furthered by a federal union.24
Anti-Federalists were somewhat more provincial or even parochial than most 
Federalists, particularly philosophical types like Jefferson and Madison, and scep­
tical of cosmopolitan calls to transcend what Madison called the ‘spirit of locality’. 
But, again, their case for self-government was not an expressivist. proto- 
communitarian impulse as claimed by some.25 On the one hand they did insist on 
certain local differences as to what, more specifically, the laws of liberty and secu­
rity of property and person were eventually for. Occasionally, they spoke of cultural 
matters and local tastes - forms of life and valued virtues that were potentially 
threatened by central government and laws with a too general scope. More often, 
their localism had a more mundane content, about geographically conditioned 
needs, conditions of trade, the execution of justice, or the forms of taxation. But 
secondly, when religious virtue, ethnic homogeneity, or local customs were on the 
agenda, these matters were almost always also, and primarily, linked to the type of 
instrumental arguments which abound in the republican tradition, above all in 
Rousseau and Montesquieu. The point which was pressed against the Federalists 
was that each state was likely to know the conditions o f its liberty best, and for this 
reason it ought to be able to regulate and re-regulate the legal forms expressing 
these conditions in a decentralised manner. We return to this point below.
4 .2 . ‘The Earth Belongs to the Living \  The Jejferson-Madison 
Debate
Jefferson’s view was expressed in his famous argument that "the earth belongs in 
usufruct to the living" which he (with Thomas Paine)26 developed in France. Here, 
Jefferson linked the American idea o f self-evident natural rights with a strong case
22. Agrippa, (4.6.48)
23. Agrippa, (4.6.34); cp. Cato (2.6.18).
24. The Federal Farmer (2.8.14); Cato (2.6.12, italics in original).
25. E.g., Kramnick (1987:54-61).
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for periodic constitutional debates and resettlement. The earth, according to Jeffer­
son. was given by God to each living generation for the good use of all individuals, 
seeking their happiness and performing their duties to others, in freedom and se­
curity. But God did not determine the details of temporal legislation which were 
most fit to further these goals. Such matters were left to human self-government. 
The idea found a particular as well as a more general expressions in Jefferson.
Firstly, there was no natural right to property, only civil or historical rights of 
given societies. Thus, the meaning of Jefferson’s famous words that all men, apart 
from “Life" and "Liberty", are endowed with an unalienable right to "the pursuit of 
Happiness".26 7 By not using the word property, as was often done. Jefferson 
stressed the historicity of all particular legal forms of the right of individuals to 
have a share of the Earth on which to labour, or some equivalent assurance of the 
primary means of subsistence. He also implied the possibility of employing higher 
order natural law requirements to censure particular laws of property, taxation, or 
entail, and even the possibility for states to incur debts, all laws which were to be 
seen as “municipal only, not moral; flowing from the will of the society, which have 
found it convenient". The general principle that the earth belongs to the living was 
“of very extensive application and consequences", enabling the abolition of all sorts 
of appropriations of land, established privileges, and monopolies. It made it possi­
ble for Jefferson to state that,
[wjhenever there is in any country, uncultivated lands and unemployed 
poor, it is clear that the laws of property have been so far extended as to 
violate natural right28
Secondly, Jefferson claimed that each living generation possessed a right to choose 
and revise its constitutions and laws in their entirety. Thus, “by the law of nature, 
one generation is to another as one independent nation to another", and
no society can make a perpetual constitution, or even a perpetual law.
The earth belongs always to the living generation. They may manage it 
then, and what proceeds from it, as they please, during their usufruct.
They are masters too of their own persons, and consequently may govern 
them as they please. But persons and property make the sum of the 
objects of government. The constitution and the laws of their
26. See Koch (1950:81-88) on the origin of Paine's use of what seems to have been 
Jefferson’s idea.
27. The Declaration o f Independence as adopted by Congress, Jefferson, Papers, I 
(p.429).
28. Jefferson to Madison, October 28, 1785 and September 6, 1789, Republic o f 
Letters, I, (pp.390,632-34).
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predecessors extinguished them, in their natural course, with those who 
gave them being29 30
Unlike Jefferson, who viewed American events from the distance (also philosophi­
cally), as ambassador to revolutionary France. Madison was in the midst of a very 
real struggle to reach a working consensus on a new political order. He responded 
to the bold suggestions of his friend with some care. Without denying that Jeffer­
son had an important point in theory, i.e., that the legitimacy of particular consti­
tutional forms derived from the will of the people, Madison was in no mood to con­
template periodic constitutional revisions. He made several devastating comments. 
If governments depended “on some positive and authentic intervention of the soci­
ety itseir, they would be likely to suffer “the casualty and consequences of an ac­
tual interregnum". Invoking a Humean argument about habit and authority, he 
asked if not
a Government so often revised [would] become too mutable to retain 
those prejudices in its favour which antiquity inspires, and which are 
perhaps a salutary aid to the most rational Government in the most 
enlightened age
Under such condition, Madison further argued, one would see “pernicious factions 
that might not otherwise come into existence", in particular inevitable struggles 
arising over the definition of positive property legislation. More theoretically, Madi­
son noted that Jefferson's position failed to make sense of obligations o f sons that 
followed from the sacrifices of their fathers - in casu war debts incurred by the 
revolutionary generation for the benefit of posterity^0
Lest one were to suffer these several practical “embarrassments” or even give 
up entirely the possibility of civil society, Madison argued, it must be accepted that 
covenants expressing the will of the majority might take the form of tacit assent 
“and that this assent may be inferred where no positive dissent appears". Indeed, 
although Madison certainly held political rights to derive from man’s equal natural 
stature, he denied that the natural law argument could be employed to justify a 
particular mode of self-government, let alone the ingenious scheme calculated by 
Jefferson, according to which a new constitution had to be instituted after the 
passing of a nineteen year period, when a new majority ‘generation’ would have 
come into being. A  strict state of nature argument with express assent would imply 
that no newcomers to society could “be bound by acts o f the Majority". Thus either 
new (unanimous) votes on every single law, or express assent to rule by majority 
would be required whenever a single new member was added to the community.
29. Jefferson to Madison. September 6, 1789, Republic o f Letters, I (p.634).
30. Madison to Jefferson, February 4, 1790, Republic o f Letters, I (pp.650-51).
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Against Jefferson, Madison argued that the republican argument about majority 
government concerned a “compact founded on conveniency“. not natural law.31
Behind these points a more fundamental difference divided the two. Jefferson’s 
optimistic beliefs in universal progress and popular enlightenment led him to think 
that democratic will formation and discernment of the common good by the people - 
including as large and diverse a people as that of the United States - was a fairly 
straight forward matter. It becomes evident, as we turn our attention towards those 
of The Federalist Papers which were authored by Madison, why he did not share 
these views. The manner in which he conceptualised what he and the other found­
ers were doing, and what was the difficulty in doing it, amounts to a theory of con­
stitutional deliberation which was profoundly different - and not only more conser­
vative - than the optimistic versions of Paine and Jefferson, yet still with distinctly 
republican features. Several aspects of this theory may be discerned.
4,3, Constitutional Foundation, Madison
Madison did agree with Paine and Jefferson at the most general level. Natural law, 
in his view, only dictated the most fundamental rights to liberty, security of person, 
freedom of consciousness and property in a share of the earth, i.e., “that sacred 
property, which Heaven, in decreeing man to earn his bread by the sweat of his 
brow, kindly reserved to him”. He opposed “unnecessary opportunities ... to in­
crease the inequality of property, by an immoderate, and especially unmerited, ac­
cumulation of riches” and lauded that “silent operation of laws, which ... reduce 
extreme wealth towards a state of mediocrity, and raise extreme indigence towards 
a state of comfort". Madison probably considered “sacred" more extensive forms of 
property than Jefferson, and used a language of ‘justice’ to censure not only “ex­
cessive taxes [which] grind the faces of the poor", but also “arbitrary taxes [whichl 
invade the domestic sanctuaries of the rich". But his views on property were pri­
marily Humean ones, about the political desirability of stable legal forms and ex­
pectations, and prudential ones, about effects on commerce and economic devel­
opment.32 However, in the context of constitutional foundation and deliberation. 
Madison’s chief concern was with the design of institutions and mechanisms of 
government. He agreed with Jefferson and Paine that it was impossible to found for 
all posterity and, like these two authors, continually stressed “transcendent and 
precious” right of the people to install, change, or alter their government. But, 
again, Madison’s appeal to the authority of We the People” took a decisively differ­
ent form.33
31. Madison to Jefferson, February 4, 1790, Republic of Letters, I (pp.652-53).
32. Madison in National Gazette. January 23 and March 27, 1792, Papers 
(14:197-98,266-67).
33. Federalist no. 40 (p.264). Also no. 43 (p.285) and no. 51 (pp.321-22). See Rosen 
(1996).
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Thus, in The Federalist Papers, Madison continually stressed the extraordinari­
ness of the task of constitution-making, whose “novelty ... immediately strikes us“. 
The articles of confederation had been demonstrated as fallacious, but in the cause 
of changing this “first foundation, and with it the superstructure resting upon it**, 
all precedents “can therefore furnish no other light than that of beacons, which 
give warning of the course to be shunned, without pointing out that which ought to 
be pursued". This being the case, Madison was acutely aware of the limited span of 
attention and resources of reason of the best of legislators, and the impossibility of 
foreseeing all the faults that practice and experience would demonstrate in the new 
institutions. Those who were to judge the outcome of the Philadelphia deliberations 
should “see the propriety of reflecting that a faultless plan was not to be expected", 
and recognise not only “the fallibility to which the convention, as a body of men 
were liable", but also “that they themselves are but men and ought not to assume 
an infallibility in rejudging the fallible opinions of others".34
These difficulties of political prudence were compounded, as besides “the ob­
scurity arising from the complexity of objects and the imperfection of human facul­
ties, the medium through which the conceptions of men are conveyed to each other 
adds a fresh embarassment". The science of politics, Madison pointed out, was 
simply of an altogether different order, where, as compared to the sciences of 
"works of nature", questions “dally occur in the course of practice which prove the 
obscurity which reigns in these subjects". The difficulties arising from the blunt­
ness of any human language which was employed to express and realise the inten­
tions of divine law concerned “indistinctness of the object, imperfection of the or­
gan of perception, [and] inadequateness of the vehicle of ideas".35
Finally, and most importantly, Madison emphasised that the task of foundation 
was difficult simply by virtue of the large numbers of different points o f view that 
needed to be accommodated, each of them advancing a different conception of the 
common good of the new union, and each of them unwilling to sacrifice their own 
precious interests. Madison’s pluralism and theory of countervailing factions, dis­
cussed in the following section, should not, however, be taken as evidence of a 
Hobbesian or Humean idea of human nature where interests and passions were 
essentially or largely unchanging, and where the science of government was exclu­
sively a matter of challenging or checking impulses of rational egoism.36 Madison 
presumed the possibility, in principle, of both capacity and willingness to imparti­
ality, in enlightened rulers and less enlightened, ordinary people alike. This is evi­
dent in the sincerity of his appeals to the sound judgement of the people who were 
to adjudicate the new constitution (“the impartial world, ... the friends of mankind,
34. Federalist no. 37 (cp. Federalist no. 14).
35. Federalist no. 37 (pp.244-45).
36. Diamond (1959). For opposing views, see Ackerman (1991:224-27) and Miller 
(1990).
190
... every virtuous citizen"), as well as in his recognition that “the convention ... en* 
joyed, in a very singular degree, an exemption from the pestilential influence of 
party animosities". But he considered this capacity to be scarce, fragile, and only 
likely to appear in sufficient quantities under certain circumstances. Moreover, in 
its exercise he assigned different roles to the elite and the mass of the people.37
Madison’s moving account of the circumstances and proceedings of the Con­
vention, which also found its way into his letters to Jefferson, comprises a dis­
tinctly republican conception of political prudence, concerned with the particulars 
of government in an imperfect world, above all with the need for restraint and mod­
eration. For each of the reasons noted, only second best solutions could be ex­
pected in constitutional politics. Towards the end of the central Federalist no. 37, 
Madison rhetorically asked whether
it would be wonderful [i.e., strange] if, under the pressure of all these 
difficulties, the convention should have been forced into some deviations 
from the artificial structure and regular symmetry which an abstract 
view of the subject might lead an ingenious theorist to bestow on a Con­
stitution in his closet or in his imagination
On the contrary, granting that “a nation of philosophers is ... little to be expected", 
it was a “real wonder" that such a degree of unanimity and "conviction of the ne­
cessity of sacrificing private opinions and partial interests to the public good" had 
in fact been evidenced. But what, more specifically, were the circumstances o f the 
process of constitution making which the Philadelphia events so happily exempli­
fied?38
A first point to note regards Madison’s understanding of factions. His generic 
definition of faction in Federalist no. 10 was “a number of citizens, whether ... a 
majority or a minority, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of 
passion, or of interest". Factions could be adverse either “to the rights of other citi­
zens or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community". Madison 
poured scorn on those "[tjheoretic politicians, who have ... erroneously supposed 
that by reducing mankind to perfect equality in their political rights, they would at 
the same time be perfectly equalised and assimilated in their possessions, their 
opinions, and their passions".39
There were several reasons why this would never happen, all having to do with 
the types and natures of faction that Madison perceived in America. Madison usu­
ally contrasted ‘interest* with ‘passion*. Factions of interest included the basic op­
position, based on differences in the faculties of acquisition, between “[t]hose who 
hold and those who are without property". Secondly, they sprang from the “various
37. Federalist no. 37 (p.247); no. 40 (p.265).
38. Federalist no. 37 (pp.246-47); no. 49 (p.314).
39. Federalist no. 10 (pp. 123,126).
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and interfering" positions of a “landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mer­
cantile interest, a moneyed interest, [and] many lesser interests’*. Both types of 
differences arose naturally by the "diversity in the faculties of men" and the growth 
of “civilized nations" respectively. A third localised kind of faction arose from the 
fact that "the United States are distinguished from each other by a variety of inter­
ests", which "give birth to contending interests and local jealousies”.40
Factions of passion also came in several varieties. Thus, reasons for individuals 
to “oppress each other” included a
zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning government, 
and many other points, as well of speculation as of practice; an 
attachment to different leaders ambitiously contending for pre- 
emminence and power: or to persons of other descriptions whose 
fortunes have been interesting to the human passions
Madison’s terms were not altogether consistent. For instance, economic interests 
occasionally operated like passions. And passions clearly might be more or less 
closely related to either considered ‘opinions’ or more irrational sentiments. Yet, 
looked at a bit more closely, Madison’s terms make sense:41
Thus, economic interests could take the form of dangerous disruptions. Jeal­
ous (unpropertied) majorities could be seized by a “rage for paper money, for an 
abolition of debts, [or] for an equal division of property”, all of them "improper or 
wicked projects". But Madison also had in mind the narrow and sinister interests of 
(propertied) minorities, bent on gains of the moment, and willing to disregard “the 
rights of another or the good of the whole”, for instance by using a monopoly posi­
tion. Such passionate, dangerous interests, however, could be partly tamed by rea­
son. Certain unjust interests were “secret wishes" which could not bear to see the 
light of day; others were narrow “local prejudices”. But Madison also spoke of “true 
interests" of the whole, which were also those o f one’s own group when taking a 
larger view. They constituted “the mild voice o f reason, pleading the cause of an 
enlarged and permanent interest", a voice which, unfortunately, was often drowned 
“by the clamours of an impatient avidity for immediate and immoderate gain". 
Apart from this, economic differences, between localities, classes, and occupational 
groups, but of a cooler and rational kind, continued to constitute more permanent, 
calculable, or ‘structural’ interests.42
When Madison spoke of passions he could have in mind powerful allegiance to 
charismatic figures (which was unstable); or religious fanaticism (which was very 
dangerous); or the general fact that individual opinions because of human vanity 
(“self-love") and a universal tendency towards “mutual animosity" could degenerate
40. Federalist no. 10 (p.124); no. 38 (p.246).
41. Federalist no. 10 (p.124); Ackerman (1991:187-88); Miller (1990:36-37).
42. Federalist no. 10 (pp. 125,128); no. 42 (p.276, italics added).
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into stubbornness and fanaticism. However, “opinions and ... passions will have a 
reciprocal influence on each other”, and while often “the former will be objects’* of 
“the latter”, opinions and (religious) prejudices could be enlightened. Indeed, it 
ought to be “the reason, alone, of the public, that ought to control and regulate the 
government”. Yet. although opinion could thus be freed from passion in principle, 
and individuals be brought to consider the merits of other points of view. “(a]s long 
as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different 
opinions will be formed”. This ineradicable pluralism, moreover, was welcomed by 
Madison.43
Below, we shall see that Madison's famous science of countervailing passions 
and interests, while extremely important, was only part of his understanding of 
politics. Unlike Hume (and unlike Hume’s less critical pupil in America, Hamilton), 
he combined it with an account of interest transcendence through representation. 
Still, by and large, Madison did not expect impartiality and civic virtue to cany 
much weight in everyday politics. The case of constitutional foundation was differ­
ent:
although this variety of interests ... may have a salutary influence on the 
administration of the government when formed, yet every one must be 
sensible of the contrary influence ... in the task of forming it44
The point to note in this context is Madison’s chastened combination, in a republi­
can language whose flavour was Machiavellian, of calls for prudent impartiality and 
realistic assessments of the pluralism of opinions and interests that would remain 
even under the best of circumstances. If some views of the states were parochial, 
others stemmed from reasonable regard for peculiar geographical circumstances 
and needs. If slavery was patently sinful, it was equally evident that its abolition 
could not at the moment be made a condition of accession of the Southern states to 
the Union. And most obviously, different, yet sincerely held opinions continued to 
exist on countless details of constitutional means.45 Given this context, we may ap­
preciate some important aspects of Madison’s views on constitutional deliberation.
First, the main currency of constitution making was the political prudence of 
moderation, a virtue conceptualised in a manner which was closer to Aristotle or 
even Machiavelli than to Hume.
It is a misfortune ... that public measures are rarely investigated with 
that spirit of moderation which is essential to a just estimate of their real 
tendency to advance or obstruct the public good
43. Federalist no. 10 (pp.123-24); cp. no. 50 (p.317); no. 49 (p.315).
44. Federalist no. 37 (p.246).
45. See, in particular Federalist no. 38 (pp.249-52) and Madison to Jefferson, 
October 24, 1787, Republic o f Letters, I (p.503). Cp. Federalist no. 1 (Hamilton).
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tModeration consisted in acknowledging the fallibility of oneself and others. It in­
volved a willingness to “compromise” and to “sacrifice theoretical propriety to the 
force of extraneous circumstances“ when necessary. It required avoiding one’s 
“predisposition to censure". It necessitated the acceptance of a large degree of 
horse trading.46 rather than insistence on unanimity on every single point. Above 
all, it was facilitated by the disposition to upgrade considerations of the common 
interest in having a union at all and, accordingly, to recognise “the necessity of sac­
rificing private opinions and partial interests to the public good”, while despair at 
“seeing this necessity diminished by delays or by new experiments".47
Secondly, Madison’s version of the appeal to 'we the people’ exhibited a dialec­
tic of the few and the many. In Philadelphia, he wrote to his friend in Paris, in view 
of “the natural diversity of human opinions on all new and complicated subjects, it 
is impossible to consider the degree of concord which ultimately prevailed as less 
than a miracle".48 In the course of justifying the extra-legal acts of the Philadelphia 
convention, Madison also suggested where that rare ‘spirit* of patriotic moderation 
came from. It arose from a sense o f danger and crisis, from being entrusted with a 
world-historical task of service to the people, “by whose confidence they had been 
so peculiarly distinguished", and from the anticipation of pending popular judge­
ment:
[Tlhe convention ... were deeply and unanimously impressed with the 
crisis, which had led their country ... to make so singular and solemn an 
experiment ... It could not be unknown to them that the hopes and 
expectations of the great body of citizens ... were turned with the keenest 
anxiety to the event of their deliberations. (...) They must have borne in 
mind that as the plan to be framed and proposed was to be submitted to 
the people themselves, the disappropriation of this suppreme authority 
would destroy it forever49
The task of political (re)foundation. while preceded by popular agitation or military 
struggle, had to be conducted by the few “since it is impossible for the people 
spontaneously and universally to move in concert towards their object”. Indeed, “it 
is therefore essential that such changes be instituted by some informal and unau­
thorized propositions, made by some patriotic and respectable citizen or number of 
citizens”. Citing with sympathy the ancient Greek experience, Madison even noted 
that entrusting the framing of a constitution to a single legislator like Lycurgus or
46. Rosen (1996:564).
47. Federalist no. 37 (pp.242-47).
48. Madison to Jefferson, October 24. 1787. Republic o f Letters, III (p.496).
49. Federalist no. 40 (p.264).
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Solon was a way to avoid the "discord and disunion among a number of connec­
tors”.50
Madison’s views on the legitimisation of government through public opinion 
placed him between Jefferson and Hume. In contrast to Hume, Madison held a 
mainstream American republican view that “the people cannot wilfully betray their 
own interests”, and that “the cool and deliberate sense of the community ... actu­
ally will, in all free governments, ultimately prevail". But, he also, unlike Jefferson, 
believed that "there are particular moments ... when the people ... may call for 
measures which they themselves will afterwards ... lament and condemn”. In stat­
ing that "Governments rest on opinion", Madison steered a middle course. With due 
attention to Hume, he noted that the “reason of man is timid and cautious when 
left alone". It only acquired strength when associated with many who shared the 
same opinion, and when the "examples which fortify opinion are ancient as well as 
numerous”. On the other hand, Madison knew that he lived in an age of popular 
revolution where “every votary of freedom [must] rest ... political experiments on 
the capacity of mankind for self-government", and that “no other form would be 
reconcilable with the genius of the people of America". Despite their propensity to 
passion and error of judgement in the short run and regarding particulars, the 
American people were capable of knowing that their most basic interests were jeop­
ardised by the uncertainties of the confederacy. In times of crisis, "the vigilant and 
manly spirit which actuates the people of America" could and had to be relied 
upon, and Madison lauded "the virtue and intelligence o f the people" which had 
"attended the revision of our established forms of government".51
This is connected to the last feature of Madison’s constitutionalism, its dialectic 
of revolutionary foundation and temporal duration. The rise of the revolutionary 
spirit of democratic equality in America made it necessary for Madison's new re­
publicanism to derive political authority and legitimacy from the people in toto. But 
it also made him stress the fragile and transient nature o f popular mobilisations 
which might “stifle ... the ordinary diversity of opinions on great national ques­
tions", and economise with the people’s capacity to self-education. Clearly, “a con­
stitutional road to the decision of the people ought to be marked out and kept 
open, for certain great and extraordinary occasions". By this he had in mind “the 
great principle of self-preservation; ... the transcendent law of nature and of na­
ture’s God", according to which “the safety and happiness of society are the objects 
at which all political institutions aim". These great "objects", however, were only 
rarely on the political agenda.52
In his resistance to constant changes, Madison not only had in mind familiar 
conservative point of the popular "veneration which time bestows on everything".
50. Federalist no. 38 (p.248); no. 40 (p.264).
51. Federalist no. 39 (p.254); no. 49 (p.314); no. 57 (p.345); no. 63 (pp.371-72).
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He made a much more general republican point about the contingency and fragility 
of new political orders - because of the limitations of knowledge, impartiality, and 
patriotic spirit, and the caprice of all things political in general, in the ordinary 
people and its leaders alike. Disappointed himself with some of the results in 
Philadelphia, he was insisting, against Anti-Federalists who opposed the new con­
stitution for shortcomings that were even more obvious in the Articles of Confed­
eration, that any constitution would be flawed, indeed that marshalling support 
even for a tolerable second best, under the circumstances, was close to a miracle, 
and that this fact bestowed a distinct value and authoritative kind of legitimacy on 
a durable constitution.52 3
Thus, finally, the pathos of the American foundation, in Madison’s vision, did 
not derive from Rousseau’an unanimity, but from shared recognition of the great 
common interest in having a union of freedom at all, from establishing a concord of 
different states, resolving to remain together in times of great hardship, from in­
venting a new form of political community in the process, and from offering this ex­
ample to the admiration of the world:
Hearken not to the unnatural voice which tells you that the people of 
America, knit together by so many cords o f affection, can no longer ... 
continue the mutual guardians of their mutual happiness; can no longer 
be fellow-citizens (...) [T]he mingled blood which they have shed in 
defense of their sacred rights, consecrate their Union and excite horror 
at the idea of their becoming aliens, rivals, enemies (...) Is it not the glory 
of the people of America that ... they have have not suffered a blind 
veneration for antiquity ... to overrule the suggestions of their own good 
sense, the knowledge of their own situation, and the lessons of their own 
experience? To this manly spirit posterity will be indebted.54
5. Formats of Liberty: The Federalist-Anti-Federalist Debate
There was, as I have shown, little difference of opinion on first principles around 
the time of the American revolution.55 Nor did anyone seriously question the re­
52. Federalist no. 38 (p.248); no. 43 (p.285); no. 49 (pp.313-14).
53. Federalist no. 49 (p.313). Adams’ views on political founding were related 
(Lemer 1979:34-36). Adams was (even) less satisfied with the contents of the new 
constitution than Madison. But despite his elitist leanings, he was somewhat closer 
to Jefferson in being less afraid of change per se, and more susceptible to treat 
politics as an evolving science. He believed that an adequately informed public, 
“who could conceive and ... adobt it (the constitution) we need not fear will be able 
to amend it, when by experience, its conveniences and imperfections shall be seen 
and felt” (Adams, cited from Appleby 1992:206).
54. Federalist no. 14 (p. 144).
55. Of course, the rhetorics of the constitutional debate included the attribution 
of sinister motives to one’s opponents. Publius often implied that Anti-Federalists
196
publican idea that the shift from rights of nature to tangible, secure, and elaborate 
rights in society was predicated on the self-government of the people, and that this 
nexus somehow had to remain. However, all the difference lay in the somehoir. No 
one in the founding generation could ignore the experience of successful revolu­
tionary resistance against the British crown, nor the accompanying, powerful 
rhetoric of a new, radically levelling popular sovereignty. Yet different figures dis­
agreed profoundly about the empirical conditions and proper formats of common 
liberty.
These disagreements were exhibited in the remarkable "great national discus­
sion"56 triggered by the constitutional convention which had gathered in Philadel­
phia with people like Edmund Randolph, George Mason. Alexander Hamilton, and. 
above all James Madison among its principal organisers. It continued, and reached 
a wider public, in elaborate newspaper exchanges and series of'letters’ which were 
read across the nation and designed to influence opinion in the ratifying states.57 
Although Madison and others on the Federalist side58 had celebrated the 'miracu­
lous' national concord, the truth of the matter was that positions were often bitterly 
opposed.
All recognised the existence of political crisis in the new country. Law and order 
left much to be desired as British colonial justice had not yet been adequately re­
placed. Individual states of the confederacy acted like small, Jealous sovereignties, 
levying taxes on each other’s exports and transits, printing their own money, 
maintaining separate navies, conducting independent diplomacy towards European 
states, and arguing over territorial boundaries. The confederate body, the Continen­
tal Congress, was weak, a legislature only, with no powers to regulate commerce, 
execute its decisions, or apply legal sanction on recalcitrant states.
However, factual disagreements apart, there was no consensus on the signifi­
cance of these matters. Some saw pending anarchy, the beginning of the destruc­
tion of the new American nation, which would establish a continent of quarrelling, 
warring states, only to perpetuate European mistakes. After all, only a common en­
emy had united the culturally and institutionally widely diverging states. Others 
merely recognised the child diseases of a young country that had to find its feet 
and get co-ordinated over its obvious common interest, co-operating about specific 
ends. What had been gained in the Revolution should not be Jeopardised, it was
secretly wished to break up the union (e.g., Hamilton in Federalist no. 1. p.89), 
whereas a standard Anti-Federalist move, justified in the case of Hamilton, was to 
accuse the gentlemen in Philadelphia of partaking in the "search for grandeur, 
power and splendor”, Patrick Henry (5.16.2.)
56. Federalist no. 1 (p.88) (Hamilton).
57. See Kramnick (1987) on the context and prehistory of the Convention. On the 
ambiguities and changing meanings of 'Federalist* and 'Anti-Federalist', see Stor­
ing's excellent long essay on the debate (1981:9-10).
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argued, and these fragile gains were interpreted to mean that the natural frame­
work of individual liberty was a strictly limited, but also direct or relatively unmedi­
ated popular government in small states - the existing units of the confederacy.
Individuals like Madison. Hamilton. John Adams, and General George Wash­
ington. who eventually agreed to lend his authority to the Philadelphia Convention 
as its president (and later as first president of the new Union), were inclined to see 
new dangers to liberty and individual rights in the unprecedented mobilisation and 
politicisation of the common man. Although an economic class-based explanation 
would be reductionist, there is no doubt that some of the impulse towards federal 
consolidation did derive from conservative fears of licentious mob rule in the new 
state legislatures, leading to abolition of public and private debts, inflationary in­
troduction of ‘paper money’, egalitarian agrarian laws and other “schemes of injus­
tice” and “wicked projects”.58 9
Many agreed with the need for consolidation and enforcement of order, but 
feared central accumulation of power. Some, for instance Madison’s co­
representative from Virginia, Edmund Randolph, finally thought the constitution 
went too far in creating an unaccountable aristocracy, and declined to sign. Others, 
notably Jefferson, who had similar misgiving at first, but for more democratic rea­
sons, eventually gave the constitution his public support. Madison, on the other 
hand, thought the federal government had been granted insufficient powers, 
wanting it to have a veto over state legislation. Hamilton, who added to Madison’s 
fears his own conviction that American politics should be modelled on England, 
wanted to reduce the popular element even more than it finally was.60
On the other front, while some Anti-Federalists vehemently opposed the con­
stitution, many did recognise the need for some consolidation. Of these, some (also 
Randolph) eventually supported ratification, many of them on the condition of fu­
ture amendments that included a anticipated Bill of Rights.61
58. Kramnick (1987:13).
59. Federalist no. 10 (p.128); Kramnick (1987:20-27). However, Madison also be­
lieved that, in Virginia at least, “the body of a sober and steady people, even of the 
lower order, are tired of the vicisitudes, injustice and follies which have so much 
characterized public measures, and are impatient for some ... stability and repose", 
Madison to Jefferson, December 9, 1787, Republic o f Letters, I (p.510). On the other 
hand, Anti-Federalists certainly recognized the danger of “subversion of all gov­
ernment” and the need for “security against licentiousness and agrarian laws", 
Centinel (2.7.166).
60. Edmund Randolph (2.5.40-43); Jefferson to Madison, December 20, 1787, Re­
public o f Letters, I (pp.513-14) (“I own I am not a friend to a very energetic govern­
ment”); Madison to Jefferson, September 6 and October 24, 1787, Republic o f Let­
ters, I (pp.491,499-500). For Hamilton, see Kramnick (1987:35).
61. Storing (1981:67). For instance, see the letter from A Delegate Who Has 
Catched Cold (5.19.13-18).
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The two main outcomes of the constitutional settlement were, first, the triumph 
of the centre over the periphery, i.e., federal sovereignty vis-à-vis the states, and 
secondly, the rise of a ‘complex' form of government, based on checks and bal­
ances, more remote representation, and a strong executive - as compared to more 
direct majoritarianism through the legislature. Indeed, the two main clusters of 
questions of the debate concerned the role of ‘the people’ and its capacity for virtue 
versus the need for authority and institutions; and, secondly, the relation and divi­
sion of sovereignty between localities and a consolidated national level. These dis­
agreements need some unpacking. They can be ordered along several dimensions 
of argument.62 We shall focus in the following on the question of the proper size of 
a republic, including the conditions of virtue and political identification. Secondly, 
we look at the (more implicit) debate about the very content of civic virtue. Thirdly, 
in less detail, we look at the central disagreements over political and institutional 
architecture, where Madison, in particular, advanced radical new ideas. This de­
bate concerned the proper understanding of principles of representation; the ne­
cessity and danger of a strong, central government; the danger or blessings of fac­
tions and pluralism in an enlarged political realm; the meaning of division of pow­
ers in a government; and the question of whether or not to have a national Bill of 
Rights. I approach each of these last questions - as did most of Madison’s critics - 
with a view to establish whether and how they challenge traditional republican 
views of the conditions of liberty.
6. The Small Republic Argument
The most important argument against federal consolidation - indeed the master ar­
gument of all the others - appealed to the classical republican idea and “the opin­
ion of the greatest writers” that the natural locus and framework of liberty was a 
small, relatively homogeneous republic, where citizens were close to their rulers, in 
terms of their manners and interests, as well as geographically.63 The argument, 
which was used by the majority of the Anti-Federalists, had a number of different 
aspects.
The main fear of the Anti-Federalists, which was constantly repeated, was the 
counterpart to the localist argument for state self-government, which was dis­
cussed above: no federal government, indeed no government at all, would be capa­
ble of catering to the “various local concerns and interests" of all the states. The 
remoteness of the capital, the lack of knowledge, responsibility, and concern on 
behalf of politicians who did not have their origin among the people they nominally 
represented, the technical impracticality of having one government taking care of 
all the affairs of a large country, the difficulty of effecting speedy dispensation of
62. See also Storing (1981).
63. Centinel (2.7.17). On the origin of the small republic argument, see Draper 
(1982:35).
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justice at the margins of the territory, and the need or propensity of such a gov­
ernment to sacrifice diversity and local wishes at the alter of efficiency and uni­
formity. all this conspired to militate against republics in large territories.64
Federalist responses to these fears took various forms. At times it involved a 
criticism of the parochialism, narrow-mindedness, or even blatant egoism of what 
Madison called “the spirit of locality” and Hamilton “a spirit of interested scrutiny, 
without... knowledge of national circumstances”. In fact. Madison was of the opin­
ion that what the states called their special state ‘concerns* as often as not con­
sisted in the opinions and interests o f tyrannical majorities which a federal gov­
ernment ought to restrain rather than empower. Indeed, the advertised homogene­
ity of even smaller states, let alone the larger ones, was vastly exaggerated. Even 
so, the Anti-Federalist argument had deep popular roots. Thus, the more important 
Federalist response was to argue that the federal level would only deal with what 
had to be regulated at a federal level. This was the start of a ‘subsidiarity* discus­
sion which raised, as we shall see, as many questions as it answered.65 But the 
small republic argument also contained versions of the instrumentalist republican 
virtue theme: Only in small republics was it possible to generate the voluntary alle­
giance that a state required; and, as a related point, discussed below, only in the 
small republic was it possible to generate and keep the requisite level of virtue in 
the people. Let us look here at the question of allegiance.
Federalists and Anti-Federalists agreed that allegiance essentially required 
good government, i.e., the experience that one’s rights and liberty was furthered. To 
The Federal Farmer it was clear that “the laws of a free government rest on the con­
fidence of the people" and that “the benefits of the government" may “induce the 
people to support it voluntarily". Madison agreed that the absence or erosion of 
such benefits, including, in a federal context, the benefit of government stability 
would lead to “that diminution of attachment and reverence which steals into the 
hearts of the people".66
At one level, the Anti-Federalist-Federalist dispute simply concerned whether 
such benefits were actually forthcoming, with the former group denying that the 
central government would adequately cater for concrete local concerns “in the ex­
tremes", and claiming that intruding laws could only be “executed on the principles 
of fear and force". Madison, here, contended the possibility of a rational (at times, 
as in the famous Federalist no. 51, even a quasi-Hobbesian) understanding in the 
great body of the people of the need for federal government. Such an understanding
64. Centinel (2.7.19). Cp„ e.g., Cato (2.6.13-21); The Federal Farmer (2.8.14); Brutus 
(2.9.14-20).
65. Madison, in Kramnick (1987:45); Federalist no. 15 (Hamilton); Madison to 
Jefferson, October 24, 1787, Republic o f Letters, I (p.500).
66. Federal Farmer (2.8.18); cp. Brutus (2.9.18) and Cato (2.6.16-17); Federalist no. 
62 (p.368).
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had to be strengthened by habituation in public opinion, and Madison believed ex­
perience of the shortcomings of the confederacy had contributed to this, although 
this did not prevent him from occasional exhortations on the spectre of the Union 
dissolving and about the need for “every man who loves liberty ... to have it [the 
spectrel ever before his eyes that he may cherish a due attachment to the Union of 
America”.67
Sinopoli, who notes the above,68 makes a great deal of the fact that Anti- 
Federalists did not expect allegiance and identification to arise from ‘pure’ virtue, 
unaided by interest, or see participation as a value in itself, the opportunity of 
which might create loyalty. In stead he points to a defining contrast between two 
different moral psychologies, both of which were ‘liberal*. One. he claims, was a 
(poor) Hutchesonian argument to the effect that identification and a sense of alle­
giance requires proximity, and that the further beyond the most intimate circles of 
family and friends citizens are required to look, the weaker will be the social bond. 
The other was the Humean argument about habitual opinion, discussed in the pre­
vious chapter.
Scottish moral sense psychology clearly had some impact in America. The 
clearest example, duly cited by Sinopoli, is Cato:
the principles which bind [mankind] ... together (...) are ... like a pebble 
cast on the calm surface of the river, the circles begin in the center, and 
are small, active, and forcible, but as they depart from that point, they 
lose their force, and vanish into calmness. The strongest principle of 
union resides within our domestic walls ...; the next general principle of 
union is amongst citizens of the same state, where acquaintance, habits, 
and fortunes, nourish affection, and attachment; enlarge the circle still 
further, and. as citizens of different states ... by degrees, we lessen in our 
attachments, till, at length, we no more than acknowledge a sameness of 
species69
Yet, Sinopoli overestimates the significance of this new argument. First of all, it is 
really only found so explicitly stated in Cato. Sinopoli has the (important) ambition 
of countering Pocock’s faulty depiction of a civic humanist moment among the Anti- 
Federalists. I submit that this ambition, along with the unfortunate tendency 
among critics of civic humanist revisionism to accept Pocock’s terms of debate, in­
duces Sinopoli to miss the most important dimension of difference between Feder­
alist and Anti-Federalist positions on civic allegiance. All participants to the debate 
acknowledged the importance of ‘an opinion of interest* as the core of an allegiance
67. Federal Farmer (2.8.18); Federalist no. 49 (p.314); no. 41 (p.369); cp. also no. 46 
(p.298).
68. Sinopoli (1992:136-55).
69. Cato (2.6.19-20).
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or patriotism which, while more or less supported by habit, was in this sense ra­
tioned. And, as in fact noted by Sinopoli himself, also Hamilton used the circle-of- 
aifection argument, only to opposite ends, namely to suggest that states need never 
fear encroachments by the federal government, as the first allegiance of citizens 
(and thus the immediate impulse to defend) would always tend to be directed to­
wards the local level.70 The illuminating differences are in the details:
Neither Cato and other Anti-Federalists nor. obviously, Hamilton suggested that 
politics could somehow be based on Hutchesonian benevolence - whatever the ex­
tent of its sphere. The argument about natural affections being weakened “in pro­
portion to the distance or diffusiveness of the object“ was clearly assimilated, and 
subordinated, to a recognisably republican (and, in the case of Hamilton, anti- 
republicanl frame of thought. Thus, when Cato used the argument, it was linked, 
first, to the argument about diversity (e.g., the impossibility of trusting idle South­
ern slave owners to be virtuous). Secondly, and prominently, it was concerned with 
trust and knowledge that demands for the sacrifices and allegiance of individual 
citizens were in fact linked to a general interest, of which they were themselves a 
part, “the interests of the public" in a small republic being "easily perceived, better 
understood, and more within the reach of each citizen”. In particular, such circum­
stances rendered it possible to ascertain that one’s contributions were not abused 
(“employments of your country disposed of to the opulent”). Moreover, the familiar 
size, distance, and homogeneity arguments were not employed by Cato in the name 
of natural sympathy, but, again, because “from the vast extent of the territory, and 
the complication of interests, the science of government will become intricate and 
perplexed, and too mysterious to understand, and observe”.71
In the case of Brutus, whose discussion significantly is tied with the issue of 
representation and political trust, the difficulty of a large republic was that, repre­
sentatives being too distant, they “cannot, as they now do, mix with the people, and 
explain to them the motives which induced the adoption of any measure, point out 
its utility, and remove objections". The result will be that
they will be considered ambitious and designing. They will not be viewed 
by the people as part of themselves, but as a body distinct from them, 
and having separate interests to pursue (...) [A] perpetual jealousy will 
exist... and their laws [will be) opposed, evaded, or reluctantly obeyed72
What was at stake, when Brutus proceeded to speak about “natural” confidence in 
those who are near, as opposed to strangers, has little to do with sympathy and 
feeling, and a great deal more with knowledge, security o f consequences, and ra­
tional trust.
70. Federalist no. 17 (p. 157).
71. Federalist no. 17 (p.157) (Hamilton); Cato (2.6.13-14).
72. Brutus (2.9.49).
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The contrast to the conservative Hamilton does not regard this rational core. 
Hamilton believed in the “general rule that ... confidence in and obedience to gov­
ernment ... (isl proportioned to the goodness or badness of its administration". And 
also this author quickly departed from the circle-of-affections argument. What 
really made a difference at the state level, he reminded his reader, was the exis­
tence of an,
attractive source of popular obedience and attachment (...) which, being 
the immediate and visible guardian of life and property, having its 
benefits and its terrors in constant activity before the public eye, 
regulating all those personal interests and familiar concerns to which the 
sensibility of individuals is more immediately awake
What Hamilton had in mind was “the ordinary system of criminal and civil justice" 
which constituted a “great cement of society, which will diffuse itself almost wholly 
through the channels of the particular governments". Yet, upon consideration. 
Hamilton - who not only needed to assure his readers that state loyalty was a safe­
guard against federal abuse of power, but also that a national government could in 
fact gain popular support - argued that loyalties could in fact become directed to­
wards a higher political level, as
the more the operations of the national authority are intermingled in the 
ordinary exercise of government, the more citizens are accustomed to 
meet with it ... the greater the probability that it will conciliate the 
respect and attachment of the community
Quickly leaving Hutchesonian language (“familiarized to their sight and to their 
feelings, ... touchling] the most sensible chords and ... the most active springs of 
the human heart"), Hamilton switched to his Humean gear, noting how “[m)an is 
very much a creature of habit". The "habitual sense of obligation" will be aided by 
the gradually increasing "familiarity and comprehensiveness" of a national govern­
ment which progressively extends its authority.73
The difference to the Anti-Federalists was that Hamilton thought allegiance 
could arise simply by experiencing a benign authority in ‘matters of internal con­
cern*, and by coming to see this as natural. In this belief the difference to Madison 
was only marginal, the latter probably believing in a slightly more active and ma­
ture attitude of allegiance. Anti-Federalists, on the other hand, emphasised dis­
trust and the lack of obvious benefits, but also the republican point that allegiance 
required a direct reminding of how one’s own interest was partaking in that of the 
whole.
73. Federalist no. 17 (Hamilton) (pp. 157-58); Federalist no. 27 (Hamilton) (pp.201-
3).
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In writers like Brutus, who distrusted direct democracy for conservative rea­
sons which he shared with some of the Federalists, the argument was about the 
necessity of sufficient closeness to those individuals whose patriotic works did 
further the common interest, and to those political institutions which embodied it. 
In other, more radical Anti-Federalists, the point became an independent argument 
for local political participation as a device of education to patriotism. A classical 
statement of this view (whose author, however, was pessimistic about its realism) 
was the [Maryland] Farmer who, along with calls for useful public education, i.e., in 
“the principles of free government, illustrated by the history of mankind” advanced 
proposals about direct participatory schemes with assemblages of freeholders, and 
the detainment of jury trial. If such measures were taken - at state level - he 
promised that “in a very few years, the people instead of abusing, would wade in 
their knees in blood, to defend their governments" - state governments, that was. 
Sinopoli, who also discusses this Anti-Federalist text, recognises that, here, “(tjhe 
virtue of direct democracy is the cultivation of the faculties of those who participate 
in it". He cites the claim that, “people are capable of being made any thing ... if we 
only ... give them good and wholesome institutions" and that
[m]en no longer cultivate, what is no longer useful. - should every 
opportunity be taken away, of exercising their reason, you will reduce 
them to that state of mental baseness, in which they appear in nine- 
tenths of this globe
But Sinopoli quite mistakenly interprets as secondary the (direct) instrumental idea 
that participation is the best defence against power and, in the case of the jury, he 
claims that the 'cultivation of faculties’ was only lauded because such cultivation, 
and activities that sustain it, are “intrinsically valuable for all the reasons republi­
cans have always claimed", ignoring the general thrust of the [Maryland] Farmefs 
argument, i.e., that such faculties are needed to maintain liberty.74
To say that many Anti-Federalists were merely making sin instrumental point is 
half true - in fact all of them were, and few valued either participation or localism 
for its own sake.75 But Anti-Federalist instrumentalism arguments cut much 
deeper than the half-hearted natural sympathy idea. This may be recognised, once 
the very poverty and inconsistency of the circle-of-affection theme is noted, once 
attention is paid to the decidedly un-Hutchesonian realism and scepticism about 
power and its abuse which characterised Anti-Federalists, and once the details of 
the texts are related to established republican ideas.
Thus, on the one hand, a reconstruction of the Anti-Federalist position does 
indeed highlight weaknesses in the face of arguments by Hamilton and Madison. 
The Anti-Federalist claim that rational allegiance could not be forthcoming, be­
74. A [Maryland] Farmer (5.1.52,67,82); Sinopoli (1992:151-55).
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cause federal government could not cater for liberty in its local particularity, was 
vulnerable for two reasons. First. It could be claimed that the larger view afforded 
by being a citi2en in a national union would cause the more parochial and illiberal 
demands of local liberty to evaporate. Secondly, a consolidated republic might earn 
the same, or even a better allegiance from the people, as, over time, the people 
would see that it secured their liberties more effectively, catered for concerns - the 
securities and benefits that only a union could produce - that states failed to de­
liver. If these points, made by Publius and others, were vindicated, The Federal 
Farmer might stand defeated, with his admission of being “in favor of any general 
system which shall promise these advantages [protection of property and a steady 
execution of the laws]”.75 6
On the other hand, an Anti-Federalist rejoinder was still possible. Thus, when 
Federalists claimed allegiance to be a mixture of rational common interest and ha­
bituation, Anti-Federalists may be seen to represent the less optimistic position 
that rational allegiance required to be awakened and sustained by certain activat­
ing political mechanisms.77
Indeed, this Anti-Federalist point was not lost on Jefferson. First, Jefferson 
strongly believed that patriotic allegiance had to be revitalised from time to time. 
Hence those occasional remarks, reminiscent of the Machiavelli-Cato’s Letters- 
Rousseau-Ferguson trail, to the effect that a degree of virile, even unruly, patriotic 
fervour was necessary, even tf the price free countries had to pay for this was ac­
ceptance of occasional unrest or rebellion - even spilled blood.78
Secondly, a related concern was part of the background of Jefferson’s famous 
ward argument, formulated towards the end of his life.79 While the cosmopolitan 
and French inspired Jefferson had little sympathy with the parochial and particu- 
larist side to the Anti-Federal case, let alone with its distrust of the capacity of or­
dinary people to discern the matters of national politics, he did agree with the idea 
that local participation might be a way to remember the value of one’s liberty. He 
may be read as adding to this the point that some of the more nativist Anti- 
Federalists missed - that participation was a way to transcend local prejudices and 
the comfortably selective loyalties to family, friends, and locality. Jefferson and 
more radical Anti-Federalists like the Maryland Farmer were surely on the retreat 
about the political practicality of such participatory schemes. But as alternative
75. Sinopoli (1992:141).
76. A Federal Farmer (2.8.24), also cited in Sinopoli (1992:140).
77. They also advanced a second argument about rational allegiance and patriot­
ism, centring around the need for a Bill of Rights as an identity device, to which we 
return below.
78. E.g., Jefferson to William Short, January 3, 1793, Papers (25:14-17).
79. See Pangle (1988:102-3).
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voices in the founding debate, they advanced concerns that were to be revived 
later, above all in Tocqueville.80
7. The Meaning of Civic Virtue
Just as different causal accounts existed about the mechanisms for generating pa­
triotic identification and allegiance, the veiy meaning of the desirable activities and 
dispositions making up civic virtue had begun to shift in the American debate. 
However, as understandings of the signification, the required extent, and the 
means of generating or retaining virtue began to change, virtue came to constitute 
one more conceptual battleground for the challenge of republicanism.
At the most general level, as many commentators have noted, several of the 
virtues advocated by American writers may be interpreted as ‘liberal* and Christian, 
i.e., primarily traits of character and moral dispositions that belonged to private, 
rather than to public life. Several distinct, although overlapping, developments of 
the language of virtue may be discerned, all of them of European origin.
One of these developments, stressed by Kramnick, consisted in the rise of 
capitalist or possessive individualist ‘liberal’ virtues. Here, according to this author, 
patronage and the idle and corrupt life of the city was opposed, not so much to civic 
independence but rather to industriousness, productivity, the free and unre­
strained development of talent, and the just material rewards of private enterprise. 
Virtue was reformulated in terms of the glory of work and frugality, and embodied 
in the new social hero, not the zoon politikon, but the scientist or economic inno­
vator and benefactor, such as Benjamin Franklin. Vice, by contrast, was wasteful­
ness, the habit of spending beyond one’s means, or without due purpose, violating 
the latter’s injunction to make “no expense but to do good to others or yourself; Le., 
waste nothing". Franklin, it should be noted, listed a whole thirteen virtues, from 
temperance to humility, each of which he resolved to acquire by turn.81
Joyce Appleby, in her competing account of the genesis of American liberalism, 
has noted how virtue became the capacity, not to participate in government, but to 
live a. private and associational life, free from political authority, yet partaking - 
through commerce, science, religion, but also social life in general - in the progress 
benefiting all. The common denominator of such enlightened virtue was the 
autonomous use of one’s free reason. In this liberal creed, Appleby summarises, 
nature had “endowed human beings with the capacity to think for themselves and 
act in their behalF. The creed emphasised freedom of choice in matters of “religion, 
marriage, intellectual pursuits and electoral politics" and the importance of free 
intellectual enquiry. However, Appleby’s account of Enlightenment individualism
80. Jefferson to John Tyler, May 26, 1810; Jefferson to Joseph C. Cabell, Febru­
ary 2, 1816; Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval. July 12, 1816, Life and Writings 
(pp.610-11,660-62.676).
81. Kramnick (1982; 1987; 1990); Franklin, Autobiography (pp.98-110).
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underemphasises how Locke as well as Scottish moral philosophy, as taught at the 
new American universities, combined self-direction and independence with volun­
tary performance of objective moral duty. While different, more or less optimistic, 
moral sense psychologies were adopted by Americans, they were typically combined 
with a stress on moral education and deliberate work on one's own character.82
Just as the capitalist virtues of frugality and hard labour, in Locke, shaded into 
moral virtues of self-control and ‘moral labour’,83 the latter was part of broader 
Christian conceptions of man's worldly callings and corresponding virtues. How­
ever, the impact of religion on early American political culture exhibited large de­
nominational and geographical differences. Compared to Puritans like Adams, 
some American intellectuals, in particular Jefferson and Paine, were influenced by 
the sceptical (French) Enlightenment and had either deist or moderate Anglican 
leanings, although their views too were shaped by Puritanism.84 But Southern 
Baptist evangelicalism and radical Puritan millenarianism in the North in different 
ways produced conceptions of even more demanding social and political life. Virtue, 
here, concerned the duty to resist earthly depravities and to further selfless be­
nevolence, in rulers and citizens alike. More particularly, commentators have 
stressed the political significance of the radically levelling, anti-authoritarian im­
pulse of Protestant theology, and the Puritan idea of the covenant with its stress on 
participation. Radical religion in America was often tied, at the outset, to an extro­
vert and mobilising culture of mission and spiritual awakening.85
The exact content and influence of these diverse vocabularies of virtue is a 
complicated matter. From our point of view, it is essential to stress that neither of 
the discourses were islands to themselves, and that all were internally highly am­
biguous. Although eventually each of them came to denominate influential, 
autonomous justifications of worthy or legitimate activities o f an essentially private 
nature, the very ambiguity of each discourse also facilitated their adaptation to re­
publican concerns, including the classical terms of corruption and the common 
good. They were virtues, in the sense of character traits and dispositions which, 
while facilitated by natural potentialities and endowments, were artificial, fragile, 
and in occasional need of institutional or educational reinforcement. Moreover, the 
discourses could be employed, not only to identify what was generally beneficial to 
society, but also in connection with the more strictly political roles of citizens. Let 
us briefly consider each of them.
82. Appleby (1992:1).
83. Dienstag (1996a).
84. Vetterli & Biyner (1987:59-61),
85. On the role of religion at the founding, see Bloch (1990); Pangle (1988:78-88); 
Vetterli & Biyner (1987:74-77).
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7 .1 . The Virtues o f Capitalist Enterprise
Hamilton, his praise of capitalism unmixed, appealed in Federalist no. 12 to the 
widespread appreciation by “enlightened statesmen" of the benefits of commerce:
By multiplying the means of gratification, by promoting the introduction 
of the precious metals ... it serves to vivify and invigorate all the 
channels of industry ... The assidious merchant, the laborious 
husbandman, the active mechanic, and the industrious manufacturer - 
all orders of men look forward with eager expectation and growing 
alacrity to this pleasing reward of their toils86
But this Humean celebration of the effects on character of commerce was not, at 
the time of the founding, the more prevalent view. The generally favourable view of 
industry, enterprise, and frugality prevailed in a moral atmosphere which was still 
far from friendly towards economic egoism. Like Jefferson’s, even Franklin's ideas 
of a good life involved economic self-sufficiency and enough comfort to afford an 
opportunity to pursue higher (religious) callings, but by no means the sanctioning 
of luxury or the vain pursuit of ‘precious metals’.87
The virtues of capitalist enterprise were advocated for different and sometimes 
conflicting reasons. One, associated with Franklin's own example (as projected in 
the Autobiography), centred on the ideal of the “restless ... ‘self-made’ man ... who 
prudently discerns the link between his rise and the promotion of useful ‘projects’ 
which benefit his neighbors and attract their esteem, affection, and assistance". 
Here, the pathos of the great individual statesman, acting for the good of all, was 
transferred to the realm of economics, and attached to the objects of general (na­
tional) prosperity and welfare, rather than to those of political liberty and secu­
rity.88
The virtue of frugality could also have a more political, indeed a republican, fla­
vour. Thus, in Jefferson as well as in many Anti-Federalist, it was a recurring con­
cern to restrict or delay, possibly by means of legislation, the unnecessary con­
sumption and “excessive importations of foreign merchandise and luxuries", in or­
der to avoid economic dependency, and to consolidate the economic health and 
stability of the new nation. For the people, this virtue translated to restricting con­
sumption to domestic produce; for politicians, it involved resisting temptations to 
undue taxation and, particularly, the protraction of public debts.89
86. Federalist no. 12 (p.134) (Hamilton).
87. Franklin, Autobiography; Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval, July 12, 1816, Life 
and Writings (p.673).
88. Pangle (1988:97).
89. Centinel (2.7.103), cp. Candidus (4.9.18) and A Plebeian (6.11.22-23); Jeffer­
son to Archibald Stuart. January 25, 1786, Papers (9:219-20); Pangle (1988:93-94).
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Almost ail participants to the American debate, including most Anti- 
Federalists, accepted the usefulness of commerce. Jefferson, Madison, and Adams 
worked as presidents to promote it, and none had much patience with nostalgic 
appeals to Spartan simplicity.90 Yet. in terms of the debate on commercial civil so­
ciety as conducted in Europe, the founders were generally less unambiguously 
positive about commerce than Montesquieu or Hume. While commerce was noted 
as a prime fruit of liberty and good government, few, apart from Hamilton, were as 
ready to adopt Montesquieu’s argument about commercial interdependence as Ag­
rippa, who saw in commerce “the great bond of union among citizens”. Many Anti- 
Federalists voiced traditional concerns that “the progress of a commercial society 
begets luxury, the parent of inequality, the foe to virtue, and the enemy to re­
straint“, and that when “people become more luxurious, they become more inca­
pacitated of governing themselves“. Jefferson, notoriously, never missing an occa­
sion to state his wish, as based “on principles of theory alone”, that the states 
should “practice neither commerce nor navigation", keeping citizens in the condi­
tion of “husbandmen”, as “(cultivators of the earth are the most valuable citizens 
... the most vigorous, the most independant, the most virtuous ... tied to their 
country, and wedded to it’s liberty and interests, by the most lasting bands”.91
Jefferson invariably went on to note that such schemes were against the demo­
cratic will of the American people, difficult to practice in an open, increasingly 
commercial world, and even morally dubious for other reasons.92 Yet, to claim that 
founders, including Jefferson or Madison, “identified happiness with property and 
material pleasure”, and that neither "committed America to political ideals that ap­
pealed to man’s higher nature” is certainly inaccurate.93 Many Federalists, includ­
ing Jefferson and Madison, did see material indulgence and vanity as evil in itself. 
Madison deplored the “despotism” of a situation where “twenty thousand persons 
are to get or go without their bread, as a wanton youth, may fancy to wear his 
shoes with or without straps, or to fasten his straps with strings or with buckles.”94 
However, only Adams contemplated making it a political concern to remedy it by
90. Kloppenberg (1987:26); Storing (1981:45).
91. Agrippa (4.6.6); Cato (2.6.34); Charles Turner (4.18.1); Jefferson to John Jay, 
August 13, 1785; Jefferson to Hogendrop, October 13, 1785, Papers (8:426,633); 
cp. also Notes on Vtginia, queiy 19, Life and Writings (pp.280-81).
92. Jefferson was uncomfortably aware that rural virtue, in America as in ancient 
republics, seemed to go hand in hand with slave economy. His occasional egocen­
tric notion that America should pursue its virtue alone, exporting its corruption as 
it were (“let our workshops remain in Europe"), is difficult to take entirely seriously. 
Notes on Virginia, query 18 and 19. Life and Writings (pp.277-81).
93. Diggins (1986:5).
94. Madison, in the National Gazette, March 20, 1792, Papers (14:258, italics in 
original).
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“prudent and reasonable sumptuary laws“. Moreover, it was certainly believed to be 
potentially harmful in the familiar instrumental republican sense.95
It may well be, as Storing says about the Anti-Federalists, that much of the 
worry “was the half-hearted criticism of children of the modem commercial world 
who worried about its implications".96 However, in the case of more sophisticated 
Federalists like Jefferson, Adams, and even Madison, it is equally possible to detect 
a deep and self-conscious scepticism that the desirable spirit of frugality and mod­
eration was a necessary, or even a likely outcome of doux commerce. From the point 
of view of the likes of Hamilton, they were feet-dragging their way into the new 
century. Although Madison drew more conservative conclusions than Jefferson, he 
too stressed the importance of agriculture and wide spread property in land and. in 
the commercial society he after all favoured, the danger of “immoderate, and espe­
cially unmerited, accumulation of riches“.97 Neither he nor Jefferson were adverse 
to more limited government programs of regulation and creation of infrastructure. 
But they were very sceptical about Hamilton’s modem vision of an industrialised 
society with highly developed division of labour, which, he alleged, would rid soci­
ety of its burden of idle labour power and even, in the process, cause
each individual to find his proper element, and ... call into activity the 
whole vigor of his nature (so that] the community is benefitted by the 
services of its respective members, in the manner in which each can 
serve it with the most effect
And if they were sceptical about this rosy adoption of Smith’s economics, and the 
claim that it would not only promote “the wealth of a nation", but also “cherish and 
stimulate the activity of the human mind", they were positively abhorred by Ham­
ilton’s schemes for the creation of national banking with its floating ‘paper money’ 
credit, and the possibility of accumulation of enormous financial power at the cen­
tre of the nation. Finally, it was Hamilton only who went all the way with Hume, in 
the acceptance o f luxury, pursuit of vanity, and esteem for mere possession of ma­
terial wealth, as essentially beneficial, because of their stimulating effects on eco­
nomic productivity.98
In retrospect, the reservations o f Jefferson and even Madison seem backward 
looking. But although their fears were like a bad consciousness which they did not 
have the political visions to deal with, their premonitions, arguably, were vindi­
95. Adams, Defense, Vol. Ill, Ninth Argument (p.349); Pangle (1988:93).
96. Storing (1981:46).
97. Madison, National Gazette, January 23, 1792, Papers (14:197).
98. Hamilton, Report on Manufactures, in On Public Credit, Commerce, and Finance 
(pp. 195-96); Hamilton, Speech to the New York Ratifying Convention, June 21, 
1788, Papers, 5 (pp.42-43). For Hamilton’s open-eyed acceptance of the erosion of 
virtue, and for John Adam’s Calvinist despair, see the discussion in Diggins 
(1986:53-55).
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cated. The virtues of the capitalist entrepreneur, originally beneficial for society and 
national politics, were eventually transformed into mindless specialisation and 
consumerism - creating the one-dimensional pseudo-citizens feared by Jefferson, 
and overlooked in Hamilton’s reading of Smith. The same virtues facilitated the 
sanctioning of egoism and acquisitiveness by that appeal to inalienable property 
rights, unrestrained by duty and purpose, except the duty to refrain from tres­
passing on the holdings of others, a duty which Madison, expressly, had not in­
tended in his defence of property rights. Acquisitiveness and egoism were not, of 
course, eventually ‘virtues’ but necessary and beneficial vices, legitimate at least in 
the economic sphere, but gaining such respectability in an era where this sphere 
was to take up ever more room in the space of human pursuits.
7 .2 . Religious Virtue
Religious conceptions of virtue were equally widespread, but also equally ambigu­
ous in their content. When Anti-Federalists advocated Christian virtues for political 
purposes, they rarely advanced intrinsically moral reason. However, religious free­
dom was often interpreted as a collective exercise of a self-government which also 
aimed at the expression, or at least the protection, of a specific religion and the lib­
erties it required (such as the rights of Quakers not to bear arms).99 Few perceived 
any conflict between favouring religious liberty (primarily of their own group) as 
protected by a Bill of Rights, and on the other hand requiring religious tests for 
politicians entering office, lest “Jews, Turks, and Heathen" be elected.100
Whatever the private convictions of devote Christians partaking in the national 
debate, the main line of advocacy was instrumental. Here, Anti-Federalists were 
not alone. Jefferson, in a manner foreshadowing Tocqueville, would often stress the 
importance of religion as a school of general moral virtue. In letters to his own chil­
dren and to other young people, he never missed an opportunity to note the fragil­
ity o f personal morality and the need to work* on one’s own habits. In the Notes on 
Virginia, he argued that “the liberties of a nation" could not “be thought secure 
when we have removed their only firm basis, a conviction in the minds of the peo­
ple that these liberties are of the gift of God". By contrast, Madison was not always 
inclined to rely on religion as a fountain of virtue and noted the patent “inefficacy of 
this restraint" as evidenced by the propensity of individuals to “join without re­
morse in acts against which their consciences would revolt, if proposed to them 
separately in their closets". Indeed, “Religion ... kindled into enthusiasm ... has 
been much oftener a motive to oppression than a restraint from it". These differ­
ences apart, Jefferson joined Madison’s principled and life-long fight to separate 
church and state. Madison thought that the co-existence (and mutual balancing) of
99. Phüadelphiensis (3.9.11-12).
100. A Watchman (4.22.4).
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Aa large variety of sects was most conducive to a peaceful civil society, and even to a 
sense of justice and political allegiance on behalf of persecuted immigrants coming 
to America. Jefferson’s version of beneficial religious pluralism was slightly differ­
ent. and much more optimistic. True religious spirit - Unitarianism rather than 
doctrinaire sectarianism - was compatible with, and eventually conducive to a spirit 
of tolerance and reflection.101
While Federalists either denied the importance of religion, or. as most often, 
believed it could be relied upon without illiberal and-counterproductive legislation. 
Anti-Federalists tended to stress not only that “without the prevalence of Christian 
piety, and morals, the best republican constitution can never save us from slavery 
and ruin", and that only religion was capable of rendering “the people a law unto 
fhemselues", but also that this entailed the need of “some superiour mode of educa­
tion" and other state measures of “publick protection of religion“, such as religious 
tests, in order to secure the quality of both “the patriotic civilian and [the] ruler”.102
In some of these writings, as in the state political cultures from which they 
emanated, Christian virtue was more like the enthusiasm that Jefferson and Madi­
son feared, i.e., a politicised religious martialism that re-reversed the Machiavellian 
vocabulary of virtue in manners that had already been seen in Puritan England. 
However, religious virtue could take on many forms. In some states, a fusion ap­
peared between Christian moral fervour and republicanism, with self-governing 
communities possessed of a holy cause which was both the practice and develop­
ment of virtue and the political conditions of being free to effect this. The practice of 
the jeremiads, calling for the renewal o f faith and old covenants, and the impact of 
the ‘Great Awakening’ around the middle of the eighteenth century could relatively 
smoothly fit the republican theme of return to beginnings.103 But also with regard 
to the language of religious virtue, the inherent ambiguity of its vocabulary was ob­
vious. The radical political meaning o f religion did not last long, and its impact, by 
the time of the constitutional convention, may be exaggerated.104 Already from the 
Calvinist perspectives of Adams, religion conceptualised the fallen nature of 
(American) men, their inherent susceptibility to blindness and pride, rather than 
their elevated stature and future mission in the New World. Corruption was con­
ceptualised as sinfulness, and what was called for, despite Adams’ occasional invo­
cation of American virtue, was also strong government machinery to save individu­
101. Madison to Jefferson, October 24, 1787, Republic o f Letters, I (p.502); Madison f
to Mordecai M. Noah, May 15, 1818, The Complete Madison (p.310) (but cp. discus- f
sion and contrary evidence in Vetterli & Bryner (1987:69); Jefferson, Notes on Vir- f
ginia, Query 17 and 18, Life and Writings (pp.272-78). (
102. Thmer (4.18.2); Letter by David (4.24.6); cp. Luther Martin (2.4.108) and A f
Friend to the Rights o f the People (4.23.3). i
103. VetterU & Bryner (1987:50-54). f
104. E.g., Vetterli & Bryner (1987:54). f
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■als from their own inherent depravities, and possibly aiding, marginally, their 
moral progress.105
In the consolidated republic, generally speaking, the political impulse of relig­
ion became less than radical, stressing the respect for secular authority, the inher­
ent weakness of human virtue and capacity for independence, even the more or 
less principled turning away from a political scene, which came to be seen as a 
tribune of (necessary) vice. And much of the less demanding language of Christian 
moral virtue, favoured by Jefferson, eventually dissolved into a language of private 
propriety.106
7 .3 . Autonomy
The third class of new virtues consisted of the high valuation of personal auton­
omy, but coupled with an emphasis on self-direction, control of one’s passions and 
immediate desires, and the voluntary performance of social duty. As evident al­
ready in Locke, the three types of virtue often went together and overlapped. Re­
flective self-restraint was tied to hard work and frugality. And both these virtues 
were easily combined with a universe of religious duty. But as acquisitiveness was 
capable of losing Its connection to socially beneficial and community-directed en­
terprise, liberal ideals of self-direction had no necessary connection with Christian 
morality, although, as noted, conventional understandings of the 'liberal’ eight­
eenth century vastly overestimates the degree to which a break had occurred at 
this early stage. Moreover, like the other virtues, also this category of character 
traits and dispositions could be given representations of differing political conse­
quence.
Education was seen as important by most of the American writers, although 
not by the more conservative Anti-Federalists. However, Jefferson, the father of the 
University of Virginia, assigned it the most prominent place. He wrote numerous 
letters to friends and the children of friends detailing advice on the proper election 
and division of subjects and literature, the manner of studying, and the prospective 
benefits of education. Education could provide “character on the mind", a capacity 
to reflect independently on every matter of science, nature, or religion (“Fix reason 
firmly in her seat, and call to her tribunal every fact, every opinion. Question even 
the existence of a God"). But even the, in this context, most classical of the Ameri­
can writers did not favour contemplation for its own sake. Knowledge and inde­
pendence of thought was necessary, as in Locke, in order to deliberately effect one’s 
own moral development, even one’s “comfort... in the moment of death". And it was 
most o f all a prerequisite for a life of useful, practical pursuits, contributing directly 
to the good of the community. Through education, he sermonised a nephew, it is
105. For Adams’ position, see Diggins (1986:74-99); but cp. Lemer (1979:235).
106. Kloppenberg (1987).
213
possible be “good, be learned, an be industrious”, and hence “render vou[rself] pre­
cious to your country, dear to your friends, happy within yourself.107
The values of autonomous reflection, personal responsibility, and pursuit of 
knowledge were often linked to social ‘usefulness’ of a general kind, depending 
upon one’s station in life. Jefferson often had in mind, for his young gentleman 
friends, administrative offices and legal careers. But the same values were also ca­
pable of assuming a distinctly civic guise. To Madison, it was certain that “a well- 
instructed people alone can be permanently a free people”. National institutions of 
learning would “enlighten ... the opinions [and] ... expand ... the patriotism” of 
those resorting to them, “sources of jealousy and prejudice would be diminished” 
and such institutions would “throw that light over the public mind which is the 
best security against crafty and dangerous encroachments on the public liberty". 
Jefferson, abhorred by French nobility’s exploitation of popular ignorance, consid­
ered “by far the most important bill in our whole code ... that for the diffusion of 
knowledge among the people”, the only “sure foundation ... for the preservation of 
freedom and happiness".108
In particular Jefferson’s conception of the citizen was an archtypical fusion of 
Enlightenment ideals of reflective individualism and earlier languages o f political 
self-government. Where traditional republican conceptions of civic virtue tended to 
stress more collective and spontaneous identifications with the common good and 
resistance of corruption, we now see two things. First, instrumentally speaking, 
while classical virtue tended to focus on will, determination, and habituation 
through practice, Jefferson’s stress on autonomy and individual exercise o f reason 
added to this the necessity of qualification, specific abilities, and education to vir­
tue, although still as something which had to be willed and mastered by the indi­
vidual, a Virtue’ that could be unlearned as well as learned. Moreover, if  classical 
citizens had to be ’independent’, this was more of a political than a moral and in­
tellectual notion - republican citizenship, despite Jefferson’s optimism, in some re­
spects had become more demanding.
Secondly, Jefferson’s thought marks an early high point in a distinctly political 
conception of liberal autonomy.109 It did so in two related ways. On the one hand,
107. Jefferson to Peter Carr, August 19, 1785 and August 10, 1787, Papers (8:406; 
12:15-18).
108. Madison. Second annual message, December 5, 1810; Madison to W.T. Barry, 
August 4, 1822, The Complete Madison (pp.313,316). Jefferson to Mr. Wythe, 
August 13, 1786 Papers (10:244). Cp. for Adams’ similar position, Lemer’s discus­
sion (1979:165).
109. Haakonssen (1991). Kloppenberg (1987:22) shows how the terms o f ’interest’, 
‘utility*, and ’happiness’, as used by Jefferson and contrary to the flattened nine­
teenth century moral vocabulary o f utilitarianism, assumes the understanding of 
everybody’s interest in becoming a good, reflective and responsible, person. See 
Jefferson to Peter Carr, August 19, 1785, Papers (8:405-408) and particularly Jef­
ferson to Thomas Law, June 13, 1814, Life and Writings (pp.637-40).
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political self-government - and more particularly (¿mired self-government - was not 
only conceptualised as the necessary format of liberty' that could hd America of 
British tyranny. Self-government was also seen as the way in which a morally ma­
ture people could ensure the requisite space to practice private and community 
based autonomy, reflecting upon and choosing their (true) religion: and ordering 
their own (properly benevolent) economic dealings. Although not all were equally 
capable of such autonomy, the ideal prompted Jefferson to stress that, in intellec­
tual and religious matters, before God. a person was “answerable, not for the right­
ness, but uprightness” of decisions taken. On the other hand, self-government was 
itself a vehicle for a collective form of autonomy. Here, the Joint exercise of every­
body’s natural and divinely sanctioned political rights was an outlet for the human 
capacity to understand and confirm the collective aspects of self-imposed restric­
tions. This aspect was all the more important in a universe where God had re­
treated more and more, leaving a degree of complexity and indeterminacy to all 
things political, where the people’s wisdom (at least their capacity to appreciate the 
wisdom of their elected leaders) was the only fountain of inputs to an open-ended 
constitutionalism.110
To the extent that republican self-government was ever a moral Value In itself. 
the origins of such ideas were relatively late additions. Old republican vocabulary 
certainly contained much approving reference to the dignity, health, and Independ­
ent character of self-governing peoples. But it was an early liberal and Protestant 
invention to associate the language of civic character with a moral premium on re­
flective self-legislation. This fusion of autonomy and political self-government was 
not long-lasting. Gradually relieved of Lockean and Christian concern for private 
salvation and objective social duty, ‘autonomy’ was to feed into the modem political 
culture of pluralism in America, a culture which placed independent value on each 
individual’s private choice to pursue a diversity of religious, intellectual, or eco­
nomic gratifications. Secondly, in the classical tradition, private property served to 
make people independent enough to be good citizens; but capitalist ideology came 
to invest economic activity as such with the moral dignity of independence, now 
understood as (market) self-sufficiency. Eventually, this ‘autonomy’ could become 
detached from both social benevolence and political duty, not least because of the 
difficulty of sustaining a moralised conception of political autonomy in an era of 
remote and routinised representative democracy.
7.4. A  New Vocabulary of Civic Virtue?
A great many languages of virtue came together at the time of the American 
Founding. I have not tried to determine their relative impacts. What has been dem­
onstrated is that the languages were not mutually exclusive (they often supported
110. Jefferson to Peter Carr, Papers (12:17).
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each other), and that each constituted a conceptual framework that could be put to 
a variety of uses. In particular, they could be employed in a more or less civic man­
ner. First, as private and social virtues, they were not incompatible with political 
conceptions of citizenship. The good father or son. the devote Christian who cared 
for his own faith and that of others and helped the needy, the responsible and en­
terprising businessman, all were figures whose activities could be represented as 
useful for society and essential for the country’s well-being. All of these ‘private’ 
and ‘social’ conceptions of worthy citizenship could, and were, assimilated to the 
republican rhetoric of corruption (sinfulness, licentiousness, sloth, wastefulness). 
However, they could also be linked to more political conceptions of virtue, giving it 
slightly new flavours, and adding (new) beneficiai character traits and motivations 
to ideas of the active and vigilant citizen and the wise ruler.
Generally speaking, although the virtuous citizen assumed new roles, it is a 
mistake to claim that the Americans dismissed the language of civic virtue. They 
certainly kept the language - although some of the theoretical understandings of 
the role of this virtue changed considerably. *Virtue\ indeed, had its possible 
meanings multiplied and could be employed in all the new settings of civil society 
where individuals legitimately pursued their happiness, with due regard to the in­
terests and rights of others.111 But to claim that the discourse of virtue in America 
was no longer civic would amount to denying the existence of ideals of individual 
dispositions and activities that were related to the preservation of common liberty 
in a direct sense, vis-à-vis authoritative political levels, and which stressed activity, 
involvement, identification, and judgement. Such ideals were still prominent, al­
though they were given different emphases and attributed different roles in politics 
by different writers.
It is possible to distinguish a number of different positions. Jefferson and Paine 
were the most optimistic, in the sense that their conceptions of citizenship required 
and expected the possibility o f widespread political participation, exercised in con­
stitutional deliberations with relatively short intervals; possibly in a demanding 
system of local ward democracy (Jefferson); and certainly in the constant, vigilant 
scrutiny and judgement of elected leaders. Jefferson’s hope was to maximise the 
“direct action” of citizens, to find a way to tap “the voice of the whole people” as 
“expressed, discussed, and decided by the common reason of the society”, and to 
“cherish the spirit of our people, and keep alive their attention” lest that their gov­
ernors “shall all become wolves". Both he and Paine had quite classical conceptions 
of patriotic willingness to sacrifice in wars and revolutions, and both accepted. Ma­
chiavellian style, the need for occasional tumulti Jefferson and Paine were joined in 
these ways by several of the more democratic Anti-Federalists, although most of
111. Vetterli & Bryner (1987:79),
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them were much more pessimistic and backward-looking, stressing the incompati­
bility of civic virtue with the new world.112
Hamilton, at the other extreme, represented a conservative, statist position, 
which reduced civic virtue to a circumscribed, rhetorically accepted, highly medi­
ated popular sovereignty. Civic virtue was only indirectly and weakly connected 
with the election of rulers. Apart from his lip service to the “spirit of patriotism" and 
“regard for those rights and liberties, in defence of which the people have fought 
and suffered” in the great national exertion of patriotic resistance to English rule, 
Hamilton’s civic virtue primarily consisted in law-abidingness, passive obedience, 
and habitual allegiance. Moreover, like Hume, he accepted the social usefulness of 
luxury and conspicuous consumption.113
Adams and Madison occupied middle positions. Adams was given to moods of 
Puritan despair and generally much less trusting of the capacities of ordinary peo­
ple than Jefferson.114 But although government to him was very much a way to 
control and repair the moral failings of fallen men, he also thought that a republi­
can government - including the monarchical type that he personally favoured - re­
quired a measure of virtue, indeed was doomed without it. Much of the virtue he 
had in mind had connotations of Christian morality and labour ethics.115 However, 
religious morality, important in itself, was also the "only foundation of a free Con­
stitution". Such “pure virtue" could not be "inspired into our people in a greater 
measure, than they have it now”, they will continue to "change their rulers, and the 
forms of government, but they will not obtain a lasting liberty". Adams was talking, 
here, of a popular capacity, aided by education of the lower classes, not only to 
obedience and moral conduct, but also to show good judgement in the exercise of 
political rights, once such rights had been granted.116
Madison, finally, developed a doctrine of the necessity to economise with virtue. 
We already noted his friendly disagreement with Jefferson’s assessment of the peo­
ple’s capacity to constantly renew the virtue and good judgement which was exer­
112. Jefferson to John Taylor, May 28, 1816; Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval, July 
12, 1816, Life and Writings (pp.670,676); see also Jefferson to Edward Carrington, 
January 16, 1787, Papers (11:48-49).
113. Hamilton, Speech to the New York State Ratifying Convention, Papers (5:44).
114. E.g., Adams, Defence, III, Letter 6, Eighth Argument (pp.325-34); Adams to 
Jefferson, May 19, 1821, “Must We. before We take our departure from this grand 
and beautiful! World, surrender all our hopes of the progress of Society", The Ad- 
ams-Jefferson Letters, III (p.572).
115. In one letter, Adams describes a “general emulation ... which causes good 
humous, sociability, good manners, and good morals in general. That elevation of 
sentiment, inspired by such a government, makes the common people brave and 
enterprising. That ambition which is inspired by it, makes them sober, industrious, 
and frugal”, cited from Lemer (1979:25).
116. Adams to Zabatiel Adams, 21 June , 1776, Adams Family Correspondence 
(2:21). But cp. Diggins (1986:69-99).
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cised in the debate on the constitution. Yet, as we shall see in the section below, it 
is inaccurate to present Madison's inter-constitutional periods as totally void of 
civic virtue, or, as claimed by Ball, characterised by the transformation of virtue 
from a civic disposition into a systemic property.117 Not only was institutional or­
ganisation of government positively aimed at recruiting the most virtuous leaders. 
Madison was also unwilling, unlike Hamilton and Hume, to assume the possibility 
of a self-moving constitutional machinery without virtuous citizens. Madisonian 
pluralism and institutional checks and balances were certainly main components 
in the eclipse of republicanism, but their originator was more cautious. He did be­
lieve, although in a more limited manner than Jefferson, that the "manly spirit** 
which was peculiar to America was somehow part of the “health of the soul", and 
those habits of independence, which were produced by republican political 
forms.118 In a dialogue with an (imagined) "Anti-republican", Madison maintained 
that “the people ought to be enlightened, to be awakened, to be united, that after 
establishing a government they should watch over it, as well as obey it". Most 
clearly, speaking to the Virginia ratifying convention, and criticising those who 
went to far in their political distrust, he announced that,
I go on this great republican principle, that the people will have virtue 
and intelligence to select men of virtue and wisdom. Is there no virtue 
among us? If there be not, we are in a wretched situation. No theoretical 
checks - no form of government can render us secure. To suppose that 
any form of government will secure liberty or happiness without any 
virtue in the people, is a chimerical idea. If there be sufficient virtue and 
intelligence in the community, it will be exercised in the selection of 
these men. So that we do not depend on their virtue, or put confidence 
in our rulers, but in the people who are to choose them119
The American tradition is often seen as marking a radical shift in the meaning of 
virtue, particularly when compared to classical Machiavellian conceptions.120 Evi­
dently, in light of the new vocabularies that were added to republican virtue dis­
course, there is some truth in this. The scope and content of virtue was widened. 
Yet, as regards the conception of civic virtue, the contrast is easily exaggerated. 
Differences regarded the degree of demand on the individual, rather than any sub­
stantially different requirement.
117. See Ackerman’s notion of 'normal politics’ and general discussion (Ackerman 
uses the term ‘economy of virtue*)!1991:165-99). Ball (1988:72).
118. Madison in the National Gazette, March 5, 1792, Papers (14:245).
119. Speech to the Virginia Convention, June 20, 1788: Madison, in National Ga­
zette, December 20, 1792, Papers (11:163, 14:426).
120. E.g., Ball (1988:47-79); Diggins (1986); Pangle (1988:62-111); Vetterli & Biyner 
(1987: 1-88).
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Some alleged contrasts can be dismissed relatively quickly, such as the familiar 
notion that classical virtue involved an ‘Aristotelian' conception of moral growth as 
its defining concern, whereas, (only} in America, virtue had become 'instrumen­
tal'.121 Also, if men like Madison. Adams, and some Anti-Federalists were afraid of 
the conduct of the masses, this should only remind us of other more conservative 
voices employing republican arguments, i.e.. Aristotle. Cicero, or Guicciardini. And 
if attention is drawn to the ‘realism’ of the principal founders, who were much in 
agreement in their low estimate of man’s capacity to transcend his lower impulses, 
it is worth recalling that classical writers with few exceptions were quite sanguine, 
and aware of the difficulty of creating and maintaining the institutions and cultural 
forms conducive to civic virtue. If anything, some of the puritan moralists were 
more optimistic, in their appeal to the golden rule.122 The qualitative difference only 
lies in the (lack of) willingness to adopt these measures, in denying their necessity, 
or in claiming the existence of (institutional) alternatives. Concluding the discus­
sion of civic virtue so far, two further points may be noted:
First, the significance of the increasing emphasis of (Christian) private virtue 
must be properly understood. We should not forget that Aristotle. Cicero, Machia- 
velli, and the latter’s British successors all recognised the importance of decent pri­
vate conduct, including honesty in business transactions, the willingness to mu­
tual assistance in everyday affairs, and particularly respect for law. A potential, 
more substantive difference lies in the tendency of some Puritans to regard private 
and social, particular congregational life as the originator of such virtue. Here, as 
also often in the Scottish moralists who were alienated from the remote, English 
state,123 the locus of socialisation (or corruption) became the institutions and hab­
its of more immediate circles of civil society. Identification with the larger, national 
community was essentially derived. Yet, this idea of civil society-centred civic virtue 
was not the dominant one. And it certainly coexisted, in America as in Scotland, 
with more classical conceptions of good citizenship as dependent upon, and di­
rected towards, the (federal) state, with its laws and political institutions. Another 
possible difference, but only to Machiavelli, concerns the relation between Christian 
and moral virtue and the demands of politics.124 Unlike Machiavelli, the Founders 
saw no conflict between the claims of politics and the virtues of Christian moral-
121. E.g., Pangle (1988:55-56,73); Sinopoli (1992:10-11.143,147).
122. Vetterli & Bryner (1987:74),
123. “The Scottish Enlightenment was dedicated to discovering methods by which 
a provincial culture could create forms of social virtue without having to rely on re­
publican political institutions unavailable to a province that was, like America, un­
comfortable with its status" (Kloppenberg 1987:17): cp. Vetterli & Bryner (1987:52). 
In Scotland as well as America the family, the church, and the local community 
had to compete with the new conceptions of a ‘civil* economic sphere.
124. Vetterli & Bryner (1987:51-52).
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ity.125 They were two faces to the same coin, and to many writers the former cru­
cially required and served to extend the force of the latter. Again, the conflict be­
tween morality and politics has been exaggerated. English Machiavellians like Har­
rington denied this part of the Master’s teaching. On the other hand, the Christian 
natural law persuasions of the founders did not prevent them from conceptualising 
statesmanship as a secular activity involving painful compromise, the severity of 
justice rather than charity, the complexity of political prudence, and the horror and 
occasional necessity of waging war.
A second contrast, often made,126 concerns the shift from martial, unruly, 
glory-seeking, narrow-minded civic virtue, to a cooler, deliberate, and moderate 
modem understanding. The impact of Montesquieu’s distinction between violent, 
selfless virtue in ancient republics and the modem monarchical principle o f mod­
eration was considerable, not least in Madison’s writings. Yet, much of this contrast 
reflects Enlightenment prejudices about the mde and uncivilised virtue of les an- 
ciens which hardly captures the diversity of classical ideals. In fact, moderation, 
one of the classical cardinal virtues, had come to refer to different things:
When moderation referred to a distaste for the pursuit of individual glory and 
recognition, there was indeed a contrast to some of the Greek and Renaissance 
ideals (but not to Cicero). On the other hand, neither Greek writers nor Machiavelli 
had any place for a glory which was not aimed at politically useful ends, such as 
the founding of states. Machiavelli, we saw, recognised that such satisfactions were 
only for the few. On the other hand, it is difficult to overlook the concern with hon­
our and distinction of figures like Hamilton or, in a different way, Madison or Jef­
ferson, both of whom were obsessed with their political testaments.127
Moderation also referred, in Madison, to a willingness to compromise, to accept 
that different interests must be accommodated, and that the unwavering pursuit of 
an inflexible ideal whatever the costs must be abandoned. This appeal to modera­
tion, also derived from Montesquieu and Hume, was held up as a contrast to clas­
sical republican zeal and ‘enthusiasm’. However, it had its real historical back­
ground in, and substantial bite against, the religious intolerance of European mon­
archies. In fact. Machiavelli^ famous rejection o f a via mezzo for the virtuous prince 
was coupled, we recall, with a dialectical understanding of reasoned compromise
125. Kloppenberg (1987:14).
126. E.g., Pangle (1988:89fl).
127. E.g., Hamilton’s reference to “love of fame” as a possible motive that “a virtu­
ous man might have for making sacrifice", cited in Mckee (1934:xx). See also Jef­
ferson’s speech to his constituency, after returning from his second presidency, 
which had “obtained for me the approbation o f my country". Having acted “on the 
theatre of public life", he now awaited the “sentence" o f the people, Jefferson to the 
Inhabitants of Albemarle County, Virginia, April 3, 1809; cp. Jefferson to Thomas 
Jefferson Randolph, November 24, 1808, Life and Writings (pp.593,596-97).
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between social forces which, in its spirit, was not so unlike Madisonian constitu­
tionalism.
A  more obvious contrast regarded the ‘moral sociology* of moderation. As we 
saw in the previous chapter, a main Enlightenment conceptualisation of modera­
tion as a character trait of ordinary citizens associated it with non-political, princi­
pally commercial activity. Where commercialism and riches in the classical tradi­
tion had been associated with untrustworthiness and lack o f moderation or ‘tem­
perance’. in the original sense of mastery of sensual appetites, it now came to de­
note regularity, calculation, cooling of passion, and self-control. But again Enlight­
enment cross-purposes stand in the way of remembering that Machiavelli^ accep­
tance of tumulti (with which, we recall, he revolutionised the republican tradition) 
was linked to distinctions between more or less civilised and disruptive political 
conflicts.
To the extent that this new conception of moderation as an essentially non- 
political virtue succeeded in presenting popular involvement in politics as the 
problem, and retreat to the market place and passive law-abiding as the solution, 
the main conceptual alternatives were shaped accordingly. Thus, men like 
Ferguson and Jefferson could dispute the causal correctness of Montesquieu’s and 
Hume’s analysis. Or they could point out the dangers of political cultures exclu­
sively based on urban and courtly vanity and conspicuous consumption, as com­
pared, not to martial fervour, but to the stout reliability of rural freeholders. Or, 
alternatively, they could accept as necessary the hazards and unruliness of un­
tamed popular vigilance.
But interestingly, in Jefferson there was also a different voice. Here, in a politi­
cal conception of civil society which may be seen as an extension of Ferguson’s 
views, moderation began to be transformed into an active, and democratic civic 
virtue of a new kind, to which the general public might aspire. Moderation and re­
straint was again associated with popular participation in politics, in two related 
ways. One was as a possible predicate of the good citizen, through proper educa­
tion, guidance, and experience with free government, including participation in ju ­
ries. Another concerned the outcome of reasoned, peaceful debate and polite re­
straint in the exchange of political opinions. A crucial distinction was made by Jef­
ferson, between such forms of participation which characterised the unruly mobs 
of the European cities, and those which could be found among more civilised 
American citizens.128 Although also classical citizens were occasionally depicted as 
capable of sound political judgement, Jefferson introduced a distinctly modem as­
sociation of civic virtue with a type of political reflection and debate which required
128. E.g., Jefferson to Thomas Jefferson Randolph, November 24, 1808, Life and 
Writings (pp.591-92,676,711); Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval, July 12, 1816; Jeffer­
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education, impartiality, and political tolerance. However, by raising the demands 
on the good democratic citizen in this manner, he also further paved the way for 
conservative voices that remained unconvinced of such popular capacities.
8. The Madisonian Science of Government
The title of this section reflects the commonly accepted premise that Madison's 
proposals in the field of constitutional architecture were designed to take any re­
maining human, civic virtue element out of politics. As already suggested, 1 do not 
think Madison went quite so far in the Humean direction. But his views did chal­
lenge what he saw as an unrealistic, even reckless degree o f reliance on democratic 
participation and popular capacity for political judgement in the programs of the 
Anti-Federalists. Moreover, his proposals were aimed at demonstrating the feasibil­
ity of a new scheme of government which required less civic virtue to function, in 
part because of its superior ability to channel and embody such virtue institution­
ally.
Madison had a strong hand in Philadelphia because of the difficulty of staying 
within the confines of the small republic argument. But as the great constitutional 
argument started to shift towards a national framework, also among the critics of 
the constitution, Madison’s various proposals for what he saw as a new ‘republi­
canism* met a set of principled rejoinders which, while largely ineffectual, came to 
define the terms of a remaining principled distrust of the new political order which 
never quite disappeared in America. We shall look at it as it surfaces, above all. in 
the last writer whose work we consider, Alexis de Tocqueville.
8.1. Consolidated Union
Different Anti-Federalists, as we saw. opposed the constitution on the grounds that 
a large republic would be unable to cater for local diversity effectively and Justly, 
would be incapable of generating voluntary allegiance and civic identification, and 
would jeopardise those local, participatory institutions, or that simple, rural or re­
ligious life, which were the essential seedbeds of civic virtue. However, the Feder­
alist case was rhetorically potent, because it started from the assumption that a 
consolidated, national union was necessary:
The difficulty of the small republic arguments was that many Anti-Federalists 
in fact did share the essentials of the very diagnosis with which Federalists argued 
that American liberty had to be pursued in a large state. Most people understood 
that a national political format was required to address some of the most pertinent 
dangers to this liberty, as these were hammered home in the Federalist Papers: the 
need to have a common defence against external enemies, the need to regulate in-
son to Monsieur A. Cray, October 31. 1823, Life and Writings (pp.591-92,676,711): 
Jefferson to Adams, October 28, 1813, The Adams-Jefferson Letters, II (pp.387-92).
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temal commerce and provide against state protectionist barriers and eventually 
their possible military rivalry, the need to facilitate the possibility of a degree (to 
Hamilton a high degree) of central taxation and spending on infrastructure and 
administration, and the need to deal with problems of law and order between and 
inside the states.
There were a few Anti-Federalists who denied the need for consolidation, 
maintaining that the dangers to liberty were exaggerated, and that wars were un­
likely, given America’s happy situation. To the extent there was a problem, some 
maintained, unwittingly undermining a main Anti-Federalist point about the local 
conditions of civic virtue, what was needed was more popular determination and 
patriotic zeal to help the young confederacy find its feet. Patriotic allegiance, it 
could be claimed, would be based on the common interests that did existed, such 
as commercial interdependence. But as most Anti-Federalists came to accept the 
need for ’consolidation*, the discussion shifted to questions of ‘how much* and 
’how*. The new point of departure of the Anti-Federalist critique, as shared in prin­
ciple by Jefferson, was the danger of tyranny, epitomised in the infamous ‘neces­
sary and proper* clause of the constitution, and elaborated in the detailed criti­
cisms of the Philadelphia document which are found in virtually every Anti- 
Federalist tract. The full spirit and content of Anti-Federalist fears are well repre­
sented by Brutus’ indictment of the federal legislative which was, capable, using 
this clause, of so exercising its power, as
to annihilate all the state governments, and reduce this country into a 
single government. And if they may do it, it is pretty certain that they will 
lasj ... the power retained by individual states, small as it is. will be a 
clog upon the wheels of the government of the United States; the latter 
therefore will be naturally inclined to remove it out of the way. Besides, it 
is a truth confirmed by the unerring experience of ages, that every man, 
invested with power, are ever disposed to increase it (...) [W]hat this 
constitution wants of being a complete government, possessed of perfect 
legislative, judicial, and executive powers ... it will necessarily acquire in 
its exercise and operation129 130
These sentiments, however, also signalled a certain ambiguity concerning power 
among many Anti-Federalists. On the one hand, they would grant, more or less ex­
plicitly, that some consolidation was necessary and that the original system was 
udefective and wanted amendment.™0 On the other hand, while accepting that
129. Brutus (2.9.9). See also Mason’s representative, brief summary of perceived 
dangers of all the new branches of government, the two houses, the president and 
vice president, and the judiciary (2.2.2-9).
130. Luther Martin (2.4.44); cp. Brutus (2.9.23, 2.9.65) and The Federal Farmer 
(2.8.75).
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“rulers are invested with powers’* in order to “protect the rights and promote the 
happiness of the people", they tended to be unwilling to grant much power at all to 
the national level, although a federal government, as stressed by the Federalists, 
was patently in need of authority and powers in order to function at all, for in­
stance as a final arbitrator in state controversies. At the same time, Anti- 
Federalists' power realism (the quasi-Hobbesian flavour of the above was typical) 
was not extended to the state level, where power, it was thought, would be checked 
by tighter and closer popular accountability.131
Madison essentially gave three responses to the problem of power and national 
consolidation, each of which is outlined below. All were premised on certain as­
sumptions about power and liberty: On the one hand, power and ‘energy* was 
needed for a government, federal or central, to do good in the first place, and the 
difficulty of generating enough power was as big as restraining it. On the other 
hand, once power uias consolidated, unless proper measures were taken to prevent 
it, wherever there was “an interest and power to do wrong, wrong will be generally 
done”. A science of government had to determine the necessary measure of power 
in different offices and at different jurisdictional levels, and provide the means to 
check its abuse and its erosion in these places. Moreover, in doing so, it had to 
dispense with the prejudice that only centralised power could be abused.132
8.2. Divided Sovereignty, Subsidiarity
Madison’s first response was directed towards fears o f the kind voiced by Brutus, 
that power would be gradually augmented at the national centre and drift away 
from the states, indeed that such a thing as divided sovereignty was inherently un­
stable133, so that “the two concurrent powers cannot exist long together; the one 
will destroy the other".134 A principled denial o f dividing sovereignty was obviously 
unstable, once it was granted that the original confederation could only be pre­
pared by granting some measure of overriding power to the centre, of however lim­
ited form and extent. Madison responded with what would be a doctrine of ’sub­
sidiarity', had the term been available to him. Thus, the jurisdiction of the union
is limited to certain enumerated objects, which concern all the members 
of the republic, but which are not to be attained by the seperate 
provisions of any. The subordinate governments, which can extend their
131. Brutus (2.3.9, 2.9.102).
132. Madison to Jefferson, October 17, 1788, Republic o f Letters, I (p.565); Feder­
alist no. 37 (p.243). See Storing (1981:29), and Hamilton’s sustained argument in 
Federalist no. 23.
133
134. George Mason (5.17).
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care to all those othe objects which can be seperately provided for. will 
retain their due authority and activity135
Anti-Federalists who had come to accept some measure of consolidation could not 
but accept this principle. The ensuing debate came to centre on accusations of art­
ful designs to provide for future centralisation of power; attacks on many specific 
powers as unnecessary and dangerous; and the need for states to retain the ability 
to keep house alone. Finally, the question of divided sovereignty did not only con­
cern which specific powers should properly be lodged where, but also how to con­
struct a division of power so as to adequately maintain a future federal equilib­
rium.136
Federalist no. 41-44 contain Madison’s detailed justification of specific powers 
vested in the national government. But Madison also directed a more principled 
point against the states making a fetish of historically contingent local sovereign­
ties. Once the necessity of some consolidation was granted, could it be that “the 
precious blood of thousands" had been spilt, not in order that
the people of America should enjoy peace, liberty, and safety, but that 
the governments of the individual states, that particular municipal 
establishments, might enjoy a certain power and be arrayed with certain 
dignities and attributes of sovereignty.
In 1787, Madison had little patience with Anti-Federalist fears, noting the "ten­
dency continually betraying itself in the members [the statesj to despoil the general 
government of its authorities, with a very ineffectual capacity in the latter to defend 
itself against the encroachments". Madison’s constitutional ideas on the division of 
federal and state authority eventually carried the day. However, later in his life, in 
the great struggle waged by Jefferson and himself against Hamilton’s plans for na­
tional consolidation in the fields of taxation, finance, banking, and foreign policy. 
Madison was to learn that Anti-Federalist reservations had not been entirely un­
founded.137
8 .2 . E n la rg in g  the *Sphere9
A  second part of Madison’s response, and the most famous one, effectively started 
by denying and reversing the most important aspect of the Anti-Federalist as­
sumption of the danger of power. Individual rights - of property and religious con­
sciousness - were much more likely to be jeopardised at the state level, and much
135. Federalist no. 14 (p. 143).
136. Federal Farmer (2.8.8-10); a [Pensylvanian] Farmer (3.14.6-21); Storing 
(1981:33-37).
137. Federalist no, 45 (p.293). On the disagreement with Hamilton, see Koch 
(1950:103-14,127-34).
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better protected in a consolidated representative government. To make this point. 
Madison developed his theory of political pluralism.
His principal point was that the danger of tyranny stemmed from majority rule 
as such, and not just from the sinister combination of big states into national ma­
jorities, infringing on the autonomy of smaller states. Madison challenged the tra­
ditional view, held by a great many Anti-Federalists as well as by Jefferson, that 
majorities of active citizens were the best and indeed the only safeguard of individ­
ual rights. To Madison, rights were also popularly contested and threatened. In 
particular the rights of conspicuous minorities (of wealth or religious persuasion) 
were likely to be violated because of the envy, greed, or religious intolerance of 
unjust majorities. Anti-Federalists, Madison pointed out, relied on a flawed equa­
tion of small size with homogeneity of “possessions, ... opinions, and ... pas­
sions".138
The solution was to “extend the sphere" of government, to adopt a new system 
of representation, and to recognise the great virtue o f what was at any rate a func­
tional necessity. The following central passage summarises Madison’s reasoning:
The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties 
and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, 
the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the 
smaller the number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller 
the compass within which they are placed, the more easily will they 
concert and execute their plans of oppression. Extend the sphere and 
you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less 
probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to 
invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it 
will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength and 
to act in unison with each other139
With this idea, Madison made two crucial moves. First, he initiated a radical 
transformation of the Enlightenment discourse on civil society. For important po­
litical purposes, man was to be taken as he was generally found. Whereas, in 
Ferguson, Smith, Jefferson, and many Anti-Federalists, a battle was fought over 
whether one or the other (political, social, or economic) human activity was more 
civilising, Madison’s position entailed that civil society should be no longer primar­
138. Federalist no. 10 (p.126; Madison to Jefferson, October 24, 1787, Republic of 
betters (p.501).
139. Federalist no. 10 (p.127). In a shrewd rhetorical move, Madison managed to 
claim that this frame of government was truly republican, and that the bad press 
the term had suffered could be accounted for by its faulty association with classical 
democratic forms (Federalist no. 14 (p.141); no. 39 (pp.254-55); cp. Jefferson to 
John Taylor, May 28, 1816 (pp.669-70).
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ily conceptualised as “a teacher, as a molder of character", but rather as “a regula­
tor of conduct".140
Madison did not reject the old language. Although more sanguine than Jeffer­
son. he also appealed to the value of agriculture and rural life.141 and. as we noted, 
expected sufficient degrees of virtue in the general population. Yet. quite apart from 
one-sided later receptions of his political theory, his new conception of civil society 
had become the more prominent. Indeed, it had come to constitute an answer to a 
problem which also he recognised: that the means to educate citizens in a large 
commercial republic were increasingly scarce, and that he, unlike Jefferson, was 
unprepared to do anything serious about this fact.
The second move implied in Madison’s new pluralism was to challenge the 
main stream Anti-Federalist conception of representation. In a republican perspec­
tive, this move was more positive, in the sense that it employed a language of virtue 
and the common good. The theme was endlessly reiterated in Anti-Federalist tracts. 
Often, representation was a second best solution, to be used where direct democ­
racy was impracticable. To the extent it was necessary, it ought to enable the full 
diversity and relative strength of opinions and interests to be reflected in the in­
stitutions of representation. Elections should be frequent, there ought to be many 
representatives, these representatives should be strictly and 'substantially* ac­
countable to their constituencies, and the creation of an elevated class of profes­
sional politicians should be avoided.142
Against the strict ‘mirror* view of representation, Madison argued that repre­
sentation was a positive opportunity, rather than a necessary evil. Under the rights 
circumstances, representation could serve to
refine and enlarge the public views by passing them through the medium 
of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true 
interest of their country and whose patriotism and love of justice will be 
least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations ... [T]he 
public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people, will be 
more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the people 
themselves
The right circumstances were a large republic, where the number of representatives 
was large enough to ensure against the corrupt "cabals of a few", yet small enough 
to “avoid the confusion and intemperance of a multitude", whose "passion never 
fails to wrest the scepter from reason". Also, where each representative had to court 
the favour of a numerically large constituency "it will be more difficult for unworthy
140. Storing (1981:47).
141. Madison, in National Gazette, March 5, 1792, Papers (14:244-46).
142. E.g., Cato (2.6.38); The Federal Farmer (2.8.95-98); Brutus (2.9.14); Aieloncton 
Smith (6.12.8-25). See also Kramnick (1987:441).
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1candidates to practice with success the vicious arts by which elections are too often 
carried”, and the people, exercising its suffrage would bestow their electoral favours 
on “men who possess the most attractive merit and the most diffusive and estab­
lished characters".143
In fact, Madison’s argument was complex. An important part of it appealed to 
the existence and likely mobilisation of the few with “enlightened views and virtu­
ous sentiments". But also other, systemic mechanisms favoured the common good. 
First of all, the mechanism of representation and accountability induced represen­
tatives to take the interests of their constituencies into account both on prudential 
grounds, as they would want to be re-elected, and because of a more ideal sense “of 
honour, of favour, of esteem ... which ... is some pledge for grateful and benevolent 
returns". Secondly, and deeper, Madison denied the premise that virtuous repre­
sentation, in the name of the common good, entailed virtual representation. Apart 
from the quality of specific representatives, and provided that the number of repre­
sentatives was kept low, preventing “the infirmities incident to collective meetings 
of the people", the mechanism itself facilitated those deliberative processes in the 
legislature which enabled this body to move beyond the fixed mandates on which 
Anti-Federalists would insist, but which Madison regarded as too narrow and paro­
chial to combine into a common interest. Finally, the pluralism of factions and in­
terest in civil society, which tended to check each other, preventing “the concert of 
... the secret wishes of an unjust and interested majority", also created a space of 
opportunity for a more ideal politics, with the most virtuous representatives taking 
the lead.144
Despite Madison’s new pluralist conception of civil society it is still unfair to 
accuse him of giving up virtue altogether. Virtue had to be there in a wisely choos­
ing people, in decent representatives, and in the features of the system, as it 
worked to exclude sinister and local concerns from the legislative process. Even so, 
Anti-Federalist reservations were obviously relevant. From whence would any re­
sidual popular virtue come, in a commercial capitalist, privatist society with noth­
ing to sustain such virtue, particularly if popular politics and elections were re­
duced to the competition of economic interest groups? And without such popular 
virtue and institutional outlets for it, could one really trust the idea of a filtering 
device, inducing representatives to seek the broader, informed general view, rather 
than bowing to the meanest common denominator of mass prejudice on the one 
hand, and secret, corporate lobbying on the other?
143. Federalist no. 10 (pp.126-27); no. 55 (p.336).
144. Federalist no. 10 (p.128); no. 57 (p.344); no. 58 (p.351). On the "natural aris­
tocracy" see Kramnick (1987:41f). See also, e.g., Afelancton Smith (6.12.16); Adams 
to Jefferson, August [14?], 1813, Jefferson to John Adams, October 28, 1813, Ad­
ams-Jefferson Letters, II (pp.365-66,388).
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8.3. \Internal Contro lsFrom Mixed to Complex Government
If the Anti-Federalists were sceptical of the small size and limited accountability of 
the representative body and feared the capacity of the people, through this body, to 
act as a counter weight against the designs of executive power, they also particu­
larly disliked the institutional organisation of the central government. The general 
view was that good government, apart from being accountable, had to be simple 
and transparent. It ought to be easy to detect the location of responsibility for poor 
legislation and abused power. More specifically, it was a prevalent view that the 
popular element, i.e., a single, large representative chamber ought to be strong 
relative to the executive. This was the simple government which was fit for an 
egalitarian, democratic society of freeholders.145
However, as some Anti-Federalists recognised,146 different orders of men were 
going to continue to exist, and in this situation it was best to revert to the older re­
publican idea of a mixed government consisting of three ‘natural’ orders of the 
many, the few, and the one. In such a mixed government, however, it was under­
stood that the popular element ought to be strong, relative to the ‘few’ of the natu­
ral aristocracy. Also some Anti-Federalists, but not all, favoured a strong president 
who was to be the trusted guardian of the general interest. Adams, presenting a 
more conservative version of the mixed government argument, had persuaded him­
self that the constitution managed to approximate this idea. Of course, in America 
there was no specific property requirement or other way to create a true upper 
house, and Adams’ ’balance’, it turned out, consisted of different classes of men 
being placed by the same mechanisms in the same representative body. By con­
trast, the typical Anti-Federalist view was that the plan “does not present a well 
balanced government”, because this body was too small to prevent aristocratic and 
oligarchic tendencies among the elected.147
Secondly, with reference to the authority of Montesquieu, simplicity and trans­
parency was also associated with a clear and ‘rational’ division of legislative, ex­
ecutive, and judicial functions. Also in this respect, the complex system of inter­
locking powers was seen to render the proposed new constitution deficient.148
Against these criticisms, Madison developed his doctrine of complex govern­
ment, the core of which is found in Federalist no. 51. He started from the same re­
alist analysis of interest, power, and human nature as in no. 10. Although it was to
145. “The highest responsibility is to be attained, in a simple structure of govern­
ment ... If you complicate the plan by various orders, the people will be perplexed 
and divided in their sentiments about the source of abuses or misconduct, some 
will impute it to the senate, others to the house of representatives, and so on"; 
Centinel (2.7.9). The following discussion follows Storing (1981:53-63). See also 
Kramnick (1987:47-45).
146. A particularly clear example is Afelancton Smith (6.12.17-18).
147. Adams, Defence, Vol. I, Letter 53 (p.363). The Federal Farmer (2.8.30, 2.8.97).
148. E.g., Gerry (2.1.2); Brutus (2.9.203-4).
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be hoped and expected that a number of adequately virtuous leaders would be 
elected and controlled by the good sense of the electorate, it was still the case that, 
while “dependence on the people“ remained “the primajy control on the govern­
ment ... experience has taught mankind the necessity of auxiliary precautions". 
This system.
of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defects of better motives 
[is ]... particularly displayed in all the subordinate distributions of power, 
where the constant aim is to divide and arrange the several offices in 
such a manner as that each may be a check on the other - that the 
private interests of every individual may be a sentinel over the public 
rights
Anti-Federalists too were in favour of governmental checks. But their notion of this 
mechanism was different, more traditionally influenced by Montesquieu. Just as 
different orders o f men had to check each other’s abuses of power (the people’s rep­
resentatives being trusted the most), so different government functions should 
counterbalance each other. However, they should do so by being separate, thus 
rendering it impossible for the holders of one type of power to enhance it with the 
help of another type. Madison’s view was different. Although it was “evident that 
each department should have a will o f its own; and ... have as little agency as pos­
sible in the appointment of the members of the other", Madison saw the best guar­
antee against abuse of power in any part of the government in enabling each of 
them to “resist encroachments of the others", by letting each partake in the func­
tions and powers of other parts. It was “by their mutual relations" that the various 
departments had “the means o f keeping each other in their proper places".149
Madison’s invention of governmental checks and balances, which not only en­
abled “the government to control the governed” but also “obligeldl it to control it- 
selF, was a land mark in constitutional and political theoiy, as yet another way to 
economise on virtue, particularly the virtue of rulers. By itself, and abstracting 
from other aspects of Madison’s vision, it was also one more nail in the republican 
coffin. A parallel to the received Mandeville-Smith idea of an economy of egoism 
and vice, which rendered politics all but redundant, Madison came to represent a 
vision of government as a machine of power, with complicated levers and springs, a 
perpetual motion machine which needed no (civic) input beyond the ever-present 
beastliness of men.150
Anti-Federalists remained sceptical about this overly theoretical idea.151 But 
they also suggested a different point. Madison clearly assumed that the particular
149. Federalist no. 51 (pp.318-20).
150. Federalist no. 51 (p.320).
151. Patrick Henry (5.6.14) argued that the proposed measures were “checks on 
paper ... inefficient and nugatory".
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complexity of the American constitution, as a result of political science, had noth­
ing sacredly democratic or republican about it per se, apart from its utilitarian su­
periority, which he thought time would “recommend ... to ... sincere and consider­
ate friends of republican government“. The legitimacy of the House of Representa­
tives or the Senate was derived from the (anticipated) constitutional expression of 
the will of the people - the will to adopt this particular experiment with “a judicious 
modification and mixture of the federal principle\ as it were. As pointed out by 
Ackerman, no particular institution embodied the Sovereignty of the People as 
such. Madison saw no problem in this. But Anti-Federalists suggested that this 
complicated governmental design was likely to alienate and confuse American citi­
zens, whose allegiance could not merely be expected to depend on the passive en­
joyment of a well-functioning machinery that delivered the goods.152 This type of 
concern was also manifest in the discussion over whether or not to have a Bill o f 
Rights in the new republic.
8.4. A  Bill o f Rights and Constitutional Patriotism
A main reason for the adoption of the new constitution was the Federalist agree­
ment to add to it a Bill of Rights. The need for a Bill of Rights was a recurrent 
theme in most of the major Anti-Federalist tracts. The eventual concession on this 
core point was a clever strategic move, making it virtually impossible for Anti- 
Federalists to shift the framework of discussion back to the level of the state. The 
debate is to complicated to be reviewed in any detail, but a few key differences of 
opinion between Madison and some Anti-Federalists are illuminating.
Standard Anti-Federalist themes included the need for constitutional protec­
tion of the personal liberties, including freedom of consciousness and religion, and 
the important right to trial by jury. The core of the Anti-Federalist fear was their 
anticipation of the new federal Leviathan which, despite artful divisions of sover­
eignty, was likely to overstep its bounds. Although the rights in question were 
those of Individuals, and while a Bill of Rights was seen to delimit the exact degree 
and nature of power that was alienated by individuals by the social compact, it was 
also typically associated with, and discussed in conjunction with, the rights of a 
people, in particular the populations of single states, to "reserve all their powers 
not expressly delegated", in particular in view of the dangerously general federal 
powers entailed by the new constitution.153 ‘Powers’ could refer to the individual 
executive right of nature against any government, but also, as by assumed impli­
cation. to the collective exercise of self-government in states. In the latter sense, a 
Bill o f Rights, while pertaining to individual legal subjects, was very much regarded 
as a state tool to resist central encroachments on the particular interests and lo-
152. Federalist no. 51 (pp,321-22); Ackerman (1991:181-86).
153. The Federal Farmer (2.8.196).
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cally specific (e.g., religious) habits of different parts of the Union. Hence also the 
stress on political rights, adequate representation, security against standing (fed­
eral) armies, liberty of the (local) press, and jury trial (protection against the unre­
sponsive federal system of justice).154
Madison's views on the matter corresponded to his ideas of pluralism. His main 
point, which struck a blow against some of his contemporaries, was the "impor­
tance in a republic not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rul­
ers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part”. The 
danger to individual liberty did not only, or even primarily, arise from a tyrannical 
state, but more often from democratic majorities. The large republic was to cure 
democracy from democratic ills. Thus, to the extent that Anti-Federalists thought a 
Bill of Rights was principally needed in a large, federal republic, he thought that 
they were falsely assuming individual rights to be safer in the states, because pro­
tected by vigilant popular rule.155
But Madison’s scepticism of democratic majorities did not divide the political 
camps so neatly. Hamilton was only one of several Federalists who asked what use 
there was of a Bill of Rights in a government where all powers emanated from the 
people, implying that abuses could not take place where "in strictness, the people 
surrender nothing; and as they retain eveiything they have no need of particular 
reservations". The crude belief that individual rights could not be jeopardised 
where the people had given its collective consent, was denounced, on the other 
hand, by Anti-Federalists like Agrippa. Even in a “government by ourselves ... the 
sober and industrious ... should be protected from the rapacity and violence of the 
vicious and idle". To this purpose, a Bill of Rights could “set forth the purposes for 
which the compact is made, and ... secure the minority against the usurpation and 
tyranny of the majority".156
In fact, Madison was far from complacent about individual liberty. But he saw 
the chief danger in the “mutability of the laws of the States", proposing, for this 
reason, an additional amendment during the Bill of Rights debate which expressly 
declared that no state should violate a series of rights, particularly the rights of 
consciousness. State intolerance, he told Jefferson, might obstruct an enlightened, 
authoritative definition of “the rights o f consciousness", which were likely to "be 
narrowed much more than they are likely to be by an assumed power".157
154. For a central statement, see The Federal Farmer (2.8.19-20; 2.8.196-203). Also 
Centinel (2.7.36-44). On the general debate, see Storing (1981:64-70).
155. Federalist no. 51 (p.321); cp. Madison to Jefferson, October 17, 1788, Republic 
o f Letters, I (p.564). See Banning (1988:126-30).
156. Agrippa (4.6.73).
157. Koch (1966:31); Madison to Jefferson, October 24, 1787; October 17, 1788, 
Republic o f Letters, 1 (pp.501,564).
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Madison had a point here. But Anti-Federalists convincingly argued that politi­
cal danger was increased simply by virtue of the accumulation of legislative power 
at the centre, so that “the greater the portion of political freedom in a form of gov­
ernment the greater the necessity of a bill of rights". To Brutus, as people in the 
forming of state constitutions had wished "that such declarations should make a 
part of their government" it was “the more astonishing, that this grand security ... 
is not to be found in this (the federal] constitution”. A Delegate Who Has Catched 
Cold deplored the absence in some states of clearly stated rights guarantees, yet 
regarded this as “additional reason" for a federal Bill of Rights.158
At a deeper level, Madison’s political realism prevented him from placing much 
confidence in the effective safe guard of a Bill of Rights in the first place. As he 
confided to Jefferson, “experience proves the inefficacy of a Bill of Rights on those 
occasions when its controul is most needed. Repeated violations of these parch­
ment barriers have been committed in every State”. This argument was more im­
portant than the formal constitutional point that powers not expressly delegated 
remained “reserved by the manner in which the federal powers are granted".159
However, the general world view of the Anti-Federalists also made them regard 
a Bill of Rights as a fragile and incomplete guarantee. However, the attempt ought 
to be made, not least in view of the vague all-purpose provisions of the new federal 
constitution. Eventually, Madison came to champion a Bill of Rights, in part be­
cause it was “anxiously desired by others", but also because it could “be of use". 
This was to some degree a concession to Jefferson. The latter had noted that weak 
or insufficiently liberal guarantees were better than no guarantees, that the unclear 
and general character of some of the constitutional provisions rendered the ‘re­
served rights’ argument useless, and that a codified text, despite its lack of real 
potency, was at any rate a helpful authoritative reference for the identification of 
abuses of power, whatever their location and origin. Madison, in fact, conceded 
that while it was generally the case “that the danger of oppression lies in the inter­
ested majorities of the people rather than in usurped acts of the Government, yet 
there may be occasions on which the evil may spring from the latter". Here, he 
granted, a Bill of Rights would be in order.160
In light of the weak, often theoretical and formal arguments produced against a 
Bill of Rights, its champions may have detected a degree of bad faith in their oppo­
nents. The scepticism of the likes of Hamilton was no doubt tied to fears that the 
document could be used by states or individuals to "distract attention from the 
business of doing the things that have to be done" to further the rights, happiness,
158. Brutus (2.9.25); A Delegate Who Has Catched Cold (5.9.14). A ¡Maryland]Farmer 
(5.1.15).
159. Madison to Jefferson, October 17, 1788, Republic o f Letters, I (p.564).
160. Koch (1950:56); Jefferson to Madison, 15 March 1789; Madison to Jefferson, 
October 17, 1788 [Republic o f Letters, I (pp.564-65,587-88).
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and natural prosperity which were the purposes of the union in the first place. As 
noted by Storing, this argument could have been decisively met with the rejoinder 
that the great purpose could only be realised with the ultimate support of the peo­
ple, and that a Bill of Rights served to mobilise and maintain this patriotism, and to 
give it the right direction, reminding the people what they had fought for, and 
should fight for still. Madison’s version of this view was modest in its hope that 
“political truths declared in that solemn manner ... as they become incorporated 
with the national sentiment, counteract the impulses o f interest and passion". To 
The Federal Farmer, a Bill of Rights might,
give existence, or at least establish in the minds o f the people truths and 
principles which they might never otherwise have thought of, or soon 
forgot. If a nation means its systems, religious or political, shall have du­
ration, it ought to recognize the leading principles of them in the front 
page of every family book. What is the usefulness of a truth in theory, 
unless it exists constantly in the minds of the people, and have their as­
sent
A Bill of Rights could inspire to civic virtue and popular allegiance in a way that the 
complicated details of the constitution could not. It could remind individuals of the 
rational content of their patriotism, “be the first lesson of young citizens", “sustain 
the dignity of their being", inspire “the envy and admiration of all Europe", and 
promote “considerable emigration". It enabled the republic to return to its sacred 
beginnings in common acts of deliberate remembrance:
Men ... do not remain free, merely because they are entitled to natural 
and unalienable rights ... because their ancestors once got together and 
enumerated them on paper, but because, by repeated négociations and 
declarations, all parties are brought to realize them, and ... to believe 
them to be sacred161
9. The Eclipse of American Republicanism
According to Storing, the Anti-Federalist project (or projects) failed to reconcile 
contradictory aspirations:
They did not fail to see the opportunity for American nationhood that the 
Federalists seized so gloriously, but they could not join in grasping it.
They doubted; they held back; they urged second thoughts (...) The Anti- 
Federalists were committed to both union and the states; to both the
161. Madison to Jefferson, October 17, 1788, The Republic o f Letters, III (p.565); 
The Federal Farmer (2.8.197); A Delegate Who Has Catched Cold (5.19.16).
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great American republic and the small, self-governing community; to 
both commerce and civic virtue; to both private gain and public good162
The Federalist side ‘won’ the debate, in the sense that its authors were willing, even 
enthusiastic, to adopt a framework of politics which presupposed as inevitable and 
desirable, a new political reality of nation-wide commerce, administrative, legisla­
tive, judicial, and executive centralisation and homogenisation, even America’s rise 
to the status of a world power. The Federalists were also willing to contemplate, in 
a constructive, rather than nostalgically lamenting fashion, that civic virtue could 
not be expected to emerge in the quantities presupposed by some, more classical 
authors, and that additional means had to be invented to secure liberty in a large 
state. Anti-Federalist positions, by contrast, were unconstructive, in the sense that 
few confronted their republican preconceptions with the consequences of their own 
growing acceptance of the inevitability of the Union. No new syntheses were at­
tempted.
Even so, the constitutional aftermath showed that Anti-Federalists fears were 
not unfounded. Madison and Jefferson lived to see the early beginnings of nine­
teenth century corporate capitalism, the rise of a national bank, and other Hamil­
tonian schemes about which they had voiced so many reservations. As presidents, 
they fought battles against Hamilton’s Federalist Party which were, in the long run, 
not only unsuccessful, but often unrealistically backward-looking in their assump­
tions about political economy and the role of the state. Also, both of the two were 
forced by circumstance to revise substantially their ideas about taxation, foreign 
policy, and public finance.163 Eventually, it was Hamilton’s schemes of administra­
tive centralisation and modernisation which facilitated whatever degree of capitalist 
regulation, economic redistribution, and welfare state integration, which came to 
exist in America - not Jefferson's ideals of an egalitarian freeholder’s democracy.164
While, in many ways, the Anti-Federalists were even more unrealistic about 
America’s future, they did make crucial points. Although no feasible solutions were 
offered, Anti-Federalists "had reasons, and the reasons had weight’’. One set of rea­
sons consisted in profound doubts that any political architecture, however ingen­
ious its checks and balances, could exist without a substantial degree of civic vir­
tue, or, alternatively, could be made to rely on a residual pool of virtue of obscure 
and postulated origin.165
Also, while the need for centralisation and political enlargement was eventually 
granted, Anti-Federalists continued to stress dangers which were ignored by Madi­
son’s subsidiarity and countervailing factions arguments. If Madison’s republican 
problematic was the constitution of libertas through the large, federal union, Anti-
162. Storing (1981:6).
163. Koch (1950:212-59).
164. Kapstein (1997).
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Federalists pointed to the many new dangers to libertas of an unaccountable, re­
mote elite of power welders with oligarchic ambitions, equipped with immense new 
authorities. They would stress, in manners that were not only parochial and egois­
tic, that many liberties had to be constituted and secured locally. They claimed that 
no adequate account had been made of how to generate and focus a national politi­
cal identification, which could combine and transcend local differences and create 
adequate motivations to allegiance - and not merely the passive and habitual ac­
quiescence of happy subjects.
Jefferson remained true to his sophisticated statement of the radical constitu­
tional self-government theme, which was prominent also among Anti-Federalists, 
i.e., his belief that ‘the earth belongs to the living’. Whatever the force of Madison’s 
theoretical and practical refutation, the latter’s position and cautious provisions for 
constitutional innovation were arguably too conservative. Constitutional revisions 
were soon necessary, given the new economical, social, and political circumstances 
of corporate monopoly, civil war, slave emancipation, and economic depression. 
Yet, such revision were not facilitated by broad constitutional debates, but through 
the remote and undemocratic institution of judicial review, subject to the contin­
gent quality of particular supreme justices.165 66
Madison’s democracy-sceptical temper was less adverse to the republican tra­
dition than sometimes believed. That tradition, we have seen, always also had its 
more conservative voices, and even Machiavelli’s praise of tumulti was qualified, and 
linked to a relatively low opinion of the capacities of the common man. If Jefferson’s 
populism often lacked this darker republican aspect, Madison may have erred in a 
Humean direction by failing to realise just how much the cat was out of the bag in 
democratic America. With Jefferson, he championed civic (self) improvement 
through education. But he was unwilling to contemplate truly democratic solutions 
to a democratic predicament, i.e., the creation and maintenance of some sort of 
participatory political culture.
We examined at some length the manners in which the languages of virtue and 
legitimate human activity underwent a process of diversification. To some extent, 
new ideals coexisted with, as well as deepened and widened available conceptions 
of the good citizen and the common good. But the ambiguities and tensions of each 
vocabulary could also point in uncivic directions. Thus, while new conceptions of 
individualism and inalienable natural rights were not originally in conflict with re­
publican conceptions of citizenship, this state of affairs did not last. In a certain 
sense, it is probably the case that "liberalism ... was the outcome of the search for a
165. Storing (1981:6).
166. Since then, the rather conservative institution of judicial review has been 
praised by several liberal American theorists who postulate, a connection between 
its deliberations and popular processes of mobilisation and legitimation, e.g., Ma- 
cedo (1990); Ackerman (1991).
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rights theory, not the cause of it", if by ‘liberalism’, here, we have in mind doctrines 
which are individualist in a theoretically ‘fundamentalist’ manner:167
First, ‘inalienable rights’ were eventually capable of being disassociated from 
conceptions of moral duty. Christian ideas of personhood and divine intention, and 
Scottish conceptions of innate moral sense and natural jurisprudence. The next 
centuries saw the rise of a truly ’possessive’ individualist ideology in America which 
was tied to radical ideas of self-ownership, just acquisition, and transfer of prop­
erty. but not necessarily to any right of the poor to survive. Quite unlike those of 
Madison, let alone Jefferson, these doctrines were functionally tailored to a new 
type of laissez faire society. Here, ‘self-interest’ could lose connotations of concern 
with one’s own moral character, and become an argument against the rationality, 
or the realistic anticipation, of public-regarding dispositions and behaviour. This, 
in turn, was facilitated by a new political economy, selectively sampled from Smith, 
and systematised by Ricardo, the British utilitarians, and Spencer, which viewed 
naked self-interest as a necessary motivating force, and which saw the common 
good as an evolving product of unintended consequences, rendering virtue redun­
dant. To this economic liberalism or libertarianism, the state of nature metaphor 
could represent a vision of the market without a regulator state, rather than a pre- 
civil state of anarchy without common liberty. The state, here, was a mere pruden­
tial device, put in place by self-sufficient, free contractors for the sake of the en­
forcement of contract.16®
Secondly, by contrast to the crude psychological reductionism of this capitalist 
ideology, the ‘other’ liberal individualism,169 which derived from Locke’s moral ra­
tionalism and the Enlightenment value of autonomy, contained a different poten­
tial. In Jefferson, individualism could be linked, via the appreciation of moral and 
political complexity and man’s fallen nature, to a conception of collective self- 
government which was both a privilege and a duty. Granted by a remote deity, it 
required the employment of every man’s moral agency and capacity for reason, to 
define along with those others which belonged, at any one time, to *the living’, the 
best possible way to order collective affairs. This morally infused populism did not 
disappear in America. Yet, the idea of basing political morality on collectively self- 
imposed obligation could eventually become married to a rationalist reconstruction 
of political jurisprudence, an impulse which we now associate with philosophers 
like Rawls and Dworkin. Moreover, in America’s professionalized political world, the 
value of individual autonomy was soon more likely to assume private forms. The 
importance of independence and individual choice became conceptualised in con­
nection with a variety of cultural, religious, and aesthetic pursuits, i.e., the radical 
American affirmation of the right to find one's own peculiar mode of happiness. In
167. Haakonson (1991).
168. Kloppenberg (1987:19,27-29); Hont & Ignatieff (1983); Bellamy (1992:9-21).
169. For the distinction, see Dunn (1993b:35-36).
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the nineteenth century, this became an anti-political impulse, in the transcenden­
talism principled privatism of Emmerson and Thoreau.170
Finally, the language of religious individualism, which was momentarily fused 
with Anti-Federalist republicanism, changed also. In America, religion came to 
mean different things. Its radical potential surfaced in Lincoln, in the rhetoric of 
nineteenth century labour leaders, and in the civil rights movements of the sixties. 
More often, it became part of America's (ethnic) pluralism, as a vehicle of seg­
mented group identities and belonging. As such, it served and may still serve as a 
source of local moral integration, constituting a brake on competitive individual­
ism. But another, recently more visible ideological tendency, articulated by 
spokesmen of the Bible Belt Moral Majority, takes religious virtue in different, fun­
damentalist directions, which stress strict private morality, intolerance of multi­
ethnicity and cultural pluralism, respect for authority, and a political program, not 
of toleration and religious freedom, but of school prayer, anti-abortion, and ‘moral’ 
political office. In the neo-conservative Christian revival, the old schism between 
commercialism and religious virtue, of how to “follow Jesus with your pockets full", 
largely disappeared. Protestant Christianity, capable, at times, of generating social 
indignation and guilt, could also conceptualise one’s duty to God and neighbours 
as a council for leaving these neighbours alone to pursue their necessarily individ­
ual temporal salvation, recognising economic rewards as the product of individual 
desert, and hardship as self-inflicted.171
The thread of American republicanism ends here. This is not to say that no re­
publican manifestations might be traced in American thought since then. Albert 
Lincoln, to take a prominent example, employed republican arguments in his ap­
peal to national unity after the Civil War. In this century, republican themes may 
be found in writers from John Dewey to Robert Dahl. However, the most interesting 
and pro-foundly innovating modem republican observer was not American, al­
though America was his subject of inquiry.
170. Thoreau, Walden (pp.212-21); Diggins (1986:192-229); Kateb (1989); Rosenblum 
(1987).
171. Bellah et al (1985:219-49); Diggins (1986:334-36); Marsden (1990:388-89).
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Chapter  6:
T o c q u e v ille : R epublicanism  in Democratic So ciety
1. Introduction
The last pages of this particular history book of republican thought belong to Alexis 
de Tocqueville. His work is highly important for a number of reasons. Several of the 
points he made may be read as a critique of the federalist assumptions that allowed 
men like Madison to believe they had invented a more viable new republicanism, 
more realistically suitable for a new age, with its new men. and new democratic 
dangers. Many of these assumptions, in Tocquevilles eyes, seemed dangerously 
mistaken. Indeed, his reasons for admiring America and believing in its ability to 
secure a new democratically constituted liberty were altogether different from those 
of Madison. Tocqueville’s vision was important because he shared many of the fears 
and premonitions of the more conservative founders and even deepened their con­
ceptions of the dangers of the new democratic civil society. Yet. he managed to em­
ploy these fears to develop a distinctly modem, pluralist, and forward-looking re­
publican analysis. We might say, on the one hand, that Tocqueville dismissed 
Rousseau’s version of republican Ubertos and republican solutions as historically 
irrelevant in terms of their material preconditions and as part of the very problem 
of liberty in a democratic world. On the other hand, he also implicitly dismissed the 
analyses of conservatives and moderates like Hume, Hamilton. Adams, and even 
Madison for failing to take seriously that the dangers of democratic society had to 
be met by guiding the democratic impetus to beneficial ends. I have no intention of 
offering a comprehensive discussion of Tocqueville’s complex political thought.1 
Our focus is determined by our treatment of the American tradition and its failings, 
and by some of the themes of the liberal Enlightenment, to both of which 
Tocqueville may be seen to react.
2. Tocqueville’s Pears and Hopes
Tocqueville was an aristocrat who looked with great concern upon the contempo­
rary social and political condition of his native France. He and the remaining mem­
bers of his class had witnessed revolutionary Jacobinism run its course and were 
still anxiously aware of anti-aristocratic sentiments. With the ancien régime a whole 
world of value had disappeared. This, to Tocqueville, was a world of stable, hierar­
chical social texture and settled tradition which facilitated social responsibility, co­
hesion and spontaneous solidarity across classes, as well as respect for learning 
and intellectual authority. At the time one indeed “found inequality and wretched­
1. A very good introduction to Tocqueville remains Lively (1962).
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ness in society, but men's souls were not degraded thereby".23 Tocqueville. how­
ever, was not a nostalgic, and, like Guizot, Constant, and de Stael, with whose 
Protestant moral egalitarianism he identified,* 4 he was perfectly aware of the injus­
tices of feudal society. Indeed, Tocqueville also shared with these Doctrinaires. who 
dominated political debate in the aftermath of the fall of Napoleon and who opposed 
attempts of the ultra-royalists to turn back the political clock, the notion that the 
revolution, despite its devastating consequences, signalled the beginning of a great 
new era. This development, analysed at length by Tocqueville in his last, unfinished 
work,5 was central to his thought from the beginning:
A great democratic revolution is taking place in our midst: everybody 
sees it, but by no means everybody judges it in the same way. Some ... 
supposing it an accident, hope that they can still check it
Tocqueville himself belonged to those who thought it “irresistible". Indeed,
the gradual progress of equality is something fated. The main features of 
this process are the following: it is universal and permanent, it is daily 
passing beyond human control, and every event and every man helps it 
along
This process, according to Tocqueville, “it would be neither desirable nor wise to try 
to combat".6
The main elements of this world-historical process which was unfolding in 
Europe, and which had begun earlier in the New World, were laid out in the long 
Introduction to the first volume of Democracy. The power bases and the adminis­
trative and economic structures of feudal society had been eroding since the birth 
of the cities, with early commercial capitalism and the possibility of escaping feudal 
tenure. The market economy introduced a division of labour and the possibility of 
diversified consumption in the new middle class, which became a competitor to the 
traditional nobility. A quest was provoked, led by the new group of lawyers, for legal 
regularity and equality, as “men’s relations with each other became more numer­
ous and complicated". The church became a new avenue of upward mobility, while 
Protestant religion taught universal equality before God. Secular learning and the 
arts became a fountain of new powers and wealth and constituted evidence of “the 
natural greatness of man", while printing and regular post facilitated the diffusion
2. Democracy in America, I: Introduction (p. 14).
4. See Siedentop (1994:20-40).
5. E.g., "the Revolution introduced fewer innovations than has been generally 
supposed (...) i t ... was the mere natural result of very long labours, the sudden and 
violent termination of a task which had successively engaged ten generations of 
men" (Tocqueville, The Ancien Regime, 1.5).
6. Democracy, I: Introduction; II: Preface (pp.9,12,417-18).
240
of knowledge. The rise of the commons to political power was initiated by the rela­
tively democratic municipal institutions, and furthered by monarchs “at pains to 
level everyone below the throne".7
All these material, technological, and intellectual elements of equality of condi­
tions were associated with two equally inevitable developments, both of which in 
their several manifestations were to occupy Tocqueville’s thought throughout his 
life. One was the gradual development of a democratic culture, with individuals con­
sidering themselves to be of equal worth and deserving of the same social status. 
The second, which was a dual outcome of the weakening and eventual destruction 
of local nobility and, later, of the inherent logic of democratic politics, was a move­
ment towards administrative centralisation and bureaucratisation.
If Tocqueville thought these developments were inevitable, their happy conclu­
sion was not. He did not share any of the great liberal Enlightenment narratives of 
progress and rationalisation. As against state of nature theory and natural rights, 
Tocqueville and the French liberals regarded equal rights, despite their conformity 
to God’s intentions, as the product of a historical and geographically variable social 
condition, rather than as ahistorical categories. Against the individualist idea of the 
political community as a body of rational, natural individuals, associated through a 
static relation of vertical, representative consent and trust, Tocqueville stressed 
this relation as a potentially dangerous structural weakness of democratic society, 
which had to be remedied by some form of mediating device between citizens and 
rulers.
By contrast to the progress theories of the Scottish Enlightenment, which 
linked the development of social, legal, political, and even cultural forms to modes 
of subsistence, Tocqueville added to this materialist and economical focus a socio­
logical concern with democratic beliefs and norms whose content were bound to 
have important effects on both political culture and political institutions. We recall 
that, while for instance Adam Smith was ambivalent about modem alienation, 
vanity, and over-specialisation, he shared with Hume and Montesquieu a relatively 
optimistic idea of market man, busy with his commercial pursuits, who would ha­
bitually submit to established authority, given the right constitutional design 
(Hume). By contrast, Tocqueville placed much more emphasis on the importance 
for both stable political institutions and for economic prosperity of the contingent 
and volatile character of political culture, legitimation, and moers in the population, 
thus adding a dynamic element to the latter concept which was not there in the 
work of Montesquieu.
Finally, in contrast to optimistic philosophes such as Condorcet, whose belief in 
the possibility of free and rational action he certainly shared, Tocqueville also 
stressed the ambiguity of Enlightenment and the many ways that social and moral
7. Tocqueville, Democracy, I: Introduction (pp. 9-15); Zetterholm (1988).
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equality might not facilitate an increase in social rationality, fellow feeling, and 
spontaneous moral conduct, but might instead bring new forms of intolerance, 
egoism, and unreason.
These contrasts explain why Tocqueville, in the face of what he saw as inevita­
ble. was haunted by "a kind of religious dread" as he beheld the rise of democracy. 
Democratic society, the outcome of social levelling, was both a great danger and a 
historical possibility - the solemn background for momentous political choice. In 
Democracy, Tocqueville started by noting how in France and elsewhere social level­
ling had done away with traditional authority without installing respect for law in 
its place: it had created a potentially tyrannical, unchecked, and bureaucratic po­
litical power in the state; it had led to envy and fear between classes: and it en­
tailed loss of belief, virtue, and devotion without diminishing prejudice, ignorance, 
and egotism. Such ills, along with disrespect for learning, social conformism, apa­
thy, lack of political will, and disappearance of any focus of national unity and soli­
darity, all constituted the grave agenda that modem countries were facing. While 
Tocqueville accepted that what once was had gone forever, indeed that it would be 
against the will of God to try to bring it back, he also realised that God had left no 
instructions to ensure success. Completely new terms of analysis were required to 
understand this new predicament, hence Tocqueville’s famous "new political sci­
ence ... for a world itself new". Yet, although he stressed the dangers of equality8 
and thought that while “our fate is in our hands ... soon it may pass beyond con­
trol”, he also believed that possibilities existed of finding "elements ... mitigating its 
vices" and bringing out “its natural good points". What was needed was to effect 
“those changes in laws, ideas, customs, and mores" which were needed to secure 
the potential benefits of democracy. “After the battle comes the lawgiver", and the 
duty of politicians and commentators like Tocqueville himself was,
to educate democracy; to put ... new life into its beliefs; to purify its 
mores; to control its actions; gradually to substitute understanding of 
statecraft for present inexperience and knowledge of its true interests for 
blind instincts; to adapt government to the needs of time and place; and 
to modify it as men and circumstances require9
Tocqueville stood apart from his contemporaries, including much more optimistic 
liberals like Constant, by virtue of his radical understanding of the ambiguity of 
democracy. What was needed, and what needed nurturing and could not be as­
sumed to develop with social levelling as such, were the right type of democratic 
mores, i.e., mores based on social pluralism, public debate, and cooperative citi­
zenship. Also Constant had discussed the danger of centralisation, and had added
8. Lively (1962:240f).
9. Tocqueville, Democracy, I: Preface to the Twelfth Edition; Introduction (pp. 
xiv,12-13).
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to his praise of a British style representative government the need for an interme­
diary level of local administration, or what he called a "new federalism".10 
Tocqueville added to this a darker analysis of the way that centralisation was posi­
tively furthered by features inherent in democracy which could only be countered 
by a political organisation of civil society, i.e., by the existence of associations. And 
he added a sustained analysis of a political civil society,11 which may be seen to 
take up embryonic elements of Jefferson’s and Ferguson’s republicanism.
The reason for Tocqueville’s hope that democracy's promise could be rescued 
was his discovery of America. Here, despite the fact that equality of condition had 
almost reached its limits, demonstrating the shape of things to come in Europe, 
and despite the fact that Tocqueville remained ambiguous about many things that 
he found on his and Beaumont’s journey to The New World,12 it seemed that each 
democratic predicament - each way that democracy generated threats to a new 
democratic liberty - had found benign solutions. While many of these were linked 
to the peculiar and happy geographical and economic circumstances of America 
which prevented their easy translation to European, and particularly to French 
conditions, Tocqueville made it clear that he “sought there lessons from which we 
might profit".13
The following section is about the particular flavour which Tocqueville gave to 
republican libertas, the supreme value that had to be protected from and realised 
through democracy. After this, to appreciate the answers, found by Tocqueville in 
America, we look at each of the most important dangers to liberty that he associ­
ated with democracy, dangers which were also promises. Finally, we turn to 
Tocqueville’s solution, as found in the various elements of a politically conceptual­
ised civil society.
3. Liberty
Tocqueville’s liberty, never formally defined, was clearly republican. However, its 
very richness, its additional aristocratic and moral elements, and the distinct man­
ner in which he linked negative and positive aspects, makes it necessary to look at 
it in some detail.14
10. Constant, Principles o f Politics, 12.
11. Tocqueville occasionally used the term "political society" to refer to civil soci­
ety in its political aspect, i.e., political culture or political, democratic mores (e.g., 
Tocqueville, Democracy, 1:1,9 (p.290).
12. Some of which, he said, “saddens and chills me", tempting him to “regret that 
state of society which has seased to be", and to “concentrate on the pleasure of 
contemplating" this state. Yet, "this pleasure arose from my weakness", i.e., as 
compared to “the Almighty ... whose gaze of necessity includes the whole of created 
things" (Tocqueville, Democracy, 11:11,8, p.704).
13. Tocqueville, Democracy, I: Introduction (p. 18).
14. Tocqueville’s use of the concept is excellently and thoroughly analysed by 
Lively (1962: 8-22,219-28).
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Tocqueville’s basic understanding of the liberty that he himself treasured above 
all other values, and whose precarious modem fate he analysed, was negative. As 
in Montesquieu and Machiavelli, the value of this liberty was associated with the 
possibility of enjoying a private sanctity from trespassings on oneself, one’s family, 
one’s "comfort” and “wealth”, and with the subjective feeling of security in enjoying 
one’s rights, whatever they be.15 Liberty was first of all the legal protection of rea­
sonable areas of unimpeded private activity - as opposed to unreasonable license, 
or what Tocqueville often called “independence", which was unregulated by any 
authority. This, Tocqueville approvingly quoted Governor Winthrop for saying, 
would be “a liberty of a corrupt nature, which is affected by men and beasts to do 
what they list ... impatient of all restraint", as opposed to “a civil, a moral, a federal 
liberty, which is the proper end and object of authority ... a liberty for that which is 
just and good ... maintained in a way by subjection to authority”.16 What the Ameri­
cans had discovered was “a mature and thoughtful taste for freedom (...) Not disor­
derly passions drove it on; on the contrary, it proceeded hand in hand with a love 
of order and legality". Indeed, “(njo one in the United States has pretended that, in 
a free country, a man has a right to do everything".17
However, Tocqueville certainly did not equate liberty with either security or 
authority. He made a point of noting that, although legal regularity and respect for 
law could only be had with a level of security, and although one of liberty’s main 
fruits was the enjoyment of the former, a free society inevitably entailed a degree o f 
tumult and conflict and the very quest for absolute security was a democratic dis­
ease that jeopardised liberty.18
Also, liberty was not the same as authority, in the sense of existence of 
authoritative rule of law {“pronouncements of the law ... categorical") and defined 
administrative powers. In particular, liberty was not simply equated with popular 
authority or collective, democratic sovereignty, although Tocqueville took some 
steps in this direction. Authority was certainly necessary for liberty, although in 
Europe some said that “to weaken authority ... is ... equivalent to establishing lib­
erty". Instead, Tocqueville said, it was possible to keep authority and its beneficial 
effects while “diminishing" its influence, namely by “sharing authority". However, 
although Tocqueville here seems to move towards a Rousseauan idea of liberty as 
having a share in collective self-government (which, we remember, was only a part 
of Rousseau’s view), it is important to note how his conception differed:19
15. Tocqueville, Ancien Régime, 15 (p.134). Also, Tocqueville spoke of the moti­
vating power of “having some rights and being sure of the enjoyment of those 
rights", Tocqueville, Democracy, I:Introduction (p.14).
16. Tocqueville, Democracy, 1:1,5 (pp.46,72).
17. Tocqueville, Democracy, 1:1,5 (p.72).
18. Lively (1962:20-23).
19. Tocqueville, Democracy, 1:1,5 (p.72).
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Tocqueville, like Constant and other post-revolutionary liberals, was quite 
aware that collective decision-making and exercise of power, the ‘liberty of the an­
cients’, often jeopardised private liberty rights. Indeed the master theme in Democ­
racy of equality threatening liberty was watered from the same fountains as Con­
stant’s distinction. But this did not prevent Tocqueville from still talking of liberty’, 
not always with the prefix ‘political’, in the sense of participation in political self- 
government.20 It was not just that Tocqueville confused liberty with (political) 
equality or occasionally forgot his own fears of majoritarianism. Indeed. Tocqueville 
cited Madison and Jefferson on their fear of the “tyranny of the legislature", and 
agreed that “[i]f ever freedom is lost in America, that will be due to the omnipotence 
of the majority".21
What may seem like an inconsistency in Tocqueville is really evidence that he 
bridged the neat distinction made by Constant.22 In an article written for Mill’s 
Westminster Review and translated by the latter, Tocqueville unequivocally spoke of 
a man's liberty as “being entitled to be uncontrolled by his fellows in all that only 
concerns himself, and to regulate at his own will his destiny". This was the just 
and, as in Constant, “the modem ... notion of liberty". But Tocqueville also spoke at 
length, in Democracy, of liberty as rather more than a right to order one’s own pri­
vate affairs (whether they be they of business, conscience, or associatlonal nature) 
- namely as a right to participate at different levels of political decision making. The 
two elements were joined in Tocqueville’s depiction of the American self­
understanding, and in his own mind, by the single principle (a “dogma") of a demo­
cratic sovereignty which derived all legitimate power - individual as well as collec­
tive - from the right and capacity of individual citizens to order their own affairs:
In all matters that concern himself (the citizen] alone he remains the 
master; he is free and owes an account of his actions to God alone. From 
this derives the maxim that the individual is the best and only Judge of 
his own interest and that society has no right to direct his behaviour 
unless it feels harmed by him o r ... needs his concurrence
But there were matters - "interests" was Tocqueville’s constant term - which, while 
not “social” in the sense of pertaining to the interest of the whole of USA 
fTocqueville mentioned taxation, infrastructure, education, and police), neverthe­
less involved the cooperative efforts of a group, i.e., a township or a county. Here, 
liberty to order one’s own affairs translated to joint decision-making at the requisite
20. “Let us suppose that all the citizens take a part in the government and that 
each of them has an equal right to do so. Then... men will be perfectly free because 
they are entirely equal". Tocqueville, Democracy, 11:1,1 (p.504).
21. Tocqueville, Democracy, 1:11,7 (p.260).
22. Cp. Lively’s (1962:11,19) to my mind exaggerated association of Tocqueville’s 
idea of negative liberty to that of Constant, a reading which renders Tocqueville’s
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level and, important to Tocqueville, to an elaborate system of control by division of 
administrative functions in the townships and by their performance by elected non- 
professionals. But the principle was the same, the township “taken as a whole" re­
sembling “any other individual":
the organization of township and county ... everywhere depends on the 
same idea, viz., that each man is the best judge of his own interest and 
the best able to satisfy his private needs23
Tocqueville’s idea of liberty as ‘sharing sovereignty’, of how the American “society 
acts by and for itself’, was not just Rousseau’s concept of taking a part in and con­
firming the power that constrains oneself as much as everybody else, let alone the 
latter’s ambition to have a maximum number of such rational laws regulate the 
people’s path to virtue. In a manner that reminds us of the debate between Anti- 
Federalists and Federalists and what I termed the principle of subsidiarity, 
Tocqueville stressed the pluralism of different “local needs" leading to a variety of 
levels of popular sovereignty, legitimate legal diversity, and, of course, the danger of 
an unresponsive centralism. Also, with bite against Rousseau, he stressed that the 
will of the majority was rarely a general will. To believe that “in matters which only 
concern itself a nation cannot go beyond the bound of reason", and that the major­
ity may thus always be entrusted was indeed “the language of a slave".24
Tocqueville never seriously analysed the legitimate relation between the rule of 
majorities and the rights of individuals, let alone the even more complicated ques­
tion of the natural boundaries between local, regional, and national jurisdictions 
and ‘interests’ - we recall that exactly how and where a national interest might 
override a local one was one of the most hotly debated political issues at the time of 
the Philadelphia Convention. He did, however, confront the question, eventually 
appealing to the constraints of natural law:
There is one law which has been made, or at least adopted, not by the 
majority of this or that people, but by the majority of all men. That law is 
justice. Justice therefore forms the boundary to each people’s right (...) 
Consequently, when I refuse to obey an unjust law, I by no means deny
equation of liberty with political rights a simple confusion.
23. Tocqueville, Democracy, 1:1,5 (pp.66-67,82), italics in original. Cp. these pas­
sages to the passages towards the end of the first volume of Democracy, where 
“sovereignty" as self-reliant choice is seen to structure every relation from that of a 
father to his child to that o f the Union and the states (1:11,10, pp.396-7).
24. Tocqueville, Democracy, 1:1,4-5; 1:11,7 (pp.60,73,251). Tocqueville continued to 
ask what else a majority was “if not an individual with opinions, and usually with 
interest, contrary to those of another individual, called the minority" and, equally 
rhetorically, if “men, by joining together, [have] changed their character" (p.251).
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the majority’s right to give orders; I only appeal from the sovereignty of 
the people to the sovereignty of the human race25
Tocqueville’s departure from liberal contemporaries like Constant or Mill must be 
emphasised. A reason for his failure to confront the harm question may simply 
have been his belief that “ipjrovidence has given each individual the amount of 
reason necessary for him to look after himself in matters of his own exclusive con­
cern”, and that such self-reliance and adversity to having others decide for one’s 
life was part of the same substantial value and spirit of liberty, as that “communal 
freedom" which “springs up" among collectives of men. spontaneously gathering to 
decide their common affairs. With his attention to decentralisation, Tocqueville re­
sisted the liberal impulse of Constant to confine the value of unimpaired choice 
and self-direction to a defined private realm. The liberty of the ancients remained 
important along with that of the modems - the former in the straight forward man­
ner of the capacity of smaller groups of individuals to act free from the constraints 
of larger ones. Tocqueville as a political thinker was prepared to accept that the 
same human impulse, when manifested in different spheres, might occasionally be 
divided against itself.26
But there was more to Tocqueville’s idea of liberty than this. Inside the con­
ceptual boundaries of liberty as unimpaired activity, extended by Tocqueville to the 
level of groups, the value had connotations different from those of Constant. 
Tocqueville's liberty was not Just about being ‘left alone*, but about being left alone 
so as to make active, assertive, and valuable choices. His understanding of the re­
stricted liberties which existed for members of his own class before the democratic 
age comes to mind here. Tocqueville valued these liberties in part for what we may 
call aesthetic reasons. They facilitated the leisured enquiry of free spirits like him­
self. and thus were conducive to cultural pluralism, refinement, and innovation, all 
things he saw jeopardised by the conformity and intellectual mediocrity which was 
typical of democracy. And secondly, they facilitated the capacity of individuals to 
act with intention and will, intervening in the world, changing the circumstances of 
human societies and moving them in more desirable directions. This too he hoped 
to transfer to modem democratic liberty - the only liberty which was also just and 
conforming to divine intentions - although occasionally he despaired at citizens 
“frightened of their own free will" who did not recognise that, inside the “predes­
25. Tocqueville, Democracy, 1:11,7 (250-51). However, much like Jefferson and 
Paine, Tocqueville also stressed that, given "the nature of a country and of antece­
dent events on political constitutions" it would be a “great misfortune if liberty were 
bound always and in all places to have the same features", and that, although 
there could “be no social state without political and civil rights" it was not neces­
sary that “such rights should be uniform" (Tocqueville, Democracy, 1:11,9-10, 
pp.315,365).
26. Tocqueville, Democracy, 1:1,5; 1:11,10 (pp.62,397).
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tined circle around each man beyond which he cannot pass" man was yet “strong 
and free", a recognition on which democratic societies more than previous societies 
had to rely.27
Most importantly, and this sets Tocqueville apart from Mill,28 the deepest level 
of the meaning of liberty was its value in itself. By exercising free, responsible 
choice, individually and with others, by “thinking, feeling, and acting for them­
selves”, individuals realise a potential for maturity and true humanity rather than 
“perpetual childhood”. Men, said Tocqueville, “must walk in freedom, responsible 
for their acts".29 In Tocqueville’s language we recognise the Renaissance vir virtutis. 
the truly manly man, now in possession of a set of more reflective virtues, i.e., “the 
virile candor and manly independence of thought”. But Tocqueville’s notion of vir­
tue as self-direction was also linked to a Christian and moral vocabulary about the 
value of free discovery of what is right. Noting that American "Irjeligion regards civil 
liberty as a noble exercise of men's faculties, the world of politics being a sphere 
intended by the creator for the free play of intelligence”, Tocqueville spoke his own 
opinion. Indeed, he “espouse|d] the cause of human liberty as the source of all 
moral greatness". In a letter, cited by Lively, Tocqueville made the point clearly.
Freedom is, in truth a sacred thing. There is only one thing that better 
deserves the name: that is virtue. But then what is virtue if not the free  
choice of what is good
Religion helped individuals to recognise that as “all citizens are equal in the sight o f 
God" it followed that all citizens are “equal before the law". And Tocqueville also 
equated virtue with the free recognition, based on individual experience with self- 
government, of the reasonableness o f mutual respect for rights:
Next to virtue as a general idea, nothing ... is so beautiful as that of 
rights, and indeed the two ideas are mingled. The idea of rights is 
nothing but the conception of virtue applied to the world of politics30
Tocqueville’s association of liberty to the exercise of social duty and an objective 
morality of rights was closer to Locke than to Mill, but the specific link to political 
autonomy rather reminds us of Jefferson.
The several value aspects of Tocqueville’s liberty are placed in perspective as we 
analyse the way they were jeopardised in democratic society. To anticipate, the ex­
tension of negative liberty to independent thought and political independence con­
siderably widens the standard repertoire of threats to liberty. They involved, in 
Tocqueville, not only the dangers of traditional despotism and tyranny, including
27. Tocqueville, Democracy. 11:11,7-8 (pp.701,705).
28. Lively (1962:12-14).
29. Tocqueville. Democracy, 1:1,5; 11:11,6 (pp.92,692-94).
30. Tocqueville, Democracy, I:I,Introduction,2; 1:11,6 (pp. 16,47,237-38,258): Lively
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the political tyranny of the majority. Liberty was also threatened by men’s own 
weakness of will, i.e., the constant temptation not to think for themselves, and not 
to take the trouble to decide their own affairs, all, as we shall see, helped along by 
a benevolently paternalist central state and a suffocating public opinion.
Tocqueville’s notion of unfreedom as slavery to one's unmanly desire for ease 
and comfort, and of freedom as moral and intellectual independence, looks a little 
like a late version of Pocock’s civic humanism.31 But although such independence 
and self-reliance was an independent normative concern in Tocqueville, and one 
which he hoped could be reinvigorated in a democratic society, it is difficult to 
overlook its association with a new version of the old instrumental republican fig­
ure. Over and above the independent value of thinking for oneself and taking one's 
turn in the exercise of political liberty, both belong in the dialectic of a free way of 
life or “the spirit of liberty”. The tangible benefits from the habitual exercise of po­
litical liberty and independent reflection might after all seem insignificant, and the 
inconvenience and restraint suffered by not having a say in matters great and 
small, or not having a mind of one’s own, might seem negligible, compared to the 
(foregone) opportunity to pursue material comforts and ease of mind. This was part 
of the lure of ‘soft despotism*. Indeed, although Tocqueville did associate political 
rights with non-trivial individual and collective benefits and protections, the call on 
citizens to be active might seem to be based principally on a moral interest in 
autonomy and humanity. But Tocqueville, in a typical republican move, added that 
manly independence of thought and action, while valuable in itself and constitutive 
of great hopes of a dignified democratic version of the best elements of aristocratic 
culture, was also straightforwardly necessary to preserve liberty in its most basic 
sense of inviolable individual lights. Only people who thought for themselves were 
capable of remaining virtuous enough to be good citizens, and the maintenance of 
structures of local political liberty and associational life, the most important for­
mats of such citizenship, was the only bulwark against new forms of tyranny.32 
“What good is it”, Tocqueville asked,
if there is an authority always busy to see to the tranquil enjoyment of 
my pleasures and going ahead to brush all dangers away from my path 
without even giving me the trouble to think about it. if that authority ... 
is also the absolute master of my liberty and of my life
For an inhabitant of such a country, the
detachment from his own fate goes so far that if his own safety or that of 
his children is in danger, instead of trying to ward the peril off, he
(1962: 13).
31. But see Lively (1962:15-20).
32. Tocqueville, Democracy, 1:1,5 (p.63).
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Mcrosses his arms and waits for the whole nation to come to his aid (...) 
When nations reach this point, either they must modify both laws and 
mores or they will perish, for the fount of public virtues has run dry; 
there are subjects still, but no citizens. I say that such nations are made 
ready for conquest33
Although some individuals, unsusceptible to the intrinsic rewards of citizenship, 
might crave for the relative de facto security and circumscribed liberties of a mon­
archy, this option was no longer relevant. Indeed, Tocqueville warned that the sta­
ble traditions and moral texture of a feudal society had gone forever, and that an 
attempt to rely on a good prince would involve all the dangers of political Jacobi­
nism.
Liberty was valuable for its own sake, and Tocqueville at times said that only 
those who did value it for its own sake, rather than for the fruits they might reap 
from its exercise, were capable of retaining it. Thus, in the Ancien Régime, he stated 
that
in the long run, liberty always yields to those who know how to preserve 
its comfort, independence, and often wealth; But (...) [t]hose who only 
value liberty for their sake have never preserved it long. It is the intrinsic 
attractions of freedom ... which have seized so strong a hold on the great 
champions of liberty throughout history; ... they loved the pleasure of 
being able to speak, to act, to breathe unrestrained, under the sole 
government of God and the laws. He who seeks freedom for anything but 
freedom’s self is made to be a slave34
Tocqueville loved liberty for its own sake himself and believed that all men had it in 
them to do so to. But his main motivational argument was different and typical of 
an established republican figure. The motivation to be free in the sense of the ac­
tive, reflective, and cooperative aspect of libertas flowed from the everyday experi­
ence that this was the only reliable way to be sure of enjoying private rights in se­
curity: “Understanding its own interests, the people would appreciate that in order 
to enjoy the benefits of society one must shoulder its obligations". These benefits, 
again, consisted in “(ejach man having some rights and being sure of the enjoy­
ment of those rights". This was the heart of the "self-interest properly understood" 
and the rational patriotism which was the foundation o f American public virtue.35
Tocqueville thought of himself as a “liberal of a new kind".36 His emphasis on 
individual autonomy, tolerance of diversity (indeed the independent value of diver­
sity), intellectual liberty, and progress of the human mind, all certainly place him
33. Tocqueville. Democracy, 1:1,5 (p.93-94).
34. Tocqueville, Ancien Régime, 15 (p. 134).
35. Tocqueville, Democracy, Li,Intro.; 1:11,6; 11:11,8 (pp. 14,235-36,525-28).
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in the company of many (Post) Enlightenment liberals. Siedentop, while noting that 
Tocqueville was much less hostile towards the imagery of “civic humanism" than 
Constant, still claims that Tocqueville shared the reservations of the former, inher­
ited from Montesquieu, about ‘ancient’ liberty.36 7 But before Tocqueville is put too 
squarely in the liberal camp, we remember the typical misunderstandings of classi­
cal republicanism of the Enlightenment, which also Tocqueville shared. Democracy 
is full of the old vocabulary and political cosmology of corruption, decay, and vir­
tue, and artificiality, all to such an extent that the failure to read him as a republi­
can seems odd. What Tocqueville saw as a ‘new* idea of virtue, based on self- 
interest rightly understood and a culture of rights, and his idea of a corresponding 
‘new’ patriotism, were not nearly as unprecedented as he thought himself. In real­
ity, he demonstrated that liberal values, also under new conditions of egalitarian 
mass democracy, had to be protected by vigilant citizens who were virtuous in a 
rational, not self-denying manner, a manner that we have encountered before.
Tocqueville emphasised that the new threat to liberty was exactly that condi­
tion of equal, privatised, atomised citizenship which, in contract theory, utilitari­
anism, and Humean liberalism alike, was seen as liberty’s core. And, finally, he 
managed to utilise those elements of the new liberal individualism which addressed 
the private and associational life of civil society and which gave moral and aesthetic 
substance to the otherwise somewhat vacuous language of individual rights. 
Tocqueville gave a distinctly political meaning to moral autonomy, religious piety, 
and even to capitalist pursuits. By infusing such substantial civic value into the 
liberal vocabulary of individuality, he emphasised that democratic rights would 
never be secure without virtue, that without it., democratic citizens were likely to 
use their rights to create new kinds of despotism that jeopardised each and every 
aspect of liberty along with its associated values. In stressing this, Tocqueville was 
certainly a ‘new kind of liberal’. He was indeed a republican liberal.
4. Equality of Condition and the Spirit of Equality
The master idea of Tocqueville’s analysis of democracy was the concepts of equality 
and equality of condition. By the latter, he partly referred to increasing degrees of 
material equality (he had in mind the new rising middle class, not the proletariat 
whose predicament Marx was to analyse, and of which, in Jacksonian America, he 
thought that there was no trace). He also had in mind social mobility, the lack of 
inherited positions and special political distinctions, and finally that “middling 
standard [which] has been established in America for all human knowledge”.38 
Rousseau had aimed deliberately at such levelling and homogeneity, all for the 
sake of mutual recognition and solidarity in Spartan citizenship. By contrast,
36. Cited in Lively (1962:8).
37. Siedentop (1994:67-68).
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Tocqueville had discovered a series of modem dangers that arose exactly, he be­
lieved, from steps taken towards the society that Rousseau had in mind. Some of 
the substantial values that Rousseau attached to republican liberty were unsa­
voury to Tocqueville in the first place, indeed part of the problem of society which 
he came to analyse. But Tocqueville also developed a new analysis of the republi­
can maladies that arose from that very condition of relative social and political 
equality, which Rousseau and others before him had regarded as the condition for 
a free republic. The following is a brief discussion of the most important of these 
new dangers to liberty.
First of all, the very impulse o f equality, that “passion ... (which] seeps into 
every comer of the human heart", was an ambiguous phenomenon in itself. Its in­
herent logic could lead towards liberty or to its opposite. So strong was the senti­
ment, Tocqueville claimed, that although most individuals naturally inclined to­
wards liberty, its rewards were less immediately obvious. By contrast, equality 
“daily gives each man in the crowd a host of small pleasures". Hence, people would 
"want equality in freedom, and if they cannot have that, they still want equality in 
slavery”, even if this meant putting up "with poverty, servitude, and barbarism".38 9
There were indeed "only two ways of making equality prevail in the political 
sphere; rights must be given either to every citizen or to nobody". The latter, of 
course, was the Jacobin scenario, the outcome of the revolution which had nour­
ished “a debased taste for equality, which leads the weak to want to drag the strong 
down to their level". The trouble with equality was envy, arising from the habit of 
social comparison, and particularly facilitated by democratic society which provided 
“the means for everybody to rise to the level of everybody else" at the same time 
that
the means are constantly proving inadequate in the hands of those using 
them (...) anything which in any way transcends the people seems an 
obstacle to their desires, and they are tired by the sight of any 
superiority, however legitimate
Such envy, essentially the same phenomenon which was analysed less dialectically 
by Rousseau as a problem of recognition, was facilitated by the disappearance of 
the stable hierarchies of feudal society. It was likely to turn into “delirium" and 
“blind surrender” for instance to a single dictator claiming to represent the general 
will, especially where, as in France, the social order had collapsed in a violent and 
sudden way, and where people had acquired a taste for social equality without 
having some experience with liberty and self-government.40
38. Tocqueville, Democracy, 1:1,3 (p.56).
39. Tocqueville, Democracy, 11:11,2 (pp.505-6).
40. Tocqueville. Democracy, 1:1,3; 1:11,5; 11:11,1 (pp. 56-57,198,505).
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America, luckily, had been blessed with a peaceful revolution which centred on 
political rights and national liberation rather than social issues, had enjoyed a 
slowly developing tradition of local self-government in the eastern townships, a lev­
elling rural economy, and the near absence of conspicuous material inequalities, 
let alone of an idle nobility. This might facilitate what Tocqueville described as a 
“manly confidence and ... reciprocal courtesy”, and a “manly and legitimate passion 
for equality which rouses in all men a desire to be strong and respected". The latter 
in turn reflected a “natural bias towards free institutions" which democratic man 
also had, i.e., for equality as the equal political liberty of self-reliant citizens. Yet. 
this natural taste had to be nurtured, directed, and protected from many counter­
vailing tendencies which were also the outcome of equality.41
5. Individualism
One of these dangers was the natural tendency in democracies towards what 
Tocqueville called individualism. This new phenomenon was “a calm and considered 
feeling which disposes each citizen to isolate himself from the mass of his fellows 
and withdraw into the circle of family and friends" where he “gladly leaves the 
greater society to look after itself. This feeling was distinct from “egoism", a “vice 
as old as the world", which denoted the “passionate and exaggerated love of self 
which leads a man to think of all things in terms of himself and to prefer himself to 
all". However, although individualism was “based on misguided judgment rather 
than depraved feeling" it “dam[edj the spring of public virtues" and “finally merge[dj 
into egoism".42
Individualism was produced by the disintegration of the many bonds of objec­
tive obligation and particularist loyalty inside and across classes in a local commu­
nity, and also between generations living in the same place and station. The new 
social and geographical mobility of democratic (market) societies further prevented 
individuals from having many stable attachments. More generally, democracy pro­
duced a sense of being without obligations to anybody in particular, of not recog­
nising anybody as more intelligent, worthy, or more knowledgeable than oneself, 
thus having a claim to be obeyed as an authority, and o f self-sufficiency in the 
mundane affairs of business and work:
more and more people ... though neither rich nor powerful enough to 
have much hold over others, have gained or kept enough wealth and 
enough understanding to look after their own needs. Such folk owe no 
man anything and hardly expect anything from anybody. They form the 
habit of thinking of themselves in isolation and imagine that their whole 
destiny is in their own hands ... Each man is forever thrown back on
41. Tocqueville, Democracy, I:I,Introd,3: II:IV.l (pp. 14,57,667).
42. Tocqueville, Democracy, 11:11,2 (pp.506-7).
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himself alone, and there is danger that he may be shut up in the solitude 
of his own heart43
This self-sufficiency and rights pride, however, was a dangerous illusion. This was 
evident in the case of many necessary cooperative ventures in civil society. And it 
was abundantly clear in the event of oppression, either as the violation of individ­
ual rights or as political tyranny. Both were easier where individuals were priva­
tised. unaccustomed to combining their powers, and forgetful of the fact that the 
rights they enjoyed was the contingent outcome of political solidarity. Such forget­
fulness was good for despotism which “sees the isolation of men as the best guar­
antee of its own permanence“.44
But also this tendency had a less sinister side which again was experienced by 
the Americans. Equality, although it destroyed particular obligations, also made it 
easier to sympathise with others, including distant others, identifying with their 
feelings and predicament:
When ranks are almost equal among a people, as all men think and feel 
in nearly the same manner, each instantaneously can judge the feelings 
of all others; he just casts a rapid glance at himself, and that is enough.
So there is no misery that he cannot readily understand (...) In demo­
cratic ages men rarely sacrifice themselves for another, but they show a 
general compassion for all the human race45
Also, the illusion of self-sufficiency could potentially be replaced by the more ra­
tional recognition of equal weakness, that “[nlo one among them (wasl any longer 
strong enough to struggle alone with success, only the combination of the forces of 
all [wasl able to guarantee liberty”. This recognition, Tocqueville stressed, was not 
readily forthcoming. But the circumstances could be established that facilitated 
spontaneous cooperation by individuals who started from their own private inter­
ests and ended with a rational sense of solidarity, even habitual benevolence as a 
mixture of sympathy and enlightened self-interest:
The free institutions of the United States and the political rights enjoyed 
there provide a thousand continual reminders to every citizen that he 
lives in society
As soon as common affairs are treated in common, each man notices 
that he is not independent of his fellows as he used to suppose and that 
to get their help he must offer his help to them
43. Tocqueville, Democracy, 11:1,2; 11:11,2 (pp.435,507-8).
44. Tocqueville, Democracy, 11:11,4 (p.509).
45. Tocqueville, Democracy, 1 (p.564).
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Indeed, a man could come to "care for his fellows and. in a sense ... find ... his self- 
interest in forgetting about himself*. At every moment the American is reminded 
that “it is the duty as well as the interest of men to be useful to their fellows“:
Having no particular reason to hate others, since he is neither their slave 
or their master, the American’s heart easily inclines towards 
benevolence. At first it is of necessity that men attend to the public 
interest, afterward by choice. What had been calculation becomes 
instinct. By dint of working for the good of his fellow citizens, he in the 
end acquires a habit and taste for serving them46
6. Materialism
Closely related to the danger of individualism was another standard vice of the re­
publican tradition, namely materialism. Although he recognised the value of com­
merce and industry, Tocqueville did not share the complacent views of a Hamilton 
or a Hume on enrichment, consumption, and luxury. Tocqueville distinguished 
between a self-indulgent craving for luxury, characterised by “sumptuous depravity 
and startling corruption", found in aristocracies, and destructive of honest busi­
ness and innovation, and on the other hand a more moderate democratic ambition 
to better one’s condition. In the latter, “love of comfort appears as a tenacious, ex­
clusive, and universal passion, but always a restrained one“. This democratic mate­
rialism was fed by a spirit of competition, discontent and social envy, which created 
a culture of restless superficiality, and of “strange melancholy ... in the midst of 
abundance". Tocqueville greatly admired the "immense works carried through 
without difficulty by a nation which ... has no rich men" and was “struck by the in­
numerable multitude of little undertakings.47
Yet, this in other ways beneficial “passion for physical pleasures" was poten­
tially dangerous to liberty. It might “in the end ... shut out the rest of the world and 
sometimes come between the soul and God". The relation between materialism and 
Christian spirituality, which Tocqueville valued on independent grounds as well as 
a means to inculcate virtue, was a separate concern,48 but Tocqueville also force­
fully advanced a traditional republican fear that.
Intent on getting rich [people] do not notice the close connection between 
private fortunes and general prosperity. There is no need to drag the 
rights away from citizens of this type: they themselves voluntarily let 
them go. They find it a tiresome inconvenience to exercise political rights 
which distract them from industry. When required to elect representa-
46. Tocqueville, Democracy, 1:1,3; 11:11.4 (pp. 57,510-13). For Tocqueville’s doctrine 
of self-interest, see Lawler (1998).
47. Tocqueville, Democracy, 11:11» 11,19 (pp.533,538,554).
48. Tocqueville, Democracy, 11:11,15-16 (pp.542-47).
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lives, to support authority by personal service, or to discuss public busi­
ness together, they find they have no time
And if “at this critical moment, an able and ambitious man once gets power, he 
finds the way open for usurpations of every sort" and “one is left in astonishment at 
the small number of weak and unworthy hands into which a great people can fall".
However, again America had been peculiarly blessed, haring “happily avoided 
all the reefs ... just charted".
An American will attend to his private business as if he were alone in the 
world; the moment afterward, he will be deep in public business as if he 
had forgotten his own
But the truth was that a heart could not be so divided between "the most selfish 
greed and ... the most lively patriotism”:
One must suppose these urges to be united ... Americans ... are there­
fore by no means inclined to suppose that it is no business of theirs to 
meddle in public affairs. On the contrary, they think it their most im­
portant concern to secure a government which will allow them to get the 
good things they want and which will not stop their enjoying those they 
have in peace49
7. Atomism and Patriotism
Individualist privatism and materialism may be distinguished in Tocqueville, at 
least analytically, from the related pathology of atomism. In an egalitarian society, 
quite apart from the propensity to cooperation or privatism, there would be a more 
general danger that modems lost all sense of common identity and shared direc­
tion, certainly in a vast country such as the USA. Unlike Hamilton and Hume, 
Tocqueville was aware that habitual allegiance was not a simple matter of enjoying 
good government, let alone the beneficial effects of a distant federal politics. More 
was needed. On the other hand, in a way that challenged Rousseau and foreshad­
owed Durkheim, Tocqueville addressed the problem of the content of collective con­
sciousness in a democratic society. Where customs, ancient values, and feudal loy­
alties had disappeared, again, each "man is forever thrown back on himself alone". 
Democracy makes men "forget their ancestors”, and “clouds their view of their de­
scendants and isolates them from their contemporaries”. On the other hand, like 
Montesquieu, he was aware that nations could not "return to the feelings of their 
youth”, “blind sacrifice and instinctive virtues" being "long past”. Indeed, it was 
part of his doctrine of self-interest properly understood that in an age of equality.
49. Tocqueville, Democracy, 11,14 (pp.532,540-41).
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without some education and enlightenment, there was no “limit to the stupid ex­
cesses” into which the natural selfishness of men would lead them.50
Tocqueville was awrare that a democratic society required a social cement fa­
cilitating integration in a particular national community, and that most men “need 
to particularise and limit the objects of their affection in order to grasp them firmly 
and durably".51 He made a distinction between two types of patriotism, linking 
them to a broader concept of the content and degree of homogeneity required in a 
national political culture. In traditional societies, he claimed (continuing Montes­
quieu’s mistaken reading of the ancients), patriotism was an
unpondering feeling that ties a man’s heart to the place where he was 
bom. This instinctive love is mingled with a taste for old habits, respect 
for ancestors, and memories of the past; those who feel it love their 
country as one loves one’s father’s house (...) |T)hey even find a certain 
attraction in living there in obedience ... [This patriotism) is itself a sort 
of religion; it does not reason, but believes, feels and acts
There was also, however,
another sort of patriotism more rational than that; less generous, per­
haps less ardent, but more creative and more lasting, it is engendered by 
enlightenment, grows by the aid o f laws and the exercise of rights, and in 
the end becomes, in a sense, mingled with personal interest. A man un­
derstands the influence which his country’s well-being has on his own; 
he knows the law allows him to contribute to the production of this well­
being, and he takes an interest in his country’s prosperity, first as a 
thing useful to him and then as something he has created52
In Tocqueville’s analysis this rational, interest-based, and “reflective" patriotism 
was closely linked to, and produced by, participation in self-government, the 
“common man" having “understood the influence of the general prosperity on his 
own happiness" and having become “accustomed to regard that prosperity as his 
own work". In America, because of its history and federal structure, most powers 
and policy areas of immediate concern to the individual being centred at the level of 
the state and the township, patriotism had local origins, so that, for instance the 
“New Englander is attached to his township not so much because he was bom 
there as because he sees the township as a free, strong corporation of which he is a 
part and which is worth the trouble to try to direct". This local patriotism, and its
50. Tocqueville, Democracy, 1:11,6; 11:11,1-2 (pp.236,508,527-28).
51. Tocqueville, Fragments et notes inédites sur la révolution. Oeuvres Complètes 
(ed. J.P. Mair), Paris, 1951- II,ü (p.346), cited from Lively (1962:203).
52. Tocqueville, Democracy, 11:11,6 (pp.235-36).
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corresponding “mores and habits of liberty” were then translated to a patriotism of 
the Union: . •
Public spirit in the Union is ... only a summing up of provincial 
patriotism. Every citizen of the United States may be said to transfer the 
concern inspired in him by his little republic into his love of the common 
motherland. In defending the Union, he is defending the increasing 
prosperity of his district land) the right to direct its affairs53
Still. Tocqueville’s analysis of patriotism was not only an extension of self-interest 
pure and simple, as these passages may be read to indicate. Thus, in a long dis­
cussion of what kept the Union from breaking up and made the inhabitants of 
states feel allegiance to the larger nation, he noted that whereas the Union was
a vast body and somewhat vague as the object of patriotism ... the state 
. ... represents a definite number of familiar things which are dear to those
living there. It is identified with the soil, with the right of property, the 
family, memories of the past, activities of the present, and dreams of the 
future
There were some common interests in Union, and in the event that its very exis­
tence were threatened, Tocqueville believed "one will see a reaction spring up" in its 
favour. However, he had to "confess that I have no confidence in that calculated 
patriotism which is founded on interest and which a change of interest may de­
stroy". Although common interest had to exist, at all levels of the polity as well as 
between them, more was needed, namely a "homogeneous civilisation", including 
“like feelings and similar opinions”. What Tocqueville meant was not a culturalist 
or ethnic nationalism of the sort that was being formulated by some of his contem­
poraries. He had in mind a distinct American political culture, which made it “more 
of a united society" and “a single nation" than some European countries.54
One element of this political culture was religion, but religion under an ecu­
menical “point of view", relating it to the political principle of universal equal rights. 
Also, -all Americans agreed that “all legitimate powers have their origin in the peo­
ple" and shared “the same ideas concerning freedom and equality ... the press, the 
right of association, juries, and the responsibilities o f agents of authority". Apart 
from this culture of rights, Americans shared a set of “philosophical and moral 
opinions" pertaining to such things as the authority o f reason, the capacity of each 
to understand his own best interest and rule himself. This political culture was a 
developing phenomenon, it slowly spread to all parts of the Union, mellowing "a 
mass of provincial prejudices", becoming ever “less exclusive", and it really only ex­
53. Tocqueville, Democracy, I:I,5,8; 11:11,6 (pp.68,162,236-37).
54. Tocqueville, Democracy, 1:1,8; 11:11,10 (pp. 167,337,373,394). For Tocqueville’s 
conception of political culture, see Bouchet (1988).
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eluded the immoral culture of the slave owning South. The culture also contained a 
distinct focus of identity, over and above the particular attachments to the states, 
by which they were “separated from everybody else", namely pride in the Union and 
the achievements of the revolution, i.e., the democratic institutions which “flourish 
among them, whereas they come to grief in the rest of the world".55
8. Public Opinion
If it was indeed necessary to have some common opinions for a society to be inte­
grated, Tocqueville was far more attentive than earlier republicans to the danger to 
liberty of citizens being too much in agreement. Possibly the most disturbing aspect 
of Tocqueville’s new republicanism was his idea that the homogeneity of sentiments 
which writers like Rousseau thought it necessary to install by artificial means, and 
which the latter believed saved individuals from misrecognition and alienation, had 
become a formidable new danger to modem liberty. On the other hand, compared 
to Hume’s and Madison's analysis of the danger of majoritarianism, Tocqueville of­
fered a far more sophisticated conception of majoritarianism as a social and socio- 
psychological phenomenon - with political consequences. Implicitly, Tocqueville 
dismissed as at least inadequate the idea that an enlarged political realm with 
competing sectional interests and passions could counterbalance each other, let 
alone Madison’s implied idea that impartial politicians were capable of transcend­
ing this pluralism rather than speak to, and manipulate its meanest common de­
nominator. Finally, he demonstrated that the capacity for individual judgement 
which writers like Jefferson, Paine, and, in a more modest way, Madison relied 
upon as necessary for a democratic republic, could not be expected to appear 
automatically.
Tocqueville’s ambiguity about modem liberty reflected a certain regret about 
the democratic decline in respect for the authority of learning, and the lack o f re­
placement for the inclination, in a leisured class, to pursue learning for Its own 
sake, something which had generated a steady supply o f exemplary individuals 
with great independence of mind. Tocqueville’s idea was not that man ought to re­
flect constantly. The trouble with democracy was also the absence of trust in the 
good judgement of others. True, a man “accepting any opinion on trust from an­
other puts his mind in bondage". Yet, this was “a salutary bondage, which allows 
him to make good use of freedom". In a modem democracy, extending the spirit of 
equality to the things of the mind, the “nearer men are to a common level o f uni­
formity, the less are they inclined to believe in any man or any class". However, the 
same democratic man, sceptical of authorities but unwilling to take the time to 
learn for himself, because busy with his more immediate and short-sighted pur­
suits, could come to combine distrust of his fellows with a propensity to accept “a
55. Tocqueville, Democracy, 1:11,10 (pp.373-74,384).
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quantity of ready-made opinions", relieving him of the necessity of forming his 
own". He would do the latter, because, in a society of uniform individuals, all "are 
readier to trust the mass, and public opinion becomes more and more mistress of 
the world”
In times of equality men, being so alike each other ... this same likeness 
leads them to place almost unlimited confidence if the judgment of the 
public. For they think it not unreasonable that, all having the same 
means of knowledge, truth will be found on the side of the majority
Democratic man, for all his independence of others, feels isolated and weak in the 
face of majorities and thus
in democracies public opinion has a strange power ... It uses no persua­
sion to forward its beliefs, but by some mighty pressure of the mind of all 
upon the intelligence of each it imposes its ideas and makes them pene­
trate men's very souls56
Tocqueville’s evaluation of public opinion was not universally negative. Public 
opinion was the main resource of a democratic republic, it was the medium of the 
political culture which Tocqueville praised, its nature was stability rather than flux 
or anarchy, and its power kept rulers in check, countered corruption, and helped 
economise with the need for coercive law.57 But he did stress its sinister sides, 
which consisted of different aspects of social conformity. One was social control. 
Even where an individual did keep his own opinion, he might not dare speak or act 
upon it, lest he suffer the censure from his immediate community: “Those who still 
at the bottom of their hearts oppose it keep their views to themselves, taking great 
care to avoid a dangerous and futile contest”. More subtly, each individual, in the 
face of a public opinion would not just “distrust his own strength” but also eventu­
ally “doubt his own judgement ... recognising that he must be wrong when the 
majority hold the opposite view". And eventually, what Tocqueville feared most, 
conformism could come as a relief to democratic individuals, who would be only too 
ready to surrender their power of judgement and impose intellectual servitude vol­
untarily on their own minds, “giving slavery a new face”.58
Apart from these justly famous elements of Tocqueville’s ‘soft despotism*, we 
should remember that the disappearance of independent thought which 
Tocqueville certainly dreaded on independent grounds might also, eventually, 
cause all remnants of civic virtue to disappear and thus pave the way for real slav­
ery. But the consequences of public opinion could also be quite straight forward
56. Tocqueville, Democracy, 11:1,2 (pp. 434-436).
57. Tocqueville, Democracy, 11:111,21 (pp.640-45) should be read against 11:1,2 
(pp.433-36).
58. Tocqueville, Democracy, 11:1,2; 11:11,21 (pp.436, 643-44); cp. 1:11,7 (pp. 255-56).
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violations of individual rights by the representatives of an unjust majority, acting 
tyrannically. Thus,
When a man or a party suffers an injustice in the United States, to 
whom can he turn? To public opinion? That is what forms the majority.
To the legislative body? It represents the majority and obeys it blindly. To 
the executive power? it is appointed by the majority and serves it as its 
passive instrument. To the police? They are nothing but the majority 
under arms (...) So, however iniquitous or unreasonable the measure 
which hurts you. you must submit59
However, again, Tocqueville recognised that the spectre of public opinion had an­
other, more promising side. Indeed, he saw “two tendencies in equality; one turns 
each man’s attention to new thoughts while the other would induce him to give up 
thinking at all”. Tocqueville certainly remained critical of conformity and intellec­
tual mediocrity in America, but he did stress the potential for an unprecedented 
degree of reflection, which, he thought, demonstrated that the critical method of 
rationalist philosophy was part of a greater and fundamentally democratic ten­
dency.60
Also, for someone trying to “find out how enlightened the Anglo-American are 
... [i]f his attention is concentrated on the learned, he will be astonished how few 
they are; but if he counts the uneducated, he will think the Americans the most 
enlightened people in the world“. Tocqueville discovered that Americans, although 
sceptical of too abstract knowledge, nonetheless had a sound respect for learning 
which was based on the practical appreciation of practical men of the “usefulness 
of enlightenment”. He was astonished to see “how incredibly quickly ideas circu­
lates” in those “empty spaces" in America where, in the meanest cabin you found 
civilised men talking “the language of the town” although they were “prepared for a 
time to face life in the forest, plunging into the wilderness o f the New World with ... 
bible, axe. and newspapers". Tocqueville partly linked learning to the system of 
public education. However, “to teach men to read and write is [not) enough to make 
them good citizens”. Instead, broadness of mind, knowledge of political affairs and 
political rights came from active citizenship. In America, “[tjrue enlightenment is in 
the main bom of experience”, an experience for which, as we shall see, voluntary 
associations were a main instrument.61
9. Centralisation
The final aspect of Tocqueville’s analysis of the dangers of democracy concerned his 
verdict on centralisation and bureaucratisation. Tocqueville was not an anti-state
59. Tocqueville, Democracy, 1:11,6 (p.252).
60. Tocqueville, Democracy, 11:1,1 (pp.431,436).
61. Tocqueville, Democracy, 1:11.9 (pp. 302-4).
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thinker, and in the American context he may be seen to represent a middle way 
between the Anti-Federalists and the Federalist position on national consolidation. 
If the conservatism of the former had been out of touch with the functional re­
quirements of a modem nation, the latter, in particular Madison and Hamilton, had 
been far too complacent in their assumptions about the nature of central power. 
What saved the republic from the dangers of centralisation and administrative con­
solidation was not the system of complex government nor the competition of inter­
est groups. It was the existence of civic virtue in general, and. in particular, of an 
intermediate level of government to focus and channel this virtue and to check 
central power. Madison had been obsessed with the centrifugal tendencies of the 
confederacy, and also Tocqueville wrote at length on the fragility of the federal con­
cord in a time where individual states and citizens were occasionally hard pressed 
to find reasons to stick together, not least with the slave-owning South. But 
Tocqueville’s French background made him see what the Founders overlooked: 
Centralisation and the more and more detailed and unaccountable regulation o f 
every aspect of social life was a natural tendency of democratic society, and Amer­
ica must thank its decentralised administrative structure for avoiding these perils.
Distinguishing between two types of centralisation, Tocqueville argued that, as . 
regards what he called “governmental centralisation“, which was the concentration 
of the regulation of “[clertain interests, such as the enactment of general laws and 
the nation’s relations with foreigners", he could not “conceive that a nation can live, 
much less prosper, without a high degree” of such centralisation. However, this 
was different and, in principle and (American) practice, separate from "administra­
tive centralisation” which meant the concentration also of “other interests of special 
concern of the nation, such, for instance, as local enterprise”.62
Contrary to widespread opinion, arising from the experience of the lawlessness 
characterising the absence of governmental centralisation, administrative centrali­
sation was a bad idea. It only served to "enervate the peoples who submit to it, be­
cause it constantly tends to diminish their civic spirit”. It was also less rational:
•Administrative centralisation succeeds ... in assembling ... all the avail­
able resources of the nation, but it militates against the increase of those 
resources. It brings triumph on the day of battle, but in the long run di­
minishes a nation’s power (...) A  central power, however enlightened ... 
can never alone see to all the details of the life o f a great nation
Although administrative decentralisation from federal to state level had perhaps in 
some respects gone too far, leading to the inconvenience of non-standardised “little 
details of social regulation", what Tocqueville called the Apolitical advantages" of 
administrative decentralisation were all the greater, when compared to his fa­
mously dystopian vision of a society where citizens were accustomed to the detailed
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regulation of an ever-present, bureaucratic and paternalist state, that "milder** des­
potism which “would degrade men rather than torment them". Although modem 
tyranny was not impossible, it was more likely that democratic tyrants would be 
“schoolmasters”. Over the new, docile democratic subjects would stand
an immense, protective power which is alone responsible for securing 
their enjoyment and watching over their fate. That power is absolute, 
thoughtful of detail, orderly, provident, and gentle ... It likes to see citi­
zens enjoy themselves, provided that they think of nothing but enjoy­
ment ... Thus it daily makes the exercise of free choice less useful and 
rarer, restricts the activity of free will within a narrower compass and lit­
tle by little robs each citizen of the proper use of his faculties ... It covers 
the whole of social life with a network of petty, complicated rules that are 
both minute and uniform ... It does not break men’s will, but softens, 
bends and guides i t ... it is not at all tyrannical, but it hinders, restrains, 
enervates, stifles, and stultifies so much that in the end each nation is 
no more than a flock of timid and hardworking animals with the govern­
ment as its shepherd62 3
Such a state, yet an aspect of the more or less voluntary subjection to modem ser­
vitude, was the result of a peculiar tendency of democratic peoples, where “the idea 
of a single central power directing all citizens slips naturally into their conscious­
ness" along with the related idea of the necessity of “uniform legislation". In a de­
mocracy, instead of the universalism of equal rights, there was always the danger 
that egalitarian sentiments translated to a view where “individuals seem of less and 
society of greater importance” because "every citizen is lost in the crowd, and 
nothing stands out conspicuously but the great and imposing image of the people 
itself. Additionally, under conditions of individualism and materialism “the natural 
inclination is to leave the only visible and permanent representative of collective 
interests, that is to say, the state, to look after [communal affairs]". The isolated in­
dividual often feels “the need for some outside help which he cannot expect from 
any of his fellow", and the “endless hatred ... against the slightest privileges singu­
larly favors the gradual concentration of all political rights in those hands which 
alone represents the state”.64
What saved America from centralisation, and from the democratic impulse to­
wards it, was the tradition of self-government. In America, the natural democratic 
aversion against all intermediate levels of government that separated the individual 
from the idea of a general will was offset by the prior existence of local sovereign­
ties, jealous of their jurisdiction, which were already democratically organised and
62. Tocqueville, Democracy, 1:1,5 (pp.87-88).
63. Tocqueville, Democracy, 1:1,5; II:IV,6 (pp.88-93, 691-93. italics in original).
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thus capable of being functional equivalents of the feudal local structures, which, 
in Tocqueville’s view, post-revolutionary France had not been able to invent, yet 
lacked so badly.
10. Tocqueville’s Political Civil Society
Tocqueville’s great move in Democracy was to present equality of condition and cor­
responding changes in intellectual and moral outlooks as both inevitable, sanc­
tioned by God, and dangerous. His aristocratic background sensitised him to the 
values that were lost with the old world, but he also made great play with the many 
areas where modem European states had the chance to opt for one democratic 
road, salvaging some of the old values and adding new ones, rather than another. 
America’s ability to choose, by and large, the right kind of equality, had been fa­
cilitated by several fortuitous circumstances. Among them were the early revolution 
which gave national independence to a federation of states which was already ac­
customed to local political liberty, and whose people already possessed a high level 
of enlightenment. America’s size and abundance of land, the lack of nobility and 
excessive accumulated wealth, the isolation of the continent, the absence of a large 
capital, and, Tocqueville granted, a number o f wisely constructed constitutional 
provisions, in particular the division of functions between state and federal levels 
and the legal system (the jury institution), all these factors contributed to American 
success.64 5 But Tocqueville also repeatedly stated his belief that democracy in free­
dom could be enjoyed in other places too, and that not particular American cir­
cumstances, institutions, or laws were needed, only the right free  mores.66 In 
America, however, such mores were linked to a set of institutions the importance o f 
which was of a more general nature.
One of these institutions was a free press. To Tocqueville, although he disliked 
their licentious conduct, newspapers were watchdogs curbing the trespassings of 
the government, as well as instruments for the quick diffusion of knowledge about 
different political opinions, relevant facts, and political platforms. The eyes of the 
press “are never shut, and it lays bare the secret shifts of politics, forcing public 
figures in turn to appear before the tribunal of opinion”. And. “through the press 
the parties without actually meeting, listen and argue with one another". In par­
ticular, in a time where “no firm and lasting ties any longer unite men”, newspa­
pers facilitated the cooperative efforts of citizens. They not only, said Tocqueville, 
“guarantee ... liberty; they maintain civilisation". They certainly occasionally “lead
64. Tocqueville, Democracy, II:IV,2 (pp.669-73).
65. Tocqueville, Democracy, 1:11,9 (pp.277-315).
66. E.g., Tocqueville, Democracy, I::II,9 (pp.308-15).
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citizens to do very ill-considered things ... but without newspapers there would 
hardly be any common action at all".67
Another institution, already noted, was local self-government in the townships. 
They were the focus of the first patriotism of American citizens, and from them 
emerged the overarching identification with the political culture of the Union. The 
habit of deciding common affairs of immediate importance combated individualism 
and egoism. And both the power which the institution represented in the federal 
structure, and the way individuals were taught to appreciate self-government by 
practising it. constituted an effective protection against bureaucratic centralisation 
and tyranny. Indeed, “(l]ocal institutions are to liberty what primary schools are to 
science (...) Without local institutions a nation may give itself a free government, 
but it has not got the spirit of liberty".68
Thirdly, religion, while different from that civic religion which has sometimes 
been ascribed to Tocqueville, was still conceptualised in a distinctly political man­
ner. Not only did it have a political function ("I am led to think that... he |whol has 
no faith ... must obey, and if he is free he must believe"), it was positively integrated 
in American political culture. Unlike Machiavelli, but in concordance with most of 
the modem republican tradition. Tocqueville emphasised that religion counteracted 
excessive privatism, materialism, and egoism. But more positively, “every religion 
has some political opinion linked to it by affinity", and history offered many exam­
ples that where people had “made prodigious efforts to defend a country ... religion 
was almost always the main motive force”. American Christianity, pluralist and 
ecumenical in form, constantly reminded citizens, not only of their duties to their 
immediate next man, but also of the universal equal dignity and free will of man­
kind, as embodied in the sacred principle of political rights which was the legacy of 
the American revolution. For this reason, for Tocqueville, who was not a very firm 
believer himself, religious doctrine of an inconspicuous and general nature ought 
to be supported by politicians, “acting as if they believed it themselves”, even as the 
beneficial effects of religious beliefs depended on the strict American separation of 
church and state.69
The final and perhaps the most important institution, discussed by Tocqueville, 
was the association, of which he found a number of different types. He distin­
guished between those which did not have an immediate political content and po­
litical associations proper, i.e., such that were “a necessary guarantee against the 
tyranny of the majority", “the despotism of parties or the arbitrary rule of a prince" 
where individual citizens “learned to combine with his fellows to preserve his free­
dom". Not always distinguishing them clearly from political associations,70 he also
67. Tocqueville, Democracy. 1:11,3; 11:11,6 (pp. 186,517).
68. Tocqueville. Democracy, 1:1.5 (p.63).
69. Tocqueville. Democracy, 1:11,9; 11:1,5; 11:11,15 (pp.287,444,546).
70. Tocqueville, Democracy, 1:11,4 (p.190).
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finally discussed the role of political parties (which used associations as their 
“weapons”), which were an “evil inherent in free government". Some of the latter 
Tocqueville treated as “small”, relatively narrow single-interest organisations, 
whereas others, clearly less of an evil, were “great” parties, which contained a more 
principled political program, and which had been instrumental in great national 
transformations.71
It seems clear that, among the numerous associations that had “no political 
object”, and which included "a thousand different types - religious, moral, serious, 
futile, very general and very limited, immensely large and very minute” some or­
ganised “to give fêtes, found seminaries, build churches, distribute books, and 
send missionaries”, Tocqueville also included advocacy groups which, even if they 
did not direct their efforts at a political level, aimed at advancing larger causes and 
at transforming values or social habits. Thus, Tocqueville’s favourite example was 
the large temperance movement in America which exemplified how Americans who 
“have conceived a sentiment or an idea that they want to produce before the world 
... are no longer isolated Individuals, but a power conspicuous from the distance”. 
Its “actions serve as an example; when it speaks, men listen"72
Democratic peoples, according to Tocqueville, “would ... find themselves help­
less if they did not learn to help each other voluntarily”. However, the functions of 
associations political and non-political, over and above their capacity to influence 
public opinion or defend citizens from the state, were several. Without them, “(t]he 
morals and intelligence of a democratic people would be in as much danger as its 
commerce and industry". With them, “the circulation of feelings and ideas" was fa­
cilitated, and citizens developed a broader, more reflective, and more tolerant sense 
of solidarity:
Feelings and ideas are renewed, the heart enlarged, and the under­
standing developed only by the reciprocal action of men one upon an­
other
Such feelings did not arise automatically in a democratic society as others had be­
lieved. On the contrary “they must be artificially created, and only associations can 
do that”. Associations were necessary for men to “become civilized”, but also to 
“remain civilized”.73
These beneficial effects flowed from non-political (“the intellectual and moral”) 
associations as well as from those political associations proper which Tocqueville 
called “great free schools", and in which “large numbers see, speak, listen, and 
stimulate each other to carry out all sorts of undertakings in common”. However, it 
is a mistake to assume that Tocqueville regarded these voluntary associations as
71. Tocqueville, Democracy, 1:11,2,40; 11:11,5 (pp. 174-75,192,195,513).
72. Tocqueville, Democracy, 11:11,5 (pp.513-516).
73. Tocqueville, Democracy. 11:11,5 (pp.514-17).
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causally primary in the development of American civility.7« The habit of association 
around “little business concerns" certainly helped citizens "acquire a capacity to 
pursue great aims in common". However, “the art of political association", although 
these associations were “only one small part", in fact “improves this technique for 
civil purposes”. Political association proper - in turn facilitated by the American 
tradition of local self-government - was the first cause of something that would not 
otherwise easily emerge. Thus, "politics spread a general habit and taste for asso­
ciation. A whole crowd of people who might otherwise have lived on their own are 
taught both to want to combine and how to do so", indeed to do so in associations 
that are “extensive”, and which “draws a lot of people at the same time out of their 
own circle; however much differences in age. intelligence, or wealth may naturally 
keep them apart”. According to Tocqueville, the “common interest of civil life sel­
dom naturally induce great numbers to act together. A great deal of artifice is re­
quired to produce such a result".74 5
Voluntary associations, local self-government, an ecumenical religion which 
preached the universal equality of man, and a free and vigilant press, these were 
the institutional components of Tocqueville's distinctly republican, but also dis­
tinctly new, conception of a political civil society. In formulating it, Tocqueville im­
plicitly dismissed as inadequate Madison's pluralism and the ‘economy of virtue’ of 
an ‘enlarged sphere*. The competition for power of interest groups, he might have 
said, would not work to check central power, if individuals were so absorbed in 
their own (group) interest and petty concerns that they would have no real time for 
politics, or if they were so insecure of their own capacity to form an independent 
judgement that they would welcome the authority of public opinion. Also, although 
he too took part in the Enlightenment revaluation of the effects on welfare and na­
tional development, as well as the cooling and rationalising spirit of commerce and 
industry, he also stressed, in a manner that went beyond the ambiguity of the 
Scottish civic philosophers, including even Ferguson, that civility - tolerance, im­
partiality, reflective capacity, trust, and the capacity to cooperate with strangers for 
mutual ends, accepting diversity and the fact that collaborators and citizens “are 
not obliged to follow exactly the same path" - was an active, political, and artificial 
affair.76
Tocqueville’s civil society was liberal, in the sense that it was based on sponta­
neous, voluntary cooperation. But it was republican in terms of its content and 
functions, and in terms of Tocqueville’s emphasis on Its contingency. Although 
Tocqueville shared the liberal notion that active citizenship and ’manly independ­
ence’ of thought and action could not be forced and had its Independent moral 
value as an expression of spontaneous autonomy, he did not entertain an idyllic
74. As does Putnam (1993).
75. Tocqueville, Democracy, 11:11,5-7 (pp.513,517,520-24).
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notion of civility growing from below, once a certain level of enlightenment had 
been reached. For all his emphasis on local self-government. Tocqueville’s concep­
tion of civil society was strictly a conception of a society of citizens who had to be 
socialised into a shared, distinctly national, political identity, based on cooperation 
and a shared political past - what he called ‘reflective patriotism’. This patriotism, 
completely in line with the tradition, was of a rational kind, based on self-interest 
‘rightly understood' - the enlightened awareness that one’s own liberty and well­
being was intimately tied to a local as well as a national common project. And the 
very capacity to have such an identity, along with much of its content, were deter­
mined by the participation of each citizen in a common political culture based on a 
degree of homogeneity, shared language, and religious feeling - but above all on the 
homogeneity of equal enlightenment in the sense of recognition of human dignity 
and respect for right. This recognition, with its particular American flavour, fore­
shadowed Durkheim’s later concept of a national ‘cult’ of the individual.
Civil society, to Tocqueville, was not a quiet and harmonious, let alone a con­
sensual place. Again, he placed himself squarely in the republican tradition of ac­
cepting a measure of moderate tunudtu in his suggestive descriptions of the sight 
that met the visitor who came to America:
No sooner do you set foot on American soil than you find yourself in a 
sort of tumult: a confused clamor rises on every side, and a thousand 
voices are heard at once, each expressing some local requirements
While different groups arose to promote different causes, more or less local or na­
tional. more or less parochial, all were part of that "great political movement which 
keeps American legislatures in a state of permanent agitation". This agitation, “con­
stantly renewed", was associated by Tocqueville, with a spirit of democratic energy, 
a “restless activity” which spread through civil society, produced very beneficial ef­
fects on trade and manufacture in America, and enabled the country, above all to 
act "by and for itself", learning from its mistakes, and facing the problems of the 
future without the defaitism that Tocqueville found in European thought.76 7
Above all, with his new conception of civil society, Tocqueville modernised the 
republican language so as to deal with the new dangers that he saw in the confor­
mism of democratic society. He presented a disturbingly dystopic picture of modem 
mass man who was trapped in the ’loneliness of his own heart’, while at the same 
time this loneliness and isolation, unless the authority of tradition and social hier­
archy were replaced by modem associations, caused him to be unable to trust his 
own opinion or even to have one at all, and to resist the pressure towards confor­
mity, not from any powerful individual in particular but from the mass of the col­
76. Tocqueville, Democracy, 1:11,4 (p. 175).
77. Tocqueville, Democracy, 1:1,4; 1:11,6 (p.60,242-44); Lively (1962:2283).
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lective. Hopeful that America had found a way to counter these dangers, this was 
yet the area where Tocqueville’s fears were greatest. It was also the area where his 
thought foreshadowed - and directly influenced - the most important contemporary 
republican analysis of the danger to liberty represented by a society conceptualised 
as a break-down of intersubjective space between individuals. I have in mind, of 
course, the work of Hannah Arendt and her conception of a public sphere which 
helps individuals to act together while defining themselves as separate individuals 
and resisting the pressures of conformism - including the deadly pressures of mod­
em ideologies such as fascism, nazism, and racism.78
This vision of Tocqueville’s was what separated him from writers like Constant. 
Constant, despite mentioning the need for civic spirit also in a representative de­
mocracy, entertained relatively complacent beliefs that commercialism made mod­
em despotism “impossible”, and that "[a) people can never detach itself from what 
is true liberty”, as “[t]yrany ... and injustice are ... against nature". Even with occa­
sional setback, truth would still "spread and penetrate" eventually, speaking to “the 
better part of our nature". Against this, it was Tocqueville’s permanent intuition 
that liberty was always threatened, both directly and indirectly, by the collapse of 
the intersubjective space of interacting, debating, and reflecting citizens, and that 
political enlightenment was itself a continuous process, linked to the generation of 
such space, rather than an accomplished state of civilisation.79
78. For Arendt’s often unnoticed inspirations from Tocqueville. see Lloyd (1995).
79. Constant, Spirit o f Conquest and Usurpation, 18,19 (pp. 140,145); Liberty o f the 
Ancients and the Modems (p.327).
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Ch a p t e r  7:
C o n te stin g  t h e  R epublican  T r a d it io n
1. A  Reconstruction of Republicanism
The previous five chapters have provided a pointed reconstruction of a republican 
history of ideas. The account was primarily tailored to counter the Baron-Pocock 
paradigm of interpretation which has represented the tradition as the long ideologi­
cal journey of civic humanism from the Aristotelian discourse of the fulfilment and 
moral growth of the zoon polifikon. via Machiavelli, to the myth of the American 
Frontier.
The republican history of ideas, I have tried to show, is instead characterised 
by the continuity of a core argument about contingent libertas and the need for 
civic virtue to sustain it through time. Considering the centrality of the argument, 
it has been strikingly overlooked in contemporary political theory. It also, or so I 
shall argue, testifies to the success of modem liberalism to suppress and forget a 
set of critical voices, potentially challenging this discourse on its home ground.
The argument has recently been brought back to light by the work of Quentin 
Skinner and Maurizio Viroli on whose shoulders I stand with this work. It pops up 
occasionally in some of the literature which is critical of Pocock’s thesis. But the 
still dominant trend in the latter work, particularly in the constantly growing out­
put of commentary, and commentary on commentary, on the American founding 
period, is to accept the civic humanist interpretation of republicanism as the terms 
of the debate, while simply denying the long history of the doctrine claimed by Po- 
cock and his followers. Thus, the discovery of state of nature theory and natural 
rights discourse in America (patently evident for anyone who will care to look) is 
used to show that the rhetoric of virtue and corruption was a mere nostalgic left­
over in an age whose values had changed towards the pursuit of private happiness, 
or, distinctly unhelpful, that the old values had fallen from grace by being tied to 
liberty and rights in instrumental, ‘liberal* fashion.
My first reconstructive aim has been to participate in the revision o f republican 
revisionism, which is under way. While the counterattacks by Kramnick, Appleby, 
Sinopoli and many others indeed expose the one-sidedness of Pocock’s attempts to 
read Locke, private liberty rights, and commercial society out of Atlantic political 
history, the positions of these authors also tend to reinforce civic humanist ortho­
doxy. They contribute to the continuing failure to appreciate the essential character 
of republican political thought as an argument about liberty which was always an 
‘instrumental’ one. And in doing so, they assist the misguided erection of theoreti­
cal and discursive walls separating allegedly incommensurable ideas about the very 
point of politics in European political thought. My approach, which has focused on 
arguments and their historical contexts, rather than only discursive frames let
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alone closed ‘paradigms’, has demonstrated the need for sober reflection on the 
common ground which is shared by republican and ■liberal’ writers. Indeed, it has 
attempted to avoid easy generalisations of either language and to pay attention, in 
particular, to the many different aspects of early Enlightenment thought which only 
gradually developed into what we now call liberalism. If republicanism has been 
misrepresented, the erection of ideological liberal straw men has been equally 
common, and equally unfortunate. I have suggested that the fault lines between 
the two tradition are blurred along several theoretical dimensions and that more 
subtle means of analytical differentiation are needed.
My attempt to develop the work of Skinner and Viroli has been motivated by 
the need to present a more systematic and didactic account, but also to qualify as 
well as radicalise their histories of instrumental republicanism. The qualification 
has to do, again, with the perhaps disappointing conclusion that the fronts of the 
great historical battle were not so distinct. In particular, the depiction of natural 
rights discourse as a radical, possessive individualist political vocabulary,1 the 
equation of this vocabulary with liberalism tout cour, and its representation as the 
sole and early bane of republicanism, is misguided. As regards the difference be­
tween republicanism and liberalism, the way to proceed is to accept the huge 
variations in the ways that both discourses have been used. We must ask specific 
questions, such as when and how discourses of virtuous activity for the sake of the 
common good of liberty came to clash with, was accommodated to, or reinvented 
within different liberal ideas about natural rights and state of nature, the effects o f 
commerce and industry, Christian morality and moral sense psychology, the role of 
political institutions, Enlightenment rationalism, and utilitarian calculus. We 
should also look at specific manners in which the language was either consciously 
rejected or forgotten.
My account is slightly more radical than the work of Skinner and Viroli in two 
respects. First, I suggest the inaccuracy of the idea that republicanism proper is 
accompanied by a civic humanist brother of more Aristotelian persuasion, and with 
an important independent existence of his own. There may have been some purely 
‘Aristotelian’ scholastic writers in the early Renaissance who saw political liberty 
and political life generally as a communal quest for human flourishing.2 Yet. as re­
gards the cannon of writers whose work has been Investigated here, I believe that 
to distinguish sharply between two republican personae, one being of primarily 
Roman and ‘instrumental’ origin, the latter gallantly resisting temptations to aban­
don the ancient ideal of politics fo r  its own sake is to misrepresent the role of hu-
1. E.g., also Skinner (1990:305,307). In fact, although Locke is mentioned, it is 
not altogether clear who the “liberal theorists of natural rights” are who, “since 
Hobbes", perpetuated the mistakes of which Rawls and Dworkin (‘rights as trumps’) 
are still guilty (Skinner 1992:217).
2. Skinner (1990:296).
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manism in republican history.3 Even the most ardent lovers of the public light, 
from Machiavelli to Jefferson to Tocqueville. retained the constitutive primacy of 
the instrumental argument. Although some Renaissance writers, and later authors 
like Ferguson, made more of glory, greatness, and development of human character 
than others, liberty was there too.
Moreover, the search for civic humanism in Western political thought may re­
flect the common attribution, shared by Viroli and Skinner,4 of something like Po- 
cock’s idea of this creed to Greek writers, particularly to Aristotle. Whatever the 
complicated impact of his Ethics on the Renaissance, which 1 do not pretend to be 
able to trace, I have argued that, strictly speaking, not even Aristotle was a civic 
humanist. Recent scholarship has shown that we have overlooked a political Aris­
totle who concerned himself with negative liberty, the generation of political justice, 
and conceptions of the political community as an unnatural artifice, as the neces­
sary framework for human flourishing. And arguments abounded in Greek political 
theory in general (coexisting to be sure with a virtue ethics of human perfection) 
which linked political activity to the enjoyment of personal security under law. In­
deed, some disputes over Aristotle’s place in or outside the republican canon may 
owe more to modem receptions of Aristotle than to what he actually said about po­
litical life, or how this was understood by later writers.
Thus my account has demonstrated the remarkably long duration of the re­
publican argument, including much of the substance of ’virtue*, and the relative 
accessibility, contrary to many views, of conceptualisations of the political world in 
such places as ancient Greece and the Italian Renaissance. However, my second 
reconstructive aim has been to highlight the extraordinary variety of ways and cir­
cumstances in which the republican argument was formulated. Skinner’s state­
ment of its form in Machiavelli and later on in the English republican tradition is 
by now well known. I have tried to show that the problem of the fragility of liberty 
presented itself illuminatingly different in the historical contexts of Renaissance 
city states, absolutist monarchy, and American democracy. The danger to libertas, 
the manner in which it was threatened, i.e., by a too strong or too weak state, by 
size and centralisation, or by commerce and luxury, changed through the ages.
Each of these two reconstructive aims, I believe, have been accomplished. What 
remains, as a separate and equally important concern of this thesis, is to present 
republicanism in such an analytical fashion as to make it accessible as a reservoir 
of ideas and arguments for contemporary political theory and political science. The 
point of doing so is at least twofold. As suggested by my reference in the Introduc­
tion to the ‘liberal-communitarian debate’, the construction of ideal typical aspects
3. E.g„ Burtt (1990:23).
4. E.g., Skinner (1990:308); and Viroli, who endorses Aquinas understanding of 
Aristotle, according to whom “[cjivil life is man's natural destination” (Viroli 
1992:35).
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of republicanism may be used to inform the debate over political liberalism. In the 
concluding chapter, I briefly return to the theoretical challenge to contemporary 
political theory which I believe republicanism represents. Secondly, ideal typical 
reconstruction helps to bring out the different aspects of an empirical argument.
1. e., a causal account of the fragile nature of constitutionalism and liberty.
The outline of these analytical dimensions requires some preliminaries, and I 
shall proceed towards it by way of a set of delineations and clarifications. First, as 
noted, the language of republicanism has been employed to many ends. The his­
torical analysis implies that at least four standard representations of the nature 
and purpose o f political activity of republicanism are too one-sided, or in some 
cares quite mistaken, although illuminatingly so. Each stress aspects, of politics as 
self-development or self-creation; politics as community: politics as autonomy: and 
politics as radical political constructivism, which are indeed in some sense to be 
found in the tradition - only not in the way presumed.
Secondly, I discuss the question of whether republicanism should be defined, 
and delineated from liberalism, by its employment o f a specific concept of liberty. I 
do so by looking at the very interesting contribution by Phillip Pettit, who has re­
cently attempted to carve out a place for republicanism beyond communltarianism 
and liberalism. Despite the importance of Pettit’s work, 1 argue that both his at­
tempt to portray the republican concept of liberty as distinct from that of main­
stream liberalism, and his more general notion of republicanism as a theory of the 
resilience o f liberty, while indeed tapping certain significant aspects of the tradition, 
are nevertheless inadequate.
However, the conceptual sophistication of Pettit’s work makes it an ideal con­
trast for my own distinct view of republicanism. Employing a different metaphor 
than ‘resilience*, I argue in the next chapter that the variety of republican positions 
and arguments necessitates an analytical distinction between four dimensions o f 
the fragility o f liberty in the republican tradition. These dimensions serve a triple 
purpose. They highlight that republican voices responded to four distinct modali­
ties of the civic virtue-liberty nexus. Secondly, inside them it is possible to discern 
continuities and breaks in the republican tradition, as well to locate where and 
how specific liberal arguments represent departures from republican diagnoses o f 
liberty, even as the latter in turn were themselves progressively framed in a recog- 
nisably liberal language. And thirdly, the stubborn republican attempts to resist 
these liberal departures correspond to different challenges to liberal political theory 
that still stand.
2. Four Ways to Misrepresent Republicanism
It is, I believe, necessary to dissociate the republican tradition from certain well- 
meaning commentators. The task is necessary, if for the same reasons somewhat 
tiresome, because important differences are overlaid and obscured by master con-
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cepts like positive liberty, autonomy, and community, all of which need to be un­
packed.
A number of overlapping, only analytically distinct themes can be discerned. 
First of all. there is an astonishing near-consensus echoing Pocock’s assertion that, 
whatever its point, republican liberty is positive in the sense of realising or enjoying 
something through common action, that this liberty is its own end. and indeed 
that, far from sustaining negative liberty or the value of private life, republican lib­
erty may be at odds with it, and may involve a heavy de-emphasis on the liberal 
language of rights.5 Yet, as we have seen, republican discourse in all its variants 
from Aristotle to Tocqueville has as its core concern exactly the importance of a 
protected private sphere, although not necessarily, nor certainly in the beginning, 
in the sense of natural individual rights.
The first two common ways of ignoring that republican political action is aimed 
at common liberty are, first, the notion that republican politics in and by itself 
bears its own reward and justification, and secondly, that it is needed for the sake 
of ethical integration of individuals and the corresponding maintenance of the par­
ticular common good of a substantially virtuous community. Although the two 
ideas are often linked, it is useful to look at them separately.
5. According to Shumer, in Machiavelli as in the entire tradition, “the liberty of 
each is the power to participate in a common activity". This "(plolitical or ‘public’ 
liberty ought not be confused with our concept of private, ‘civil liberty’ - the security 
of one’s rights and property and protection from the domination of others - embed­
ded in modem liberal-constitutional thought" (Shumer 1979:14). Charles Taylor 
sees the existence of a (Canadian) republican political tradition in the higher value 
placed on collective decision-making, and believes that this is connected to the 
need to compromise on a politics of individual rights (Taylor 1989: 170-71; cp. 
Sandel 1988:64). Oldfield begins his reconstruction of civic republicanism in the 
modem world with the need for republican ideals of participation in the community 
to be modified and accommodated to an otherwise exclusively liberal project of citi­
zenship as a status of "effective security", something “to be sought and. once 
achieved, to be maintained", - curiously picking out exactly that early liberal liberty 
flavour, found in Locke, Hume, and Montesquieu, which republicans through the 
centuries have stressed too (Oldfield 1990:2-3, cp. Sullivan 1986:12). Finally, much 
of the “republican" legal revisionism going on in the United States has at its core 
exactly the confrontation between collective decision-making and individual rights. 
See here, for instance, Fraser (1990) and Sunstein (1985:31). Michelman (1986:24- 
27; 1988:1503-4) sees the essence of republican liberty in much the same way, al­
though his own constitutional jurisprudence is much closer to the reading of the 
tradition proposed here. However, both he and Bruce Ackerman choose to see re­
publicanisms’ concern with private liberty as commencing only with The Federalist 
(Ackerman 1991:45-46; also Amar 1988). For (critical) commentary on the new ‘re­
publican’ jurisprudence in America see e.g., Epstein (1987), Murphy (1992) and 
West (1990:678-721).
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I.
As regards the first - seif-creation or self-development - Arendt’s political thought, or 
rather its existentialist side, has been influential. For her, according to influential 
readings of her work, political action carried the promise of individual authenticity. 
Her ideas were shaped here by Nietzsche and Heidegger, but she went beyond both 
in stressing the importance of public appearance. Individuals could transform and. 
in turn, realise their selves in politics by inserting an aspect of spectacular, some­
how uncaused newness, into the public realm. Although not her considered opinion 
(and although her phenomenological anthropology of appearance did not necessar­
ily involve activity which either we or the republican tradition would call ‘political’}, 
she sometimes seemed to suggest that the point of ‘the world’ and ‘the space o f ap­
pearance’, so fragile in modernity, was to make possible such experiences.6 Yet. 
even in her most existentialist moods, when Arendt connected the longing for 
authenticity and recognition with political action, she also connected it with the 
political problems of the twentieth century, above all the horrors of totalitarianism. 
The existential premium could only be reaped in action with common liberty as its 
instrumental point. Moreover, even she thought that only the few who had a taste 
for Jefferson’s ‘public happiness’ (which did not include herseli) would crave for 
this premium. The great many who could be called upon to act as a matter of duty 
would usually act, if ever, for other reasons.
The quest for glory, honour, or recognition - being remembered after one’s 
death for something great - is a part of the republican tradition. The child of the 
classical age, this aspect was reinforced and transformed in the Renaissance image 
of mortal man who is capable of the most base and the most noble in the art o f 
politics as in other arts. Politics could be about the greatest of things, and there
6. Arendt has many followers here, although only some of whom confuse her oc­
casional existentialist Unbehagen in modernity with republicanism. According to 
Geise, the republican citizen “through the act ... not only declares his uniqueness, 
but also ... presentís] himself for assessment by his peers", where “‘esteem* and 
‘fame’ have value only if they are given freely by one’s peers". We should also ask. 
he thinks, “what characteristics describe the state which makes meaningful actions 
likely?". Indeed, “[flor the republican ... actions are worthy in ... the degree to which 
they fulfil the two tasks of sustaining the virtue of the actor, as well as enhancing 
the public space which makes these acts possible" (Geise 1984:25-29). In contrast 
to the communitarian version, the point here is individual self-expression, the pub­
lic realm is stage, and the community is an audience (cp. also Lasch 1991:173-74). 
In a rather less celebratory tone, some feminists, reading republicanism through 
Arendt in the same fashion, have been quick to point out the gender bias in this 
agonal conception of politics, with Its contemptuous dismissal of daily necessities 
(Phillips 1991:46-50,115; Pitkin 1981). Arendt’s existentialist persona, most evi­
dent in The Human Condition (Arendt 1958b), has been highlighted by Hinchmann 
& Hinchmann (1984; 1991) and recently by Benhabib (1996:35-61). I discuss the 
Arendtian tension between Existenz and republicanism in Mouritsen (1992; forth­
coming).
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was cause for regret, in some writers, when the taste for such greatness was com­
pletely lacking. But republican writers also recognised that these tastes, let alone 
the slightest chance of realising them, were for the few, not for the great mass of 
the popolo.
Machiavelli and Tocqueville certainly aspired to belong to these few. Unable to 
gain the immortality they believed they deserved by playing a direct political role, 
they instead eventually sought to invest themselves, as advisor to the good prince 
and as inventor of a new political science, with some of the pathos of the great leg­
islator. While Machiavelli could perhaps pursue fame and recognition for a time 
with the grandi outside the free republic (as a shrewd Machiavellian) - he recog­
nised that such competitive and disruptive ambizioni were also the chief vice of the 
elite, and that in the end true and lasting glory rested with those whom the gods 
loved most, i.e., those who founded cities, and who did so, contra Pocock, not 
merely for the sake of perpetuating their own civic life.7
If Arendt’s politics of authenticity has often been noted for its flavour of heroic 
display and competitive individualism, Pocock’s classical man does not, in fact, 
seem to drink from quite the same Homeric or Renaissance wells, despite the 
author’s occasional reference to Arendt. While constantly presupposing the idea of 
the model citizen or vir virtutis as a historically recurring standard, yet recognising 
that it is hardly constant over time. Pocock is surprisingly little concerned with ei­
ther the nature of the changes or of the remaining core. By and large, becoming a 
virtuous man, as Pocock reads his authors, is a question of escaping the superficial 
and transient life of luxury and passion, for the sake o f the security of a more sta­
ble group-related identity. This, of course, is quite contrary to Arendt’s heroic exis­
tentialism.8
As recently discussed by Charles Taylor,9 this notion o f conforming to the ideal 
of a citizen, being recognised as alike in a group of equals in virtue (particularly in 
self-denying, martial virtue) is an independent political ideal and motivation in 
Rousseau. Yet, Rousseau’s total citizen, who tries to escape alienation, stands 
rather alone in the tradition. Idealisation of Spartan simplicity and purity o f char­
acter can be found elsewhere, in some of the early English republicans and much 
more ambivalently in Montesquieu, but here it is primarily conceived in instru-
7. Siedentop (1994:131-32), Dunn (1990c:71-72), De Grazia (1989:374-80).
8. Elsewhere, speaking about the implications of viewing political languages as 
paradigms, Pocock suggests that political activity inside such paradigms (in casu 
the republican paradigm) should be understood in connection with the individual 
need to affirm, but also to navigate and criticise, inside reasonably stable political 
Identities. The article attempts, in very elusive and abstract language, to draw 
normative implications for a theory of political practice from political linguistics and 
historiography, and its relation to Pocock’s understanding of political practice in 
historical republicanism is quite unclear (Pocock 1971b).
9. Taylor (1991; 1992:25-51).
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mental terms (as also in Rousseau), as the price to be paid to avoid political cor­
ruption. In fact, Montesquieu’s influential version of the self-denying republican 
citizen, with which he, unlike Rousseau and Pocock, was uncomfortable, repre­
sents the beginning of a biased modem reading of the classical tradition.
Moreover, with the exception of Cicero, even the instrumental idea of educating 
to virtue does not usually presuppose something like ‘love of virtue’ or concern with 
one’s own moral stature as a strong empirical motivation. Republicanism, much 
more sanguine than usually presumed, sees enlightened self-interest as a neces­
sary core in civic motivations, although the general public recognition that some 
personal sacrifice should be expected and that such sacrifice is honourable, gives a 
twist to the structure of civic motivation. Seeking the esteem of fellow citizens may 
indeed become a motivation for a few, while avoiding the shame of not meeting 
one’s obligations will be a more potent factor for the majority.
Republican discourse, with few exceptions, was never really a language of po li­
tics for its own sake, or for the sake of human fulfilment. To the extent that such 
gratifications could indeed be reaped, they would always depend on a publicly 
shared point of politics - common liberty. It is difficult to overstate this conclusion: 
Pocock has been the authoritative source of a civic humanist narrative about politi­
cal motivation which, upon consideration, is strikingly implausible. It has sought to 
install an historical ideology based on the primary notion that political self- 
government is to be cherished by all for the sake of their wholeness of moral char­
acter. And this ideology, allegedly, was moving large numbers of individuals and 
penetrating most political writings as late as the American revolution and constitu­
tional convention period. Why such effectiveness? And why should this ideology be 
a challenge to liberal discourse on individual rights, including the right to seek in­
dividual happiness, let alone exert a minimal influence on individualistic emigrants 
seeking their fortune on the Western Frontier, unless something more was at stake 
than proposed by Pocock? The non-existence of such a doctrine in the places where 
political theorists have sought for it the most constitutes circumstantial evidence to 
the sceptic. But I shall not pursue my suspicion here that no political order or po­
litical ideology could ever thrive for long on a Pocockian idea of politics,10
10. Pocock assumes that a normative account of the ideal man, and the science o f 
nurturing this creature, must be the key question at all stages of the history of po­
litical thought (e.g., Pocock 1985c:71). This is so because these are the basic com­
ponents of the conceptual vocabularies which exist as matrixes of meaning in a so­
ciety. While Pocock, writing republican “tunnel history” (as he conceded after Mo­
ment (Pocock 198lb:53)), does not suggest that only one vocabulary is available at a 
time, he does imply that they "confine more than they liberate", and that, rather 
than combining and changing concepts in response to the social reality historical 
actors face, they find themselves (for various, including 'material' reasons) feeling 
affinity with a language “which thereafter entails them in its multiple meanings" 
(Appleby 1992:283).
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The second major misunderstanding is the association of republicanism with re­
cent communitarian writings. There is a certain degree of shared ground and some 
communitarians are more instrumental than others. But by and large, communi­
tarian writers, as well as their critics who tend to believe claims of republican an­
cestry, should look elsewhere, notably in Hegel. Herder, and certain parts of classi­
cal sociology, in search of intellectual roots. Republican authors do not share the 
notion that political action is a major way to be integrated into, to experience, or to 
reinterpret the substantial ethical content of a shared common good. nor. indeed, 
that the very activity of experiencing or searching for this ethical content is itself a 
part of this good. They certainly do not exhibit anything like the communitarian 
relativist idea of a ‘particular’, local common good as ‘constitutive’, and deriving its 
value from the fact that it is shared by a certain group of people, and that it defines 
the identity of each one of them.11
I hope to have shown that the communitarian employment of a republican lan­
guage of the common good and virtue represents only the most superficial congru­
ence between the two doctrines. Thus for instance the Aristotle which is used, di­
rectly or indirectly, by many communitarians is not that more commonsensically 
political writer which I tried to rehabilitate. The latter was concerned with real 
problems of conflict and government, of order in the always imperfect political 
community, and of justice and the rule of law as the necessary framework for the 
good life. Most importantly, even for this founder of virtue ethics, the good life was 
only contingently related to political affairs. Moreover, it was the problems of the 
latter, rather than the schematics of the former that were to be taken up in repub­
lican thought.
Republican virtue is the politically relevant character traits and actions of a citi­
zen as public person, i.e., as a person who seeks to further common liberty, not the 
quality of his general conduct. The common good of Cicero, Machiavelli, Sidney, or
II.
11. The extent of the communitarian embrace is wide. According to Oldfield, for 
instance, “[clivic republicanism ... holds that political life ... is ... the highest form of 
human living together that most individuals can aspire to" and in this life “citizens 
... make judgments about their identity and about common purposes" (Oldfield 
1990:7,9). Taylor associates his own, rather Hegelian, idea of politics as interpreta­
tive practices directed towards establishing and partaking in a constitutive com­
mon good with "the tradition of civic humanism", in which he includes Aristotle, 
Machiavelli, Montesquieu, Rousseau, Tocqueville and Arendt (Taylor 1985: 96; cp. 
1989). Sandel (1988:63-65; 1996) sees the American republican tradition as essen­
tially advocating a formative, eventually national community of virtue. Also Walzer 
(1990a: 19-20) appeals to this tradition. That liberal critics of communitarianism 
tend to think they are attacking republicanism at the same time is no surprise 
(e.g., Herzog 1986:487ff; Phillips 1993; Bader 1995; but cp. Rawls 1993a:205-6), 
although few go as far as to postulate that “classic republican thinkers" believe that 
"it is through politics that we learn to love each other" (Howe 1991:125).
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the Anti-Federalists was not, even remotely, a fully shared way of life. Even Rous­
seau, who introduced nationalism to republicanism, was only a half exception. He 
praised as an independent value the moral unity (and the xenophobic sentiments) 
of the Polish people that he sought to create. But he knew that it had to be created. 
It was hardly a natural entity, as communitarians tend to believe. And in the over- 
all structure of his argument it was still linked, as a Machiavellian argument about 
civil religion driven to extremes, to the maintenance of common liberty.12
Nor does the republican common good have the peculiar island character o f 
cultural givenness and untraslatability which is found in much communitarianism. 
Montesquieu’s alleged relativism was an insistence that liberty (the security and 
absence of fear that all rational persons will cherish) required a f it  between consti­
tutional and legal architecture and prevailing social and cultural mores, a fit that 
would vary on a number of dimensions. These he sought to trace in a comparative 
sociology of liberty, later to be sophisticated by Tocqueville. Finally, even the Anti- 
Federalist concern with securing certain local interests and specific important 
rights against centralisation had very little to do with later communitarian attempts 
to trump individual rights with self-government.
The republican bene commune remained the shared political way of life of com­
mon liberty and justice and the institutions and practices that sustain it, in very 
large measure by maintaining the divide between the public and the private. How­
ever, in a manner to be explored, a republican common good o f liberty was con­
ceptualised through ideas of patriotism, which were shared by the entire tradition 
although typically in less drastic versions that that of Rousseau. It was described 
in various ways in terms of a particular political enterprise of a given people, and 
dramatised in the collective mnemonic structure around myths of beginnings and 
civic rites of passage, to which the republic owed its temporal existence.
Some have seen republicanism as a source of inspiration for invigorating (local) 
community life in a more broadly moral sense. Republicanism, for communitarians
12. As summarised by Haakonssen (1993:571):
A  striking feature of traditional republicanism is that for all its talk of 
virtue, it rarely presents anything that can be called a moral theory. At 
most, there may be an invocation of Aristotle or neo-Stoic ideas to 
support what is little more than an intuitive and tradition-bound idea of 
the wholeness of character that is required of the independent citizen. 
The parts of the whole character are, however, largely determined in 
terms of the public functions or offices required by the republican 
constitutional machineiy. O f course, respect for republican forms Is 
emphasised and, in that sense, a republican ethos inculcated. But this is 
a far cry from the ethical way of life detailed by communitarians ... The 
traditional republican tirades against ‘corruption’ and ’luxury’ had little 
to do with immorality as such, being primarily protests against 
intermixing one’s private life, whether good or bad, with the public 
realm, especially in economic matters
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of a more sociological brand,13 comes to stand for moral, responsible, or selfless 
behaviour, with participation in local community activities and shared cultured tra­
ditions, and with unreflected habits as the normative cement. This is perceived as 
being in contrast to the mindless egoism and hedonism of acquisitive economic lib­
eralism. While concerns of this new sociological moralism with such problems as 
poverty, inner-city deprivation, and unaccountable political authority in American 
certainly may be seen to strike a contemporary republican chord, the means, when 
they include the authority of tradition, a new moralism, and the comforts of relig­
ious worship as palliatives for individuals in search of a haven in a morally dis­
turbed modernity, do not. Sociologists like Robert Bellah, Phillip Selznick. Christo­
pher Lasch, and most recently Amitai Etzioni, might, if they wanted to, point to 
ground shared with Rousseau. But their standard embrace of Tocqueville is mis­
taken. Religion was primarily important for Tocqueville as a provider of the moral 
texture of liberal egalitarian individualism - one, but by no means the only, neces­
sary support of a political culture of equal liberty. Far from condemning liberal in­
dividualism and materialism tout court, Tocqueville aimed at securing politically 
beneficial versions of both. Moreover, his famous habits o f the heart were also re­
flective capacities, instrumental for securing republican liberty.
More generally, with the exception of Rousseau’s anti-modernism, republican­
ism does not really concern itself with alienation or ‘homelessness*, unless or until 
such sentiments become salient for the maintenance of civic virtue and liberty. 
Also, the moralistic description of the good citizen is, by and large, lacking in re­
publicanism. The individual capable of seeing beyond himself is certainly an ideal. 
But except in Cicero it is tied, as already noted, to the possibility of prudential ap-
13. If, broadly, philosophical communitarians confuse republicanism with con­
ventional Aristotelianism (often via Hegel), sociologists read Into it the emphasis on 
group, norm and role and the critique of modernity and industrial capitalism of 
some classical sociology (often through American pragmatism). In particular, see 
Bellah et al. (1985:30-31,196-218,252-71), and, rather more conservatively, Selz­
nick (1987:454) and Lasch (1991:170-76). William M. Sullivan, co-author o f Habits 
o f the Heart and The Good Society, connects his American discontents and hopes 
for spiritual recoveiy with a long elaboration of “the civic republican tradition", that 
“wisdom that sees a self-governing community, one whose public life embodies and 
in turn enhances the moral quality of its members’ lives, as a great ... human 
achievement". It emphasises “the value of politics as moral cultivation" and its 
“freedom is ultimately the ability to realise a responsible selfhood". The "language 
of civic republicanism addresses directly the craving of the human self for a life of 
inclusion in a community of mutual concern”. Sullivan asks “[h]ow ... is civic life 
possible? ... how can we conceive of individual fulfillment as realised through mu­
tual commitment to a common good?", conceiving the latter as “the peculiar human 
satisfaction of feeling oneself to be a significant member of an ongoing way of life 
that appeals because of its deep resonance of beauty and meaning”. He loosely re­
fers to Jefferson, Paine, Tocqueville, Montesquieu, Rousseau, and Hannah Arendt 
to support his claims (Sullivan 1986:1,21,159-64).
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1preciation of the communal nature of liberty and the need for solidarity and to the 
manner in which private and public interests are interlinked. Moreover, the repub­
lican tradition also stresses the fragile character of this prudential identification 
with the common good. Seeking republican ancestry for a new Moral Common­
wealth14 ignores republican obsessions with such eternal human weaknesses as 
the apathy and selfishness of the masses and the thirst for power and honour o f 
the great. Virtue, with or without uillages, is not natural, and corruption is not a 
failure of an inherent community sense.
III.
A third set of ways of getting republicanism wrong can be summarised as misun­
derstandings of the republican idea of autonomy. The most important mistake here 
largely derives from the modem reception of Rousseau. Again, this reception does 
not always correspond to what Rousseau actually thought, in particular it hardly 
taps the proper relation between Rousseau's justification of political order by w ay 
of a general will and his republican theory of virtue and citizenship. However, i f  
Rousseau’s well-known figure is accepted at face value as a description of the point 
of popular exercise of personal and political autonomy, it is not typical of the re ­
publican tradition. To recapitulate, Rousseau's classical dilemma was that, on the 
one hand, a person is only really free when consciously willing the rules according 
to which he must live. On the other hand, we live in societies, and hence the on ly 
way to be free is to will the same law for everybody, asking the proto-Kantian right 
questions, and doing, collectively, what is evidently rational.
But republicanism is not really about rational self-direction and self-legislation. 
Clearly, there is in the tradition an important ideal of the morally and politically 
mature citizen who is capable of showing, together with others, the prudence and 
determination necessary for the republic. Such a person is of a superior cast, more 
worthy of respect and capable of self-respect than the private 'idiot', the name used 
by the Greeks for those unfit to govern themselves.
Tocqueville took over Rousseau’s moral liberty, but transformed it into a rather 
different, aristocratic individualism, hoping for a spin-off from politics adding to the 
liberty of private life. So did, in different ways, Sidney, Cato, and Jefferson.15 But 
these concerns, and most certainly the idea of the moral necessity - as distinct from 
political necessity - of being able to consent to the rules of one’s collective, were but 
occasional side-stories to the essentially political project of republicanism, and of­
ten late-comers with a Christian and liberal flavour. In the next chapter, we return 
to the doctrines republicans were in fact supporting. To anticipate, they were about 
political autonomy through collective self-government as the means to protect eve-
14. As does Phillip Selznick, in a book thus titled (Selznick 1992).
15. And, in the stoic sense of mastery of Berlin’s inner citadel Cicero.
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rybody’s liberty; about the ability of individuals to influence the shaping of the ex­
act content of this liberty and the historical institutions embodying it; and about 
the legitimation (hence stability) of constitutional settlements as inevitably contin­
gent compromises between interests and viewpoints.
There is certainly no question of republicanism advocating the continuous for­
mulation of a comprehensive general will. Nor does Rousseau or any other writer 
support the idea that such ongoing self-government, with its severe and time- 
consuming demands for participation in collective deliberations, enjoys primacy 
over individual liberty, whether or not defined in terms of (natural) rights.16
The very ideal of popular participation is, in fact, easily misrepresented.17 Al­
though the argument about the necessity of citizens’ activity importantly defines 
the republican tradition, it is integrated into a wider concern with the durability of 
the republic and the fragility of liberty. Popular participation is only one element, 
for instance in the teaching of mixed government and the general republican obses­
sion with the balancing of power and the checks on ambition and passion. Again, 
while the possibility of civic-mindedness in and through participation is possible, 
republicanism is just as much about the many inherent obstacles to this possibil­
ity, even to the extent that participation in certain of its most sinister forms may be . 
one of the prime dangers to liberty.
16. Many critics of the tradition continue to believe that participation is primarily 
an educative device to create more rational, public spritied, citizens (e.g., Herzog 
1986:486). The stress on the primary importance, in political participation, of 
autonomy as rational self-direction is seen in programs for "republicans (to] ... so 
constitute the polity as to ensure that its decisions (...) are framed in the form o f ... 
laws which all citizens have participated in formulating and to which, in conse­
quence, all have given their free and equal consent" (Geise 1984:31). Similar views 
abound, for instance, in Sullivan (1986) and Oldileld (1990). While, in most of these 
writers, ‘autonomy’ is married to ‘community’, in the sense of collective interpreta­
tion of a substantial good, others emphasise a more rationalist-Rousseauan con­
ception (Habermas 1992b:3-5), feminists often in order to criticise ‘gendered* ambi­
tions to transcend all differences (e.g.. Young 1989:252-55; but cp. Dietz 1992:77). 
Some would-be republicans stress collective decision making at the expense of 
rights, provoking the accusation that republicanism entails facile beliefs in the 
possibility o f consensus (Herzog 1986:487-88). Barber, whose strong democracy is 
defended in republican language, cannot be accused o f confusing politics with the 
transparency and stillness of perfect consensus. Instead, he appeals to “politics in 
the participatory mode", with “(s]elf-govemment carried out through institutions 
designed to facilitate ongoing civic participation in agenda-setting, deliberation, 
legislation, and policy implementation". Here, the problem of consensus is sus­
pended, as such “politics deals with public disputes by subjecting them to a never- 
ending process of deliberation, decision, and action" (Barber 1984:150-51). Shu- 
mer’s republicanism, in a similar vein, is about citizens “work[ing] out together ... 
where they are going" (Shumer 1979:20).
17. To “classic republican thinkers ... participation, through which the citizens 
control the state, is the right of all. So far as practically possible, everyone is in­
volved in deciding all public matters” (Howe 1991:125-26).
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As regards the content of the ideal, ‘eternal vigilance’ certainly is not only, or in 
several authors even primarily, participation in political deliberation, let alone ac­
tual decision-making. Nor does the ideal of political equality, even when gradually 
extended to something remotely similar to modem democracy, entail that every­
body is expected to participate to an equal extent or in the same fashion, let alone 
to want to do so. In fact, the tradition starts with a stress on the different manifes­
tations of virtue to be expected from different categories of people.
IV.
A fourth and final way of misunderstanding republicanism, linked to some of the 
points mentioned above, but meriting special mentioning in view of its influence, is 
the notion o f politics for the sake of what we may call, for want of a better term, po­
litical constructivism. A very important aspect of republican discourse, in many ways 
well described by Pocock as far as his analysis holds, classically conceptualised by 
Hannah Arendt, and central, as we shall see, to my own emphasis on fragility, is 
the idea of the republic as an artificial, contingent structure, created and inserted 
into ‘secular time’. Also important, as already noted, is the manner in which politi­
cal rhetoric and narrative contributes to the formation of the memory of the repub­
lic as a discursive entity, a (nationally) shared articulation of meaning and collec­
tive mnemonic act.18 However, there are important reasons to resist a tendency, 
helped along, one feels, by theorists who confuse sophisticated methodologies and 
ideas about political historiography (be they neo-Wittgensteinian or Foucauldian) 
with a tradition of political thought. Republican discourse, to put it bluntly, is not a 
prototype of any of the postmodern doctrines currently in vogue,19 the res publica 
was not a collective subject articulation, and the experience of it had an existence 
independently of those at any rate heterogeneous and overlapping rhetorical frames 
employed, often strategically, to generate civic motivation.
Machiavelli, Sidney, Montesquieu, and Tocqueville in each their way exemplify 
the important republican recognition that a political order is a legal, constitutional, 
and, in a certain sense, cultural product of human design. Machiavelli - and Arendt 
of course - also thematize the degree to which such a design, because of the con­
tingent nature of human action, is difficult to control or predict completely. Sidney, 
Jefferson and Madison all note the contingencies of historical compromise, the 
limits of human reason and political imagination, and the necessity of future
18. See, in particular. Bruce James Smith (1985).
19. Shumer, foreshadowing recent poststructuralist treatments of Hannah 
Arendt’s theoiy of action and judgement and reading what he finds into Machia­
velli, sees republican action as the radical creation of human meaning in a world 
where “there are no absolutes, no transcending values by which to judge actions" 
(Shumer 1979:19). And the Idea of political action as a Foucault-type power game, 
the stakes of which are the constant generation o f ‘differences’ has finally heralded 
the arrival of a poststructuralist polis (Dalmayr 1977; 1984).
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readiness to amend and revise the shape of the republic, including the structure of 
rights. However, we also saw that republicanism had no problems accommodating 
itself to doctrines of natural rights, and, again, that common liberty as the point o f 
il all of a republic was remarkably and uncontroversially consistent through the 
centuries. This is all very far indeed from hazy notions of politics as the primordial 
positing of difference, instituting the ‘impartial discourse of liberty’ only then for 
citizens to identify with,
3. Philip Pettit - Republicanism vs. Liberalism
Having spent some energy extracting republicanism from a range of embraces, the 
battle over conceptual territory is still only half won. The reconstruction of republi­
canism as a discourse of ‘negative liberty’ and ‘instrumental’ political activity 
makes it obviously vulnerable to charges that it is not very different from liberal 
doctrines, or perhaps only different in non-interesting ways because unchallenging, 
or outdated, or just very unattractive - representing values that liberals have good 
reasons to resist. I shall deal with these questions in the next chapters of this the­
sis. The following chapter contains attempts to synthesise the historical contrasts, 
on four analytical dimensions, between republicanism and the various early En-, 
lightenment doctrines of individualism, which we may or may not denote as ‘liber­
alism’, and it seeks to suggest, in this light, what constitutes the main legacy of re­
publicanism. In the Conclusion, I briefly engage in a more principled discussion of 
the extent to which republicanism in fact constitutes a problem for contemporary 
liberal political theory. Before doing this, we shall look at a sophisticated but - so I 
shall argue - still unsatisfactory attempt to delineate republicanism from liberal­
ism, which claims a distinct concept of liberty for the former.
3.1. The *Resilience o f  Liberty '
It makes sense to talk of republicanism as a distinct historical tradition of political 
thought, understood as a type of argument and way of conceiving the political con­
dition. including the nature of the actors seeking to operate within it, which shares 
a number of fundamental values and assumptions about reality. I have argued, 
however, that the particular delineating searchlight of Baron’s and Pocock’s civic 
humanism fails to capture the tradition. A quite different searchlight has been pro­
posed by Phillip Pettit. It shares my resistance against the notion that republican 
discourse owes its long life to a widespread and die-hard nostalgia for a mythical 
past of human fulfilment through politics. We shall look at Pettit’s discussion in 
some detail. However, before turning to his work, it is worth considering the repub­
lican concept of liberty which has been presented so far.
The core of republicanism is the notion of liberty as a collective affair, a com­
mon way of life, where each citizen is a partaker and contributor to an ongoing, 
fragile, and essentially artificial project of mutual assurance and protection. It con­
nects the idea of a created legal status, involving a certain, historically developing
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number and type of guarantees, immunities, and protected spheres of action, 
equally enjoyed by all citizens, with the idea that this status must itself be created, 
protected, and realised and that this, to an important degree and in various ways, 
requires the political involvement of citizens. Citizens enjoy their status, their liber- 
tas - essentially the possibility and actuality of a situation of peace and security in 
which they may seek to realise their private projects as they please without inter­
ference - on the condition, not only that they respect the equal right of others to do 
so, but also that they are willing, from time to time or even often, to leave this 
peace and security, and act politically.
By analytical philosophical standards, republican liberty is a rather muddled 
conception. In the tradition, it is typically used to refer to at least two separate 
phenomena, sometimes distinguishing between them and sometimes not, and 
sometimes referring to one of them only. Also, both phenomena may be looked at 
from the point of view of a collective, such as a people or a state, or from the point 
of view of individual citizens. One phenomenon is popular participation in political 
power, conceived in a very broad sense - we may call it republican self-government 
or political citizenship. The other is the existence o f a legal framework which either 
implicitly or, more so in later formulations, explicitly involves equality before the 
law, security against a range of abuses of power and privilege, and a positively 
specified set of elements defining the status, the ‘rights’ and duties of a citizen - we 
may loosely speak here of republican constitutionalism and legal citizenship.
What links the two phenomena is the underlying idea of not being ruled, or ab­
sence of slavery. It is the condition of not having to live (or die) at the will and dis­
cretion of someone else. Not being ruled is a feature of a lawful, constitutional 
state. Such ‘rule by law, not men’ may in principle exist in a monarchical state 
where a wise legislator has given laws with a view to the common good, rather than 
his own good. But in general, and empirically speaking, enjoying this lawful state 
requires popular self-government of some sort. The failure to enjoy self-government 
and to participate in it is associated with the danger of subjection, by tyrants and 
despotism at home or conquerors from abroad, and with the inability, where laws 
are no longer protected and respected, to enjoy one’s status securely, or at all.
The conflation of the two ideas is not total. Both Cicero and Machiavelli occa­
sionally spoke about the liberty ‘of the Greeks’ (in self-government) as well as of 
that liberty which, whatever the political regime, is a question of lawfulness and 
the common good, of republics bene ordinate. Montesquieu started to distinguish, 
in somewhat confusing terms in retrospect, between the political liberty of the per­
son (experienced as security and defined by law), and the political liberty of the 
constitution. The latter was liberty, not by virtue of political (democratic) self- 
government pure and simple, but by virtue of a balanced constitutional and insti­
tutional set-up that secured moderation. The relation between the two was close 
but by no means determinate, as good criminal laws could yield de facto security in
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an otherwise immoderate regime. Rousseau and Tocqueville, in each their way. and 
often without complete consistency, distinguished between liberty as a status of 
security of property, privacy, and person, and on the other hand liberty as political 
self-government and political action. Separating the two aspects too much, as in 
Constant's famous essay, may eventually have been bought at the expense of jeop­
ardising the central intuition of a close connection, empirically as well as norma* 
tively, between the two types of liberty, and the stress on private enjoyment of se­
curity as a collective affair of mutual legal assurance, backed by collective political 
action.
Through history, republican liberty has also referred more loosely, and with a 
variety of connotations, to an integrated vision of a free way of life, or. as in Ma- 
chiavelli, to a free state. Components of this way of life have also been cultural and 
psychological, including the existence of a public sphere of political life, the quality 
of civic spirit characterising this sphere, and the inclinations and dispositions (de­
termination, vigilance, independence of mind, critical sense) of the individuals con­
stituting it, all lending to the idea of liberty additional connotations of what is re­
quired to sustain it, as well as which moral obligations it entails.
Finally, different versions of individual autonomy or moral self-directedness 
can be found. At times, such autonomy is primarily an independent value - the 
type of private existence republican liberty is meant to secure. More often, such 
personal autonomy, as in Sidney, Jefferson, or Tocqueville, is also part of that 
wholeness of character which helps sustain civic virtue.
Is there, then, a separate republican idea of liberty? At the level of fundamental 
value ideals, I do not think that there is. However, republicanism, like a very large 
part of liberalism, employs a conception20 of the liberty concept which is law- 
centred. And I shall go on to argue that republicanism is by and large alone in em­
ploying a fragility-centred conception o f the latter.
It has been suggested to view liberty as a triadic relation concept.21 If we un­
derstand liberty to denote the capacity of some agent, in the absence of some re­
straint, to do some action (enjoy some activity, state of affairs, etc.), few uses of the 
term will surely be left out. In our context, however, it makes sense to rely on a less 
broad idea to capture the separate intuition which unites liberals and republi­
cans.22 The departure point, here, is the idea of individuals being left alone - not 
being hindered in a certain range of activities.23 This base line still leaves much
20. For the distinction between concept and conception, see Rawls (1972:5); 
Lukes (1974: 26-27); cp. Connolly (1983:10flQ.
21. Oppenheim (1961); MacCullum (1972); Connolly (1983:140-78).
22. But which leaves out, for instance, the nationalist dictator who wishes *his 
people* to be ‘free* to ‘live their way o f life*. Here, we do not talk of individuals, and, 
whatever the restraint, there is no choice between a range of actions.
23. Including political activities, as that subsection o f individual liberty which 
concerns the unhindered access of individuals to choose to pursue different politi-
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scope for difference, most of which, extensively discussed in the literature.24 I shall
leave aside.
Phillip Pettit, who shares many of the points made above about what republi­
canism is not. has suggested that the tradition is characterised by an idea of liberty’ 
as resilient As opposed to a conception which simply says that liberty means a 
(specified) state of non-interference pure and simple, a republican conception
would say that the absence of interference is not enough, what is also 
necessaiy is that the agent be protected against interference, that she be 
given guarantees which help to insure against interference25
The security of non-interference is the collective liberty of the city: a defined area o f  
protected action which everybody agrees to grant each other, maximised only co l­
lectively and equally as the degree and type of security which the walls will hold, so 
to speak. This is distinct from the liberty o f the heath, the actual exercise (or a t­
tempted exercise) of action - maximal in a situation where no others are around, o r  
where superior strength is enjoyed. Exercise of one type of liberty tends to diminish 
liberty of the other type. Pettit's idea of republican liberty first of all is that of liberty 
as secured and constituted by law. As we have seen, this is indeed central to all the 
republican writers discussed. So is, in fact, the idea of liberty of the heath, on ly 
this by the name licentia, license. The existence of law which works effectively and 
equally for all transforms liberty as a mere formal opportunity concept (freedom to 
do or be what one wants, if  one can), to an ability concept (assurance of being able, 
unhindered, to do or be something - necessarily a specified range of actions).
Pettit, who has developed these ideas in much interesting detail,26 claims that 
resilience is what distinguishes the negative republican idea of liberty from the 
negative liberal idea. According to him, the latter also often stresses the importance 
of law, but sees it as a means to maximise the equal enjoyment of liberty by im ­
posing a measure of constraint on its exercise: Liberty, from the point of view of the 
individual, remains diminished by law. Pettit elaborates a very important point, 
first made by Skinner against Hobbes’ idea of liberty as absence of external im ­
pediments to motion, and the liberty of a citizen as the famous silence of law.27 A
cal courses o f action, however their specific range be defined.
24. For an overview, see Connolly (1983:140-78) and Kukathas (1993).
25. Pettit (1993a:165).
26. Braithwaite & Pettit (1990:54-85); Pettit (1989; 1993a; 1993b; 1993c; 
1997:17-79).
27. In fact, Skinner stresses not only the way that liberty as the status of an indi­
vidual citizen status is legally constituted, but also the way law may have to coerce 
individuals to be free, by having to "force us out o f our habitual patterns of self- 
interested behaviour, to force us into discharging the full range of our civic duties, 
and thereby to ensure that the free state on which our liberty depends is itself 
maintained free of servitude" (Skinner 1990:305).
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few other liberals have followed Hobbes’ definition, most notably Bentham and. 
more recently, Isaiah Berlin.28
The trouble with Pettit’s analysis of a distinct liberal idea of liberty as simple 
‘non-interference’, including legal non-interference, is that it renders the liberal 
camp quite small. The point has already been noted in the historical chapters but 
bears repeating. Not only was the republican conception of liberty not ‘positive’ in 
any of the familiar senses noted above. Its conceptual relation to legal status and 
constitutionalism was virtually undisputed by anyone, with the sole and uninflu- 
ential exception of Hobbes, in the very period where the republican analysis of the 
political condition and the place of civic virtue began to be disputed. Law, constitu­
tionalism, and political institutions as conditions or embodiments of civil liberty 
simply was not an issue.
Thus, we saw that Locke’s concept of liberty was distinctly law-centred, and 
contrasted to the arbitrary condition of slavery. Hume linked liberty to action “by 
general and equal laws, that are previously known to all" and to the superior qual­
ity of the British constitution. Indeed, criticising republicanism with its own con­
cepts, Hume scornfully claimed that “it may be affirmed of civilised monarchies, 
what was formerly said in praise of republics alone, that they are a government o f 
laws, not o f men”, Kant, most prominent of course, contrasted the “brutish free­
dom" of the “savage state" of warring states or individuals with the “calm and secu­
rity within a law-governed constitution (...) a civil commonwealth”, a condition 
which he termed “rightful freedonf, Constant (who is placed on the liberal side of 
his fence by Pettit), in a French, post-revolutionary context, discussed individual 
liberty, contrasting it to “arbitrary power", as something guaranteed by constitu­
tions and powerful “safeguards ... means of defence sanctioned by the written law". 
Laws create security and peace and constitute “bonds” under which is nurtured 
"the well-founded hope of living free, under the shelter which justice grants to the 
citizen”. And Mill, at a time when, according to Pettit, the liberal landslide had 
happened, spoke of "personal liberty ... which belongs" to a person “by law”, as ”le­
gal rights", and of “the license of disobedience”, contrasting 'personal* with an al­
leged “natural liberty of mankind".29
28. “By Liberty, is understood ... the absence of extemall Impediments: which Im­
pediments, may oft take away part of a mans power to do what hee would; but 
cannot hinder him from using the power left him", Hobbes, Leviathan, 14. To Ben- 
tham, a law must be judged according to "the mischief it does by the restraint it 
lays on liberty" (Bentham, Principles o f Legislation, VI, 13, cp. Appendix B, 1,3). For 
Bentham and his influence, see Pettit (1997: 41-50). For Berlin’s reference to Ben­
tham and Hobbes and employment of their concept, see Berlin (1969b: 123).
29. Locke, Second Treatise, V,22; Hume, ‘Of the Origin of Government*. ‘O f the 
Parties of Great Britain*. ‘Of Civil liberty*, Political Essays (pp.23,42-44,56, italics in 
original); Kant, Idea fo r  a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose and Perpet­
ual Peace, in Political Writings (pp.48,99, italics in original); Constant, Principles o f
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Pettit, of course grants that many liberals (prominently Hobbes) accepted that 
liberty needed to be restricted in order to create the possibility for people to be ab le 
to live peacefully in society. This is not helpful, though. Kant’s and Mill’s distinc­
tions between natural or ‘brutish’ liberty on the one hand and civil liberty on the 
other may reflect that the term liberty (or freedom) was used to denote relatively 
undesirable social states. But conceptually, the distinction is parallel to the ancient 
one between libertas and licentia. The old writers were perfectly capable of under­
standing the concept of ‘liberty as non-interference’.
Pettit's reconstruction does hit Bentham’s utilitarianism with its ultimate d is ­
regard for individual rights, as, clearly, one may enjoy a high level of individual or 
collective utilitarian welfare without having real, i.e., mutual and secure, republi­
can liberty. Also, liberty as strict non-interference or ‘silence of law’ may refer to  
certain strong contractarian natural rights theories, in particular that of Nozick 
who, in this respect, is a heir to certain nineteenth century laissez faire doctrines. 
Here, the notion that the person who enjoys liberty owes nothing to anyone (and 
may expect rather little in turn), does seem to epitomise a distinct, libertarian and  
marked-orientated twist to the value ideal of negative liberty.30
Now, I am sure that there does exist a value ideal on the right side of con ten t 
poraiy and historical liberalism of what we might call liberty-with-risk. But, d e ­
pending on what we mean by ’risk’, or the “willingness to do without ‘resilience*, th e  
distinction does not really separate so many liberals from Pettit’s project. Even d ie ­
hard market Darwinians would hardly want to risk the absence of a mutually re c ­
ognised legal framework securing property rights, inviolability of one’s person, or 
freedom of contract. They would not want to have to compete for that The point 
even of Hobbes’ minimalism, it will be remembered, was to legitimise the security 
afforded by a legal framework (enforced, of course, by the sword of a mighty sover­
eign, in whose absence it was ‘but words’). If a difference exists between a language 
of liberty which emphasises security or resilience, and one that emphasises risk, in 
this basic sense,31 modem liberal thought no less than the republican tradition 
clusters around the former, not the latter. This, incidentally, is why even libertari­
anism is a theory of rights. Rights is simply the concept in which the value of secu-
Politics Applicable to all Representative Governments, 18 in Political Writings (pp.289- 
90); Mill, Utilitarianism, Chap. 5 (p.45).
30. In a further development of a set of contrasts between liberal and republican 
models of political life, voting behaviour, and politicians, Pettit goes quite far in 
one-sidedly equating market metaphors of competition and bargaining with liber­
alism (Pettit 1993a: 171-79).
31. The latter may only survive in a pure form, beyond the borders of both liber­
alism and what most would define as libertarianism, as the sentiments of right- 
anarchists on the ideological fringe of the National Rifle Association, or of a street 
fighter surviving with his gun and his blade, both of whom challenge the very idea 
of state authority.
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rity under the rule of law, in most of its various aspects, is nowadays deposited. 
That Nozick may be criticised, from Pettit's perspective, because of his moralistic 
and unpolitical conception of rights, is another matter.
However, although veiy few political theorists would want their conceptions of 
liberty, however thin, to be un-resilient. in the sense of un-backed by a law that 
protects against domination, we may speak of resilience in a broader sense. Here, 
the contrast is between those liberals or libertarians who connect basic resilience 
with the values of radical self-reliance, of taking your chances and accepting your 
defeats, and those - like Rawls - who connect it up with various all-purpose mate­
rial means, rendering the realism and the success of free choices more secure or at 
least likely. I return to the distinction below.
Yet, Pettit’s line against Rawls, as a typical representative of liberals “on the 
lefT, is that the latter entertains a conception of liberty which "is directly continu­
ous with that of Hobbes and Bentham”. According to Pettit, Rawls implies that the 
state infringes on liberty in the pursuit of equal rights, including liberty rights, and 
that this is the meaning of a passage in Theory o f Justice, where Rawls says that 
“liberty can be restricted only for the sake of liberty”.32 This is misleading. In Rawls, 
the creation of rights does not restrict liberty as much as define and (equally) dis-. 
tribute the mutually possible liberty areas of a society, thus maximising the prime 
value of law-constituted equal liberty in a liberal polity. Again, if there is a termi­
nological difference here, with the introduction of rights, there is hardly a concep­
tual one.
It is true that the creation of one right (say, to social provision) restricts another 
right (say, to the economic fruits o f one’s industry). However, the rights-conflicts 
and rights-balancing which are thematized in contemporary political liberalism, 
and which require some liberties to be ‘restricted’, are by no means new. In par­
ticular, it is not at all absent in republican discourse. Thus, in a Roman language 
of law-constituted libertas, it would make perfect sense to say that libertas (once 
defined and installed) might be restricted by new laws, including some that im­
posed new, equal obligations on all. Also, one part of libertas, one of the liberties, as 
the old republicans could also say (as does Rawls), i.e.t one area of activity hitherto 
defined as legitimate and protected, could certainly meaningfully be said to be re­
stricted for the sake of another in whose would-be ‘silence’ liberty had so far ex­
isted. In particular, laws could restrict the liberty of some (i.e., the strong or 
wealthy) who could previously act ‘freely’, for the sake of the liberty of others (i.e., 
the poor).
Although the political value Ideal of the Greeks and the Romans was the law- 
constituted liberty of the city, there is ample textual evidence that they also under­
stood and used the Hobbesian idea of liberty as doing what one wants if one can
32. Rawls (1972:302), cited from Pettit (1993a:168), and Pettit (1997:50).
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(indeed, this is where Hobbes got the notion in the first place, only stripping licentia 
of its moralistic, derogatory flavour). Bracketing the changing texture of constraints 
on what counted as decent, proper, natural, or Christian behaviour in premodem 
cultures, the ancients were perfectly capable of conceptualising the human value o f 
freedom from restraint and the ability to do as one wished without being hindered - 
also not hindered by an inconvenient law. But they also realised that in order to be 
certain of enjoying such experiences of freedom along with their fruits, it was im ­
perative that spontaneous human behaviour be constrained and hedged by the 
means of law. Because men were not angels and because human virtue was inade­
quate, spontaneous action, unfettered by law, would quickly take the form of licen ­
tia, with its dual connotation of moral depravity and general insecurity in a war o f  
all against all.33
When, in Rawlsian liberalism, the values of equality and liberty as equal effec­
tive liberty in a system of justice are spelled out in a legal constitutional context 
(which is the context of political liberalism), they also translate to libertas as 'basic 
liberties’, or legally defined aspects of a citizen’s rights. Here, it is true that one lib ­
erty’s legal constitution (i.e., free speech) is also always, from a different point o f  
view, another law’s (i.e., about 'hate speech’) silence. However, in this respect, and 
bracketing differences of meaning between modem rights and the old fits, there 
simply is no substantial conceptual divide between a Roman and republican lan­
guage of legal citizenship as delineated in a constitution and a modem liberal one; 
between the language of rights and respect or disrespect for rights on the one hand 
and the language of libertas and licentia on the other.
The key value and the key concept of modem Rawlsian style rights-liberalism. 
which also informs its criticism of utilitarian disregard for the sanctity of the indi­
vidual and of libertarian disregard for the unequal actual enjoyment of the under­
lying basic value of liberty, is the same ‘resilient’ or secure liberty as in Pettit’s ver­
sion of republicanism. It is also what Kant meant by RechU namely the specified 
legal relations between citizens in a state, which defines and delineates (as Free­
dom with a capital F, as it were) the reasonable and possible equal enjoyment of 
'freedom' in the broader sense of normatively unpredicated, unimpeded activity. 
Thus, to Kant, the end of government is
the right of men under coercive public laws by which each can be given 
what is due to him and secured against attack from any others (...) the 
whole concept of an external right is derived entirely from the concept of 
freedom  (...) Right is the restriction of each individual’s freedom so that it 
harmonises- with the freedom of everyone else (in so far as this is
33. Pettit grants that republicans could use ‘natural liberty’ or licentia as a con­
cept - and uses this to suggest that the existence of this concept facilitated Ben- 
tham’s invention o f ‘modem’ liberal liberty as non-interference (Pettit 1997:43).
291
possible within the terms of a general law]. And public right is the 
distinctive quality of the external laws which make this constant 
harmony possible. Since every restriction of freedom through the 
arbitrary will of another party is termed coercion, it follows that a civil 
constitution is a relationship among/reemen who are subject to coercive 
laws, while they retain their freedom within the general union with their 
fellows34
As also suggested by our account of the republican encounter with natural rights 
and state of nature discourse in the American debates, Pettit’s depiction of the 
‘isolationist* and anti-social character of contract theories reflects a misunder­
standing of what most of the writers had in mind with their use of the term (natu­
ral) liberty in a preconstitutional state. To Hobbes, the liberty of the law of nature 
was meant as an empirical description of a state of affairs where no sovereign was 
empowered to institute social peace . It was not a moral right, let alone a socially 
valuable phenomenon. On the other hand, when writers like Jefferson. Paine and 
Madison spoke of men as bom equally free and endowed with certain natural 
rights, this did refer to the moral status of the individual and to a more or less 
comprehensive understanding of devine intention with, and restrictions on, the 
conduct of men towards their fellows. But again, such liberty was not a political 
value ideal. Locke, Jefferson, Rousseau, Kant and a host of other writers shared 
the recognition that the liberty worth craving for for individuals, conceptual differ­
ences aside, was the liberty of a constitutional state.
The point is certainly well taken that contractarian political theory should not 
lead us to entertain notions of rights as valuable private liberty possessions which 
individuals trade for something else. Many authors of the Enlightenment toyed 
with ideas of pre-civilised spontaneous order, which represented a marked differ­
ence to the Renaissance conception of a pre- or extra-civilised state as chaotically 
violent. However, neither in Kant, nor Rawls, nor most of the American discourse 
does the contractual devise rely on any historical assumptions of previous self- 
sufficiency in a state of nature, which individuals may seriously speculate whether 
or not to give up. In stead, the individualism of contract theory served to model the 
idea of civic liberty as a mutual construction whose exact content had to be demo­
cratically established, so that its legitimacy derived from the more or less active 
consent of all. The difference between republican and Rawlsian, as well as most 
earlier contractarian liberal conceptions of citizenship is indeed important, but it 
does not consist in a disagreement on its essentially mutualist nature.
This said, the existence of anarchist and libertarian traditions of political 
thought does demonstrate the possibility of liberal discourse sliding into concep­
tions of naturally free, self-sufficiently acting agents. In Locke, Sidney and Ameri-
34. Kant, Theory and Practice, in Political Writings (p.73).
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gUSBulfi'
can discourse, the language of natural rights, consent, and the right of resistance 
was used to demonstrate the legitimacy of changing one (despotic, monarchical) 
government for another (republican). Madison was one of several clearheaded writ­
ers who pointed out how basing the legitimacy of the state on the unanimous con­
sent of all to ‘give up’ their executive right of self-defence in a state of nature would 
make political society impossible. In a period of political founding, revolutions, and 
civic unrest, this was plainly obvious. However, in a later, nineteenth century con­
text of capitalist civil society, it did became possible to shift the emphasis from the 
contingency of political structures to the naturalness of the market, taking the 
minimal rules of contract for granted in a manner that neither Montesquieu. Smith, 
nor Hume could ever have done. Also, such circumstances placed a premium on 
the willingness to take risks and compete, to pursue one’s opportunity for happi­
ness at the expense of others, but for the good of all. Once law, constitutionalism, 
and mutual restraint could disappear as constitutive empirical conditions of any 
form of reasonable and valuable liberty, not least the freedom to acquire and keep 
property and dispose of it by means of enforceable contracts, it became a great deal 
easier to construct moral theories which seriously questioned the legitimacy of the 
state or the reasonableness of civic obligations and solidarity in it.35
In his new book, Pettit is clearly aware that a great many of the authors which 
are usually called liberal become republicans in his view of the world (i.e., Locke 
and “the French juridical tradition”). He also, half-heartedly and in foot note fash­
ion, grants that “Rawls can sometimes be read as endorsing a similar view of law 
and liberty" (as that of Hayek),36 wisely refraining from a substantial encounter 
with the highly juridically inspired main stream of contemporary liberal theory 
(Dworkin, Raz).37 But apart from Hobbes. Filmer, “tones who were opposed to 
American independence" (surely neither Hume nor Burke),38 Bentham, and a few 
relatively obscure followers of the latter, i.e., William Paley and John Lind, few writ­
ers remain. The absence of further examples from the last two centuries is con­
spicuous, to put it mildly. And the claim that "the conception of liberty as non­
interference came to replace the received republican notion at the end of the eight­
eenth century", or that liberals, despite their being “a broad church ... most of them 
unite in endorsing the modernist conception of liberty" is indeed mysterious. What, 
we may ask, should we say of the entire French tradition, including Constant,
35. The rise of industrial capitalism also, incidentally, facilitated the emergence of 
utopian socialist and Marxist conceptions of a civil society without law and state 
institutions.
36. See Hayek (1960:143,155).
37. Pettit (1997:10).
38. Burke contrasted the ancient, constitutional, and regulated “law and liberties" 
of the English with “liberty in the abstract" and the unruly and violent “new liberty 
of France", Burke, Refactions on the Revolution in France (pp.90,119). For Burke’s 
distinctly law-centred position, see also Kukathas (1993:29).
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Kant’s and Hegel’s numerous nineteenth century followers and developers, or John 
Stuart Mill, Green, and Hobhouse. Despite the analytical merits of Pettit’s distinc­
tion, the historical contrast between liberalism and republicanism is untenable.39
As noted in the previous chapter, libertarian and market based conceptions 
which diminished the importance of law and constitutionalism certainly partook in 
the decline of republican conceptions of politics. However, by employing resilient 
liberty and law as a historical line of division, Pettit begins too late in the history of 
ideas. In particular, he misses the great discursive battles which took place from 
the early Enlightenment over the meaning of virtue, commerce, representation, po­
litical architecture, and natural rights, and over interpretations of the conditions 
and values of the ancients versus the modems. Thus, he fails to place writers like 
Locke, Hume, and Hamilton in the non-republican camp, or to see the ambiguity of 
writers like Montesquieu, Madison, Adams, and Smith, all of which either denied or 
consciously diminished the importance of civic virtue.40
3.2. The 'Intangible Hand '
There are more aspects to Pettit’s development of the resilience of liberty. A second, 
‘social space’ aspect is discussed in a great deal of very interesting detail through­
out Pettit’s work. For instance, it has been applied to the sociology of crime- 
deterrence and punishment.41 Resilience he argues, is also a question of liberty 
being secure and robust in the sense of the actually forthcoming respect for every­
body’s liberty, and, furthermore, in the sence of the psychological state of expecting 
security, i.e., the opposite of the fear or apprehension of trespassing, which may 
ensue in a public culture where the existence of non-domination “will tend to be­
come a matter of public belief*. Whereas the existence of law and legal sanction is a 
step towards this valuable state of affairs, it also has a significant extra-legal aspect 
which has to do with the structure of expectations and generated motivations 
which characterise the social space of a polity. Briefly, Pettit has in mind various 
social and institutional mechanisms, which have in common their reliance on the 
motivational logic of exposure, the risk of shame and, most generally, the “self- 
interest in ... reputational welfare“. One such type of mechanism is the jury, an­
other is open voting. Together, such elements of mutual control and moral policing 
contribute to what Pettit terms “the intangible hand", which “helps to nurture a 
pattern of behaviour by holding out the prospect that its manifestation will earn 
the good opinion of others and/or the failure to manifest it will earn the bad".42
Pettit makes important points here. In Montesquieu and some of his Anti- 
Federalist followers, we saw that absence of fear entered into the very definition of
39. Pettit (1997:21.45,50).
40. Pettit (1997:102).
41. In Not Just Deserts, Braithwaite and Pettit (1990).
42. Pettit (1993a: 176: 1997:166,250).
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individua] political liberty. Also, the reliance on mechanisms of social control are 
evident in Cicero, Machiavelli, Harrington, Sidney, Rousseau, and Montesquieu, as 
well as in American writers like Madison. As Pettit rightly notes, republican think­
ers are not, by and large, concerned with why and in which moral state individuals 
decide to become virtuous, as long as the outcome is that they behave virtuously. 
However, I have two reservations about Pettit’s employment of the idea:
One concerns the contrast to liberalism. The stress on actual security and 
opinion of security does serve to delineate Pettit’s republicanism (which, in the 
1997 book, includes Shklar’s early ‘liberalism of fear’) from libertarian market doc­
trines and survival of the fittest and laissez fa ire *3 Although both Hobbes and 
Bentham were highly interested in probabilistic security,43 4 it may also be noted 
that the former’s utilitarian calculus has no place for the essential human experi­
ence of fear. But Pettit’s orchestration of the contrast again misses an important 
historical debate. This is the liberal criticism of the Enlightenment of the exces­
sively intolerant and interfering political life of the ancients. ‘Enthusiasm’, collec­
tive mobilisations of virtue, and social control was seen as either positively danger­
ous, or conducive to a type of liberty which was decidedly less valuable than that of 
modem ages. What Hume and Montesquieu feared, what Harrington unreflectively 
praised, what Rousseau consciously revaluated, and what intensely concerned 
Jefferson, Ferguson, Madison, let alone Tocqueville, was exactly Pettit’s ‘intangible 
hand’. Enlightenment writers believed that the norm control of the ancients con­
stituted intrusion into the most intimate circles of the individual (producing fear 
rather than a feeling of security). Thus, the new accounts of commercial civil soci­
ety and political architecture were tailored to suggest the possibility of a life where 
fewer people acted in such irregular and passionate ways as to create fear in the 
first place; or where such action was accepted as inevitable and checked or chan­
nelled accordingly by institutions that were superior to those of the ancients.
This leads me to a second reservation. The propensity to tolerate and live with 
(religious) diversity, and the capacity to practice a more distancing, cool civility 
were# early liberal values which were also in fact taken seriously, along with the 
competing accounts of social space and social virtues on which they depended, by 
late republican authors such as Ferguson, Jefferson, and Tocqueville. Liberals also 
evoked ideas of civil society and institutional designs which continued the concern 
with the generation of social expectations and the power of opinion. But generally
43. But there is no contrast to contemporary liberalism. As regards the value of 
security of liberty, Rawls is typical in his move, parallel to that of Pettit, from the 
perspective of the individual beholding his inviolable constitutional rights, to that 
of the collective beholding a basic framework, surrounded, in due course, by a po­
litical culture characterized by a shared sense of justice. As noted in Chapter 2, the 
trouble with Rawls’ conception is its lack of sociological realism. See Rawls 
(1972:453-512).
44. See Pettit (1997:46-47).
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speaking, liberals in the past as well as today would not tread the territory of “in­
stitutionally designed pressures" as lightly as does Pettit, or use with the same 
nonchalance the instrument of coercive law. The question is. and we return to this, 
if the republican tradition in general, and modem versions of it in particular, would 
do so either. Pettit’s idea of social space and what he calls “civility" is about 
“mounting the level of vigilance, and therefore a level of exposure to sanction". He 
associates it with socialising mechanisms which reinforce awareness of non­
domination (his version of Rawls' sense of justice in a well-ordered society), and his 
position implies that social control, like state intrusion, constitutes a non­
dominating form of interference if done “according to opinions of a kind that I 
share". In making such claims, Pettit relies on questionable assumptions, dis­
cussed below, about a relatively accessible and easily constructed common good, 
i.e., an institutionally embodied, culture and group sensitive, and consensually le­
gitimised conception of libertas as a system of non-domination.45
The trouble, of course, is that no such consensus is to be expected; that relying 
too strongly on it as a regulative public idea in a pluralistic society is likely to breed 
a mixture of in-group righteous indignation and out-group resentment and aliena­
tion; and that in its absence societies require open-mindedness, tolerance, and 
willingness to compromise, even as majorities eventually decide. Moreover, Pettit’s 
habitual norm control and shaming is unlikely to do the trick of enforcing the 
shared recognition of highly complex legal constructs of non-domination, with the 
various types of group rights and exemptions which Pettit envisages.46 Complex so­
cieties which recognise increasingly diversified forms o f social need require in­
creasing levels of reflection and norm-distancing. Norm control is about determin­
ing what ‘people like us’ will do or like in a given situation. All societies require 
such control, and republicans like Machiavelli and the British Commonwealth writ­
ers stress it. However, as Pettit himself notes, citing Skinner,47 republicans already 
in the Renaissance lauded the ideal of impartiality. Jefferson’s conception of public 
debate and Tocqueville’s obsession with pluralism, individuality, the supreme dan­
ger of conformism, and the despotism of public opinion also need to be noted.48
45. For instance, he must assume “that domination is a salient evil, and that re­
moving it or reducing it is a more or less unambiguous enterprise", and believe it to 
be easy “to show how institutions can be designed ... so that people’s enjoyment of 
non-domination is more or less smoothly maximized" (Pettit 1997:92,103).
46. E.g., Pettit (1997:130,135-47).
47. “Our watchword ought to be audi alteram partem, always listen to the other 
side", and "[tjhe appropriate model will always be that o f the dialogue, the appro­
priate stance a willingness to negotiate over rival intuitions concerning the applica­
bility of evaluative terms. We strive to reach understanding and resolve disputes in 
a conversational way" (Skinner, cited from Pettit 1997:189).
48. May we detect, in these Tocquevillean themes, a reason why Pettit’s "more 
modem republican tradition" only "perhaps” includes the former (Pettit 1997:19)?
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Although Pettit invokes Sun stein and Habermas in the isolated context of con­
stitutional contestation and debate, he makes no attempt at all at discussing the 
relationship and obvious tension between social space as norm-control and norm- 
enforcement and on the other hand social space as reflection and impartiality, let 
alone the difference between the types of institutions that might reinforce one or 
the other.49 Under the complacent regime of the intangible hand, and in the con­
spicuous absence of any mentioning of the multiple social, cultural, and ideological 
forms of domination of which volumes of contemporary social theory speak.50 Pet­
tit’s gestures in the direction of multiculturalism and politics of difference seem 
postulated.51 In my view, as developed in the next chapter, the republican tradition. 
taken as a whole, is better characterised by its ability to theorise both the ambigu­
ity of the former conception of social space, the necessity of both, and the questions 
of how they are generated and given their proper form.52
3,3, The Substance o f  Resilience
The last aspect of the republican resilience of liberty, as I read Pettit’s position, 
concerns the actual, substantial legal content of libertas. According to Pettit, resil­
ience does not just mean the security and predictability of any equal civic status; 
the sheltering walls of whatever laws a person may find himself obeying. Indeed, 
Pettit is in accordance with the classical tradition In the sense that areas of non­
domination must be relevant and valuable ones for citizens’ lives, and laws must be 
just. And we have noted that the republican tradition, generally speaking, had no 
problems in assuming, in a common sense or even implicit manner, that libertas 
must involve and further a set of very basic private immunities and freedoms o f ac­
tion, corresponding to things that every reasonable man would want for himself 
and his family, even as the grandi, as noted by Machiavelli, wanted more. Pettit’s 
republicanism, however, goes a great deal further.
First of all, he claims that the constitutive idea of resilience or non-domination 
may be used as a master value to generate a fairly comprehensive conception of 
citizenship. Distinguishing between “intensity” and “extent" of non-domination, he 
defines the former in the following manner:
. Take a person’s powers to include all those factors that are liable to 
affect political, legal, financial, and social clout. The intensity of
49. Pettit (1997:187f); cp. Rosenblum f1994a; 1994b).
50. E.g., Lukes (1974); Foucault (1984).
51. Consider Pettit’s, to my mind unconvincing idea that the existence of civility 
as norm-compliance and social control is conducive to the inclusion of new groups. 
Pettit’s move is to focus, not on the responsiveness of the majority society which 
does not recognize that something constitutes an offence against a vulnerable 
group, but on the need for in-group norm-compliance as a resource for “articulat­
ing shared grievances" (Pettit 1997:247).
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someone’s freedom as non-domination - if you like, the level of their 
protection - is not just a function of the powers that enable the person to 
resist or deter arbitrary interference by others. It is also a function of the 
powers at the disposal of those others52 3
The extent of liberty as non-domination, by contrast, is about “the number o f areas 
where they can enjoy such non-domination". Where republicanism implies a quest 
for strict equality of the powers of self-protection wherever they are first established 
(i.e., the sphere of civil rights), including minimization of steps towards relative in­
creases of the ‘powers of others’, Pettit does not think it necessarily implies “that at 
any point where people differ in the range of choice available to them - at any point, 
in effect, where they differ in material resources - it is always better for overall non­
domination that there should be equality".54
Although Pettit speaks of different ‘areas’ of protection inside which a person’s 
experience of non-domination may be more or less ‘intense*, he also seems to dis­
tinguish between more or less fundamental spheres, perhaps moving from legal 
and physical integrity of the person to ‘range of choice’ and material resources to 
effect them. However, according to Pettit, the normative vocabulaiy of non­
domination, although it does not lend itself to strong egalitarianism, may be em­
ployed to support a wide range of policies instituting non-domination in “different 
spheres of dominium, different levels of resource and control, in everyday life", thus 
countering “the dangers that ordinary people face in their dealings with one an­
other, individually and in the context of collective and corporate organization". Re­
publicans, he claims “will be less sceptical of the possibility of state intervention 
and they will be more radical in their view of the social ills that the state ought to 
rectify”. Moreover, the republican language of freedom as non-domination is capa­
ble of articulating “grievances which outrun the complaints of its founding com­
munities". Thus, over and above the fairly traditional conception of legal, political 
and economical or social dimensions of citizenship, and a coresponding economic 
language of ‘powers’, Pettit goes as far as claiming (without elaborating), that liberty 
as non-domination “lends itself at eveiy point of departure to further glosses and to 
further applications". Indeed the general idea that “a person not be exposed to the 
possibility of interference on an arbitrary basis", in a modem, pluralist society, ac­
cording to Pettit, translates to the requirement that
The person must not be in a position where others can interfer in their 
[sic] lives in a manner that may be guided, for all the checks available, 
by interests or ideas that they do not share at any level This ideal is 
dynamic, because there is never a final account of what someone’s
52. Pettit (1993a:162,176).
53. Pettit (1997:113, italics added).
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interests are or of whether certain forms of interference ... are guided by 
ideas that they share54 5
Moreover, throughout his development of republican policies, Pettit claims theo­
retical ancestry in the republican tradition. This claim - which is a primary concern 
in our reconstructive context - needs to be heavily qualified. By and large, the at­
tempt to represent republicanism as an ideal of comprehensive citizenship with 
economic welfare back-up only tabs the ideas of a part of the tradition (e.g.. Rous­
seau). Pettit sees himself as modernising the republican intuition of the value of 
non-domination, security, or resilience, by taking into account modem dimensions 
of dominance which the classics did not envisage. This is misleading, though. The 
uncontested historical core of libertas was a rather limited idea of personal security 
and protection from the arbitrariness of the powerful (in particular the arbitrary 
taxation or confiscation of property). Pettit’s notion that republican liberty is open 
to new interpretations and applications certainly captures an important republican 
insight (e.g., Paine’s and Jefferson’s ‘the Earth belongs to the living’ argument), but 
not in the sense that new republican generations will necessarily fill up new spaces 
of possible domination and personal insecurity. Jefferson's call for social subsis­
tence provision (e.g., in his letters from France) was part of an early conception of 
natural rights which conceived of basic subsistence as a necessary ingredient of 
the moral agency (and duty to do good) of individuals, endowed with equal dignity 
by their creator. In the American writers, including Jefferson and Paine, it was 
combined with doctrines of invisible hand economics and freedom of contract (Pet­
tit’s ‘liberalism’). Also, whatever Jefferson’s ideas o f a fair start for American free­
holders, liberty also involved a stress on personal self-sufficiency, opportunity, and 
individual effort which was almost invariably conceptualised to require a strictly 
limited government.
The general point is that the particular flavour and thickness of republican re­
silient liberty, although never reduced to dogmatic libertarian non-interference, 
varied with the context. However, a republican case uxis made for a more derived. 
instrumental extension of citizenship in an egalitarian direction. This was the idea, 
found from Machiavelli to Sidney to Jefferson, that a certain degree of material se­
curity and economic independence (and/or possession of arms) was required in or­
der to qualify as a good, reliable citizen.56 This was not, as in Pettit, seen from the 
point of view of the individual, but from that of the republic and the need to mobi­
lise enough civic virtue, whether as military or political clout, so that the citizen in 
question could be trusted to act in the interest of the community. In order to secure 
that independence from the threats and bribes of the powerful which was neces-
54. Pettit (1997:103,113, italics added).
55. Pettit (1997:130.133,146,148, italics added).
56. See also the discussion in the next chapter of populism and liberalism.
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sary to have the common good in mind, some early republicans would in fact re­
strict citizenship to those who had the means to support or defend themselves, 
simply arguing that only these were capable of enjoying the fruits of liberty. More 
democratic and radical versions, by contrast, favoured various agrarian law 
schemes which could make freemen of individuals who were not so before.57
Pettit, invoking Rawls’ concept of “reflective equilibrium“ claims that the con­
cept of non-domination contains the raw material for an attractive political ideal 
which “has institutional implications that prove, at least on reflective considera­
tion, to equilibriate with our firmer intuitions”. I cannot deal adequately here with 
the case that Pettit makes for this assertion. However, despite being an interesting 
thought experiment with a distinct moral intuition, it seems less than solid. Pettit, 
for instance, talks out of existence the problem of indeterminant trade-offs between 
intensity and extent by claiming that non-domination policy efforts in different ar­
eas generally support each other, so that a state does not “have to worry about 
whether it may be better to concentrate on this or that area", as an effort in one 
place does not jeopardise the intensity of non-domination in another. Also, he rec­
ognises in principle a large degree of indeterminacy in the choice of a state "be­
tween being more restrictive on the extent of choice, thereby giving people a more 
intense degree of non-domination, and being less restrictive fi.e., more areas of free 
choice) and giving them a lower degree of non-domination”. This type of indetermi­
nacy is particularly salient in the choice of a state as to “how far it seeks to expand 
people’s choices into new areas by removing physical and cultural obstacles". How­
ever, these seemingly massive problems are “effectively removed" once we add the 
"plausible assumption" of “a fairly accessible limit" inside "any area of activity" be­
yond which the efforts of the state to "protect the vulnerable from the dangerous" 
will render “the state itself... a greater threat to freedom as non-domination than 
any threat it seeks to remove".58
Once such ‘assumptions’ are made it is easier to understand that Pettit is ready 
to claim neutrality for a comprensively worked up ‘republican* constitutionalism;59 
how he can envisage a public consensus about relevant "interests and ideas" about 
what constitutes domination; and how such an evolving consensus could be fed by 
a mixture of deliberative “contestability" on behalf of new groups or new needs, and 
the recognition by previous majorities “that they each have a common interest in 
being protected from others in a constitutionally assured manner".60 Even accept­
ing, unhistorically, that a republican polity would necessarily carry Pettit’s statist
57. Harrington, Sidney, Cato, Rousseau, Jefferson, and many Anti-Federalists 
were agrarian egalitarians. Amar (1990:37-40) comments on the two traditions. 
Neither the citizenship-property nexus, nor the distinction between egalitarian and 
exclusivist solutions is distinctly republican (King & Waldron 1988).
58. Pettit (1997:104-5,130).
59. Pettit (1997:97).
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features, its particular constitutional creation and distribution of rights and privili- 
ges would still be quite indeterminate, once the bluntness of the language of non­
domination is recognized. Who. after all, is to judge whether, and with what weight 
a claim merits as an instance of dominination in need of repair? What degree and 
kind of equality constitutes adequate empowerment (resilience and ability to assert 
oneself) in the labour market, the family, or the political sphere? How to weigh the 
claims of groups with special needs? And exactly when do the legitimate powers of 
a state to interfer, redress, and empower, which Pettit's republicans so enthusiasti­
cally endorse, accumulate to the sort of potential for state domination, which the 
same republicans fear (and on which empirical grounds, if any, might “the vulner­
able” be expected to evaluate this danger in the same way as the powerful)? Where, 
indeed, is the “built-in brake" which Pettit assumes a reflective equilibrium will 
discover? Moreover, it is simply not clear in what manner the question of how “the 
state can improve the defenses that it provides for its citizens against possibilities 
of interference” may be connected to such matters as "educational and medical 
provision" (your employer may well ‘dominate* you, if you are ill, but even i f  he 
doesn’t surely you require care?). Pettit’s agenda of seeking means “whereby the 
value of citizenship can be increased" is close to welfare liberalism - occasionally, 
one feels that a language of fairness and entitlement would suit his intuitions bet­
ter.60 1
Haakonssen, who grants the originality of Pettit’s republicanism as a distinct 
normative search light, puts the problem succinctly:
The problem with this idea of republican negative freedom, resilient 
freedom, is much the same as the problems that have always been 
perceived in the liberal ideal of negative freedom. As long as the pursuits 
of individuals are likely to involve which aspects of the individual's 
independence warrant the special protection of the law. The liberal 
tradition has generally tried to formulate this by means of the concept of 
rights. The suggested republican idea of negative liberty shifts the 
problem but does not solve it. The problem is now, which forms of 
resilience should be backed or instituted by law62
The upshot of Pettit’s work, also reflected in his one-dimensional account of politi­
cal space as social control, is an attempt to narrow the field of republican delibera­
tion and the fields of value that a republican conception of politics can be under­
stood to protect. Pettit’s introduction of contestability and his appeals to the work 
of Cass Sunstein and Jurgen Habermas is timely. But it is patched onto a theory of 
politics which, despite its concern with non-domination, is decidedly unrepublican
60. Pettit (1997:63,68,183fi).
61. Pettit (1993a: 185; 1997:105,150).
62. Haakonssen (1993:572).
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in its very ambition to prejudge, theorise, and construct the shape of the republic in 
the abstract. Not only are the institutional embodiments of non-domination radi­
cally indeterminate. The very ideal hardly captures more than a part of the norma­
tive fabric of modem societies. Pettit's orchestration of non-domination seeks to 
monopolise a modem normative space occupied by the concerns of environmental­
ists, feminists, multiculturalists. socialists, and Rawlsians - leaving on the way side 
only a minority of die-hard free-marketeers and Benthamite liberals of seriously 
bad faith.63 Of course, the procedure makes nonsense of actual ‘reasonable plural­
ism’ in advanced industrial societies in a manner that contemporary political liber­
alism cannot after all be accused of.
To my mind, the value of Pettit’s conception of resilient liberty lies in its ability 
to conceptualise a political value. First of all, he develops an important distinction 
between ‘freedom* as a generic agency concept and ‘Freedom’ as a political value 
ideal, in the manner discussed above. Secondly, once we grant that virtually all lib­
eral doctrines must support a resilient law-centred liberty, even when such liberty 
is only based on very minimal, libertarian rights schemes, we may appreciate an 
intuitively clear difference between political values, where only one emphasises re­
silience in the broader sense of material and social back-up for free agency. Pettit's 
work helps us concentrate on a difference on the level of substantial richly tex­
tured, human values.64 Welfare liberalism of the Rawlsian type enriches basic re­
silient liberty with the normative content of something like the equal and mutually 
guaranteed material powers to pursue one’s projects of the good life, (almost) what­
ever they be. Right-liberal and libertarian doctrines enrich basic resilient liberty 
with such contents as the opportunity to take risks, to compete and measure one­
self against others, to rely on one’s own efforts, to 'deserve* the material and psy­
chological fruits of such contingent efforts, and to be existentially responsible, 
autonomous, or self-relying by acting on the world and taking the consequences.
Such are some of the rich flavours and more or less independent subtexts to 
liberty in its generic sense of resilient citizenship status under law. They are also, 
in a manner that Pettit’s project of republican reconstruction fails to acknowledge, 
an integrated part of the contestations of libertas. It is historically inaccurate to 
claim that republican resilient liberty was necessarily resilient in the specific sense 
of what Pettit proposes. The veiy idea of presenting a comprehensive scheme of 
values and institutions as 'Republicanism* - rather than using one’s republican 
understanding of politics to present a theory of politics - is a serious misreading of 
the tradition. As I argue in the next chapter, this would blur the distinction be­
tween republicanism as a decidedly unfoundationalist discourse of compromise, 
pluralism, and political contingency, and various types o f liberal rationalism.
63. Pettit (1997:81.132).
64. Berlin (1990).
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3.4. From Resilience to Fragility
Each of the criticisms noted above point to one last troubling aspect of Pettit’s 
work. In contrast to Skinner and Viroli. let alone Pocock. Pettit does not view politi­
cal participation as a defining feature of the tradition. In Republicanism where the 
place accorded to participation is slightly bigger, he rightly notes that “participation 
may be essential to the republic, but that is because it is necessary for promoting 
the enjoyment of freedom as non-domination, not because of its independent at­
tractions". However, he fails to recognise the way that ‘participation’ u jo s  a part o f 
the republican idea of liberty and to see the manners in which freedom was pro­
moted by active citizenship.65
In wanting to disassociate himself from all ‘positive’ conceptions of liberty, 
which are almost always also “concerns with democratic membership and partici­
pation", Pettit fails to see what Viroli and Skinner have stressed, and what I de­
velop in this thesis, i.e., the existence of a conception of liberty which was both es­
sentially law-centred and defined by the instrumental importance that it placed on 
self-government and specific modalities of civic virtue. Pettit cites a passage from 
Machiavelli about the possibility of enjoying civil liberty in a monarchy, notes that 
Harrington saw “people’s liberty as consisting in something distinct from participa­
tion in government", and stresses the obvious distrust of the common multitude o f 
the popolo in early and not so early republicanism. Also, according to Pettit, 
“[djemocratic control is certainly important in the tradition, but its importance 
[does not come] from any definitional connection with liberty". The truth in Pettit’s 
position is that republicanism cannot be equated, for obvious historical reasons, 
with democratic sovereignty or collective self-legislation, although this has been 
done by modem commentators. But in order to rescue republican liberty from a 
neo-Rousseauan embrace, Pettit throws the baby out with the bathwater. He fails 
to see the dual nature of libertas, which Wirszubski, who is cited, has highlighted 
in the case of Rome, and which our republican history encountered as early as 
classical Greece. Republican civic activity does not necessarily equate full-scale 
Rousseauan populism, it only has it as one of its later forms. Yet, in Greece and 
Rome, even in the conservative Cicero, libertas as a concept contained both the 
‘negative’ aspect of security under a regime of laws and the ‘positive aspect of con­
stitution-protecting self-government, where the ‘self bore some relation to the citi­
zens of a republic, as distinct from foreign rulers or an unaccountable home grown 
despot, and to activities which it was the duty of these citizens to perform. Typi­
cally, this did not entail ‘rule by the people’ (a dangerous and disruptive prospect in 
the opinion of most classical writers), but more often things as a popular element in 
the government and legislation, political discussion and scrutiny, performance of
65. Pettit (1997:8).
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administrative and judicial duties, and above all the willingness to fight bravely in
wars.66
It is useful at this point to place Pettit's views in perspective in the context of a 
different author who, incidentally, is summarily dismissed by Pettit. Bracketing her 
political existentialism and Nietzschean conception of action, Hannah Arendt’s 
ideas may be used to highlight the shortcomings of the latter, in particular his lack 
of concern for civic activity, in a fashion that foreshadows our republican recon­
struction in the following chapter.67 First, in a manner which is strangely absent in 
Pettit's rational and constructivist approach, Arendt was concerned with revolu­
tionary founding, popular resistance, and collective, even rebellious civic action in 
the defence of what she called a safe ‘place in the world' - not just against visible 
tyrannical majorities, but also very much against the soft Tocquevillean despotism 
of a bureaucratic state and that ‘rule of nobody* of which one is occasionally re­
minded, when contemplating Pettit’s conception of impersonal mechanisms of con­
trol.68 Secondly, like Tocqueville, Arendt stressed the danger of conformity, of ex­
clusive political reliance on ‘public opinion*, and indeed of the danger of that suffo­
cating mass-society where, in the company of others, we recognise only the mirror 
images of our unstable ‘self, and not the constitutive public dialectic of individual 
‘natality’ and political ‘plurality’ which is a precondition of freedom - significantly, 
such freedom, in Arendt’s ‘Dark Times’, was not only an existential value in itself. 
In particular, where most of Pettit's ‘civility’ is created by the institutional mecha­
nisms of which he constantly speaks, and is anyway a fairly static form of gener­
ated social visibility, Arendt famously conceptualised a political space of perspec­
tives, a fragile space which was kept in existence by political participation, and 
which disappeared as soon as citizens left the public and stopped talking in a po­
litical manner. Thirdly, her ideas of foundation, promise, and political judgment, as 
applied to her reading of American political history, suggested a form of ongoing, 
contingent, and activity-requiring constitutionalism, whose flavour of compromise 
and reconciliation of plural perspectives I do not find in Pettit. Finally, Arendt’s 
work is perhaps the most suggestive modem account of that political pathos or ro­
mance, which does exist in the republican language of politics. Participation and 
civic virtue are instruments to secure common liberty, but the engagement with 
one's role as citizen may after all promise additional rewards. Pettit’s calculating 
and rationalist language misses the importance - also the instrumental motivating 
and integrating importance - of rhetoric, narrative, and identification as both the 
outcome and the fuel of civic activity.69
66. Pettit (1997:27-30, italics added); Wirszubski (1950).
67. Pettit (1997:8). See also Fraser (1997),
68. See Isaac (1993).
69. Arendt (1958a; 1958b; 1961; 1971; 1973; 1982). The republican Arendt is dis­
cussed in Canovan (1992), Uoyd (1995), and Mouritsen (1992; forthcoming).
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The idea of liberty as resilient and secure is important, and certainly important 
to clarify, not least because Pettit may be right that the relation between liberty and 
law is poorly understood. But it does not define the difference that we want to 
stress between a republican and a liberal conception of liberty. Many of Pettit’s 
suggestions and analyses are not very controversial for liberals. And some that are, 
should worry republicans too. It is not the notion that liberty is preferable when it 
is (felt to be) secure that divides the field. It is rather the evaluation of what politi­
cal measures this state of affairs requires. In particular it is the question of what 
forms of civic virtue are needed, how demanding may be the obligation of citizens, 
and, related to this, what motivational difficulties must be countered to make such 
virtue come forth. Pettit fails to conceptualise the most central guiding idea o f re­
publican thought. This is not only that liberty is most valuable when experienced 
as secure and robust, but that such an ambition must be reconciled with the fact 
that liberty, like the institutions which support it, is nevertheless fragile, that it re­
quires intervention and care, that an important part of this intervention - be it in 
war or in deliberation - consist in the activity of citizens, and that this places obli­
gations on these citizens accordingly.
I shall argue that a more suitable dividing and defining metaphor for the re­
publican conception of a cooperative venture in realising liberty, and for doing so in 
a manner which does not itself jeopardise its object, is indeed the concept of fra g il­
ity. The security of liberty is contingent, potentially threatened, and non-obvious in 
its existence and content, in a manner that is not illuminated in Pettit’s vision of 
the city. The emphases on legality, conscious design of institutions, and systems o f 
incentive, are certainly much needed antidotes to the depiction of republicanism as 
a doctrine of spontaneously self-organising popular rule. There is much merit, as 
far as it goes, in the emphasis on rationality and interest, in contrast to the lan­
guage we have come across of unworldly moral sacrifice. And also the emphasis on 
the role of social norms, rather than individual conscience, policing citizens to meet 
obligations is clearly important, as much too often republicanism is misrepresented 
as highly optimistic and generous in its assumptions about human nature.
Still, Pettit’s solutions bypass the most important problems. Indeed, in certain 
respects, they become part of the problem. The idea that civic virtue can be re­
duced to a question of unequivocal social control of one’s fellow citizens, and, 
through voting, screening, and sanctioning, of one’s politicians, is much too simple, 
as is the tendency to regard corruzione in the republic as only consisting in at­
tempts to free-ride on the common good. A  system of self-interest, mixed govern­
ment or, as in the large democratic republic, a balanced government with separa­
tion of powers, can never be regarded as self-sustaining or self-perpetuating, as 
even the confident federal political scientists of the American Constitution knew.70
70. Harrington is the most obvious republican ancestor to Pettit. But we have
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Pettit’s analysis and de-emphasis of chic virtue overlooks a very fundamental 
republican intuition. The point, made in a number of different ways in the tradi­
tion. is that civic virtue is both deeply problematical and indispensable. Institu­
tions. good laws, civil religion, respected moers or other things may be essential to 
liberty, including the generation of the simple but crucial virtue of honouring obli­
gations and respecting rights. But their nature and good quality is exactly what 
cannot be taken for granted.Different voices in the tradition have different answers 
to the type and locus of political intervention that is required to secure the republi­
can artifice. But the common denominator is that such intervention is possible and 
necessary, and that a significant part of it, by the nature of things, must consist of 
the actions of the many, of the mass of ordinary citizens. On the other hand, an 
important part of the republican tradition deals with civic virtue as itself fragile. Se­
curing the proper guidance of civic activity, preventing its goals - also the goal of 
common liberty - from being displaced, and even generating the necessary motiva­
tion in the first place, is far from easy. It is suggested that the quality of the citi­
zenry. or the dispositions, direction and strength of motivations in a political cul­
ture, is a complicated and contingent outcome of a dialectical relationships be­
tween institutions and civic virtue, political culture and civic virtue, and laws and 
civic virtue. Laws, institutions, and culture must be imbued with the right spirit, 
but in order to be protected they must also have a life in the hearts and heads of 
citizens. These dialectical relations are visible in all of the four aspects of the re­
publican argument about the fragility of liberty, which we may now proceed to de­
velop.
seen that Harrington in many ways departed from the republicans that came before 
and after him.
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I
I
C h a pte r  8:
T h e  Fr a g il it y  of L ib e r t y :
F o u r  D im ensions  o f  a  Republican  A rg u m en t
1. Introduction
What follows is an analytical summary of different modalities of the republican ar­
gument about political activity as necessary to secure common liberty. The distinc­
tions that I make are indeed analytical, in the sense that actual political activities 
may partake in more than one of them. Also, each dimension itself has different 
aspects to it, different republican authors have stressed different points or provided 
different, at times conflicting answers. In each of the four sections, I also briefly 
point out in which ways particular versions of republican argument have been 
challenges to various historical liberalisms. As I do so, I occasionally take the lib­
erty of enlisting, in ad hoc fashion and as theoretical adversaries as well as sup­
porters, a number of contemporary writers who see themselves as reinventors of 
republican themes.
2. The Artifice
The first dimension is about the contingent character of what we may generally call 
the artifice of the republic and the effectively recognised legal status of citizens, and 
about the corresponding need for civic virtue to institute and protect this artifice. 
As stressed by Phillip Pettit, the republican conception of liberty is law-centred and 
state-centred. The citizen status of individuals enjoying common liberty is made up 
by a set of laws, constitutional and subconstitutional, and by a set of enforcing and 
protecting institutions. The state, with its various agencies and political and ad­
ministrative powers and officers, all working according to the rule of law, and the 
principle of equality under law, makes up a 'liberty-enabling* structure. Whether 
libertas is relatively ‘thin*, as in the American conception of limited government, or 
relatively ‘thick’, as in Rousseau’s conception, the point is the same. Moreover, the 
state facilitates common liberty not only directly but also indirectly, in manners 
which vary in the tradition, by taking upon it the task of educating or inducing citi­
zens in whatever way that is necessary to secure the requisite public spirit.
Contra Pettit, the republican emphasis on legal and political institutions is 
found in a very great deal of liberal thought too. It is really challenged only by some 
right-liberal, particularly libertarian theories of 'possessive individualism* and a 
minimal night watchman state, which replace the importance of state and institu­
tions with benevolent invisible hand anarchism.1 What may be controversial, par-
1. Rumours about the long history of anti-statist liberalism are vastly exagger­
ated. Barber’s eloquent development of liberal anarchism (1984:6-11,37-38) has
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ticularly to contemporary liberal writers, is the republican conception of non­
neutrality. We return to this aspect in the Conclusion. I
What is constitutive of the most basic republican fragility of liberty is the fact | 
that the state and its legal institutions cannot be taken for granted. They have to I
be created and consolidated in the first place. Yet, laws, officials, and offices which I
used to work benignly in the past may at any time become corrupted. Hence also 
the constitutive dialectic in republican thought between republican liberty by the i 
state and from  the state. Machiavelli, in the turmoil of warring city states and prin- j 
cipalities classically stressed both, liberation as well as liberty, but the dualism in 
the view of the state is equally evident in Montesquieu, American republicanism, 
and Tocqueville.
Republican history can be reconstructed as a set of more and more sophisti­
cated defences of the idea that the political structures that secure and realise 
common liberty do so only, certainly in the long run. if active citizens are around to 
create and protect these structures; and, in turn, around to protect themselves and 
other citizens from  them, as well as from the individuals who use them for their 
private ends.
Most basically, republicanism always contains a doctrine of revolutionary 
founding. At its most general, this can be expressed as the radical awareness o f the 
unnatural, artificial character of the republic and its institutions. Hannah Arendt 
once noted that republican theorists and political actors themselves resisted the 
full implications of the new republic as a Novus Ordo Saeclorum.* 2 3Still, the stress 
on the contingency of the republic in space and time as a product of human action 
is characteristic of the tradition, as is the radical nature of the depiction of all non­
political states. Liberty has beginnings and ends and always need new beginnings 
somewhere. Despotism, fear, slavery, or license is typically seen as the normal 
state of affairs, and liberty, law, and citizenship as the exception, - most dramati­
cally, again, in Arendt’s account of human freedom as flickering lights in the long 
dark times of totalitarianism and mass society, and citizenship as a ‘place in the 
world* the precariousness of which became evident to the world in the aftermath of 
World War IÎ.3
The republican emphasis on the artificiality of constitutionalism and citizen­
ship carried important consequences for views and ideals of active citizenship. It is 
simply built into the republican idea of citizenship from the beginning that it is
Robert Nozick as its only ideal type. If Locke’s labour theory of property and his 
theory of money (viewed in isolation) are central (Locke, Two Treatises, 11,25-51) 
central, the theoretical articulation of ideological ‘Manchester liberalism* is other­
wise rather scarce. Also Adam Smith, for all his fame in this connection, was rather 
'statist*.
2. Arendt (1978:Vol.II,195-217).
3. Arendt (1958b:269-302; 1973).
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necessary and hence rational for individuals to secure the conditions of their own 
status as citizens.
First, citizens have an interest in creating and maintaining political order as 
such, as this is the sine qua non of liberty. In the republican world, Kantian un­
comfortableness with revolution and war4 is replaced with the insistence on the oc­
casional need to secure the very existence of states, instituting iibertas in the first 
place, and with the general acknowledgement that political justice is the result of 
popular will to ‘begin’, and as such presupposes independent sources of civic vir­
tue. The ultimate contingency of such self-propelling motivation is obscured in the 
liberal idea of a sense of justice and civic identification evolving as a long-term re­
sult of what Rawls calls a well-ordered and just society^ - the point being that such 
a society has to somehow get off the ground in the first place. Here, the work of 
Sidney, Jefferson and Paine stand as important democratic-collectivist exceptions 
to a more elitist tendency in republican discourse, from Cicero to Machiavelli and 
Rousseau, to conceptualise the beginning as the work of a single great lawgiver or 
good prince.
Secondly, corresponding to the republican emphasis on the numerous dangers 
of erosion and corruption of the state and its political and legal institutions, ra­
tional citizens ought to be on guard against the domination of such institutions by 
non-accountable groups with varying power bases and clienteles. Citizens of Ma- 
chiavelli's Florence knew or ought to know that uncorrupted institutions and mag­
istrates in the long run could only be secured through the exercise of civic virtue. 
Citizens must, for their own good, be willing to leave their private comforts to pro­
tect their republic from the insolence o f those arrogant signori who wished to use it 
for their private ends. Exactly what this virtuous protection of the artifice required 
varied from armed popular resistance, to public scrutiny, questioning, and critical 
debate in the public square, to Jeffersonian ward democracy, to participation in lo­
cal civic associations. Even the occasional local revolt, Jefferson and Paine be­
lieved, helped to keep the republic in shape.
The republican tradition also exhibits a long series of internal differences be­
tween more populist or democratic and more elitist or aristocratic evaluations of 
who should participate how much, and how much popular vigilance could be real­
istically or reasonably expected. Differences concerned the diagnosis of dangers to 
the republic, and varying sensitivities to these dangers (including the danger asso­
ciated with too much popular activity) were no doubt to some degree relative to the 
social groups and interests that were prominent in the discourse. Aristotle and 
Cicero each had their democratic critics. Guicciardini, the aristocrat, disagreed
4. Kant's famous ambiguity between rejection in the name of Recht and “a sym­
pathy which borders almost on enthusiasm" should be noted though (Kant, The 
Contest o f Faculties, section 6, Political Writings (p. 182)).
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1with Machiavelli. Rousseau’s egalitarian sentiments placed him in opposition to  
Montesquieu, just as Harrington distrusted the people more than Sidney. Jefferson 
struck a decidedly more democratic note than Madison and some conservative 
Anti-Federalists. Finally, Tocqueville was highly sensitive to the dangers of m odem  
mass participation and aware of the need to provide the institutional and cu ltural 
means to secure its beneficial form.
The challenge to these core republican ideas took several forms. At the m o s t 
general level, republican political cosmology became threatened by the rise of p ro g ­
ress theory. In Chapter 4, we noted a range of different attempts by European E n ­
lightenment philosophers to conceptualise political institutions, legal regimes, an d  
even the behaviour of the elite and the masses as outcomes of universal m o ve ­
ments of progress leading human societies, more or less slowly but usually in evita ­
bly, towards a more civilised and peaceful state. Some progress histories w e re  
largely materialist, for instance by viewing property, law, and the state as the la s t  
stage of a natural process driven, say, by the transformation of modes of su bs is­
tence. Others, more idealistic, were based on appeals to the human capacity to  
combat prejudice, a capacity which was somehow woven into a wider fabric o f  a  
well-ordered, reasonable universe and which would eventually produce more c iv i­
lised constitutions and political forms. Kant connected realist reason of state a n d  
knowledge o f the weakness of the call of duty to a sort of bio-evolutionary theodice. 
And eventually, the dynamic of reason was taken out of the heads o f rational or r a ­
tionally egoistic citizens as well as progressive utilitarian legislators and placed in  
history itself, as in Hegel. However, we also saw, for instance in Ferguson, that p ro ­
gress theory could be combined with a republican analysis of corruption.
We noted that the contrast between natural rights discourse and republicanism 
has been overdrawn. Still, the Enlightenment turn towards viewing individuals a s  
naturally equal before their God or in their possession of reason certainly contrib­
uted to the rise of progress theory and the eventual forgetfulness of historical co n ­
tingency. In particular, although republican versions of the figure continued to e x ­
ist, the advent of contract theory and state of nature discourse sowed an an ti­
republican, libertarian seed. Eventually, politics could become conceptualised p r i­
marily in terms of moral and legal relations between the state and the self-owning 
individual who consented to give up part of a natural status. The state and law w as  
no longer necessarily constitutive of civilised life as such, but could be viewed p r i­
marily as products of convenience.
If progress and natural rights theory came to constitute an increasingly infertile 
discursive environment for republican thought, also more particular theoretical de­
partures came to divide the field. Important junctures came when a political theory 
developed which convinced itself that institutional mechanisms, divisions of pow- 5
5. On the republican-liberal dispute on this dynamism see below.
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ers, a pluralist civil society of competing interest groups, or the cooling economic 
rationality of the market could replace the political activity of a virtuous citizenry, 
however the latter was defined. We saw such developments above all in the work of 
Hume, but also as new elements inside an American discourse which also con­
tained important republican elements, e.g., that of Madison. Many writers of the 
Enlightenment, even while recognising in principle that liberty was a fragile tempo­
ral creation, started to de-emphasise the role of civic virtue. Patriotic dispositions 
became depicted as the unruly, irrational, and disruptive passions of the mob 
which could be directed towards sinister purposes by competing elites. Civil gov­
ernment was an outcome of a progressive, rational modernisation of European 
monarchies, where the more enlightened members of the learned and wealthy 
classes had more of a role to play than the people. Or, in more sceptical thinkers, 
political institutions and procedures were seen as better repositories of political ra­
tionality than individual men.
The discourse of commercial civil society as a cooling and civilising agent, 
which rendered political institutions more stable and secure, is treated below as an 
instance of the liberal challenge to republican conceptions of political 'space’. As 
regards the second great anti-republican move, the turn to institutional checks and 
mechanisms, it is a mistake to believe that republican discourse completely disre­
garded constitutionalism or institutions in favour of exclusive reliance on popular 
participation. The difference lay in conceptualisations of checks on political power. 
Republicans from Aristotle to Machiavelli to Sidney had recognised the importance 
of rotation in office and other means of institutional architecture that helped to 
keep corruption at bay. But they also stressed political participation, including in­
ternal participation in forms of counterposed social forces in a govemo misto. The 
guardians had to be guarded by the people - and the people in turn had to be kept 
virtuous. By contrast, the new conceptions of division of power as complex, inter­
locking and countervailing government aimed at a more thorough instrumentalisa- 
tion of the beastly inclinations of citizens. Unlike Hume and Hamilton. Madison did 
not take the last step himself, but continued to believe that even the best political 
architecture required some virtue. However, in terms of theoretical impact, his 
work did herald a new ‘political science’ of constitutional legislation which assumed 
the propensities of men to be constant, universal, and calculably egoistic. Their ar­
guments, in turn, were implicitly dismissed by Tocqueville who saw in them an 
American failure to understand the real preconditions of the country’s stable de­
mocracy.
The final challenge to the republican argument, related to the above, was the 
liberal theory of democratic pluralism which depicted politics as a market place for 
the competition of a large number of groups with each their constituencies whose 
interests they seek to promote. We saw that the first version of this idea was Madi­
son’s formulation of the enlarged sphere argument. A  later, cruder but highly influ-
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ential variant, may be found in the utilitarian conception of ‘protective’ democracy, 
where competing groups controlling their political representatives by their vote e n ­
sure a ‘rational’ aggregation of preferences, and at the same time facilitate th e 
automatic voicing of all relevant interests, securing that no one sinister interest w ill 
monopolise institutions.6
This conception, it is worth noting, is different from Machiavelli’s or M ontes­
quieu’s favourable view of such social conflict which made magistrates unable to  
rely on a single stable group, and which still connected to a broader common in ter­
est translatable to rational patriotism, particularly in times of danger. More gen er­
ally, Machiavelli, Rousseau, Sidney, Jefferson, and Tocqueville all emphasised th e  
need for individuals to protect their rights by banding together - in se lf-  
government, in vigilant public criticism and scrutiny, in protest, in revolt - with a ll 
those who shared the essentially common interest of having an uncorrupted an d  
just political order. This is quite different from the idea of interest groups protecting 
their interest against the state, securing their representation in the state, or e f­
fecting the peaceful arbitration of diverse interests through the state.
The republican tradition contained several responses to interest-group based  
liberal democracy. One was Tocqueville’s fear that a politics based on the egalitar­
ian jealousy of interest protection would lead to a type of mass majoritarianism 
which might eventually lead to the sacrifice of individual liberty. Participation - o f  
the right kind - was exactly necessary to prevent the tyranny of a state addressing 
itself to citizens reduced to hedonistic consumers. In a rather different, populist r e ­
publican argument, also seen in Cato and many Anti-Federalists, we find the a r ­
gument about the need to organise and mobilise the people against the sinister 
economic interests of a few (speculators), by contrast to which the diversity o f the 
people’s circumstances may be transcended to yield a general, popular interest. In 
this connection, Robert Dahl, in his work on economic democracy, has recently re ­
ferred back to the Jacksonian reaction, already visible in Jefferson and even in  
Madison, against the threat of a political system dominated by powerful corporate 
interests.7
6. James Mill, Essay on Government is the classical text. Ryan (1989) has eluci­
dated how Mill the elder was a precursor of Schumpeter (although the latter’s p o ­
litical market place was assumed to be oligopolistic, rather than perfectly competi­
tive, as in Mill) and Downs. It is worth noting that not all ‘pluralist* political science 
was equally crude. Truman, who cited Bentley, Lazarsfeld, and Lasswell in support, 
was ‘Madisonian’ in the sense o f assuming the background condition of a liberal 
democratic consensus on, and allegiance to, the rules of the game (Truman 
1951:512-16). And if early American political science ideas of a basic ‘civicness’ of­
ten reflected the complacent functionalist hegemony of the period, much of the 
work of Dahl and Undblom had its Jeffersonian moments. See for instance Und- 
blom (1988¡introduction) and Dahl (1963:91-92). For Dahl’s latest, distinctly re­
publican formulations, see Dahl (1989).
7. E.g., Dahl (1982).
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In the majority of republican writings, particularly older ones, it was assumed 
that libertas is an unambiguously common interest, and that protecting it corre­
sponds to solving a reasonably simple collective action problem. However, the tra­
dition also at times reached a more demanding normative territory where active 
citizenship was particularly needed in order to secure the equal status of some 
groups of individuals in the republic. This was most clearly in the concern with 
economic equalisation, as stressed by Rousseau in particular, but also by Jefferson 
and many Anti-Federalists. To these authors, the struggle to avoid the degradations 
of material misery of the least of the members of the republic was a separate moral 
concern. Even so, in its most original form, the republican argument was constitu- 
tively defined by the intuition that egalitarian citizenship, perhaps including cer­
tain schemes of redistribution, amounted to a straight forwardly rational, mutualist 
measure, even as it might involve sacrifice on behalf of some, and even as the ex­
istence of different social classes was acknowledged. Failure to exhibit civic virtue, 
accordingly, was primarily conceptualised as failure to understand one’s own best 
(long term) interests, i.e., as ‘rightly understood’, or as free-riding on the labours of 
others.
3. Civic Space
A second fragility of liberty can be summarised as a question of civic or public 
space. This space refers, in a very broad sense, to those inter-personal relations, 
pressures, generated dispositions, and expectations which are necessary to make 
libertas more than a merely legal reality. In the most general way, we may say that 
republicanism contains a number of arguments about how beneficial dispositions 
in citizens to practice virtuous activities - both in their private and their public 
dealings and activities - are a result of a public space or public sphere. And this 
sphere is in turn generated by the public part of the virtues which it helps gener­
ating. I have in mind a complex set of ideas. Before looking at them, consider again 
the republican conception of libertas which was analysed in the previous chapter:
As noted, republican liberty was not conceptualised as the (contingent) ability 
to do what one actually can in some area. Also, it was not only the legally defined 
right to do or have something, nor even the actually forthcoming material honour­
ing of such a right by the state. These legal and material/institutional aspects of 
what Pettit calls resilience were of course important. But republican liberty was 
also, as paradigmatically visible in Montesquieu and as taken up my many Ameri­
can writers, a social phenomenon. It was so in the sense, first, of the actual reality 
of having one's legal rights respected by others, i.e., fellow citizens. Secondly, it was 
so by virtue of the importance of inhabiting a social space where one could safely 
expect such respect of one’s rights to be forthcoming from the state as well as from 
fellow citizens.
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1Fragility of liberty as fragility of civic space is about this social aspect of liberty. 
This is so, both as regards the actual enjoyment of one’s rights as spheres o f u n ­
violated private existence respected by others, and as regards the subjective safe 
expectation of such a state of affairs also in the future. Both are experienced, by 
citizens wishing to enjoy this liberty, as questions of the protection yielded by social 
norms and social visibility, the latter, subjective aspect directly so. From the 
standpoint of citizens respecting the liberty of others, the space of normative e x ­
pectation and public visibility is experienced as an ongoing exposure to potential 
censure, and as a system of incentive structures that disposes the individual to ­
wards beneficial forms of action.
A note on private virtue in republican thought is in order. Thus, virtue in the 
republican tradition by no means exclusively referred to strictly political virtues, 
such as participation in self-government or fighting in wars. Very often - in d iffer­
ent ways in for instance Cicero, Sidney, Rousseau, or Tocqueville - it was con ­
nected to the broad citizenship ideal of respecting other people’s rights and liv in g  
with one’s fellows in justice, according to the spirit of the law, in moderation, se lf- 
restraint, and impartiality. To associate republicanism exclusively with martial and  
self-sacrificing Spartanism, to repeat, is to accept a reading of the tradition w hich  
became fashionable in the early years of commercial capitalism, and which associ­
ated it with an unruly passion for honour and public display and a positively dan ­
gerous disregard for one’s own private existence, as well as that of others.8
These ’private’ civic virtues may also be found in liberalism. The good liberal 
citizen, of course, came in many forms,9 but even the most minimal conception in ­
volved a duty to respect the rights of others - however minimal these rights, and 
whatever one’s motives for doing so. Through histoiy, a number of liberal accounts 
of moral psychology can be traced, each o f which presuppose more or less elabo­
rate theories of civil society. The historical contrasts are rather less than clear-cut. 
Yet, it is still useful to recall a set of liberal and proto-liberal ideas, coming out o f  
the Enlightenment, most of which we have discussed, and all of which could be 
employed to challenge specific republican assumptions about the fragility of good 
’private’ as well as ‘public’ citizenship. Loosely, we may speak, first, of a set of Kan- 
tian-Hegelian ideas which emphasised individual development to moral conscious­
ness and internalisation of impartiality and sense of justice in various types o f in ­
stitutions, from the family to various intermediary ’corporations’. A  Hobbesian and 
Benthamite line of argument emphasised forms o f self-interest in the fear of coer­
cive law and sanction. A third family of ideas, which may be associated with writers 
of the Scottish Enlightenment, but also with Montesquieu and American writers 
who took up the theme of the morally beneficial effects of commerce, stressed the
8. Hirschman (1977).
9. As discussed in Chapter 5. See also Macedo (1990).
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cooling and disciplining effects of exposure to the market which was seen to dis­
pose individuals towards the habitual honouring of contract. A fourth set of ideas, 
again with writers of the Scottish Enlightenment as prominent figures, in different 
ways presuppose a natural propensity towards an inherent moral sense or ‘sym­
pathy’. which might under the right circumstances connect to more artificial 'man­
ners’ of civility. Most progressive Enlightenment thought, finally, adopted versions - 
more or less optimistic and ambitious - of belief in human moral perfectibility, very 
often drawing on Lockean sensationist psychology and ideas of a tabula rasa for 
educators to place impressions upon.
Many of these ideas overlap with particular articulations of republican dis­
course which survived into the Enlightenment. However, the main stream of re­
publicanism was still characterised by its intuition that even the propensity to pri­
vate virtue was significantly unnatural, not in any way to be taken for granted or 
treated as a constant, calculable, ahistorical, psychological disposition. Indeed, to 
republican writers such dispositions were not so much the result of the building of 
’good character*, or enlightened moral stature, but more like an unstable and frag­
ile outcome to be enjoyed where citizens experienced certain constraints and con­
ditions. Also importantly, the vices acknowledged by republicanism, contrary to the 
received image of republicanism’s rosy optimism, Included not only predictable 
egoism, but also thirst for power and glory, and, more common among the many, 
apathy, irrationality, forgetfulness, and mass behaviour. Securing private virtues 
such as respect for justice and the practice of toleration and keeping vice at bay. 
was very much a continuous result of the generation of public space and public 
activity.10
Moreover, not only are private virtues publicly generated, so are public virtues. 
This last point may be noted as a constitutively ‘circular’ republican argument. 
Civic virtue, once operative, starts a Virtuous circle’ by generating the conditions 
needed for its further creation. To the propensity to respect and honour justice in 
one's immediate private dealings corresponds the public virtue of positively fur­
thering justice. And to both modalities of good citizenship corresponds some notion 
of a civic space, constituted by the actions, valuations, and visible presence of 
other citizens, who thus, in different ways, make it their public business to remind 
each other what their liberty consists of, why each component is important, and in 
particular see to it that common liberty is respected as an ongoing concern. Im­
portantly different aspects of republican political space may be discerned:
Let us return for a moment to Phillip Pettit’s account. Although he has valuably 
stressed the social ‘resilience’ of liberty, we shall see that there is more to it than 
he thinks.
10. But not exclusively so. I do not discuss, in this thesis, the important role of 
education in republican thought.
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First, Pettit’s conceptualisation of social visibility usefully captures the Spar- 
tan-Rousseauan vision of social control through potential exposure to public shame, 
as well as its opposite, public praise and esteem. Here, we respect other peoples* 
liberty out of an interest in our own reputation, which is important to us because 
we live in societies. Liberty, in this sense of political - or social - space is maximised 
when a society commits itself to policing those rules which everybody recognise as 
valid and rational, even when they would privately be tempted to cheat. Social 
control is clearly important in republican thought. Even that large part of republi­
can thought (e.g., Ferguson, Jefferson, Federalists and Anti-Federalists, and 
Toqueville) which entertained early ideas of reflective individualism also generally 
relied on the motivational mechanism of being seen by others. At the most general 
level, this represented a motivational mechanism which tended to be crowded out, 
in particular, in liberal reliance on individual (Christian) consciousness on the one 
hand, and reliance on coercive law on the other.
While Pettit primarily discusses the role of specific ways of institutionalising 
shame, for instance by means o f the legal system, historical republican discourse 
more often focused on exposure to ‘being seen* and active shaming as features o f 
public activity and a continuously generated public space. A  person could suffer 
shame when there were virtuous. i.e., non-indifferent, citizens around to watch. 
The exposure to personal shame was more easily avoided by some people than oth­
ers. Thus, it was an important civic activity to bring to attention those shady proj­
ects, in the corridors of power and privileged courtly access, which were so unam­
biguously sensitive to public light as to be defeated by exposure. Political activity 
could be the habit, not just of mutual policing in various settings of civil society, 
but also of vigilant exposure of the corruption of the powerful.
On a more positive note, again taking the idea in more participatory, activist di­
rections than does Pettit, the republican tradition also prominently featured the 
complementary mechanism to shame, which was public esteem, honour, or recog­
nition as the rewards of worthy actions, i.e., not so much the conventional virtues 
of the good private citizen, but more the public virtue of dangerous or demanding 
defence of common liberty. The thirst for public happiness, we noted, does not de­
fine the tradition. Even so, it remained an important motivational mechanism, for 
instance to Cicero, Machiavelli, Sidney, and Jefferson.
Secondly, a rather different idea, found in Machiavelli, Rousseau, Anti- 
Federalists, and particularly Tocqueville - mentioned by Pettit, but not developed - 
is the generation of social trust Trust, here, meant the assurance that other people 
would act in certain ways in the near future, i.e., meet their obligations, respect 
one’s rights, refrain from free-riding on common projects. Moreover, they would do 
so also in the absence of social control and public exposure. Such trust had to do 
with repeated interactions about projects of mutual concern through which indi-
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viduals came to have expectations about the future actions of others.11 To the 
American Founders, trust was a horizontal bond between citizens pledging in pub­
lic space to ‘stay together’ for the sake of joint (revolutionary) action.
While liberal theory historically may be somewhat weak on the idea of social 
trust,12 its absence is only constitutive of Hobbesianism. The difference is in the 
perception of the'mechanisms that generate trust. A source of social trust in much 
liberal theory was the impersonal operation of the market, with the mutual long 
term interest in, and habituation towards, honouring of contract. By contrast, re­
publican theory tended to conceptualise trust as created and enforced by forms of 
civic involvement where citizens demonstrated, through deeds involving risk or 
costs to themselves, their determination to undertake common projects and thus 
their trustworthiness.
Pettit’s conception of republican civic space and civic virtue, while important 
and perceptively developed, is inadequate in a very important way. We noted above 
that the most basic normative vocabulary of the republican tradition treated liber­
tas as an uncontroversial common good, and conceptualised failure of public virtue 
as failure of the enforcement mechanisms of straight-forward collective rationality. 
However, when we look at the entire tradition, such one-dimensional social norma- 
tivity does not capture the full complexity of republican civic space. Thus, other 
conceptions went beyond conformity to norms and standards that were uncontro- 
versially recognised as common obligations, and also beyond the generation of ex­
pectations of cooperative reciprocity. Very often failure to meet obligations was seen 
as a result of neither weakness of moral will, egoistic attempts to free-ride. nor dis­
belief that one would be treated Justly in turn. Sometimes republican citizens were 
depicted as either forgetful or narrow-minded, in their failure to perceive and act 
upon what common liberty required.
Thus, a third way of conceptualising public space may be found from Machia­
velli to Rousseau and Jefferson, but again also with Tocqueville as a main figure. 
The stress here is on the corruption of forgetfulness. This is the problem of citizens 
who much too easily forget their duties and obligations, as it were shamelessly, 
once they are left to themselves, and once the mutualist foundations of common 
liberty is allowed to loose its hold on the public imagination. In early, Calvinist 
natural law theory, we saw that virtue became conceptualised as a moral duty, op-
11. There is a degree of agreement, here, with some communitarian theory. 
Stripped of the vocabulary of community, togetherness, and belonging as abstract 
independent values, particularly second generation sociological communitarians 
(Selznick, Bellah, Etzioni) stress the important public good of trust. As also noted 
in an Italian context by Putnam (1993) citizens* enjoyment of welfare, prosperity, 
and security may be seen to depend in a number of fields on the generation of so­
cial capital, which in turn is an outcome of certain forms of civic involvement.
12. As distinct from the vertical relation of trust between rulers and ruled (Dunn 
1990a).
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1erating from within. As liberal rights discourse became progressively detached from 
notions of such Christian duty, and linked to possessive individualism, private 
autonomy, and economic laissez-faire, Tocqueville. in particular, came to represent 
a modem republican criticism of what he saw as the capitalist ethos of rights-pride. 
the illusion of self-sufficiency, i.e., of not owing anything to anybody. One impor­
tant point of Tocqueville’s celebration of a diversified associational life was to se­
cure that citizens were able to have continuously before them that the republic was 
a cooperative affair.
Fourthly, and more critically still, the type of virtue which was required in som e 
situations could be seen as particularly unobvious and taxing for the individual 
citizen, because it demanded an unusual degree of impartiality and broadness o f 
mind. Indeed, sometimes what was needed was exactly the opposite of conformity 
to established norms. Rather, it could be the ability to transcend the narrow v iew  
points of one’s own group and its particular interests and needs. It is safe to say 
that a great deal of early republicanism had fairly crude conceptions of the com ­
mon interest. We saw, well into the American debate, that ‘the people’ was very o f­
ten seen as a homogeneous body. Indeed, traditional republican discourse was at­
tacked, by men like Madison, exactly because of its inability to recognise a diversity 
of legitimate social, cultural, economic, and geographical interests - and not ju s t  
natural estates - in modem civil society. Modem pluralism was conceptualised, by 
Madison, to require a modem form of moderation, a willingness to reflect upon, re- 
lativise, or transcend one’s private particularity. Rousseau’s position in this respect 
was modem in its sophisticated requirement that the republican artifice be so con ­
structed - small scale, agrarian, artificial national customs - so as to avoid such 
pluralism, and render perceptions of the general will unambiguous.
Above all in Tocqueville (as famously re-developed by Hannah Arendt in the 
latter’s analysis of modernity and the danger of ‘the social’), but also, in various 
ways, in Machiavelli, Montesquieu, Ferguson, and Jefferson, we find a latent or ex­
plicit republican insight that liberty is not just by society, but also from  society and 
its pressure to conform. While a division may be seen in the tradition on the rela­
tive importance of one idea or the other in any one author, republicanism often 
combines social control, shaming, and socialisation on one hand, and the demand 
for independence of individual judgement and the capacity to reason reflectively on 
the other. Civic space was not only being seen by others, but also the capacity to 
see others, in their diversity. If Rousseau was exemplary in eventually stressing the 
former at the expense of the latter, Jefferson and Tocqueville placed more emphasis 
on public reflection and independence.13
In its extremer forms, what Pettit calls the ‘intangible hand’ of the shaming 
mechanism has certainly taken highly illiberal social forms - as indeed they did in
13. See Barnard (1989).
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Rousseau or Harrington. let alone in all of the historical city states where republi­
canism was practised. Indeed, the historical appeal of a great deal of liberalism has 
been its case for a moral individualism of independent judgement, private con­
sciousness. hostility towards the pressure of (prejudiced) public opinion, and above 
all the readiness to live in peace and tolerance with people whose outlooks - in 
particular religious beliefs - are different from one’s own.
In terms of the historical fault lines, the early liberal challenge consisted in re­
versing the terms of the problem. Hume, along with other Enlightenment writers in 
France and Scotland, who painted draconian view of the social forms of the an­
cients, saw the force of public opinion in large, uneducated collectives as the 
source of dangerous passion and fanaticism. Civility, politeness, and cool detached 
behaviour found its fountain in new conceptions of civil society based on com­
merce, exchange, refined consumption, and the development of a sphere of inti­
macy; even as some continued to stress that childish vanity and materialism was a 
high (but necessary) price to pay.
The more political conceptions of civil society of Ferguson, Jefferson, and above 
all Tocqueville may be seen, in light of the above, as a conscious attempt at an AuJ- 
hebung of classical republican discourse and liberal thought. Here, the market and 
commerce, while valuable and useful, were still seen as potentially conducive to 
various forms of corruption, such as a dangerous neu>, social conformity, variety, 
and incapacity for independent judgement. And in particular, the capacity for dis­
tancing and tolerance of political adversarity and social diversity became attached 
to other forms of interaction, including political debate and participation in local 
assoclational life. The civil in civil society came to stand for new versions of the re­
publican virtues of involvement, now attached to new, plural conceptions of politi­
cal space. Even the word ‘commerce* was also capable of denoting new forms of 
public civility and ‘friendship’.14
Tocqueville’s move, which inspired later theorists of the public sphere like 
Arendt, may be seen as a new republican reconstruction of the master virtue of 
moderation. Tolerance as an ongoing concern, an impartial political culture, the 
existence of significant social diversity and perspectives (as opposed to the dreary 
and dangerous mass society of busy consumers, which Tocqueville feared), even 
the habit and capacity to reflect independently, all of these things could become 
seen as a result of involvement, of political, assoclational activity and a functioning 
public sphere.
The contrast to liberal thought here, consists in a different flavour of interpre­
tation of the social and political causality of these achievements. By and large, lib­
eral writers, critical of state sponsored religious intolerance, and sceptical of the 
public life of les anciens, saw the solutions in letting people be and in re-evaluating
14. Silver (1997).
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private autonomy. The belief was widely shared that reflection and tolerance w ere 
the automatic outcomes of various forms of social and moral progress, or. as re ­
cently reconstructed by Nancy Rosenblum, of new conceptions of civil society, not 
only those based on commerce and market, but also what she calls elective civil s o ­
ciety, made up of plural associations and social activities, and voluntary, ‘shifting 
involvements’ between them.15
If liberals since Locke stressed the values of reflection, tolerance, and im parti­
ality, prominent writers like Kant, J.S. Mill, and T.H. Green also developed concep­
tions of a liberal Öffentlichkeit of autonomous citizens, controlling and guid ing 
elected representatives, and effecting their own growth to maturity and moral ed u ­
cation in the process.16 This importantly public-oriented strand of modem libera l­
ism should warn us, of course, not to overdo contrasts. Still, these late liberal 
adoptions of republican themes were framed in the context of an alien political 
cosmology, not of artificial virtue and its corruption, but of idealism, progress, and  
perfectibility. In them, we no longer find the constitutive intuition of republican 
contingency, according to which not just shame, exposure, and remembrance o f  
one’s duty, but also perspective, distance, and reflection are the fleeting products o f  
activated virtue, rather than the accomplishments of progressive civilisation. W h a t­
ever the exact conception of civil society - i.e., markets, families, voluntary in ter­
mediate associations, Hegelian corporations, or parliamentary publics - and w h at­
ever its corresponding 'civility’, liberal understandings tended to assume their na tu ­
ral causally independent character.
If these remarks begin to sound Arendtian, this is no coincidence. Arendt’s 
work may thus be seen as a sustained modem reflection on the nature and contin­
gency of the second type of civic space, with which Tocqueville had been preoccu­
pied. To Arendt, the very existence of the different voices and perspectives, i.e., w hat 
she called the ‘space of appearances’, and even the capacity to judge and reflect in ­
dependently, as a public or private activity (‘representative thought* and the ‘two- 
in-one’ of consciousness) were artificial and fragile achievements, human potentials 
which depended upon a functioning public sphere, keeping the pathologies of m od­
ernity at bay.
Tocqueville and Arendt were late republican thinkers who Anally applied the 
intuition of artificiality and fragility to the analysis o f reflective public space. Such a
15. Rosenblum (1994a; 1994b).
16. E.g., Locke’s condemnation of the “narrowness of spirit on all sides (which! 
has undoubtedly been the principal occasion of our misseries and confusions”, 
Locke, Letter on Toleration (p. 11); Kant’s famous celebration of Enlightenment as 
“man’s emergence from his self-incured immaturity", Kant, What is Enlightenment?, 
in Political Writings (p.54); Mill’s sustained argument for freedom of speech and po­
litical participation, Mill, On Liberty, Chapter 2 in Utilitarianism On Liberty, and 
Considerations on Representative Government On the genesis of the liberal theory 
of the public sphere, see Habermas (1962:112-71).
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space exists only as long as actual individuals are around to reflect, to discuss, to 
judge, or just to be there. Arendt and Tocqueville were aware that civilisation, en­
lightenment. and education did not necessarily prevent public space from degener­
ating. Only too easily do citizens decide to stay away; too quickly do they unlearn 
the capacity to test their own habitual views or the prevailing prejudices of society 
against the needs and perspectives of other groups; too transient is the habit of 
thinking for oneself, of living in what Arendt called the republic of the mind.
Bracketing huge internal differences, the republican perspectives we have dis­
cussed treat the intersubjective space of virtue and motivation to virtue, whatever 
its character, as something to be created, maintained, or cared for, also in terms of 
legitimate and necessary political intervention. In terms of Nancy Rosenblum’s 
useful typology, the republican conception of political space would be closer to 
what she calls democratic civil society, where secondary associations, participatory 
structures, educational institutions, even (in some republican schemes) the family, 
are judged, supported, or directed according to how well they perform as vehicles of 
socialisation and motivation to good citizenship.
4. Political Autonomy and the Content of Libertas
The third fragility of liberty is about the manner in which republican common lib­
erty is given its specific legal and constitutional content through self-government, 
understood here in its specific sense of collective self-legislation. We need to distin­
guish this idea from the value of moral autonomy which, as we saw in the previous 
chapter, was an adventitious (liberal) Enlightenment element. Again, in the repub­
lican tradition, the collective determination of its principal legal forms by a political 
community was not, until Rousseau and Jefferson, associated with the notion of a 
rational confirmation of the principles by which an individual governed himself, 
either as an individual or as a member of a collectively. Because of the ambiguity of 
the term autonomy, and because we also use the term self-government in a more 
generic sense, we may introduce, for our purposes, the expression political auton­
omy.
Political self-government, to repeat another crucial point, was not, pace Berlin 
and Constant, the republican conception of liberty, but only a part of it. This part 
was associated with collective independence from foreign rulers, and, via a popular 
element, from internal tyranny. In many writers of the Enlightenment, this part 
was called political liberty and seen to consist of man's collectively exercised (natu­
ral) political rights. Another part of liberty, closely related, consisted in the legal 
status of the individual under the law. This last element, we saw. was there already 
in the Greek writers. However, before proceeding, we should distinguish between 
political self-government as concerned with the formulation of, and debate about, 
basic law (constitutions, constitutional revisions), and political self-government as 
concerned with the act of collective legislation and decision-making as such. Al-
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though it never replaced individual legal liberty, it is important to note that also the 
latter sense of political self-government or political liberty was prominent in Greek 
and Renaissance thought and continuing into the Atlantic tradition. In the more 
radical Anti-Federalists, for instance, the direct, collectively exercised popular rule 
of a people (a state) was simply seen as the best means of self-protection, prevent­
ing anybody else (the federal government) from ruling over it. Self-government, here 
shading into the first dimension of fragility, denoted the self-protective state o f be­
ing in collective control of one’s own affairs.
But political self-government or autonomy was also, more specifically, about 
the substantial content of Iibertas. It is this aspect which we have in mind as the 
third fragility of liberty. ‘Content’ refers to the specific constitutional rights- 
settlement and historical-institutional form of a people’s Ubertas. More particularly, 
it refers to the importance for individuals and collectives of being able to influence 
this content, and about the difficulty but also the supreme necessity of securing a 
reasonable, and reasonably stable, popular agreement on this content. Civic virtue, 
here, is the political participation taking place in connection with constitutional 
deliberation, including ongoing public debates about *our liberty’. More particu­
larly, it refers to the political wisdom and good judgement required by leaders and 
people alike. To bring into perspective this third aspect, two misunderstandings 
must be avoided.
First, there was no incompatibility per se between republican and natural 
rights discourse (the latter was used by Harrington. Sidney, Ttenchard and 
Gordon, Reid, Paine, Jefferson, and Federalists and Anti-Federalists alike). There is 
no truth in the claim that republicanism was inherently relativistic, in the sense 
that ‘liberty’ could refer to any culturally distinct common good whatsoever.17 We 
have continuously stressed the core constitutive value of private liberty as security 
of person, family and possessions. To Aristotle and the Greek democrats, to Cicero, 
and to Machiavelli the existence of these political ideals was treated as common- 
sensically obvious, simply not an issue - the discourse was not about philosophical 
Justification, but political practice and legal construction as means to secure these 
values. The early Enlightenment simply added the notion, which had emerged 
gradually from Calvinist receptions of natural law, that all men were equal in dig­
nity before God, and that hence everybody had a prima facie moral claim to the en­
joyment of the liberty which the republican tradition considered to be such a great 
good. This radical conception of universal rights to liberty originally intrinsically 
tied to notions of duty and self-control, could still be easily coupled to republican 
ideas of worthiness, as when Sidney, Ferguson, and the Americans talked of natu­
ral rights as a prize that had to be ‘deserved’, and could certainly only be main­
tained, by a virtuous people.
17. As claimed by Taylor (1989). j
f
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Secondly, The Enlightenment conception of rights, as developing from Locke in 
Britain or from Kant in Germany, were part of a modernisation and individualisa­
tion of the value of liberty. Indeed, one of the more fruitful criteria for dating the 
beginning of liberal thought is the gradual introduction of modem conceptions of 
an abstract society of different, individualised citizens with each their private life. 
Tied to the invention of a culturally and socially pluralist commercial society, the 
sphere of intimacy, and philosophical scepticism about absolute knowledge and re­
ligious dogma, this liberalism is epitomised in the idea of toleration o f what is 
nowadays called ‘conceptions of the good' along with a set of principles and insti­
tutions associated with modem rule of law. Early republicanism contained less so­
phisticated species of “liberty before liberalism’*18 which did not have these modem 
attributes. The origin of the latter was the experience of religious persecution and 
the possibility that not only tyrants and tax-collectors, but also fanatic mobs, re­
ligious institutions, and prejudiced majority communities jeopardised the liberty of 
the individual. But also these new liberal conceptions of toleration, freedom of con­
sciousness, diversity of interests, and legal process were assimilated to republican 
discourse, as most evident in Jefferson, Madison, and many Anti-Federalists.
The republican conception of common liberty as a deliberative outcome was not 
distinct because of its incompatibility with natural rights doctrines or with modem 
abstract individualism and toleration. The republican impulse, also in these new 
conceptual surroundings, simply consisted of various ways to insist on the need for 
deliberative, popular involvement in the framing of constitutions. To show this, in a 
very general way, we may employ a contrast often made in American legal and 
democratic theory, between populism and liberalism19:
Firstly, republican discourse was populist in the sense of emphasising that 
constitutions and legal forms were conventionalist dispensations of a political 
common good. In classical forms this involved some idea of striking a balance be­
tween different legitimate interests of a society. Common liberty required a consti­
tutional form which was determined as a matter of prudence, typically by a wise 
legislator. With the rise of popular sovereignty and equal natural rights doctrines, 
republican normative discourse would stress that only a limited number of rights, 
relating to life, personal security, and freedom of consciousness followed from 
natural law. Legitimate common interests of historically and geographically situ­
ated collectivities were too diverse and changing to admit of a single ahistorical 
formulation in the blunt, if rhetorically potent, language of natural rights. Jeffer­
son, Paine, many Anti-Federalists, and in principle Madison, regarded specific legal 
forms of property as contingent expressions of a general right to subsistence. State- 
of-nature arguments were typically used to establish limits to political authority.
18. Skinner (1998).
19. See the distinction in Gutmann (1993), also Gutmann & Thompson (1996).
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not to suggest a possibility of self-sufficient enjoyment of rights outside of society. 
And by contrast to Locke, political rights, pooled to collective self-government, were 
not only a possibility for legitimate withdrawal of one's (tacit) consent to an unjust 
authority, but also the means to authorise, in a more substantial, explicit, and 
creative manner, the common affairs of a people.
Still, it is important to remember that few, if any, of the American republicans 
thought that political rights were the most basic, and that other (civil) rights de­
rived from them. When natural rights were talked of, political rights were only a 
part of them, although some, including Hamilton, unreflectively assumed that co l­
lective self-government would not collide with these other rights - by implication 
equating the will of political majorities with the basic interest of any individual. In 
light of this, a recent formulation of republican populism by Habermas is somewhat 
off the mark. In view of its influence we may quote him at some length:
According to the republican view, the status of citizens is not determined 
by the model of negative liberties to which they can lay claim as private 
persons. Rather, political rights - preeminently rights of political partici­
pation and communication - are positive liberties. They guarantee not 
freedom from external compulsion but the possibility of participation in a 
common praxis, through the exercise of which citizens can first make 
themselves into what they want to be - politically autonomous authors o f 
a community of free and equal persons. To this extent, the political proc­
ess does not just serve to keep government activity under the surveil­
lance of citizens who have already acquired a prior social autonomy in 
the exercise of their private rights and pre-political liberties (...) So the 
state’s raison d’etre does not lie primarily in the protection of equal pri­
vate rights, but in the guarantee of an inclusive opinion- and will- 
formation in which free and equal citizens reach an understanding as to 
which goals and norms lie in the equal interest of all (...) While in the lib­
eral view the point of a legal order is to make it possible to determine in 
each case which individuals are entitled to which rights, in the republi­
can view these "subjective" rights owe their existence to an “objective" 
legal order that both enables and guarantees the integrity of an autono­
mous life in common based on mutual respect. For republicans, rights 
ultimately are nothing but determinations o f the prevailing political will, 
while for liberals some rights are always grounded in a higher law of rea­
son20
Habermas insists that this process aims at determining exactly which legal guar­
anties constitute each citizen’s ‘negative* liberty. He also seeks, ‘pragmatically*, to 
derive a quite comprehensive set of welfare-liberal rights from the veiy acceptance
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of a discourse situation. But whatever the merits or demerits of Habermas’ philo­
sophical and legal sociological analysis, his historical account is incorrect. Enlight­
enment republicans like Jefferson, Madison, and Paine did not deny that certain 
very important rights could be “grounded in a higher law of reason”. While knowing 
that such rights could only become a social reality through politics, they often re­
served the possibility of criticising politics by appealing to values that lay beyond 
this practice.20 1
The difference between republicanism and liberalism, here, is less clear-cut, 
more a matter of degree. The contrast is most clear and makes most sense at those 
limiting points of the liberal history of ideas which are characterised by a search for 
rationally derived political principles, prior to, and independent of the political pro­
cess. In my view, what Ackerman calls liberal “foundationalism” differs from his­
torical republican populism, not, or not necessarily, in the sense that republican 
democratic will-formation is completely prior to rights, but in the sense of the lat­
ter’s much more limited ambition about which political principles may be ‘taken off 
the agenda’, as Rawls would put it.22 By contrast, Kant’s attempts to deduce prin­
ciples which any rational person must be assumed to will, despite the occasional 
use of republican language, was distinctly unrepublican and ‘foundationalist.23 So 
was the ambition of nineteenth century utilitarians to base all legislation on the 
overarching normative principle of utility, and to believe that this principle could be 
scientifically articulated. Finally, to the extent that Locke was read as introducing a 
radically anti-political, even anarchist, laissez-faire principle of self-ownership, 
where only ‘original’ rights of state-of-nature agents plus principles on which eve­
rybody could agree, had political ‘legitimacy’, we cannot get any further away.24
Secondly, apart from its recognition of a large degree of normative contingency, 
republican discourse was populist in more political and practical ways. It inte­
grated the language of moral justification, whatever its content, with a language of 
political legitimation. In Machiavelli. Montesquieu, all American writers, and 
Tocqueville, a profound distrust of metaphysics and abstract philosophy or ‘theory’ 
was visible.25
An important aspect of this, recurring throughout the tradition, was the need 
to deal with individuals and groups ‘as they are*. Less sophisticated writers like 
Trenchard and Gordon, Harrington, and many Anti-Federalists, when they spoke of
20. Habermas (1994b:8); cp. also Gutmann (1993).
21. See Habermas (1992a: 109-65); Bellamy (1994:251-52).
22. Ackerman (1991:1 lfi): cp. Bellamy (1994:249-50).
23. But see Maihofer (1990).
24. Nozick (1974); for the history of moral arguments for laissez-faire, see Viner 
(1960); Rashid (1986).
25. E.g., Tocqueville's dismissal of “Metaphysics and all the purely theoretic sci­
ences, which do not serve anything in the reality of life” (Letter to M. Charles, No­
vember 22, 1831, cited from Lively (1962:25)).
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virtuous regard for the common good, simply had in mind the rational under­
standing of an easily accessible collective interest of rather selfish individuals, and 
the avoiding of free-riding. Harrington thought this to be a matter of political m a­
chinery, whereas Rousseau was well aware of the tough homogenising pressures 
that were required before the general will had become an undisputed social fact, 
readily perceived by the simple peasant under the village oak. However, a great 
many republicans recognised the inevitability of conflicts between groups in soci­
ety, whether perceived as natural estates with different umorf or as a plurality 
opinions and economic interest. Republican discourse always involved a broad idea 
of the possibility of citizens to adopt and develop more reasonable and impartial 
views than they would have as private individuals, providing their uncorrupted in ­
dependence could be maintained. But with a few exceptions and some differences 
of emphasis it was also recognised that this possibility was difficult to realise, even 
when politics went well. In pluralist societies with less than ideal citizens, what 
could be hoped for and aimed at was to find constitutional settlements which re­
flected a ‘balanced* common good, where the most arbitrary and sinister interests 
were excluded. Self-government typically aimed at establishing working, stable con- 
cordia, and involved the exercise of moderation, here understood as a political sense 
of restraint and willingness to give and take. Political deliberation, at best, could 
‘launder* disagreements to some extent, cause opinions to be recognised as sin ­
cerely held, and, through procedural arrangements, induce citizens to regard as 
legitimate also some things they would not have chosen themselves.
Closely related to the above was the notion, prominent again in the American 
tradition, that political settlements had to be actually consented to. The idea o f 
consent was of course linked to the conception of popular sovereignty and consti­
tutional justification. Here, as Lockean contract theory travelled across the Atlan­
tic, consent no longer denoted a hypothetical original alienation o f executive rights 
of nature, entrusting authority to a ruler, or the principled possibility of its w ith­
drawal after a ‘train of abuses’. Rather, it became conceived as the periodic exercise 
of a deliberate and considered political act by concrete citizens. Moreover, as a 
further important aspect to this idea, actual expression of consent and even its pe­
riodical renewal was now considered to be a precondition for stability and political 
peace, as the conscious and reflective recognition by citizens of their common lib­
erty was a necessary first condition for their propensity to virtue and patriotic alle­
giance.
Finally, a third ‘political’ aspect of republican self-government consists In the 
recognition that constitutional politics and deliberation was importantly an empiri­
cal process. Republicans constantly stress the centrality of practical wisdom and 
experience in politics. What I have in mind is not only the need to accept the sub­
optimality of all solutions political, which arises from the pluralist and conflictual 
nature of civil society. Classical and modem republicans were constantly con-
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cemed with the need to consider, and the difficulty of predicting, how law’s and 
constitutions would work. Laws, to Machiavelli and the Greeks, were deemed ‘good* 
or ‘bad’ according to empirical and causal considerations, w’hich entailed a large 
element of contingency, even luck. Madison stressed that exact and reliable politi­
cal knowledge was scarce. Political deliberation, of a more or less democratic sort, 
w’as a way to tap, sort and process, not only preferences and principles, but con­
siderations of political sociology and psychology, geographical and cultural par­
ticularity, theories and experiences of propensity to virtue and corruption, and 
knowledge of political effects on the distribution of property and power. In such de­
liberations, as evidenced in the aftermath of the Philadelphia debates, error was 
likely to occur, circumstances were likely to change, and legislation and institu­
tions alike were likely to have unexpected consequences. Although Madison, like 
Hume, spoke of politics as a ‘science’, it was the latter, along with his real Ameri­
can disciple Hamilton, who sought to reduce government to unpolitical techno­
cratic manipulation.
We have seen several typical republican modalities of such constitutional con­
tingency. In the most general way, they correspond to an idea of ‘the public thing’ 
as an historical and secular entity - a collective legal arrangement (res) which is 
talked about by a plurality of citizens (pubUcal, and on whose specific form some 
measure of agreement and support simply has to be reached, preserved through 
time, or reformulated.26 The most important aspect regarded the conceptualisation 
of common liberty as the achievement of a geographically distinct people, aiming at 
securing its specific constitutional version of liberty in national self-government. 
Rousseau’s general will, by contrast to Kant’s (or Rawls’) later cosmopolitan- 
rationalist conception, was the concrete expression of the political will of a 
bounded group, ordering its own affairs. Also, Machiavelli clearly implied, and 
Montesquieu, Paine, and Jefferson stressed, that different laws and institutions 
may suit different peoples* circumstances, cultures, and political temperaments.
The idea of a liberty as the self-determination of a people was particularly 
prominent in the debate between Federalists and Anti-Federalists, as was the con­
stitutive ambiguity of this idea as regards the difficulty of delineating the shape of 
‘a people’. Here, liberty was closely related to size and locality and to the dangers of 
centralisation and distance between governed and governors. These dangers were 
not primarily about the legitimate variety of cultural expression per se. Rather, they 
concerned the specific material circumstances and needs of localities. They were 
about how, in large states, the interests of small groups of people might be difficult 
to safeguard, when rulers were far away, difficult to call to account, and likely to
26. "La res publica. c’est ce qui dans un people concerne tout un chacun et est 
donc discuté publiquement ... Ainsi contre toute attente, res a une signification 
primordialement juridique, au sens de ce qui concerne l'homme" (Archives de phi­
losophie du droit, Sirey: 1979, vol. 24 (p.44), cited from Dogoguet (1993:13)).
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dominate the interests of smaller localities. And they concerned the realistic politi­
cal format of virtue and patriotic allegiance. The Federalist response was both a 
denial of the impossibility of popular control of. and identification with, a powerful 
centre and an argument about the need to transcend local differences and settle for 
a common liberty of more general nature and a more robust and durable constitu­
tional order which was by now seen to require a large, rather than a small republic.
Finally, republican political self-government entailed the possibility of change 
over time in the constitutional order. Rousseau’s idea that citizens from time to 
time should gather and confirm the constitutional order reflected the recognition 
that common liberty, in an important sense, is only safe as long as citizens agree 
and remind each other about its nature. But Machiavelli and, more explicitly, Sid­
ney, Jefferson, Paine, and Madison in different ways acknowledged the limitations 
of human reason and foresight and the likelihood of future revisions in light o f new 
circumstances as well as new legitimate social demands.
The need for such revisions was likely to be slowly recognised and fiercely 
contested. Republican thinkers knew that even in the best of circumstances con­
flict and imperfect compromise was much more likely than consensus, and that 
compared to the perfect justice of philosopher kings and philosophers, republics 
were always only second best. The content of historical constitutions was deter­
mined by power struggles, accidents, changing alliances, and external pressures. 
Because these and other factors remained, the quality of a settlement was not 
solely to be judged by its approximation to abstract justice, but also according to 
its prudential balancing of the opposed interests of social groups, its ability to 
speak to some shared interests, and its general capacity to secure legitimacy, dura­
bility and stability. Hence the republican pathos of ‘founding’: Because of the nu­
merous dangers threatening a new political order, and because of the importance of 
having some order, also imperfect results become imbued with an authority that 
increases with age.
Also the third fragility of liberty has its constitutive ambiguities and tensions. 
One is between political ‘arguing’ and the necessity of accepting interest-brokering 
or ‘bargaining’.27 The outcome of constitutional deliberation is a concordia, a deci­
sion, in Arendt’s words, to ‘stay together', which is hedged by mutual promise.28 
Although it presumes an uncontested core of libertas, it does not constitute 
transhistorically valid moral knowledge, and the notion of installing in time a ‘well- 
ordered and just society’ of, say, Rawlsian comprehensiveness, is hardly an option. 
Only a minority of republican writers believed that a people, legislating for itself, 
would inevitably reach the most rational and just conclusions. Most writers recog­
nised a constitutive tension in republican citizenship. It was important for every­
27. The distinction is Elster’s.
28. Arendt (1973:181-82).
328
body that libertas might somehow find its abode in the world, as a stable protection 
against arbitrary state power, including the ‘wicked* democratic schemes that 
Madison feared. Yet, the rights of citizenship necessarily had their origin in political 
activity and derived their political legitimation, and hence the stability they might 
have, ultimately from the fallible will of the people. And they did so. even for Madi­
son. not only as the result of a single initial founding experience that henceforward 
protected libertas from all dangers, taking it out of politics. Republicanism em­
ployed a political language which subordinated, in range of importance, the prob­
lems of moral justification to those of political legitimation. But in doing so, the 
tradition had nothing much to say about the normative limits of democratic legiti­
macy, or the place of individual political criticism and civil disobedience. This first 
tension is related to the contrast made above to various forms of liberal rational­
ism.
A second constitutive tension is between the more or less ‘conservative* or 
‘radical* (democratic) voices in the republican tradition. The tension exists between 
the authority and prudence of original constitutional settlements, and their neces­
sary amendment or reformulation, between 'beginning* and a more or less frequent 
‘return*.29 In America, some, like Jefferson and Paine, entertained democratic con­
ceptions of ‘moderation’, believing in the capacity of the people to educate itself, 
show good sense, make valuable contributions of opinion, and do so frequently. 
Madison, much more sanguine, thought recourse to the people should be a last 
and rare constitutional resort. And aristocratic tempers like Adams and Hamilton 
tended to consider the people irreparably immoderate, jealous, and unwise, hoping 
to leave political affairs to a select few of naturally virtuous disposition.
Correspondingly, different ideas existed about the manner of popular legiti­
macy. To some, like Hamilton and to a large extent Madison, legitimacy was pri­
marily a matter of habituation, identification with, and acceptance of, benign gov­
ernment evolving over time. Others, like Jefferson and many Anti-Federalists, 
thought that legitimacy and patriotism required continuous, active and reflective 
confirmation. The elitism of Madison and Adams was part of a long tradition. Before 
them, Harrington, Guicciardini, Cicero, and Aristotle had all expressed severe res­
ervations about the capacities of the ordinary people, and about the danger of un­
leashing their passions and jealousies. Each writer had his more democratic con­
temporaries, who were either less afraid of the people, or less willing to persuade 
themselves, as did Adams, that the rich and well-born were the natural custodians 
and interpreters of an organic and hierarchically ordered common good. Although 
the conservative authors of the American debate reserved a small place for popular
29. Ackerman’s imaginative reading o f Madison employs the metaphor of a ‘con­
stitutional threshold*. New rights claims must have the capacity to persuade ma­
jorities, and their supporters must prevail over some period of time for a constitu­
tional resettlement to be viable (Ackerman 1991).
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consent, and although they certainly started from a republican analysis of civic 
virtue, they began to depart from this tradition to the extent that they became in­
fluenced by those new Enlightenment intellectuals, above all Hume, who valued 
constitutionalism and rule of law. but feared the unruly people as much as the 
despotism of kings and the fanaticism of priests, and seriously believed that liberty* 
could be secured without its participation,30
5. Patriotism
The fourth dimension of the fragility of liberty, and its corresponding modes o f civic 
activity, is the most misunderstood. We have already seen, in the second dimen­
sion, how republicanism challenges facile accounts of dispositions and motivations 
to private as well as public virtue. To recapitulate, republicanism is sceptical about 
accounts of civil society that represent acceptable moral behaviour as a natural or 
automatic outcome of enlightened egoism, the cooling effects of commerce or lux­
ury, a rational capacity for justice, ‘sympathy’, or human perfectability and prog­
ress. Even as aspects of these ‘liberal* discourses of the Enlightenment were em­
ployed, a republican moment continued to exist which emphasised that both what 
we may call the abilities to behave justly (capacities for trust, reflectivity, or impar­
tiality), and the propensities to do so (the motivation and incentive structures of 
public space) were fragile, transient, and non-obvious.
However, the tradition also presents us with a related but analytically distinct 
conceptualisation of civic motivation. Throughout the tradition we find the argu­
ment that ability and propensity to virtuous behaviour - respecting Justice, however 
'thick* or ‘thin*, let alone defending just institutions when this involves sacrifice or 
danger - presupposes something more, namely solidarity and identification with a 
specific group. The crucial question is not just whether individuals are able and 
willing to act virtuously in the abstract, or to do so in more or less demanding 
ways, but also whether or not they are able and willing to do so with reference to a 
particular group of people. The fourth dimension of the fragility of liberty argument 
of republicanism consists in recognition of the non-obviousness of such willing­
ness, and in conceptualising patriotism or civic solidarity as both a necessary pre­
condition of motivation to civic virtue and itself - in two different ways - the product 
of active citizenship.
The concept of patriotism is central to the entire republican tradition.31 But it is 
important to understand what it means. The virtuous citizen, from Thucydides,
30. On the relation between early liberalism and democracy, see Sartor! 
(1987:Chap. 13).
31. The concept has been reconstructed by Mary Dietz (1989) and in particular by 
Maurizio Viroli (1993; 1995) who traces it as historically, and not only conceptu­
ally, distinct from nationalism. Viroli’s important book also contains a spirited at­
tack on recent communitarian attempts (see the discussion of Taylor below) to hi­
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Cicero and Machiavelli to Ferguson, Jefferson, and Tocqueville. was someone who 
loves his pairioL or fatherland. He might love it. as Machiavelli and his contempo­
raries would sometimes put it. more than ‘his soul’, or as in Cicero (and perhaps 
also in Machiavelli), exactly because he cared for his afterlife. Patriotism, very of­
ten, was simply a short-hand for willingness to make sacrifices for the sake o f the 
common good of the republic.
Also, a patriot, in Greek writers. Cicero, and Machiavelli. but living on as a po­
tent motive also in later republicanism, was someone who deserved praise and es­
teem, and who might indeed expect this, along with the fame and recognition that 
would make his name remembered or even immortal after his death. However, a 
patriot was also - and this idea does not change throughout the tradition, although 
it becomes highly explicit in writers like Trenchard and Gordon, Sidney, and most 
Anti-Federalists - someone who, while loving and risking his life for his patricu is 
securing his own most basic interest. And interest, here, is the familiar republican 
one in common liberty and security - the goods that can only be enjoyed in the long 
run by citizens who are willing to cooperate with, and make sacrifices for, one an­
other.
‘Patriot’ and ‘patriotism’ may signify an array of things. It is a citizen ideal 
worth aspiring for, and for which someone may be held in esteem. It is also, as 
most obviously in Cicero, a moral duty. It is clearly also a collectively rational form 
of behaviour, at least for the enlightened citizen who does not cheat. But there is 
more. The concept also partakes in the republican sensitivity to corruption. A  pa­
triot is someone who has not been corrupted in the sense that he still remembers 
what his liberty consists in and why it is precious, where it came from, which dan­
gers threaten it, and how its survival is connected to the lives of himself and his 
fellow citizens. He is ‘public spirited’ in the sense of identifying with the liberty 
project of his and his compatriots* patricu as opposed to being a person who suffers 
from the illusion of owning his liberty as a private possession.
These different aspects reflect a specific and remarkably constant republican 
socio-psychology of civic motivation. In all the authors discussed, we find an appeal 
to the obvious interest everybody will have in personal liberty and security and to 
the common-sensically rational reasons for each to be virtuous (providing that eve­
rybody else is).32 All take as a point of departure that, whatever else is needed, vir­
tuous citizens must have a material source to their virtue, something to be grateful 
about, or something for which they may be brought to recognise an obligation. Nor
jack the term and pollute its original meaning. I believe my proposal here, of link­
ing patriotism to political activity and the fragility of liberty, is complementary to 
Viroli’s work.
32. For historical evidence from Renaissance Florence sources, see written 
sources in Brucker (1971:81-83).
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Tis there any doubt that the language of duty and citizenship is not only an ‘aes­
thetic’ or heroic ideal, but also a moral one.33
However, the republican argument again concerns the empirical fragility, not 
just of liberty directly, but of the effectiveness of either of these motivating mecha­
nisms in making citizens willing to preserve and protect their common liberty. In 
recognition of this problem, the republican tradition contains two types of solu­
tions, both of which use political activity as a mechanism for enhancing patriotic 
identification and civic solidarity. The two solutions share the idea that common 
liberty, in order to work as motivation, must be made vivid and concrete for citi­
zens, that securing it must become experienced as directly linked to cooperation 
and common activities, and, often or to some degree, that these activities enhance 
solidarity and patriotism by coming to constitute an independent value for citizens.
The first of these solutions is about the public commemoration of the origin or 
dangerous rites of passage of the republic, the way in which libertas was first in­
stituted, or later protected and enhanced. Civic virtue, here, is helped along by 
connecting the rational content as well as the moral dignity of sacrifice to stories 
and images that dramatise and render vivid the particular common past of a group. 
It is the particular orchestration of a civic history - of foundation, revolution, dan­
ger and consolidation - that has at its centre ‘our liberty’. This narrative, public 
pathos of the ‘common thing’ has two faces in the tradition.
One of these is the top-down perspective of political manipulation, the need to 
mobilise virtue by using whatever instruments which are deemed necessary by an 
elite, typically in the form of civic religious rites, customs, and festivals. This per­
spective implicitly distinguishes between the point of view and civic capacities of 
the ordinary citizen and the elite, the ruled and the rulers. In Cicero. Machiavelli, 
and Rousseau, where virtue is often the willingness to stand and fight, faith in the 
mental capacities and the strength of character o f the people is low. Citizens tend 
to be governed and governable by passion, and virtue has to be aided by a social 
technology of managing and directing this passion. Public commemoration is mobi­
lisation of the masses, using whatever means necessary, occasionally even includ­
ing such that eventually short-circuit rationality - as in Rousseau’s use of proto­
nationalist identification.
33. Shelley Burtt, in a very good systematic account of republican conceptions of 
civic virtue, has argued that there is not one but three different republican psy­
chologies of virtue - based on self-interest, the demanding call of moral reason and 
duty, and passionate identification respectively. Clearly, she has a valid point, 
when stressing the sheer variety of versions of the republican argument, none of 
which rest on an optimistic teleology of man as ‘political animal’. No doubt, Rous­
seau places much more emphasis on passion than does Tocqueville or Cicero, and 
Tocqueville’s rational citizen has his own interests more in mind than Cicero’s. But 
overemphasising these differences misses the underlying permanence of the argu­
ment I have traced, which significantly combines the three (Burtt 1990; 1992).
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Yet. even in Machiavelli, the bird's eye elite perspective does not stand alone. 
Although the main focus is on the way memory is manipulated, i.e.. erased or 
maintained by the prince, under certain circumstances when virtu has been estab­
lished. even when liberty is lost or threatened, citizens will not be able to forget 
their liberty and the good laws of the republic.34 Against Machiavelli’s belief that a 
free people is better at remembering stands Tocqueville’s more sombre diagnosis of 
democratic man who is only to easily alienated from his past, and who has to be 
educated by the aristocratic observer who loves liberty and knows the history of its 
costs. While Tocqueville placed great emphasis on religion (not civic religion proper, 
yet still ecumenical national churches that had were civic in the sense of support­
ing equality and liberty), he also observed the role of a particularly American 're­
flective patriotism’. And this democratic patriotism, which Tocqueville contrasted 
with what he saw, even more than did Montesquieu, as unquestioning loyalty and 
affection for one’s birthplace, was a rational, enlightened, love of the country to 
which a citizen owed his liberty. It was the same rational, rights-centred, patriot­
ism, which Jefferson and the Anti-Federalists wished to underpin with the consti­
tutional symbolism of a bill of rights, and to which both sides of the National De­
bate would appeal as they spoke for or against the new constitution.
Patriotism as reflective memory of the past is evident in the very way that re­
publican discourse is structured. Several commentators have stressed how repub­
lican discourse differs in Its structure and temporal references from the discourse 
of more traditional societies. One aspect of this reflective remembrance is the dual 
notion that the republic is a fragile entity inserted by humans into time, which 
might ‘not have been*, and whose shape (the way a republic is started by those who 
‘begin’) might have been altogether different. Bruce James Smith notes
the uncertain status of the res publica in ‘the order of things’ and yet ...
the enduring conviction, founded on personal practice, of its intrinsic
value35
It is this double knowledge of the hazards, uncertainties, and imperfections of the 
republic which nurtures the knowledge that it is something very valuable, a “treas­
ure", as Hannah Arendt called it,36 to be cared for and transmitted through time. It 
is most clearly seen, perhaps, in the self-conscious writings of Jefferson, Madison 
and other American revolutionaries. Appreciation of contingency was a main source
34. “And he who becomes master of a city that used to be free and does not de­
stroy her can expect to be destroyed by her" (Machiavelli, Discourses, 1,26). Smith, 
who quotes the same passage, claims that in “Republics ... memory of their ancient 
Institutions is somehow etched into the mind of every citizen, impervious to the 
benevolence of princes and the ravages of time, passed on from father to son even 
in the face of tyranny" (Smith 1985:81).
35. Smith (1985:9).
36. Arendt (1973:2150).
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of the ’love of the city* of these republicans: It was the love of what cannot be taken 
for granted, exactly because it cannot. It is in this manner that it must be distin­
guished from custom, way of life, and all manners of relating to the past which are 
habitual and unreflective.
It is a further feature of this reflective remembrance, according to both Smith 
and Pocock, and behind them Arendt, that common memories are often character­
ised by interpretative contests as their meanings gradually change over time:
A republic’s self-conception is mediated through tales and stories - the 
remembrance of words and deeds. In these tales and stories is preserved 
a special kind of knowledge of ‘a free people’. Political memory is the 
concrete conceptualisation of the experience of a people. (...) Only by 
sifting, distilling, rediscovering its traditions can the res publica preserve 
itself (...) Such a tradition is susceptible to rearrangement (reinterpreta­
tion, recreation, recovery) because it is the object of ‘incessant talk’ 
[Arendt’s term, PM1. The republic is both the beneficiary and the victim 
of the inexactness of language. In the ambiguity of words we find one 
spring of republican vitality ... [Yet] ... the struggle over meanings of 
words is circumscribed by the limits of a public language drawn from 
common mnemonic images37
The quote elaborates on the idea that a republic’s decay, its being forgotten, is pre­
vented through the maintenance of a specific type of public dialogue. Dialogue, 
here, is not about abstract values or principles, but the concrete meaning of a 
country’s past. Political values and principles, such as the value of liberty and the 
ideal of virtuous citizenship in defence of liberty, are talked about as they are ex­
emplified by historical experience, and rendered vivid through the use of rhetorical 
techniques and narrative structuring.
In this connection, we may think also of Hannah Arendt’s writings about re­
flective or narrative historical judgement, which corresponded to her fascination 
with the American revolution. The original founding experience and the experiences 
of strife and upheavals, she thought, gave a degree of authority to the constitution 
which could still oblige those who come after not to take its existence too lightly, 
but to affirm and appreciate it as an inspiration for action. The very difficulty and 
great historical significance of achieving a concord between individuals with differ­
ent backgrounds and interests provided a degree o f shared direction, reminding all 
of a political community’s common ‘fate’ which was the basis of political identity. It 
made it possible for citizens to know *who they are*, because they might refer to the 
past and to other people who shared this past.38
37. Smith (1985:9,21-22).
38. Arendt (1958b:178-81; 1973:198-214).
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While the concreteness of common liberty can be connected to political partici­
pation through collective acts of public re-membering. also a second, more direct 
connection may be found. The very activity of doing something important with 
other citizens may create bonds of solidarity which are strong enough to constitute 
a civic ‘we’, which in turn serves as a further motivation for action, thus making 
civic virtue self-reinforcing. Over and above the direct instrumental point of civic 
activity, virtually all republican authors are concerned that citizens who retreat 
into privacy will ‘forget’ in the sense noted above. Again, the chosen perspective 
may be more or less ‘top-down’ or ‘bottom-up’. Machiavelli primarily advocated civic 
militias as opposed to mercenary armies - a theme constantly rehearsed in later 
republican writings - because citizens that were required to fight for their liberty 
were reminded at one and the same time of the value, the fragility, and the coop­
erative basis of their enjoyment of citizenship. Tocqueville presented the most ar­
ticulate case (but the theme can be found in diiferent forms in Sidney, Cato’s let­
ters, Rousseau, Jefferson, and several Anti-Federalists) for participation as the 
means to experience how the interests of the individual, ‘rightly understood*, were 
bound up with those of his fellow citizens and the community as a whole.
Both of these modalities of patriotism are connected to a republican concern 
with time. The first, clearly, is about the past. However, it Is about a past that is not 
over yet, because its symbolic meaning is open to new reconstructions or re­
memberings. The second is concerned with the future. Here, solidarity and patriot­
ism is not so much a matter of what we achieved, or how and when we did it. but 
about who the we is that is going to achieve something, also in the future, and in 
what ways we are cooperating to achieve it.
Before discussing the republican idea of patriotism in more detail, consider why the 
historical contrast between republicanism and ‘liberalism’, on this fourth dimen­
sion, is relatively clear. To the extent that the general argument about civic virtue 
and libertas was replaced by schemes of countervailing interests and reliance on 
the stabilising effects of commerce and commercial spirit, the language of patriot­
ism was largely discredited. Hobbes, of course, founded his own distinct tradition 
which was special by simply not regarding solidarity as an issue. In Leviathan, po­
litical obligation became a matter of individual interest and coercive control within 
the jurisdiction of a mighty sovereign.39 Locke’s conception of civic motivation was 
typical of much Puritan natural law thinking in its reliance on an inculcated dispo­
sition to do one’s Christian duty; whereas Hume. Smith, Hamilton, and in his un­
republican moods Madison in each their ways expected a habitual allegiance to 
(reasonably benign) political authorities to develop over time, along with the habit 
of abiding by law and contract. The background for these conceptions was the be­
39. Hobbes, The Leviathan, 1,13-16; 11,17-18; also Austin, Lectures on Jurispru­
dence, 1,1-6.
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lief that what modem commercial societies primarily required from its citizens were 
the passive virtues of submission and restraint. With significant exceptions like 
Smith and, less ambiguously, Ferguson, it became a commonplace for British and 
French Enlightenment thinkers to represent patriotism as a blind and dangerous 
passion on a par with religious fanaticism.
We know that Kant, for political purposes, believed less in the force of rational 
duty or a ‘sense of justice’ than either later day neo-Kantian liberals like Rawls, or 
earlier natural rights theories. The overwhelming demand in Kant, we recall, was 
not only to live together in justice, but to extend such cooperation in justice to 
neighbouring peoples whenever possible, until a pacific world federation could be 
established.40 However, such a state of affairs, in Kant’s view, could only be ex­
pected when violent conflict would persuade citizens, which he expected to be dev­
ils rather than angels, to find a peaceful concord. However, by contrast to Kant’s 
political theory, idealist liberal writers like Hegel and T.H. Green did produce elabo­
rate conceptions of rational obligation, perceived to have actual motivating power.41
40. According to Kant, it is a rational, a priori idea of an unlawful state of nature 
that every human being
must leave the state of nature, in which everybody follows its own judg­
ment, unite itself with all others (with which it cannot avoid interacting), 
subject itself to a public lawful external coercion ... that is ... enter a civil 
condition (Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, §44)
And, regarding federation.
Peoples who have grouped themselves into nation states may be judged 
in the same way as individual men living in the state of nature, inde­
pendent of external laws; for they are a standing offence to one another 
by the very fact that they are neighbours. Each nation ... can and ought 
to demand of the others that they should enter along with it into a con­
stitution similar to the civil one (Kant, Perpetual Peace, in Political Writ­
ings (p. 102))
For discussion, see Ingram (1995).
41. T.H. Green, for instance, was much more optimistic than Kant, in his concep­
tion of reflective morality and progressive development of self-consciousness. Like 
Hegel and Fichte, his idealistic notion of self-imposed obligation and rational iden­
tification with the political community as a moral entity, of which each citizen was 
a part (providing that it conformed to universal or cosmopolitan right), and whose 
institutions contributed to the full development o f each, may be seen to make up 
the second generation of that belief in moral progress, which we saw originating in 
philosophers like Condorcet. For instance,
The truly loyal man Is not he who shouts for king and constitution, or 
who yields a blind obedience to the routine o f existing institutions, but 
he who looks beyond them to the universal law of the common reason of 
men, and in reverence for this yields a willing and hearty obedience to 
the rules in which it embodies itself for the establishment of right deal­
ing in society (Green, 'Loyalty’, Lectures on the Principles o f Political 
Obligation and other Writings (p.306); cp. Lectures, G, 113-36.
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Secondly, however the Rechtstaat of Green or Kant or other liberals should be 
seen to have come about and be supported - by a rational sense of justice, by ha­
bituation, force of law, or a slowly working divine and natural design - it had to 
presuppose that the structure of obligations developed within a bounded group of 
people: a moral ‘division of labour’ was going on which involved, at least, the exis­
tence of state boundaries. Yet early liberals did not thematize this. The combination 
of abstract state of nature and contract theory, which rendered citizenship a uni­
versal right of all. with less demanding conceptions of civic obligation, served to 
transform the manner in which the relation between the citizen and the community 
was conceptualised. By and large, liberal thought from Hobbes and Locke to Kant 
was concerned with the question of why and under which circumstances a person 
should obey an authority, and, secondly, what would induce him to do so, be it 
force, habit, or reason. There was no discussion of the conditions of entry and 
membership of a political community, over and above contractarian notions of the 
tacit consent of visiting strangers and the like, nor was there any concern with the 
conditions of group solidarity between citizens. By contrast, republican discourse, 
even as it employed the language of natural law, recognised that citizenship was 
more than a legal status which an individual could simply step into. We recall that 
republican citizens made up bounded groups of individuals who banded together 
for mutual benefit. These benefits were recognised to require sacrifice and determi­
nation by all, and civic virtue in turn presupposed a sense of political friendship 
and mutuality, even among strangers, which could not be expected to arise by it­
self.
However, unlike most contemporary neo-Kantian liberals, and unlike earlier 
thinkers of the Enlightenment, nineteenth century liberals were indeed aware of 
the problem of solidarity. J.S. Mill. Hegel, FIche. Humboldt, Mazini, T.H. Green, 
and Sidgwick all explicitly presupposed the framework of the nation-state, and ‘na­
tional’ self-determination was a standard liberal commitment.42 In these authors, a 
constitutive liberal contradiction becomes apparent: The moral language of liberty 
and rights was considered in principle to be universal and neutral, whether derived 
from God’s law, human reason, or general utility, but it could only motivate indi­
viduals who shared a cultural identity. In a large degree, as recently pointed out by 
Will Kymlicka, liberal writers of the last century were for instance beginning to rec­
ognise that national minorities did not, after all, enjoy a de facto equality of rights 
with majority populations, who were able to monopolise national cultures and in­
stitutions with their power of numbers.43
The usual conclusion drawn by the nineteenth century authors consisted in 
liberal nationalist doctrines according to which states must be fitted to existing
[ 42. For discussion and reference to these authors, see Kymlicka (1995:505).
| 43. Kymlicka (1995: 51-52).
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‘peoples’. But an aspect of this had to do. not only with legitimate and necessary 
cultural diversity of institutions, in particular religious and language related ones, 
but also with the conditions of solidarity and identification. These conclusions, in 
writers like J.S. Mill and Green, were significantly tied to the rediscovery of the 
need for civic activity to sustain free institutions, and of such activity as a main 
generator of civic virtue and identification with the common good.44 However, in the 
idealist and liberal-humanist new use of the language of patriotism, identification 
was invariably linked, not only to the experience and remembrance of common lib­
erty per se (although only liberal institutions deserved loyalty),45 but to a shared 
cultured background.
Green added to his idealist rationalism the stress on “ties derived from ... tra­
ditions and customs, and from the common ways of feeling and thinking which a 
common language and still more a common literature embodies".46 Mill, who con­
sidered the matter in some detail, thought that it was “in general a necessary con­
dition of free institutions that the boundaries of government should coincide in the 
main with those of nationalities". By "nationalities", Mill had in mind groups united 
by “common sympathies" which could have a large range of different origins, in­
cluding “race and descent", “[clommunity of language, and religion", and 
" [geographical limits". Important were also common “political antecedents" and a 
shared national history of pride or humiliations. But, by contrast to most o f the 
older republican discourse, Mill did not recognise - perhaps for good reasons, in an 
age of nationalism and nationalist unrest - the normative potential o f patriotism as 
an integrating and bridging form of solidarity:
44. Green doubted that
the legislative and administrative agencies o f society can be kept free ... 
and true to the idea of common good without popular control - land] 
whether again, if they can, that appreciation of common good ... which is 
as necessary to free or political society as the direction of law to the 
maintenance of common good, can be kept alive without active partici­
pation o f the people in legislative functions (Green, Lectures, G, 119) 
According to Mill,
(tlhe food of feeling is action ... Let a person have nothing to do for his 
country, and he will not care for it (...) Where [thel school of public spirit 
does not exist, scarcely any sense is entertained that private persons ... 
owe any duty to society, except to obey the laws and submit to the gov­
ernment. There is no unselfish sentiment of identification with the public
Representative institutions necessarily depend for permanence upon the 
readiness of the people to fight for them in the case of their being endan­
gered. If too little valued for this, they seldom obtain a footing at all, and 
if they do, are almost sure to be overthrown (Mill, Representative Gov­
ernment in Utilitarianism, On Liberty, and Considerations on Representa­
tive Government, cpt.3-4 (pp.220,234,236)).
45. E.g., Green, 'Loyalty’, Principles (p.306).
46. Green, cited in Kymlicka (1995:52).
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Among a people without fellow-feeling, especially if they read and speak 
different languages, the united public opinion, necessary to the working 
of representative government, cannot exist47
Mill recognised the practical need to recognise state sovereignty in many cases 
where national groups had been previously subdued by ‘superior’ cultures (i.e., the 
British and the French), or where such groups were too dispersed and fragmented 
to be the basis of separate political entities. But by doing so. and by sticking to the 
language of nationalism. Mill came to partake in the nineteenth century project of 
what is now considered to be a distinctly un-liberal, forced assimilation - rather 
than the tolerance of cultural diversity which has become a main topic of contem­
porary liberal ideologies which rest safely on the foundation of established nation 
states. By implication, he also came to have a small share in the self-perpetuating 
construction of myths of naturalness of nations, and of the nation as the prime 
object of modem identification and belonging,48 which spelled the death of the re­
publican language of patriotism.49
In light of these liberal ideas of the last century, the republican argument about 
solidarity and patriotism can be reconstructed to entail three claims. The second 
and third of these are also promises - ambiguous promises - which highlight, again, 
a constitutive element of tension or dialectic in republican thought - evident above 
all in Rousseau, in the American founders, and in Tocqueville’s implicit criticism of 
Rousseau: Fragile liberty requires mechanisms of civic identification to support it, 
but the quality of this identification is not to be taken for granted.
The first claim is that boundaries are needed. It is a commonplace, and not an 
embarrassing afterthought, from Machiavelli to Tocqueville, that the propensity to 
solidarity is easily diluted, whether this means to live in justice wrtth someone or 
something more demanding. This is not a moral question of ‘particular* versus ‘uni­
versal’ obligations, but about the human capacity for abstraction. By and large, 
solidarity must be writh people that a person is 'closer to* than the entire mankind, 
although exactly how close is an open question. Somehow, it must be with people 
wrtth whom one shares, beyond some abstract conception of justice, some ‘concrete’ 
fate. Most basically, the veiy meaning of solidarity in republican discourse is para- 
digmatically linked to the idea of an historically and geographically bounded coop­
erative community of citizens protecting and furthering a particular common liberty 
project.
47. Mill, Representative Government Chap. 16 (pp.391-92,394).
48. Classically Anderson (1983); Hobsbawon (1990). The basic point about nations 
as ‘constructed’ entities is not contested by theorists who place more stress on old 
ethnic backbones of nations (Smith 1991).
49. Viroli (1995).
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The second claim is that civic cooperation, while always taking place within 
boundaries, may be a more or less exclusive or inclusive affair. As regards the first 
mechanism of civic remembrance, Roman republicanism expressly enabled people 
from the provinces to become citizens, regardless, for instance, of their religion. 
And the Machiavellian republic ‘for increase’ was legitimated not only on instru­
mental grounds, but because of the potential for more people to become citizens. 
American revolutionary patriotism was defined by a communality in defence of lib­
erty which was inclusive in principle:
by 1776 ... the concept o f ‘patriot’ and 'patriotism* were clearly affixed to 
a particular set of ideological, constitutional, and political principles: 
formation of a body politic, and to a distinctively political public spirit 
that evolved from the experience of a shared struggle and self-sacrifice 
for a common cause50
Dietz notes with regret that the concept has become associated with its bloody 
brother, nationalism, and claims that “maintaining a distinction between patriot­
ism and nationalism is more than just a an exercise in semantics".51 Viroli even 
more unequivocally stresses how patria^ from the Romans onwards, has referred to 
the republic which was able to secure a citizen’s liberty, and how, correspondingly, 
the patriot was a citizen who showed a willingness to make sacrifices for the sake 
of this liberty and the laws securing it. Patriotism was the specific type of love of 
the citizen, which was later revived in Machiavelli’s ‘I love my native city more than 
my soul*. This republican caritas cive was not linked to a mystical homeland, as in 
the romantic nationalism of Herder and Schlegel:52
the civil philosopher’s city ... is grounded on justice, not on a particular 
concept of the good, a culture, or a tradition ... the republic is, as Cicero 
said, a congregation of men gathered to live in justice under law, and its 
aim is to protect the liberty o f the citizens against the insolence of the ar-
50. Dietz (1989:183,187). Thus, Jefferson was able to “think it fortunate for the 
United States to have become the asylum for so many virtuous patriots o f different 
denominations", Jefferson to M. de Meusnier, Jefferson, Life and Writings (p.533, 
italics added).
51. Dietz (1989:191).
52. Patriotism, according to Viroli who cites two famous writers, is indeed a form 
of compassion and care: “è piuttosto, come ha spiegato Simone Weil, una forme di 
compassione che si prova nei confronti di persone o di cose care di cui percepiamo 
la bellezza e la fragilità. Vale la pena di ricordare quanto scriveva Crocce nel 1943: 
'si potrebbe dire che corre tra amor di patria e nazionalismo la stessa diferenza che 
c’è tra la gentilezza delfamore umane per uriumana creatura e la bestiale libidine o 
la morbosa lussuria o l’egoistico capriccio" (Viroli 1993:463).
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rogant ... Citizens regard the city (or should) as something to which their 
parents and grandparents contributed, and which they must preserve53
This relationship is found even in Rousseau, and even in his The Government o j 
Poland.54 The love of patria which Rousseau wished to awaken must derive from an 
enjoyment of peace and liberty, and from an appreciation of their fragile character. 
Even when proposing to employ the standard paraphernalia of nationalism. Rous­
seau never departed from the premise that liberty is what must be secured. But 
while this part of Rousseau’s’ work starts in the theoretical landscape of republican 
patriotism, it also provides early examples of knott>-hou> on nationalist mobilisation 
- in whatever cause. Rousseau, again, is a locus classicus of the dangers of the re­
publican argument. Patriots may be motivated in the wrong manner, and the 
means employed to secure liberty, in the hands of ruthless propagandists, may 
quickly displace and obscure as a matter of fact if not conceptually the end o f lib­
erty.
Yet, a republican political identity, as noted by Smith, is to some extent malle­
able, because created. It may be thematised and criticised in manners that make 
its meaning broader and accessible to a wider range of Individuals. Clearly, repub­
licanism was ambiguous on these matters, and relatively silent, for good reasons, 
on issues of cultural identities. However, the American tradition along with 
Tocqueville’s conception of reflective patriotism contains the building blocks for an 
idea of patriotism as based on the reconceptualisation, as an ongoing political con­
cern, of the meaning and historical references of liberty, on guarding the republic 
against nationalistic and chauvinistic passions, and on attempting to include more 
and more different people into the mnemonic community, as the history of a re­
public unfolds and new groups contribute to it or become recognised as silenced or 
forgotten contributors of the past.
Also the idea of a forward-directed political integration through participation 
may have its dangers, although it does not involve (inventing) a common past. Eve­
rybody, regardless of creed and culture, can participate in defending the institu­
tions of liberty. Accomplishing important things together is creates potentially ro­
bust bonds, and there are many possible settings where this may take place in 
modem societies. Republican standard cases, we have seen, have been civic mili­
tias, local associations, and political deliberation. But also here republicanism has 
its dark side. Rousseau typifies a Spartan ideal where participation - for instance in 
connection with the ‘spectacles’ that he commended with such enthusiasm to 
D’Alembert - becomes a melting together of individual minds, where all completely 
forget their private selves, and all are constantly seen by everybody else. Individu­
53. Viroli (1992:288).
54. Viroli made this point with much energy in a talk at the European University 
Institute, Florence on 12 April, 1995.
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als, here, identify themselves and others exclusively as citizens, and hence as all 
alike, rather than as private individuals with a shared civic identity. Each will be a 
brother to another, each wall be able to suffer any sacrifice for the sake of all. What, 
one may plausibly ask in such a situation, will become of the capacity to see other 
individuals in their difference, with possibly different needs and diverging view­
points?
Rousseau’s theme of the Total Citizen as a vehicle for equality of recognition 
was in principle independent of his other, republican, employment of the argu­
ment. Still, many passages from the Lettre a D'Alembert seems to contradict the 
third claim about patriotism that we may reconstruct from the republican tradition: 
Patriotism always contains a rational core, and it does not involve a demand for 
unquestioning allegiance. Again, according to Viroli,
Every city is a particular one, with its distinctive qualities and its par­
ticular story ... [and] ... preserving our community is an indispensable 
condition if we are to understand our own story ... Patriotism has always 
been a value cherished by civil philosophers..[but] ... Our country has to 
deserve our sacrifice, if we are to serve it ... Our country has to be de­
fended only if it is a just republic that protects the liberty of the citi­
zens55
There is no doubt that republican patriotism is conceptually linked to liberty in this 
way. But leaving it at that is too simple. The motivational mechanism involves a 
degree of departure from the conceptions of rationality common to most Enlight­
enment liberalism. First, the republican tradition, in focusing on the need to make 
the memory of liberty vivid and concrete, positively applauded the employment of 
rhetorical and narrative means in public discourse. Republican citizens, remem­
bering liberty with their heads, must also be moved in their hearts, even be im­
pressed by the beauty and the pathos of their present political existence as well as 
their past. This, of course, is in stark contrast to the ‘unimaginative’, philosophical, 
and technical language of contemporary liberal political theory which, despite the 
virtues of using such language in scholarly circumstances, fails to catch the public 
imagination. Historically, writers like Hume and Constant unfairly presented re­
publican patriotism as a blind passion. Yet, the widespread Enlightenment turn 
towards cool and calculated interest and reason did mark a departure, and possibly 
a premature one, from the republican universe of political psychology.
Secondly, there is also a sense in which patriotic identification motivates be­
cause it becomes a value in itself. The section below is an excursion from the juxta­
position of republicanism to ‘liberalism’, which otherwise structures this chapter. 
However, because of the veiy illuminating manner in which, to my mind, he mis-
55. Viroli (1992:288-89).
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reads the republican idea of patriotism. Taylor’s influential contribution merits 
further attention.
5.1. Taylor: A  Cross-Purpose Regarding *Patriotism#
Taylor’s argument, in the article. Cross-pu/poses: The Liberal-Communitarian De­
bate. was that patriotism as an identificatory device serves to motivate citizens to 
duties beyond the most ordinary, because the historical community is a common 
good in an immediate sense. Confirming oneself as sharing this identity, belonging 
to this community, and sharing bonds of solidarity with these people is valuable in 
itself. It is the sharing as such which is valuable and which compels, as distinct 
from what is going on in the case of what he calls the merely convergent common 
goods. Political communities must take care that institutions are fashioned prop­
erly, so as to reflect these shared values and hence mobilise patriotic feeling:
Taylor argues that.
The identification of the citizen with the republic as a common enterprise 
is essentially the recognition of a common good. My attachment to the 
MUC [Montreal Urban Community] for its police service is based on 
enlightened self-interest. My (frequently inoperative) moral commitment 
to the welfare of all humans is altruistic. But the bond of solidarity with 
my compatriots in a functioning republic is based on a sense of shared 
fate, where the sharing itself is of value. This is what gives this bond its 
special importance, what makes my ties with these people and to this 
enterprise peculiarly binding
The latter type of attachment is lacking in nominally liberal regimes where the 
public tolerates power abuse. Even though a few people "feel very strongly about 
the fate of democracy everywhere" they will never make the crucial difference, nor 
may a liberal regime rely on its fair weather friends who will not show up before 
and unless the state delivers the goods.56
Now, Taylor associates this argument about motivation with what he calls the 
"republican thesis”. He goes on to argue that this involves that "a free society re­
quires a patriotism", and patriotism is “a common identification with an historical 
community founded on certain values”. But as we look closer at Taylor’s conten­
tions, we see that his points are communitarian rather than republican: Republi­
can patriotism is about Aristotelian self-government (although his unsupported ref­
erences are to Machiavelli, Montesquieu, and Tocqueville), where the creation of a 
community consensus allows citizens a “common expression of [their] respective 
dignity", even an "extension of themselves". Moreover, there are many types of pa­
triotism, including fascist ones and some "founded on race and blood ties", and the 
question becomes one of “defining a meaningful freedom which can capture peo-
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pie’s allegiance". Republican patriotism. Taylor thinks, fits Canada better than 
USA. the latter’s freedom being based on rights and procedurally neutral institu­
tions. And, more particularly, in some societies, like Quebec, the value of institu­
tions, as they reflect citizens’ freedom and dignity, implies not just self-rule, but 
also an embodiment of “a national culture ... which is also defined in terms of some 
language or histoiy". In Quebec, patriotism is only fostered through dedication "to 
the defence of French culture and language, even if this involves some restriction 
on individual freedom.56 7
The instrumental element in Taylor’s conception of patriotism turns out to be 
rather weak. It cuts the conceptual link with libertas, referring in stead to different 
meaningful ‘liberties’ in different countries, using ‘liberty’ in a very broad sense, 
related to collective autonomy as well as cultural expression. He also fails to see 
that republican identification does not necessarily rely on already prevailing traits 
of political culture, let alone ‘culture’ as such. Although he does not spell it out. 
nor attend to some of the drastic conclusions that might follow, the content o f a 
given ‘culture’ becomes normatively privileged as the embodiment, pace Taylor’s 
rather strong version of “holism”,58 of what is already there. Hence, the commemo­
ration of the American Revolution and Declaration of Independence are treated as 
parallel ‘constitutive values* to language in Canada.
In the Taylor logic, once political institutions reflect stable and ‘given’ cultures, 
political allegiance - of the sort that fits the cultures in question - will in fact be 
forthcoming. The instrumental problem, as presented by Taylor, is to secure the 
right fit, as it were. He ignores the republican experience that patriotism is exactly 
what cannot be taken for granted, and needs to be mobilised, created, or directed. 
In particular, he treats civic activity (apart from being a means of self-expression) 
as a generator of patriotism only for those peoples, including Canadians and in 
particular the Québécois who have such participation as a part of their tradition, 
contra the republican point that it is a general means to create patriotism where 
none was before, or to recreate it where it has been lost. Again, the republican 
point is not to express an identity, but rather to construct or reconstruct it.59
But let us abstract from all these misunderstandings and look at Taylor’s idea 
of immediate common goods, the value in itself o f sharing a citizen identity, which 
is a state of affairs, according to Taylor, that may be likened to playing an instru-
56. Taylor (1989:170).
57. Taylor (1989:173,178,181-82). Taylor’s writings, philosophical and polemical, 
on the Quebec question, are collected in Taylor (1993).
58. Taylor (1985).
59. Taylor, in a later book (1991:118) seems to come closer to the republican argu­
ment, suggesting that “(sjuccessful common action can bring a sense of empowerment 
and also strengthen identification with the political community”. Still, Canada, with 
its more decentralized federal system, stands a better chance here than the USA.
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ment in an orchestra. He clearly has a point here. The republican idea is not only 
that we must cooperate with others in order to realise personal benefits we could 
not have alone, and that such benefits also, incidentally, accrue to others who par­
ticipate in the enterprise. Nor is liberty only a common good in the moral sense of a 
collective arrangement which a group may regard as reasonable. The moral obliga­
tion refers to a bounded group of individuals, and to the community as a whole as 
represented in its laws and institutions. Here, ‘the sharing itself may be of value 
because the activities involved become ways of confirming to oneself in an impor­
tant way (though not necessarily the only nor the most important way) who one is, 
by identifying with the group where the sharing is done, and with the political val­
ues of this group.
This is, indeed, a sentiment in citizens which goes beyond the rational, both 
the merely self-interested, and the merely moral, and expresses an emotional at­
tachment to something particular, both a particular political entity and particular 
individuals with whom one shares citizenship. The problem with Taylor’s account is 
that it distorts the rational core of the ‘immediate’ common good as it is employed 
within a language of identity and belonging. The republican argument suggests 
that rational interest, let alone duty, cannot be had in mind constantly. But how­
ever unreflectively any one citizen may ’share’ or ‘belong’, and derive intrinsic sat­
isfaction from it, the meaning of the ‘immediate’ common good will still derive from 
historical experiences of liberty as being the result of cooperative undertakings. 
Such experiences are at least in principle accessible to. if no longer personal re­
membrance, then the re-minding which takes as point of departure the great value 
of a person’s present and actually experienced liberty, and, often, some plausible 
story of the relationship between these benefits and the history of how it was se­
cured, threatened, or renewed in the past.
The reason why participating in a project or sharing certain political memories 
of liberty may become valuable in itself, is that both activities are bound up with 
ideals about what constitutes a good citizen. It makes sense to see such ideals as 
the core of a political way of life, also when it does indeed become a - more habitual 
- way of life. They become reasons which everybody will or should be able to give, 
even as an independent value becomes attached to the company of others in ac­
tion, or to the comforts of sharing in a common history and future. The motiva­
tional force of the republican common good is a ‘passion’ with a rational content 
and origin. Belonging and participating are of value because they presuppose ideals 
which citizens could at least be able to state and understand.
It is in this way that Viroli is right that patriotism can never be unquestioning. 
Nor could it be the case, as some communitarians would argue, that refraining 
from questioning, or experiencing the impossibility of questioning, is what consti­
tutes a common good. There can be no ‘my country right or wrong’. Being a citizen, 
someone who partakes in an important historical enterprise with others, may be a
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great good, a source of pride, a measuring rod for praise and esteem, and a very 
important base of mutual recognition. But all this may, indeed should, break down, 
if the enterprise is no longer concerned with liberty, if the republic falls into decay. 
There may be such a thing as a human need for areas of psycho-ontological secu­
rity, of knowing that certain things can always be trusted to be in a certain wray. 
But at the very heart of the republican idea is just the opposite notion, that there is 
no such thing as the certainty that liberty will last.60
If. returning to Rousseau’s bold reflections offered in the letter to D’Alembert, 
some republicans have relied too much on the ‘value in itself of being recognised 
as belonging, this only serves to highlight, as a last republican tension, that civic 
activity may generate more or less reflective and critical patriotisms. We have good 
historical reasons to doubt that individuals treated with Rousseau’s medicine could 
remain open to newcomers and strangers (Rousseau did not think they could, and 
did not care much), or even distinguish between the institutions securing their lib­
erty and those required by and orchestrated for the sake of the nation. But the re­
publican intuition here would not be to let sleeping dogs lie and identities and na­
tional feelings be, sticking to cosmopolitan high ground. Rather, it would be to in­
sist that there is no other way to avoid chauvinism than to have forms and institu­
tions of participation and collective remembrance that are linked as much as pos­
sible to critical reflection on the sources and meaning of a political community’s 
shared past and future.
6. On Republicanism and Liberalism - Again
These, I submit, are the most important contents of the rich republican tradition of 
political thought, highlighted with the analytical searchlight that I have called the 
fragility of liberty. I shall end this chapter with a few remarks on what I see as the 
distinct contribution of republicanism as an historical tradition.
6.1. Ancients and Modems - New and Old Republicanisms
I have tried, throughout this thesis to emphasise the continuity of the republican 
argument. Thus, to repeat, 1 believe to have established that republican theory
60. Psychologically speaking, the republican idea suggests an analogy to friend­
ship, as we normally understand it (i.e., not Aristotle’s phllia) as opposed to the 
blood relationships in a family, otherwise suggested by the concept of patria. A par­
ent does not put in question what is the basis of his or her love of a child. If the 
child commits a terrible crime or act of betrayal, it makes good sense to us if the 
parent says ‘she is still my child’, and forgives him. In a friendship we do know that 
an easy way to ruin it is to start keeping accounts or analyse feelings. It is certainly 
unpleasant to place its value and the merits of the friend in question. Yet, it is not 
at all impossible, and there may be moments, such as, for instance, great breaches 
of trust, that may eventually cause a person to ask himself what in a relationship 
(what has been experienced in common, what are the relations of gratitude etc.) 
could possibly motivate him to continue to forgive and forget.
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from ancient Greece to modem America conceptualised a species of negative lib­
erty, that civic activity was not, in the senses usually attributed to the ‘civic hu­
manist' tradition, values ‘in it self, and that civic virtue, whatever its content and 
flavour, was an instrumental matter.
Clearly, historical shifts occurred, as the language of virtue and corruption 
travelled from the Italian renaissance to France, Britain, and the American colo­
nies, and as good citizenship became embodied in new religious, social, and entre­
preneurial contexts. Even so. I have also suggested that the usual contrast between 
‘classical* and ‘modem’ republican virtues and corresponding conceptions of the 
person are somewhat overdrawn. In particular, they thrive, today as in the Enlight­
enment, on distorted images of the classical world and its theoretical representa­
tions. Looked at more closely, neither Aristotle, Thucydides, Cicero, nor Machiavelli 
based their theories on the existence of such selfless, and selflessly sacrificing citi­
zens which populated Montesquieu's Persian Letters and Rousseau’s imaginary 
Poland, and which served as theoretical straw men for Madison, Hume, and Ad­
ams. Moderation, although its flavour was different, was also a ‘classical* value.
This said, the unfocussed use of republican discourse as a repository of ideas 
claimed to have contemporary relevance makes it an important task to show that 
some republican writings are quite unattractive. The negative liberty advocated by 
early republicans was at times a circumscribed and limited protection of the most 
basic human interests in life and security, which reflected the grim social realities 
of their contemporary societies.61 At times, the means considered necessary to se­
cure such liberty - strict social control, Spartan frugality, social engineering of de­
votion to the Fatherland - seem to have been such a strong medicine that the pa­
tient, common liberty, would be killed or left to lead a crippled existence. Yet, the 
temptation to celebrate these means and their consequences as dignified values in 
themselves, i.e., the spectre of Rousseau's armed peasant, is occasionally found in 
authors as liberal minded as Montesquieu.
A shift which does occur, and which arguably justifies using the term ‘liberal 
republicanism’, has already been noted. It is the part of the Enlightenment concep­
tion of moderation which is associated with the general shift towards a more ab­
stract, impersonal, and pluralist conception of civil society. However, the transmis­
sion between such ‘modem’ and remaining ‘premodem’ political and social cos­
mologies does not correspond to the decline of republicanism. Inside the old politi­
cal view of the world, with Its static, natural hierarchies and social division, repub­
lican arguments (i.e., by American Anti-Federalists) were countered by conserva­
tive, aristocratic conceptions of the common good (as that of Adams). On the other 
hand, those ‘modem’ writers who analysed the new reality of social pluralism, indi­
vidualism, and egoism included Tocqueville and Ferguson, along with Madison and
61. Brucker (1971)
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Hume. Abstract, individualist, pluralist, and commercial society became the fertile 
soil for influential new (i.e., liberal, utilitarian, and libertarian) individualisms. B u t 
I have also tried to demonstrate that the same social realities were the occasion fo r  
renewed formulations of the fragility of liberty7 argument, now aimed at new, d is ­
tinctly modem dangers to the republic.
6.2. Virtues o f Involvement and Virtues o f  Distance
Throughout the historical analysis of this thesis I have tried to resist the tem pta­
tion to erect liberal straw men. Locke, Hume, Kant, and Mill all treasured the sam e 
rock-bottom political value of liberty under law as did republican writers, although 
each of course added his own flavour to it. Possessive individualists and libertari­
ans were late comers, not theoretical founding fathers. Although we have noted a  
tendency, prominent since the Enlightenment, to naturalise or rationalise the p o ­
litical condition in cosmologies of progress, many liberal authors continued to  
share the republican assumption that liberty was contingent and unobvious. In  
relation to these authors, the really significant difference, also for contemporary 
political analysis, concerned the proper response to such a state of affairs:
We should not allow the elaborate development above of analytical dimensions 
and contrasts, with their obvious ambiguities and contrasts, to make us miss th e  
forest for the trees. A suitable shorthand contrast which cuts through reservations, 
exceptions, and refined distinctions, between historical republican intuitions an d  
their rising non-republican or anti-republican opponents, based on what we m a y  
see as contrasting sociologies of citizenship and liberty, is between the virtues o f  
involvement and the virtues o f distance.62
The republican impulse has always been to stress the need for civic interven­
tion and political activity. The very existence of the political artifice: the existence 
and quality o f political ‘space*, including dispositions to civic virtue itself; optimum 
working solutions to constitutional disputes and their continuous deliberative le ­
gitimation; patriotism and solidarity as reflectively generated public commemora­
tion and active identification - all these modalities of fragile liberty presupposed 
activity and involvement from citizens, and did so through changing ideological en ­
vironments and discursive frameworks.
By contrast, the working understanding o f ‘liberals* (see Introduction) has been 
based on a negatively defined amalgam of quite diverse writers who in each their 
way, more or less intentionally, disputed elements of those republican arguments 
to whose existence this thesis has drawn attention. Such ‘liberal’ writers who really 
challenged the tradition would stress how, in order to achieve the same outcomes, 
republican remedies were part o f the problem, not the solution, and that liberty 
was best secured by nurturing more passive, detached, elsewhere-occupied citi­
62. I owe the suggestion of this conceptual pair to Jorgen Poulsen.
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zens. and corresponding social and political forms. Outlets for virtuous civic con­
duct - including forms of conduct which were conceptualised as socially beneficial 
and essential for the wider community - were increasingly unpolitical or extrapoliti­
cal in their content, as concerned with private, economic, or associational dealings. 
Or, to the extent that citizens did apply themselves to matters political, mecha­
nisms and incentive structures had to be invented which channelled the disruptive 
and dangerous egoism or passion of such involvement to socially useful ends.
The self-consciously ‘anti-classical* discourse of the Enlightenment was cen­
trally defined by its wish to transcend what it presented as the close-knit, restric­
tive, homogeneous, normatively one-dimensional society of earlier human history. 
Modem liberty, they (rightly) claimed, had to be invented and embedded, institu­
tionally as well as culturally, in societies of increasing social, economic, and relig­
ious diversity and distance, where people did not and could not know each other 
personally, and where conflicts and their resolution had to be increasingly routi- 
nised and mediated by impersonal rules and norms. Virtues, in such a society, 
were either the personal traits of character, suitable for one's immediate social cir­
cles, religious life, or sphere of family intimacy. Or they were procedural, legalistic 
virtues, suitable, for instance, for the impersonal transactions of the realm of busi­
ness. However, we saw, particularly in the work of Tocqueville, that republican dis­
course was still capable of generating accounts of such virtues of political involve­
ments which were required, also, indeed particularly, in such increasingly abstract 
and impersonal societies.
In the Introduction I noted that the difference between republicanism and ‘lib­
eralism’ is most fruitfully seen as an entire set of ways that arguments were for­
warded against republican views on each of the four dimensions -  but not neces­
sarily on all dimensions at the same time, and thus leaving us a range of authors 
who may be classed as either-or, or both-and. I do not see this as a problem, in­
deed I have made much of the fact that republicanism does not have to be seen 
(indeed that it leads us into problems if we insist on seeing it) as a subject- 
constitutive mindset, a package deal to which you either do or do not subscribe. 
The very internal diversity of republican arguments partaking in the common in­
tuition of the fragility of liberty makes this easier to appreciate. Because republi­
canism was a set of only loosely converging, historically changing, and conceptually 
flexible arguments which referred to real political experience in changing contexts, 
it makes sense to see authors sampling, combining, or selectively giving up such 
arguments according to changing perceptions of degrees and ways in which civic­
ness was seen as called for.
These arguments, we saw, were restated -  sometimes strengthened and some­
times modified or given a less prominent place - inside different conceptual uni­
verses, none of these in turn to be seen as closed, determinate, or constraining to 
the degree assumed by either conceptual history or discourse analysis. But inside 
each of these languages -  some of which were developed in Chapter 4 -  it is also
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possible (again, at the level of arguments rather than authors) to locate a diversity 
of terminal points of republicanism. Using the four dimensions of the fragility o f  lib ­
erty as my framework. I have explained and exemplified -  pointing out w hat in 
these contexts at least were non-republican, anti-republican, or ‘liberal’ authors -  
where these republican ideas came to rest. To repeat some of the most important o f 
these points of discontinuity -  there are more - they include Hobbes’ refusal to  ac­
cept (against Harrington) the very idea of liberty under law, let alone any notion  
that citizens might be trusted or trust each other to defend it; Mandeville’s, 
Hume’s, and Hamilton’s celebration of luxury and unbridled commerce as w ays to 
cool passions or direct them to less dangerous pursuits -  in denial of Jefferson’s. 
Ferguson’s and (later) Tocqueville’s ideas that even an unruly virtue was be tter 
than apathy, or their notions that also ’polite* interaction and manners could take 
on (moderate) political forms; Hume’s and much later writers’ presumption th a t a 
political science of institutional checks and balances, or a properly designed and 
‘pluralist’ enlarged sphere of mutually countervailing passions and interests cou ld  
be counted on to secure liberty (and that ‘virtue* was not just an unrealistic so lu ­
tion, but a part of the problem); the ambition -  be it that of Locke or Kant (or Raw ls) 
- to derive a finite conception of Recht outside politics, or the later utilitarian idea o f 
doing so by the means of utilitarian calculus; the notion of late laissez fa ire  that 
individuals are so much owners of their own persons that any idea of obligation to 
a political community is illegitimate (and the forgetfulness by the same group that 
the ‘natural’ rights of acquisition, transfer, and contract presuppose the contingent 
existence of such a community in the first place); the optimistic moral psychologies 
which assume that (sufficient degrees oi) virtue, benevolence, or public spirit m ay 
be expected to develop as a matter of innate moral sense (Hutcheson) or corporate 
integration (Hegel); the ideas of most Eighteenth century liberalism (Mill, Green. 
Hobhouse) that patriotism, in order to work, requires the backup of cultural hom o­
geneity (let alone the nationalist ‘pollution’ of patriotism and departure from com ­
mon liberty); and such determinist (materialist or idealist) varieties of progress th e­
ory which completely deny that particularity o f time which is at the heart of the fra­
gility of liberty (Condorcet, Hegel, Turgot).
6.3. The Price o f Liberty
The diversity of republican creeds, in terms of their degree of theoretical and h is­
torical distance from those tenets of modem liberalism which make up a liberty ‘fit 
for modems’, is plainly obvious, as noted above. Indeed, in view o f the unfocussed 
use of republican discourse as a repository of ideas which are lauded for their un­
qualified contemporary relevance, it is a task o f some importance to remind each 
other that some republican writings and arguments were quite unattractive. How­
ever, apart from this diversity and apart from the need to admit that few republi­
canisms were liberal enough to a modem eye - as were, in fact, few historical liber-
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alisms - a more disturbing, principled point needs to be made. While some republi­
canisms were more palatable than others - this author rather likes the writings of 
Tocqueville - the tradition as a whole exhibits a series of illuminating constirutiue 
tensions in the fragility of liberty argument.
These tensions are indeed constitutive. The significance of contemplating the 
internal diversity of the republican tradition, including its less palatable, illiberal 
formulations, is not merely to be able to stick with the few good guys and dismiss 
the bad, illiberal ones. Rather, viewed in its entirety, the republican tradition may 
oblige us to face the most difficult level of the problem of fragility of liberty. Liberty, 
it seems, always requires sacrifices, always comes at a price. It does so, of course, 
in the familiar sense of the necessary collective efforts in the service of liberty. 
However, the republican discourse of liberty is also defined by its preoccupation 
with the fact that liberty must be realised in an imperfect world by imperfect men, 
and that libertas has a set of causal, circumstantial preconditions for its existence 
which inevitably, to some degree, involves aberrations from the ideal itself.
Thus, the republican tradition urges us to reconsider the contingent existence 
of political communities in time. The enjoyment of liberty presupposes acts of lib­
eration, i.e., the more or (often) less civilised foundation of libertas and the repub­
lic. It is an open matter how much and which type of civic activity which is needed 
to protect the artifice; the historically necessary and realistic balance between the 
enjoyment of a private life and the demands of political activity cannot be stipu­
lated in theory. Nor can the question of which mechanisms are required in order to 
make citizens perform their collectively rational duty. The tradition highlights the 
non-obviousness of both private and public virtue and of the propensity to respect, 
realise, and further common liberty as an ongoing concern of a public culture. It 
also thematises the corresponding tension between social space as dominated by 
social control and shaming, and by reflectivity. Impartiality, and tolerance. Repub­
licanism treats as fundamental the normative and political contingency of any con­
stitutional order. In particular, it highlights the tension between rational argument 
on the one hand and political bargaining and compromise on the other; and the 
tension between the authority of constitutionalism and the contingencies of the 
necessary ongoing public legitimisation and contestation of the political order. Fi­
nally, in accepting the constitutive nature of partial and bounded political solidarity 
and civic identification, it raises thorny questions such as how much common 
identification a political community of liberty needs to survive and prosper, and 
how public remembrance and civic cooperation may be given more or less reflective, 
flexible, and unsinister forms, so as to tip the balance between exclusion and lib­
erty as much as possible in the direction of the latter.
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6.4. A  Challenge to Liberalism
Republicanism, I have argued, continued as a challenge to liberal -  or ‘liberal* - p o ­
litical theories which developed throughout the Enlightenment, even as republican 
arguments had to be reframed under new circumstances, and even as the d is ­
course accommodated itself to new ideas and master concepts such as natural 
rights and commercial society. The challenge to contemporary liberal political th e­
ory - a challenge about which I shall say a little more in the conclusion - is first o f 
all to start to take the republican tradition seriously. The first step towards do ing 
so is to resist the misrepresentations of the doctrine which started with Hobbes 
and accelerated through the Enlightenment, only to be perpetuated by contempo­
rary participators to the communitarian project as well as by their critics.
The second step is to face historical republicanism as a vast reservoir o f em p iri­
cal challenges to liberalism. I have in mind the point, alluded to in the introduction, 
that all value systems and normative theories o f politics must rely on basic causal 
generalisations and assumptions - which are not always clearly stated - about such 
matters as human nature, the mechanisms of human motivation, the sources and 
nature of social conflict and its possible resolution, and the forms and sources o f  
civic solidarity. This is also true of different liberal theories. Several important lib ­
eral principles, specifically ideas of obligation and state neutrality between forms o f  
life, depend on such empirical assumptions. Obviously, assumptions of this m eta- 
theoretical or ‘paradigmatic’ order are not easily falsified - and trying to do so m ay 
be as much a theoretical task as an empirical one. Thus the argument about the 
fragility of liberty may be reconstructed as a sustained and multifaceted contesta­
tion of competing, more or less considered liberal assumptions about the conditions 
of liberty. Moreover, such republican contestations of historical liberalisms corre­
spond in several ways to conclusions drawn from the recent liberal-communitarian 
debate, which were noted in the Introduction.
Republican contestations as summarised in this chapter take these points 
further. They present a comprehensive set of doubts about standard liberal as­
sumptions - about progress, moral development, pacifying commerce, institutional 
architecture, and solidarity. They point out, by implication, how such assumptions 
shelter liberal theory from realising or having to remember the thoroughly artificial 
and non-obvious existence of its most treasured institutions and character traits. 
They remind contemporary liberals that the case for civic activity, and the further 
implications of such a case, may be linked to a rather more robust set of argu­
ments than what these liberals have encountered in communitarian or participa­
tory democratic agonising about the lack of authenticity or moral integration in 
modem politics. Liberalism, seen from a republican point of view, is clearly a thinly 
and unevenly spread, recent, and reversible Western experience (exported with 
various degrees of success to a few other places). Liberal institutions do not main­
tain themselves. Liberal states do not represent a natural order of things, nor does.
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certainly, a minimally inclusive and secure citizenship. And an 'overlapping con­
sensus' on a reasonably civilised form of such citizenship is an altogether contin­
gent affair. Instead, republican contestations suggest the hypotheses, outlined un­
der the four headings above, that the contingencies of a liberal order must be ad­
dressed by thematising the existence of, and the potential for, civic activity, public 
vigilance and public reflection.
Exactly what is the right quality and kind of such civic virtue in modem socie- 
Ues is far from obvious, in light of the constitutive tensions of the republican argu­
ment. Civic activity, to take an obvious example, was shown to consist of both re­
flective impartiality and maintenance of social control, belonging, and boundaries. 
The extent of the difficulty is signalled by the fact that, in order to cater for both 
concerns, contemporary liberalism is called upon both to refrain from ‘staying on 
the surface' and to accommodate itself to the limits of its own reflective-universalist 
moral psychology.
More generally, the notion that we must put our faith in a more civic and active 
society is far from uncontroversial. Much of the ‘political participation* that the 
world sees is not very civic, patriotic sentiments often shade into chauvinism, and 
public space is a battleground for the exchange of Feindbilden and thinly veiled 
abuses of the language of the common good, as often as earnest deliberation and 
tolerance. The difference between republicanism and much participatory commu- 
nitarianism is that the former, although this is often overlooked, is itself intensely 
preoccupied with the problem of securing the right forms of participation.
It is not the purpose of this thesis to formulate anything like a general republi­
can theory of politics. The four dimensions of the fragility of liberty argument point 
in many directions, and following each systematically would require many volumes, 
carrying such names as 'revolution*, ‘constitutionalism’, ‘tolerance’, ‘trust*, and 
‘solidarity’. The claim is not that contemporary liberal theory should accept any 
particular orchestration of these tensions or any particular version of the fragility of 
liberty argument; only that it ought to integrate a concern with the existence of 
such arguments. The historical demonstration of evolving fault lines between re­
publican and ‘liberal’ discourse is quite distinct from an argument about which of 
these differences are such as should matter to contemporary liberal theory. Apart 
from the fact that much old republican theory was both normatively unsavoury and 
theoretically crude, there is no doubt that some of the causal counter claims of lib­
eral Enlightenment theorists had great merit. However, I suggest that a properly 
defended, politically relevant liberalism needs to take its own fragility seriously by 
attending to the preconditions of its own realisation as a stable and working com­
munity of common liberty.
Clearly, not all political theorists who consider themselves liberal (as does this 
author) are equally vulnerable to a reconstructed republican critique, or at least 
not to all of its elements. Indeed, the concern with matters such as cultural plural­
353
ism. political deliberation, nationalism, federalism and forms of democracy are part 
of a way of doing political theory which takes ‘stability* and ‘feasibility* seriously, 
and which has always existed alongside more strictly philosophical enquiry'. H ow ­
ever, some liberal political theorists of a more neo-Kantian, analytical and con ­
structivist mould, who I believe ought to be concerned, will dismiss the new rep u b ­
lican revisionism (as has Rawls himselfl as a mere empirical argument that m ay  or 
may not be attached to ideal theory. Republican thought helps place such en deav­
ours in a certain perspective. In the Conclusion I say a little about this claim, and 
about the kinds of theoretical challenges a reformulated republicanism might pose 
to those who forward it.
i
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Chapter 9: 
Conclusion
In this thesis my aim has been to contribute towards the reconstruction of our un­
derstanding of republican citizenship. I have traced a republican tradition of politi­
cal thought in the history of ideas, and argued that a suitable way to do so is to use 
the analytical searchlight of the fragility of liberty. While the reconstruction, sys­
tematisation, and conceptual analysis of this tradition has been my main focus, I 
have also sought to explicate in what manners republicanism is different from lib­
eralism, and different in important ways. I have done so while stressing that such 
‘liberalism’, historically speaking, should be seen as a shorthand for a variety of 
rather different doctrines which challenged republican arguments in various ways. 
As regards contemporary political theory, it is my impression that the so-called lib­
eral-communitarian debate was ‘won’ by the liberal side, that there is very limited 
shared ground between the republican arguments and values that I have recon­
structed and most communitarian writings, but finally also that the same debate 
may be seen to highlight -  as briefly developed in the Introduction - a theoretical 
impasse which liberals should confront by taking republican arguments seriously 
(to start with by distinguishing them from communitarian ones). The liberal theory 
I have in mind (although I have made no serious attempt in the thesis to distin­
guish inside this tradition or to substantiate my criticism in detail) is primarily 
analytical neo-Kantian egalitarianism of a Rawlsian bent, but also other types of 
theory, right-liberal libertarianism not least.
Throughout the historical reconstruction, I have made a point of showing that 
republicanism as a tradition was concerned with an empirical and causal argument 
- or rather a set of arguments - about the fragility of liberty. Moreover, as antici­
pated in the Introduction, I have been guided by the belief that these empirical and 
causal arguments - lifted out of their context, sampled, and theoretically developed 
to be sure -  might still have some relevance today. To demonstrate this has not 
been attempted at all. However, in the Introduction a number of areas were high­
lighted where, at the very least, a liberal onward march of history was not in evi­
dence, and where liberty was still ‘fragile’. I believe, and shall say a few words more 
about this below, that promising research question and hypotheses do indeed 
arise, and that several areas of empirical contestation of contemporary republican 
programs are likely to be found. Moreover, the question of whether such empirical 
and causal purchase of republican arguments may be found is, I believe, highly 
important for contemporary political theory, as Is more particularly the question of 
in what way ‘normative* theory is or should be affected by such empirical and 
causal considerations.
In what follows I leave the history of ideas to take some tentative steps into 
these matters. First I offer a few closing remarks on what seems to be the most im­
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portant findings and perspectives of the thesis, by way of discussing the very p o in t  
of reconstructing a republican tradition and what has been my own contribution in  
this regard. After this I say a little about the character of the empirical and ca u sa l 
claims that ‘a republican perspective’ facilitates or suggests in a contemporary p e r ­
spective. Thirdly, I look at the nature o f the challenge to liberal political th e o ry  
which seems to follow from republican argument, both from the various aspects o f  
its empirical and causal claims, providing these claims are relevant and from th e  
very fact that these claims are indeed (‘merely?) empirical and causal.
1. The Importance of Republican Reconstruction
Taking the republican tradition seriously is important. First of all. it is im portant 
for political theory. Of course, an argument in political theory should not stand o r  
fall according to whether it has a distinguished past. Nevertheless, history o f id e a s  
does give authority to theory, if in indirect ways. Certain interpretations of rep u b li­
canism have been used, as it were, to try to give advocates of liberal theory a b a d  
conscience. Thus liberalism has been blamed for repressing (theories and t ra d i­
tions of) an intrinsic meaningfulness of politics, for crowding out a pre-liberal 
communal life without selfishness and moral atomism. Such charges, to some e x ­
tent at least, have been strengthened by their reference to influential readings o f  
historical texts. On the other hand, liberal theory has also been de facto sheltered 
by the misrepresentation of republican arguments. Certain theoretical lacunae a n d  
unquestioned assumptions of contemporary liberalism may, in some degree, b e  a  
result of the failure to preserve the instrumental republican trail of ideas.
However, if history of ideas is important for political theory, previous work on  
republicanism has been inadequate in several respects. I have noted already th e  
extent to which this thesis is indebted to the work of Quentin Skinner and M aurizio 
Viroli for the very idea of its conception, and for the core intuition of the fragility o f  
liberty argument. Skinner and Viroli, along with a number of other historians o f  
ideas have started a large revision of that grand project of republican revisionism  
which was undertaken by J.G.A. Pocock and his many followers. 1 identify m yse lf 
with what I see as the *post-Pocockian’ moment o f the former. However, I also b e ­
lieve work needs to be done inside this new project.
What I try to add as my modest contribution to the impressive work of Skinner 
and Viroli is this: I present a concisely reconstructed republican history which is  
more concerned with criteria of originality, variety, and thus substantial relevance 
for contemporary purposes. It is somewhat less concerned with the tracing of in flu ­
ences and ideological impacts. To present the very variety of republican arguments, 
and the changing contexts inside which the fragility of liberty presented itself w ith  
radically different problem scenarios - from the city state to American federalism - 
has been a main purpose of my work. Adopting such a focus corresponds to a cer­
tain way of doing history of ideas, defined by its purpose, and linked to crucial
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modifications of the exclusive methodological focus on conceptual change and dis­
course found in the work of Skinner and Pocock. I have alluded to Berlin’s ambi­
tion to emphasise what makes ideas, appreciated in their plural historical contexts, 
important to us - adding the thought that republican diversities are not only a 
question of those universes of human value and normative argument which Berlin 
wished to recover, but primarily about repositories of empirical and caused claims, 
and that different aspects of the tradition also in this respect may be lifted out of 
context. In this connection, also unlike either Skinner or Viroli, I have attempted to 
systematise republican arguments - putting them together in an unhistorical way - 
to yield four manageable dimensions. Individually, these are containers of many 
different arguments, deriving from their historically specific inventions and histo­
ries. Between them they are reasonably distinct (analytically, certainly not in terms 
of the empirical social and political forms to which they refer), and serve as useful 
short hand references to republican thought. To my knowledge, no work has so far 
been done which simultaneously traces, let alone systematises, all of the, as it 
turns out quite varied, elements that relate to the basic argument that was laid out 
by Skinner and Viroli.
Thus, my historical reconstruction of republican argument has attempted to do 
two things at the same time that are in potential conflict. First, it has sought to 
establish an intuitively clear way to understand republicanism as importantly dif­
ferent, a separate field of argument to take seriously. Secondly, I have wished to 
preserve the appreciation of the immense internal diversity of republicanism. Just 
as serious theorists will wish to ask *which liberalism?’ (Kantian deductions, utili­
tarian calculus, or Lockean state of nature theory?). I hope to have shown the pos­
sibility and fruitfulness of also asking \vhich republicanism?’, while having a 
shared idea of what justifies the generic term. Moreover, I hope that this is possible 
even as it is recognised that also my particular delineation of the republican tradi­
tion is of course contestable.
I also trace in a more systematic fashion, both in connection with Individual 
authors and in the analytical reconstruction, the nature of the fault lines between 
republican and liberal traditions. In doing so. I try to avoid (too) simple juxtaposi­
tions, which thrive on the erection of not just republican, but also liberal straw 
men. A part of this task is about remembering the diversity of liberalism. The Po­
cock tradition of republican historiography had a peculiarly biased view o f liberal­
ism as a doctrine obsessed with individual rights and possessive individualism. In 
this context also Quentin Skinner makes some of his points about republican lib­
erty against an idea of liberalism which is much too narrowly understood as a state 
of nature doctrine which posits the individual as free and without any obligations, 
and which even reads such a view into contemporary neo-Kantian liberalism. *
1. I return to the latter point below.
I also criticise the view of Pettit, which Skinner seems to support to some ex ­
tent, that the very concept of negative liberty in liberalism (liberty of the heath. 
Hobbes’ ‘silence of law’) is different from the republican concept of negative liberty 
(liberty of the city, liberty by law). The problem with Pettit’s otherwise important 
contribution - including its other elements - already suggests itself with the fact 
that liberals such as Locke, Hume, and Kant had distinctly law-centred concepts o f  
liberty. Pettit’s eventual way out of this problem, to restrict the term liberalism to 
late utilitarian and laissez-faire ideology, fails to distinguish between distinct 
causal narratives of how liberty is secured. Moreover, my searchlight - ‘fragility* 
rather than Pettit’s ‘resilience’ - is also the one o f the two that reflects the most im ­
portant dimensions of ideological dispute, those that took place during the age o f  
Enlightenment rather than at the height of the industrial revolution.
I try to remedy the defects of these and other, to my mind misleading, concep­
tual and theoretical polarities. In doing so, I also question a tendency to view the 
contrast in terms of the simple presence or non-presence of specific discursive e le ­
ments, such as 'natural rights’ or ‘commerce’. Sidney and Jefferson, to recall an e x ­
ample, in different ways assumed natural and ‘inalienable* rights of man, a long 
with an inherent capacity for reason, to be divinely bestowed. The difference to 
Locke, who thought the same, was the fusion of natural law, state of nature theory, 
and consent to a political language of struggle and revolution, in which democratic 
government was a means to install and protect but also to specify through de lib ­
eration the temporal form of God's remote intentions, combining the values and 
aspirations of the living with the institutional and legal imagination of which they 
were capable. Also, although early republicanisms were obsessed with the corrup­
tive effects of commerce, republican language was perfectly capable of eventually 
encompassing or at least accommodating the value of trade and capitalist accu­
mulation as part of the fruits of libertas. Similarly, despite the martial and Spartan 
flavour of virtue in Machiavelli and Rousseau, all through the American constitu­
tional debate, and in the work of Tocqueville, it was possible to argue, while staying 
inside the republican framework, that, so to speak, both market man, democratic 
man. private man, and religious man could generate capacities to, and find chan­
nels for, the exercise of a virtue that was civic in nature. The discursive flavour o f 
virtue changed, in particular in the sense of becoming more diversified. But the 
structure of the arguments about virtue as necessaiy for liberty remained re­
markably constant.
Indeed, I have radicalised the republican revision of Skinner and Viroli by dem­
onstrating that the fragility of liberty was already present in ancient Greek writers, 
and that the influence or even the existence of a separate ‘Aristotelian’ discourse of 
politics entirely for its own sake has been exaggerated in the literature. Although 
libertas was associated with, filled with as it were, a specific perfectionist ontology 
of human value, a political language was also already in use which linked the en­
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joyment of personal security and legal status with civic activity and with a set of 
dispositions and character traits that were quite recognisable to the modems.
The flavour of virtue, again, certainly changed. In particular, the political rec­
ognition of the value of religious toleration, social diversity, and politeness of man­
ners, fit for an abstract, complicated, and rights-regulated society, also brought 
with it changes in the language with which civic virtue was represented. But I have 
resisted the notion of a very radical break between an early virtue language of un­
ruly, passionate martialism, and a later language of ‘moderation* and cooling pri­
vate interest, as well as the corresponding idea that the two languages either sepa­
rate republicanism from liberalism, or ‘classical* republicanism from a fundamen­
tally different ‘liberal’ brother. Indeed, the value of political moderation, along with 
fear of (democratic) passion and the appeal to rational interest was also there in the 
early writers, also in Machiavelli, the theorist of beneficial tumulti. The really im­
portant break occurred with the change in the Enlightenment towards new as­
sumptions about which institutions and political forms produced moderation, and 
in particular in the revaluation of private, market based, and ‘social’ spheres of ac­
tivity, as opposed to socialisation to virtue through traditional political activity, 
which, after the experience with religious fanaticism, was now represented as dan­
gerous, immoderate, and irrational enthusiasm, the sentiment of uncontrollable 
masses and veiy much part of the problem, rather than its solution.
On the one hand, the new vocabularies of doux commerce and institutional ar­
chitecture generated sophisticated new republican responses that sought to incor­
porate their criticism and to demonstrate, as did Tocqueville in particular, that only 
civic activism and associationalism, i.e., of a new, society-based kind, was capable 
of curing republican ills, in particular the dangers of popular government, and of 
generating beneficial manifestations of modem, democratic individualism, e.g., re­
flective patriotism and political impartiality. Republican argument continued inside 
the new universe of commerce, individualism, polite society, and social diversity.
On the other hand, the Enlightenment critique of the ancients contained a re- 
representation of what classical authors actually said which again informed the 
counter-Enlightenment romanticism which was a part of Rousseau's project, and 
which remains influential to this day. This great rhetorical move, which caused the 
constitutive republican argument to get lost in a myth of classicism, also made it 
possible for writers like Constant to participate in the great debunking of ancient 
liberty, while ending his great essay with a rather republican defence of civic activ­
ism in the framework of representative government.1
The historical contrasts between the two traditions must be made according to 
a more pluralist appreciation of different ways of questioning, denying, overlooking, 
and eventually forgetting, different aspects of the republican argument, all to be 2
2, Constant, Liberty o f the ancients and the modems (pp.326-27).
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traced in different ‘liberalisms’, liberal authors, or - perhaps best - in different 
counter-republican arguments. For instance, state of nature theory and other spe­
cies of Enlightenment rationalism occasionally confused abstract deductions o f 
rights with the legal constitution of actual states, and started to assume that such 
schemes could be installed as stable and unchanging through the hypothetical ap­
peal to popular sovereignty as tacit consent, or could be delivered by history’s de­
sign, because partaking in the ultimately rational ordering of human nature and 
the moral universe. Market forces or institutional-legislative design were seen by 
some as a more promising modem stand-in for the volatility of civic virtue. Propen­
sities for virtuous behaviour (including the private virtues of the law abiding bour­
geois and honurn) were seen to derive from such sources as a psychology of sym­
pathy. And solidarity was either a non-issue or an eventually unstated matter o f 
cultural homogeneity and nationalism. Each of these historical trajectories are also 
important because they provide clues about where to look for similar blind spots in 
contemporary liberal theory. We return to this in a moment. Here, I wish to stress 
two additional points of some importance:
First, a very important corollary of my attempt to show republicanism in its d i­
versity is to avoid all types of political nostalgia. If Lockean liberalism presumably 
was some distance from contemporary liberal conceptions of constitutional rule o f 
law and toleration, republican traditions surely had a great many dark spots too. 
The conception of libertas in Cicero, Machiavelli, or Rousseau was a proto-liberal 
value without the rich moral texture of contemporary rights language. And some o f 
the means and political technologies required to secure it can only be described as 
draconian. It is an obvious condition of contemporary relevance that these themes 
can become reconstructed.
But more profoundly, I have noted the existence of a series of constitutive ten­
sions in republicanism. Their common denominator is an appreciation that secur­
ing liberty is never without friction, it always involves a price. And It is part of the 
republican promise that awareness of these tensions prepares political theorists 
and practitioners alike to confront political realities better. The exact balance be­
tween the enjoyment of private liberty and the demands of public activity and sac­
rifice cannot be stated in the abstract. Realising liberty as an intersubjective reality 
involves social control and shaming as well as reflection and tolerance: Just as soli­
darity and patriotism, needed for the sake of common liberty, involve processes and 
images of exclusion whose content and nature may be more or less reasonable and 
accessible to difference. Finally, the shape of constitutional orders is both norma- 
tively and empirically a contingent matter.
I would personally wish to push republican thought in its more liberal, reflec­
tive, and reasonable directions - those building on Tocqueville, Jefferson, and 
American republican constitutionalism. But tensions remain constitutive of repub­
lican thought even here. And this is connected to the second point, which is about
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why liberal political philosophy was able, as it were, to win. My account suggests as 
plausible that republican thought was defeated because tensions like those men­
tioned were eventually denied, along with the very relevance of the fragility of lib­
erty argument in its various forms. By and large, the central value ideal of republi­
canism and liberalism - be it the liberalisms of Hobbes, Locke, or Kant -  was much 
the same. But liberal doctrines progressively came to offer the realisation of this 
value, as it were, fo r free - that is, without tensions and ambiguity, without sacri­
fice, and without a call on citizens to have civic virtue.
Liberals did not ‘change the subject*. Neither Locke, Kant, nor Mill persuaded 
their audiences (some like Hobbes, Constant, and Berlin, thought they did) to give 
up old values for the sake of new ones that were intrinsically better or outweighed 
the old ones. Although enormous shifts in the discursive construction of intimacy 
and private moral life did occur in eighteenth and nineteenth liberal thought, these 
were not compensations for the loss of public life. Republicans were not ‘optimists’ 
about human nature or the possibilities of civic virtue - they were rather ‘pessi­
mists’, and rather more imaginative than liberals as regards the sheer range of 
human depravities and weaknesses and concomitant dangers threatening political 
orders. Nor was liberalism more ‘realistic* in aiming lower, at either mundane and 
worldly, or inner life-oriented pursuits. This entire representation is mistaken and 
must be resisted. Whatever else its importance and valuable insights different lib­
eral doctrines offered a discourse which promised a liberty which was less fragile, 
easier to get, subject to fewer dangers -  and all in all less demanding. Who - among 
frequenters of Parisian salons, subjects of the Prussian monarchy, or settlers in the 
western territories of America - would not prefer this representation if  convinced of 
its causal soundness?
The political phenomenology of the conditions of liberty, viewed as a whole, 
presents a prima facie concern for political theory to take very seriously indeed. It is 
possible to reconstruct the history of republican ideas, not just as a story o f grad­
ual decline and departure from great things, but as a series of more and more so­
phisticated restatements of the fragility of liberty problem. Early republican ideas 
were met by attempts to overcome the need for civic virtue and its often illiberal 
prerequisites, and these, in turn, met republican rejoinders, prominently by 
Tocqueville and. less noted (and not developed her), by Hannah Arendt, exposing 
liberal complacencies and wishful thinking. Contemporary rights-based political 
liberalism, with which republicanism shares the same central value ideal, should, 
at the veiy least, find reason to reflect on these obstinate modem rejoinders.
Now, the relevance of the republican argument depended in principle on the 
negative answer to whether, after all, liberals empirically speaking were right. Did 
the liberal theory that came after republicanism rest on wishful thinking and facile 
assumptions? Or did it, on the contrary, reflect the fact that political orders o f lib­
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erty were not - or no longer, in the radically changed world of the modems - so 
fragile? Is a republican analysis of contemporary politics of any use today?
2. Empirical Relevance?
I cannot answer these questions with any degree of finality here. I do believe, how­
ever, that a systematic appreciation of the republican tradition equips us with some 
conceptual tools, a great deal o f historical sensitivity, and better empirical imagi­
nation to be sceptical at the outset about liberal optimism.
Let me stress, first, that a contemporary republican case would at any rate be a  
prima facie one. It is obvious that the conditions of liberty include many things b e ­
sides good citizens. I have no doubt that it is much easier to secure rights - not ju s t 
social rights - in countries blessed with high levels of economic development, effec­
tive administrative infrastructure, and honest civil servants. Reflective citizenship 
and toleration of difference is likely to be related to levels of education, urbanism, 
and general social modernity. Both constitutional deliberation and the problem o f  
solidarity present themselves very differently in different countries with different 
historical experiences. Also, more people enjoy more liberty without much personal 
sacrifice right now than maybe at any other time in history. And liberty is much 
further away from realisation, and requires much more civic virtue in Russia than 
in Sweden. The republican instrumental argument about the need for civic virtue is 
not equally urgent everywhere and all the time. The argument would be more like a  
permanent intuition that any order of liberty is in principle threatened. Dangers 
may be smaller or bigger, republican decay is relative, but even the most just and 
humane society may deteriorate.
I have suggested in the Introduction and elsewhere that republican fragility 
intuitions are being vindicated by the several turns of Machiavelli’s wheel of F'or- 
tuna that have recently characterised world history. I also suspect that some o f the 
popularity of liberal theory of the Rawlsian kind in particular may be attributed to a 
certain lack of sense of history. Such theory has thrived, perhaps, on a feeling that 
the welfare societies which were established in some quarters with much success 
and popular support, and which ordered relatively one-dimensional distribution 
problems through compromises between economic efficiency and modest equality, 
represented the normal state o f affairs for other societies to gradually copy as they 
reached political maturity.
Predicting the rise of large scale migration and multiculturalist revivals in 
multination states, or the regional development of supranationalism, or the pull o f 
capitalist globalisation, or of xenophobic nationalism would have been difficult in­
side any social science discipline. But Western political theory - liberal as well as 
other strands - was certainly caught off guard as history came rolling back. All in 
all, it has presupposed the historically relatively recent, highly unstable, and ex­
traordinarily idealised political format o f the nation state. Although the heralded
362
demise of this political structure is much exaggerated, its various problems are also 
those of liberal theory. If multiculturalism and globalisation thematise problems of 
constitutionalism, solidarity, and political identity, then 'rectifying revolutions’ and 
the post-totalitarian experience of Eastern Europe highlight the difficulties of se­
curing citizenship beyond the letter of constitutions and the problems of building 
and maintaining a civil society.
Several areas of possible research may be suggested -  and much existing re­
search placed in a new light -  as elements of *a republican research program’.2 In 
the historical-sociological debate on national sequences and ñames of citizenship, 
marxist and various state-functionalist writers have seen rights as ‘given’ by ruling 
classes or modernising elites responding to system-imperatives like territorial con­
solidation, conduct of war, management of the population, regeneration of the work 
force, or political ‘integration’ while largely ignoring the differences of various citi­
zenship regimes.3 Other writers have concentrated on national historical sequences 
of inclusion, political cultural formats of citizenship, and functional conflicts be­
tween rights in the context of investigations of the degree and manner in which 
collective mobilisation and activist political cultures connect with extensions of 
citizenship, many seeing the rise of Marshallian citizenship flet alone its consolida­
tion and further extension into new areas) as a contingent, open-ended, and re­
versible process.4
Robert Putnam’s Making Democracy Work expressly referred to an empirical re­
publican argument about the instrumental importance of civicness, which could 
and should be tested. Despite its many faults, that book has inspired a whole range 
of related research into the historically situated relationships between different 
types and (associational) formats of civic activity and mutualism and on the other 
hand the quality of public services and government responsiveness, social toler­
ance, trust and solidarity. It has also generated important theoretical discussions 
about the (ambiguous) meaning and motivational dynamics of each of these as­
pects of ‘civic space*.5 6
Multicultural aspirations, new controversies and large scale functional changes 
in the area of social citizenship (workfare, de-regulation, ‘third sector* involvement.
3. See references in the Foreword.
4. Marx, On the Jewish Question, in Selected Writings (p.52-53); Poulantzas 
(1973) cf. Van Gunsteren (1978:21-25) and Esping-Andersen (1990:13-14); Bar- 
balet (1988:29-43); Brubaker (1992:41-49); Giddens (1985); Mann (1987;1988); 
Tilly (1992); Kaspersen (1997); Bendix (1964); Parsons (1969); Marshall 
(1992:25,28); Rokkan (1970); Dahrendorf (1974).
5. For instance Turner (1986; 1992; 1993); Held (1989); Shklar (1991); Tarrow 
(1994).
6. Putnam (1993); Bagnasco (1994); Cohn (1994); Diamond (1994); Foley & Ed­
wards (1996); Goldberg (1996); Levi (1996); Portes & Landolt (1996); Sabetti (1996); 
Tarrow (1996).
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new participatory social citizenship), and the challenge of supranational constitu­
tionalism all demonstrate republican points about political pluralism and constitu­
tional contestation as a highly plural and contingent affair. Part of the interest o f 
these and other developments consist in highly empirical investigations into dy­
namics and constraints of actual processes of constitutional debate (including the 
pragmatics of ‘bargaining’ and ‘arguing’) and into various institutional experiments 
with deliberative democracy and conflict resolution.6
Finally, the burgeoning politics of political identity, nationalism, and group rec­
ognition, does not only constitute so many modem pathologies to be ignored or 
dismissed on normative grounds by liberal universalism. They are also elements o f 
a universe for the integrating, reflective reconstruction of contemporary versions o f 
republican patriotism. How such constructions could even begin to be envisaged 
(let alone actually carried out with sufficient public resonance), inside different n a ­
tional cultures, with each their different mnemonic frames and particular dilemmas 
of historical and contemporary exclusion, is also a matter of empirical discussion.7 8
3. The Nature of the Republican Challenge
In my historical reconstruction, I have seen no point in exaggerating the contrast 
between republicanism and liberalism. Indeed, I noted that even as the classical 
language of virtue and corruption was replaced by political cosmologies of progress 
and human ideals of autonomy and perfectibility, the republican core argument 
could still resurface, as in Kant’s theory o f an enlightened public, or in J.S. M ill’s 
ideas of participatory democracy. Correspondingly, it would be unreasonable to 
deny the family resemblance between the tradition that I have reconstructed and 
the great American tradition of democratic theory, ‘public philosophy’, and much o f  
the empirical political science interest in the civic foundations of American plural­
ism, from Dewey, Lippmann, and Laswell to Almond, Verba, Lindblom and, o f 
course, Robert Dahl.
The liberalism against which the republican tradition has real bite is a different, 
more philosophical creed. At any rate I shall claim that it does indeed have such 
bite. John Rawls in recent years may be seen as having accommodated his original 
theory to real political conditions in a number of ways which suggest a certain 
openness towards the concerns raised in this thesis, including those expressed in 
the Introduction. Thus, one may note his concern with ‘the fact o f (reasonable) p lu ­
ralism’, with the conditions of an legitimising overlapping consensus, with political 
community as a common good, and with the conditions of a sufficient sense o f ju s ­
7. See footnotes 68 -  70 below.
8. For Germany see for instance the Historikerstreit between Habermas 
(1990; 1993), Sturmer (1993), and Nolte (1993); for an Italian debate see Panebi- 
anco (1991), Rusconi (1991a; 1991b), and Scoppola (1991); for Britain see Larsen 
(1997) and Parekh (1994); and for Europe see Waever (1990:1995). Also Kymlicka
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tice, all as parts of a new emphasis on political ‘stability* which seems to signal 
Rawls’ new concessions to empirical constraints and conditions.8 1 do not believe 
Rawls has moved a lot, however. More importantly, I think republican arguments 
may be formulated to suggest that also his new position is unstable. What follows 
is a very preliminary attempt to map some of the problems raised by a republican 
view of the world for Rawlsians and to suggest, equally tentatively, at least in which 
directions to look for answers.
In order to approach this discussion I shall start with Quentin Skinner, whose 
seminal work9 has already been acknowledged. In first bringing the republican ar­
gument about liberty to the attention of political theory, Skinner also made a num­
ber of point to the effect that republicanism presented an argument which was not 
just ‘different’ and ’older’ but in conflict with liberal theory, in particular Rawls. In 
doing so, he actually overstated his case, or failed to make it veiy effectively. To as­
sess the degree to which republicanism really touches Rawlsian liberalism where it 
hurts, I start by revisiting Skinner’s critique. I do so by way of a discussion of a re­
sponse to Skinner by Allen Patten which also deals with Taylor’s conception of pa­
triotism. 10
Patten states a number of ways that liberals11 12- to the extent that they accept 
the empirical claims of republicanism -  in his opinion are theoretically equipped to 
accommodate the normative implications which may follow from these claims. This 
general way of construing the republican challenge to liberalism as starting from 
competing empirical and causal assumptions, i.e. as a different set of instrumental 
arguments is certainly useful. Moreover, the article deals with both what we may 
call first order instrumentalism -  questions concerning to what degree (if to any) 
civic virtue is required to secure and maintain free institutions -  and with what we 
may call second order instrumentalism -  questions about which (if any) measures 
are required in turn to generate the dispositions and civic abilities required for this 
virtue to ensue. On both counts, future debates between contemporary ‘republi­
cans’ and their {Rawlsian or other) interlocutors would do well to recognise a dis­
tinction between largely empirical (and empirical-theoretical) questions about 
whether one or another reformulated republican analysis of instrumental condi­
tions of liberty is accurate or realistic (and in particular to what extent it forces lib­
erals to explicate and defend their alternative instrumental assumptions, also in 
the case of liberal theoiy which tries (and admits) to assume as little as possible); 
secondly questions about which normative consequences it carries for the shape of
(1996).
9. See Rawls (1993a).
10. Skinner (1986; 1990; 1992, 1998).
11. Patten (1996).
12. Rawlsians and other “contractarian liberals” (Patten 1996:25).
a recommending theory of politics if one or more of such analysis are assumed to 
be true; and thirdly questions about in what way such assumptions about ‘realism* 
are relevant at all in political theory. In what follows I deal primarily with the sec ­
ond and, towards the end, the third question. But the first question is not entirely 
absent.
Starting with Patten’s discussion of Skinner’s critique to the effect that liberals 
have no place for duty (or for legitimate coercion); I move on to the question of w h e ­
ther and how Rawls has a place for an instrumental argument in favour of civic v ir­
tue and the requisite institutions to generate such virtue; and thirdly to the m ore 
particular question, not discussed by Skinner, of the need, legitimacy, and shape o f  
patriotism Fourthly, and going beyond the Skinner-Patten debate, I say a litt le  
about where I think the republican tradition would leave Rawls’ ideas of an o ve r­
lapping consensus. Fifthly, I summarise what, in the light of the discussion, m a y  
be said about the Rawlsian ambition of neutrality, which Patten claims is unhurt b y  
republican arguments. Sixthly, and still in the light of the way that Patten defends 
Rawls, I use an appreciation of the latter’s turn towards the question of stability to  
make some more general points about the relation between empirical social science 
knowledge and political theory, and about the relevance of ’realism’ for this p ra c ­
tice.
4. Patten on Skinner and Republican Normative Implications
Skinner, according to Patten, over and above his empirical quarrel with liberals, 
makes “the philosophical claim" about contractarian liberals that it is “impossible 
for them to take seriously the republican analysis of the maintenance of liberty".12 
Patten focuses on the normative implications that Skinner draws, rightly noting 
that Skinner does not spell them out in sufficient detail. There seem to be th ree  
such (related) implications. They are about how citizens have an obligation to  b e  
politically virtuous; about how social and political institutions should be shaped so  
as to facilitate the acquirement o f the civic virtue capacities needed for political activ­
ity; and about how the state may legitimately use coercion and legal sanction in o r­
der to induce individuals to fulfil their duty. The problem for republicans, according 
to Patten, is that liberals like Rawls and Dworkin have no necessary quarrels w ith  
these points.
4.1. Rights and duties (and Coercion)
Patten rightly points out that Skinner overlooks Rawls’ mentioning of a natural 
duty to justice. The duty to justice in Rawls’ liberal society is not only the duty to 
respect the laws of justice in one’s everyday dealings, it may also involve the sup­
port and furthering of just institutions, including decisions to participate in poli- 13
13. Patten (1996:30).
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tics, and choice between political parties. Such a duty would be chosen by rational 
parties in the original position. Indeed, it takes some form of fairness or (other) 
Kantian argument to arrive at the idea of rationed duty which Skinner seems to 
have in mind, as Patten also rightly notes that “no particular individuals participa­
tion is strictly necessary for the maintenance of liberty."13
Also, it is equally true that republicanism does not necessarily collide with a 
liberal conception of rights as ‘trumps’. Patten points out that Dworkin and others 
are making the point that individual rights have primacy only in the sense that 
furthering and protecting such rights constitutes a good moral argument for some 
political scheme or action. Dworkin does not suggest (as does Nozick) that rights 
are such as almost always to preclude any social duties, but only, much like Skin­
ner himself, that duties must be "right-based...ultimately justified not by goals or 
duties, but by the preservation and protection of rights."14
Nor is Skinner right to assume that a contractarian view precludes that law 
may in some cases be used to coerce us as individuals into doing what is necessary 
to secure our common liberty - and in this sense to ‘force us to be free’. Liberals 
would insist that what takes place in such a situation is a legitimate restriction of 
liberty in one area in order to secure the greatest amount of liberty or the largest, 
number of ‘liberties’ for all (as would, apart from some conceptual differences in 
some statements, instrumental republicans). Rawls explicitly mentions the legiti­
macy of conscription.15
All of these points are true, and so far Skinner’s criticisms seem to have their 
real bite against libertarian state-of-nature thought and the assumption that indi­
viduals have their rights before they enter into society with others.16 But if Skinner 
is about to join in communitarian misunderstandings of liberalism, his criticism 
may be partly reconstructed.
First, he could at least be read to suggest the plausible thesis -  which is of 
course ‘merely’ an empirical and sociological fTocquevillean) one, that the social 
understanding of duties in a well-ordered society must be such that the appeal to a 
duty has as much actual motivational weight as the appeal to a right. This point is 
related to some sociological communitarians’ criticism of an excessive ‘rights talk'
14. Rawls (1972:334-35); Patten (1996:29).
15. Patten (1996:32).
16. Patten (1996:30-36); Skinner (1990:304-7; 1992). Patten also notes two more 
points. One is about Skinner’s attribution to Rawls of the view that restricting indi­
vidual liberty for the sake of common liberty is an unjustified ‘utilitarian’ concern 
for general welfare - but of course such restriction is in order if the common liberty 
is indeed common, i.e., that restricted liberty is not the sacrifice of an individual’s 
liberty for the good of others. Another concerns liberalism’s alleged misunder­
standing of negative liberty and adds nothing to Patten’s other points.
17. Nozick (1974).
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which makes the moral reality of a sense of duty in a society increasingly difficult 
to come by.
Secondly, and more importantly, one might ask where duties should fit into 
Rawls' scheme in terms of lexical priority: are they dependent on a just or ‘nearly 
just* society, or should they operate and be valid already some time before, as 
based on some notion of a political community as a co-operative scheme whose 
ability to ensure minimal libertas to its members is constituted by the exercise of 
civic duties (as republicans might wish to require}? In Rawls, the natural duty to 
justice is in fact premised on the full implementation of the two principles o f ju s ­
tice, It is exactly because these principles are known and accepted by citizens that 
they have no rational reason, behind the veil of ignorance, to insist on making “the 
requirement to comply with just institutions conditional upon certain voluntary 
acts on their part’’, i.e. actual free consent. From a republican perspective, Rawls’ 
duties scratch where it does not itch, because such duties are particularly required 
on the road towards a (nearly) just society -  but this said republicans would still 
have to specify what constitutes the requisite base line common good of a political 
community, from where duties could ‘start*.17
A third reason is the most important one. Although Patten is right in noting 
that both rights and duties may and will enter into neo-Kantian justice deductions, 
the very point about ‘rights as trumps’ is that they function to secure the individual 
from the trespassings of the state and society,18 something which gives them a spe­
cial, absolute and inviolable, status. Now, republican libertas is certainly also about 
the value of rights as something stable and reliable for the Individual citizen. How­
ever, the republican emphasis on the historically and empirically changing condi­
tions of liberty is associated with the potential need for new or extraordinary duties 
that restrict the use or value o f certain rights. Moreover, the acceptance of consti­
tutional diversity and change over time (below) makes it possible and likely that 
different duties may be required in different types of polity.19 20By contrast it is a 
general aspect of neo-Kantian foundationalism that it aims to specify philosophi­
cally a set of rights and duties -  including perhaps a duty to military service, 
backed by the coercive force o f law - which, as part of a constitution, sire (in Rawls’
18. Rawls 1972:335). An article by Parekh suggests ways o f conceptualising such 
a political community, as based on many things including what looks like a repub­
lican intuition of historical interdependence of fellow citizens bounded in a com­
mon political ‘fate’, implying also -  but not specifying how -  that societies may be 
too undemocratic or unjust for such obligations to ensue for the Individual (Parekh 
1993:241).
19. Dworkin (1978:150-205).
20. A universalist welfare state arguably requires specific arrangements, such as 
a duty to civil service, in order to generate that sense of moral obligation which is 
crowded out by state institutions acting as our ‘brother’s keeper’, as implied by 
Wolfe (1989); and some forms of political or administrative decentralisation may 
require more local participation than traditional representative democracy.
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phrase) "removed from off the political agenda".20 The very idea that further sub­
stantial duties, backed by politically formulated claims about empirical necessity in 
a specific type of republic, and brought forward by a (constitutionally amending) 
legislative majority, could go beyond these rights and duties cannot be accepted by 
Rawlsians. v
Republican rights and duties are reciprocal relations, rather than inviolable 
possessions (this is arguably also the way to understand Rawlsian Recht as op­
posed to libertarian conceptions), also in the sense of more or less continued out­
comes of re-deliberation. The practical difference between republican (‘populist’) 
and Rawlsian ideas may not always be terribly big. Just as some new forms of 
rights and (particularly) entitlements may be seen as matters of ‘application’ inside 
a framework of constitutional essentials,21 particular duties may indeed be re­
garded as policy measures, depending on the degree of comprehensiveness of lib­
eral constitutional ambition, and of course depending on the nature of duties re­
quired. Even so, whereas the specification and differentiation of rights in new cir­
cumstances of cultural and administrative complexity seems increasingly accepted 
by liberal writers. I am not sure this would be the case with duties. The way that 
Rawls talks about duties is after all rather weak and general. The duties “to sup­
port and to further just institutions“ that Rawls has in mind are primarily about 
respecting justice when it is in place, and on the assumption that everybody else 
does so too. We are also “to assist in the establishment of just arrangements", but 
Rawls hastens to add “at least when this can be done with little cost to our­
selves".22 Whereas the (very heavy) duty of militaiy conscription has been in place 
for many generations in Western Europe and also (for that reason?) in Rawls (but is 
now being dismantled for technical and economic reasons almost everywhere) what 
would he or other liberals think of such schemes as a duty for both sexes to do a 
year of national civil service, or a duty for all to take turns in a rotating (second) 
deliberation chamber, or the notion that such duties might be enforced by law (or 
by using such sanctions as the loss of certain social rights)?
All this said, there is reason to question the fruitfulness of Skinner’s exclusive fo­
cus on duty as potentially backed by coercive law. Different classical authors make 
different points, and so might contemporary republican formulations of what is, at 
any rate, an empirical matter. But generally speaking, whereas some duties, as ex­
emplified above, are likely to require some sanction, in other and indeed in most 
instances they may not.23 Parekh has usefully spoken of political obligations as obli-
21. Rawls (I993a:151).
22. Habermas (1992a).
23. Rawls (1972:334). The natural duty to Justice is also rational to choose, be­
cause it helps underpin the sense of justice which Rawls sees as the main moti­
vating factor in a liberal society (see below).
24. It is a (good) liberal value in itself to seek to justify to individuals that they
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gâtions which should not, or only in special circumstances and to a limited degree, 
be legally or coercively sanctioned, because doing so would jeopardise the public 
sense of responsibility on which they rest (and the integrative side-effects w hich  
they produce). Moreover, these obligations -  to participate in politics, to scrutinise 
and criticise the government, to take civic initiatives locally or whatever -  are n ot 
unconditional and ‘personal’ in the sense of the obligation to obey the law or to pay  
one’s taxes. Everybody does not have to participate all the time (but sufficient num ­
bers have to do so), and duties to civic activity must relate to whom a person is. 
and what are his capacities and station.24
Also important (and noted by Parekh), just as the question of legal coercion is 
not so prominent as assumed, the tradition (with Cicero as notable exception) is 
generally inclined to view duty, not primarily as a moral calling pulling from within, 
but more as a motivating force pulling from without. Obligations are social ideals 
about what we owe to fellow citizens. And republicans stress the importance, m ore 
particularly, of mechanisms of social control, shaming, and esteem (some of which 
may upset some liberals). This takes us towards the second normative implication 
of the republican argument, noted above, namely how social and political institu­
tions may legitimately be shaped so as to facilitate the acquirement of civic virtue (a  
first aspect of republican second order instrumentalism, patriotism being another).
4.2. Institutions and Virtue
Although Patten makes valid points in defending liberals, he makes too much o f  
the Rawlsian friendliness towards instrumental republicanism, i.e. when claiming 
that parties to the original position “recognise the fragility of free and just institu­
tions“.25 It seems fairly clear that Rawls, and by implication the ghostly choosers he 
puts behind the veil of ignorance, do not in fact speculate much about the fragility 
of institutions in the republican sense. There is no mentioning in Rawls of partici­
patory democratic structures or other necessary channels of virtue. However, and 
as noted in the Introduction, one outcome of the communitarian onslaught has 
been a literature on virtues in liberalism, for instance the work of Steven Macedo, 
along with the question of proper liberal education to democratic reflection and tol­
erance.26
should do something. And if  they remain reluctant on more than free-rider 
grounds, the quality of the ensuing civic activity may be poor indeed. We may re­
mind ourselves of Machiavelli’s typical low view of forced  conscript soldiers as op­
posed to citizens who identified rationally with the common good of their city.
25. Parekh (1993:244-46).
26. Patten (1996:31).
27. Macedo (1990; 1995); Dagger (1997); Caflan (1996); Gutmann (1987). To Ma­
cedo, the “sort of character ... associated with a liberal form of personal excellence" 
involves “willingness to ’live and let live’, to subordinate personal plans and com­
mitments to impartial rules of law, and to persuade rather than coerce". They also
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The important ambitions of these several new civic liberals collide, however, 
with Rawls' turn in Political Liberalism towards avoiding ‘comprehensive’ doctrines 
and relying on a 'political' conception of the person. The problems of Rawls' ambi­
tion to be as neutral as possible by ‘staying on the surface’ -  criticised among oth­
ers by Macedo -  were noted in the Introduction. Rawls’ idea seems to be that the 
particular reasonable pluralism which would generate an overlapping consensus 
and support a public conception of the good, adequately democratic and reflective 
citizen, is a pluralism which is already, as it were, modernised. Strong believers 
and convinced supporters of comprehensive doctrines come in suitably laundered 
varieties. By living in a well-ordered society and by learning to appreciate Lockean 
doubt and the value of civility and trust, they have become accustomed to brack­
eting parts of their comprehensive doctrines whenever this is required.
Here, the republican tradition, for instance in the form of an Arendtian update 
on Tocqueville’s conception of the ambiguity of civil society, would argue that re­
flective persons are not a stable achievement as much as the fragile outcome of the 
‘decision to think*; that Rawls severely underestimates the degree to which, in a 
complex modem society, toleration as social openness and actual respect for diffi­
cult rights has become a highly demanding civic skill; and that the new turn in the 
West towards intellectual obscurantism, celebration o f ‘feeling’, and xenophobic 
nationalism, much of it arising for distinctly modem sociological and psychological 
reasons, testify to the numerous ways that enlightenment may be reversed. Repub­
licanism, here, suggests the need to remain committed, as a matter of policy and 
public culture, to controversially ‘thick’ ideals of democratic reflection.
Even Macedo’s ‘deep’ liberalism is rather complacent when it comes to ex­
plaining how such an ideal might be realised. Rather than speaking about institu­
tions it trades on a rosy liberal idea of civil society, according to which private plu­
ralism and shifting involvements more or less automatically produce good citizens:
we should not overemphasize the amount of political participation that 
liberalism requires. Liberalism ... does not force on its citizens a 
conception of the good life with a very large political component (...) 
liberal citizens learn and apply public norms in their interaction with 
others. Children ... criticise, discuss, listen to others, and take votes,
include “that we respect the rights of people with whom we disagree strongly”, “that 
we are capable of putting ourselves in the shoes of others", “attitudes of tolerance 
and sympathy among people who disagree", and a willingness to live with such 
“(L]ive options [which] incite self-examination, self-criticism, and experimentation". 
The private ideal of reflection and autonomous self-legislation is linked to the civic 
virtues (judicial, legislative, and executive ones), of impartiality of judgement, ad­
herence to principle, capacity to “survey different ideals in personal deliberation", 
and capacity to “resolve, act, and persevere rather than thrift, dither, and crumble 
at the first sign of adversity” (Macedo 1990:265-75).
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they follow, debate, change, and help enforce rules, at home, in school, 
at work, in games, and with their friends (...) private life goes a long way 
in helping to prepare us for our public duties
Also,
liberal subjects will prize not isolated activity, but the liberty to choose 
how to be associated, with whom, in what manner, and for what 
purposes land] include participation in the host of clubs and 
associations that do exist and flourish in liberal societies27
Macedo provides no evidence that American society - his own context - creates the 
citizen character that he wishes to see.28 His otherwise important work testifies to a 
strange and unargued optimism of some contemporary liberalism.29 Although mod­
ems may not again become incapable of reflection, it is misleading to claim that 
once “one’s horizons are broadened ... no act of will can narrow the vistas again".30 
For many, it is unbearable to live a reflective life. For all of us, it is sometimes in­
convenient and demanding in view of our inclinations, petty interest, and weak­
nesses of will.
A serious version of this complacency seems evidenced in Rawls off-hand re­
marks in Political Liberalism, to the effect that he had no quarrel with Skinner’s in­
strumental republicanism, and that affirming it did not require the type of “com­
prehensive doctrines" which Rawls took such pains in that work to avoid. There 
might be “certain differences on matters of institutional design" and Rawls dis­
agreed with Skinner’s “political sociology".31 32What Rawls is basically saying here is 
that rather less virtue is likely to be needed than Skinner thinks, and that the 
means to further such virtue in turn only involve uncontroversial institutional 
measures. His point about ‘political sociology’ puts us back to the ‘sense of Justice* 
as evolving in different associations (elaborated in Theory), and to liberal civility as 
an outcome o f his peculiarly tamed Lockean pluralism in Political Liberalism.
Moreover, the reason why Rawls thinks that he can take in (Skinner's) instru­
mental republicanism without going comprehensive, is that he assimilates the re­
publican argument to a (weak and unspecified) moral instrumentalism -  instru­
mentalism ‘in theoiy’ as it were - which could become part of an overlapping, and 
motivating, consensus, a point to which we return below. He does not feel that he
28. Macedo (1990:273-74).
29. See also Shils (1991) on liberal civility and Rosenblum's idea of the distinctly 
liberal conception of society as elective (1994a; 1994b).
30. The post-modern liberal communitarianism o f Rorty (1985), or the romantic or 
agonistic individualisms of Kateb (1984; 1989) or Connolly (1991) are other exam­
ples. Bach place their confidence in transgression and identity experiments to fos­
ter a general spirit of ironic tolerance of diversity.
31. Macedo (1990:279).
32. Rawls (1993a:205).
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has to contemplate this or that Institutional measure, such as non-neutral public 
education to democratic reflection or forms of participatory and deliberative politi­
cal structures, which he would not like.32
5. Which Patriotism?
Patten says more about the other aspect of second order instrumentalism, i.e. the 
question of patriotic identification as a necessary motivating solidarity device. He 
claims that liberals do not have a problem with some forms of (liberal) patriotism 
but certainly with others and secondly that the liberal forms of patriotism are quite 
sufficient to work (he is aided here by not taking first order instrumentalism en­
tirely seriously: what is needed to motivate to solidarity of course depends on how 
demanding is the solidarity in question, i.e. in terms of what we owe our fellow citi­
zens).
Unfortunately, Patten’s discussion is based on Charles Taylor whose views, dis­
cussed in Chapter 8, are different from republican arguments. Patten distinguishes 
between a “liberal or constitutional patriotism" and (what he sees as) a non-liberal, 
republican patriotism. Rawlsians have no difficulties, he claims, with affirming the 
former. As regards the latter, “liberals would be wise to stand their ground".33 345Pat­
ten reaches this conclusion by tipping the scales strategically - helped by Taylor - 
in his own direction, as he describes the theoretical and empirical claims of each of 
the patriotism arguments in turn.
First, he argues that a liberal patriotism (like Taylor, he uses the American ex­
ample) may be based on “a bond of solidarity ... [between] ... fellow citizens as a re­
sult of the fact that they are all engaged in a common enterprise of putting forward 
and defending certain ideals". In fact, such solidarity is an instance of that “co­
operative venture for mutual advantage" which follows from Rawls* sense of Justice 
inside a well-ordered community. Nor is such a disembodied patriotism merely 
"conceivable”. Its feasibility is obvious, as “one need only think of the American 
case mentioned by Taylor, or the strong commitment of Canadians to their new 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms (sic!], or ... the inspiration one feels in reading 
some of the great liberal texts such as Mill’s On Liberty".3*
Secondly, he accepts Taylor’s representation of republican patriotism as a doc­
trine about respecting the pre-given and unalterable cultural identity of national 
groups as the basis of their political motivation. This allows him to argue that re­
33. Rawls says, with characteristic vagueness, that a liberal regime may take 
“certain steps to strengthen the virtues of toleration and mutual trust, say by dis­
couraging various kinds of religious and racial discrimination", without thereby be­
coming “a perfectionist state" (Rawls 1993a: 195).
34. Patten (1996:40).
35. Patten (1996:39-40). But the specific passages which Patten quotes in Rawls 
(from the section on The Morality of Principles') clearly imply the limitations of the 
sense of justice (Rawls 1972:472-79).
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publican patriotism leads to suppression of civil liberties (e.g. a patriotism based on 
anti-communism), and to the impossibility that citizens may wish to transfer their 
loyalties to “institutions which are better equipped than their own political institu­
tions to confront threats to their liberties’*. He even argues ad absurdum still fo l­
lowing Taylor, that republican patriotism could be construed to involve appeasing a 
culturally alienated group by granting them unfair advantages, all in order to se­
cure common liberty.
The contrast causes Patten to dismiss republican patriotism because it has u n ­
savoury consequences for liberty (“the causal mechanism linking citizen motivation 
with the preservation of a free society remains unclear, since the object of citizen 
allegiance differs from the result that republicans claim patriotism will achieve ... a  
free society"). By contrast, as "the object of their allegiance is defined in terms o f 
liberty, liberal patriots respond to the suppression of liberties with ... outrage, and 
to opportunities to secure liberty further with ... eagerness”.35
Again. I believe Patten makes things to easy for himself and for Rawls. It is u n ­
clear to what extent Rawls would be willing to enter the theoretical orbit of instru­
mental patriotism at all.36 In discussions of moral psychology and sociology in The­
ory, although Rawls recognised the origin of a sense o f justice in groups, including 
'a well-ordered and just society’, where a capacity for justice is developed in ever 
wider circles, as aided in the concrete exposures to the moral actions of others and 
to their expectations of justice in turn, Rawls still claims that principled morality 
may be an independent motivation which is strong enough to make us act justly, 
also towards those “who have not yet had ... opportunity to display an ... intention 
to do their share", and also "where the institutional scheme in question may be so 
large that particular bonds never get widely built up."37 38
Rawls is no doubt right that such a universalistic morality of principles - which 
knows no boundaries - may and often is learned, that its human experience is at 
the heart of what morality means (whatever else it means), and indeed that the ex­
posure to such boundless moral intuitions is common (as when we ask ourselves 
why the children of third world parents have to suffer, while our own do not). But It 
is also a non-contingent fact of modem societies, ignored by Rawls, that the moral 
will to apply such principles with any degree of consistency is not a matter of either 
understanding or affirming the reasonableness of such principles, but of an inde­
terminate common sense delineation of how much justice we may be expected to 
give (as when we say that we cannot be expected to help the whole world), even to 
those who might become capable of partaking in Rawlsian reciprocity of justice (i.e. 
as immigrants to welfare states which could go on functioning in a sufficiently well-
36. Patten (1996:41).
37. The following draws on work in progress (Mouritsen 1999c).
38. Rawls (1972:474-75).
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ordered Rawlsian manner with annual intakes of, say, 1-2% work immigrants for 
some time to come).
Moreover, there are some signs that Rawls’ theory does rely on bounded soli­
darity (also bounded in a non-trivial sense),38 as evidenced in his new work on the 
law of peoples with it ingenious but morally uncompelling stage construction,39 as 
well as in certain features of his theory which come into view in the context of elite 
work migration between poor and rich states and the question of whether or not to 
have wage incentives or other institutional measures to ensure societies against 
such dramatic brain drain which might cause them to be no longer ‘well-ordered* 
(where a strict reading of Rawls’ intent would seem to suggest that Rawlsians ‘must 
be patriots’ for the sake of justice in a community).40
In Political Liberalism Rawls has favourable things to say about political com­
munity and of the way "a democratic people distinguish different periods in their 
history“ and take “pride in distinguishing themselves from non-democratic peo­
ples". But all that Rawls is saying here is that liberal community is perfectly legiti­
mate as such, that its experience may become valuable in itself (much as argued by 
Taylor), and that its development may be possible (indeed seems likely) as a by­
product of enjoying life in a well-ordered community with just institutions over 
time. Rawls clearly does not think they should be actively furthered by the state, 
nor even that such sentiments are necessary. Thus, he does not link the recogni-
39. Rawls of course readily acknowledges that his theory presupposed the legal 
confines of states (Rawls 1993a:228, note 51). My point is that these boundaries 
cannot merely be understood in the trivial sense of a functional ‘division of (Justice) 
labour’ between states, neccesitating certain numerical restrictions on immigration 
and cooperative schemes between states (Goodin 1988; Shue 1988).
40. Rawls (1993b) and a parallel statement in Habermas (1994a); Poulsen 
(1994a; 1994b).
41. See Lukes (1995); Van Parijs (1995). I do not aim to criticise Rawls on moral 
grounds (Whellan 1988:6-16). The republican point in this context is about how to 
generate sufficient solidarity, using legitimate identitarlan means, given that such 
means are necessary. 1 have nothing to say here about how to delineate or restrict 
membership of a community, how to conceptualise partial as opposed to universal 
obligations (Miller 1995b), or how to deal with the obvious dangers to any cosmo­
politan fellow feeling, if the legitimacy of the former is too complacently or one- 
sidedly argued (see essays in Nussbaum 1996). Republicans would not prescribe to 
either a communitarian ‘birthright to states conception’ (Walzer 1990b; Taylor 
1993; cf. Ingram 1995), or to a culturalist version of instrumental exclusion (Hail- 
bronner 1989), arguing in stead that anybody is in principle capable of partaking in 
a republic. However, it is evident that they would have to consider what is mini­
mally required to aspire to citizenship, and how to deal in a principled way with the 
fact that not everybody are allowed entry, whatever their civic qualifications 
(Baubock 1994). But these hard questions are of course shared by liberals, in­
cluding those who gesture towards a new 'cosmopolitan* citizenship (Held 1995; 
Unklater 1998; see debate in Hutchings and Dannreuther 1999, and Kveinen 
2000).
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tion of the common good of political community to his new concern with 'stability' 
(below) which still speaks of "a normally sufficient sense of justice."41
Greg Hill, writing before Political Liberalism and reconstructing Rawls' position 
uis-a-uis Taylor, has argued along lines similar to those of Patten that while political 
liberalism has no place for favouring one political way of life over another, original 
parties who care about the stability of liberal institutions would give "special con­
siderations ... to institutional alternatives that encourage ... participation" and the 
identity formation produced through such participation (but significantly giving no 
details about these institutions). And as a sociological point, seen to be latent in 
Rawls, he notes that the "citizen will want "to meet her obligations because in so 
doing she strengthens her identification with the community as a whole, thereby 
gaining a sense of membership and participation in its collective accomplish­
ments". Such an identification, will arise in a functioning liberal society where 
“convergent individual ends can develop into a genuinely common good," or a good 
valued “because it is shared" and where “a love o f the community and its institu­
tions” will arise from the simple enjoyment of the advantages of "social coopera­
tion".42 43
The trouble with both Hill’s and Patten’s rescue attempts is that they at most 
establish that Rawls does have, or may be seen to have, an ‘instrumental argument* 
-  unlike what republicans and Taylor thinks. Thus, again, they may claim that 
there is no disagreement 'in principle’, and that a republican type o f concern with 
patriotic identity can find a place inside a neutral liberalism. But the question still 
stands about whether 'participating in* (i.e. living inside) comprehensive justice 
schemes and tolerance-demanding public cultures really does produce solidarity 
(or whether more demanding activities are needed); whether integrative civic iden­
tities may be built on the reading of J.S.Mill (rather than the national discourse o f 
this or that civic memory or aspect of political culture), and whether whatever 
mechanisms are needed may really be assumed to generate themselves without the 
help of the state, for instance through the education system. If Hill and Patten were 
disappointed in any or all of these respects -  and i f  such disappointment was taken 
seriously - there would seem to be a disagreement ’in principle.*
The way that neither of these commentators take instrumentalism empirically 
seriously is indicative of a broader problem to which I return below. Here we may 
note that the contrast erected by Patten between a realistic and feasible liberal the­
ory of patriotism (luckily the one which Rawlsians can affirm and remain neutral) 
and a draconian republican one is both an inaccurate depiction of the latter (re-
42. Rawls (1993a: 141,204); cf. Dworkin(1992).
43. Hill (1993:75-80).
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pmembering the elements of republican patriotism, laid out in the previous chapter) 
and for several reasons an unrealistic appraisal of the role of the former.43
There is every reason to believe that motivations to liberal solidarity. let alone 
solidarity of the demanding Rawlsian egalitarian kind, presupposes a type of 
bounded solidarity which has to be based on something rather more concrete than 
the reading of liberal philosophy (Patten presumably did not think of Mill’s remarks 
on nationalism). In a world where global, corporate elites do not have to rely on any 
one national welfare state but may eventually tire of paying to the many who still 
do, solidarity may soon enough become a scarce commodity. The steady influx of 
newcomers with whom the terms of belonging are continuously negotiated and po­
litically contested does not help. Nor, finally, is the problem made any easier, if re­
publican civic obligations are added to what we owe each other.44
Not only is solidarity more demanding and more difficult to generate in a plu­
ralist, open, and civic society. It is also, as part of a republican analysis of political 
pluralism, made more necessaiy. As noted in Chapter 8, the constitutional delib­
erations of republican political autonomy require a readiness to civic impartiality, of 
a reasonable give and take on the road to a contingent and fragile concordia. Be­
cause citizens cannot be expected to be motivated by the anticipation of any har­
mony of zwangloser Zwang redeeming their limited rationality, the very willingness 
to enter such dialogues with any degree of responsibility and open-mindedness, 
risking one’s own groups interests and view points, can only be assumed if one’s 
political adversaries are also fellow citizens. There has to be a minimal sense of 
shared fate, as well as an experience of “relations of reciprocity" for such civicness 
to get of the ground.45
44. Patten (1996:43); Rawls (1972:245-48). |
45. Although support for the welfare state remains high in Europe, research indi- i
cates that traditional redistribution is somewhat less strongly supported in socie- j
ties with higher levels of socio-economic development and among groups with
higher incomes and education. These trends are neither strong nor alarming and (
their predicted impact was vastly exaggerated by advocates of “welfare-backlash’ 
theories of the seventies. However, combined with the turn of European electorates 
towards post-materialist values and individual fulfilment, there may still be some |
reason for concern (Kaase & Newton 1995:68-71,155ff; Scarbrough 1995). Miller j
(1999) analyses how solidarity is more demanding, and requires to be more i
bounded, the more participatory and civic a country’s political traditions.
46. Miller (1999:65,77-78). Of course, this type of argument has been short- I
circuited in Roussean fashion: people’s identities may be required -  or manipulated j
towards -  such conformity and uniformity that the problem of willingness to im- j
partiality almost disappears, as individuals are so alike that they agree anyway.
Moreover, the argument does not imply, I believe, that new levels of democracy and 
republican libertas cannot be aimed at. But it does suggest at the very least that
some sort of basis for solidarity and common identity, and some degree o f mutual­
ity and trust has to be there first. In a European Union context there is little future 
in the search for a European nation. However, there may be in the more limited
J
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To assume, as does Patten, that non-neutrality of political identity is an anom­
aly is patently untrue. Historically, all Western political communities have been 
integrated through nation building. Some national identities are less thick on cul­
ture, Biut and Boden, and more accessible than others. But even in felicitous cir­
cumstances they involve a selectively orchestrated re-membering of political history 
and ideals of good citizenship that serves to include some and exclude others. Nor 
is the quest for national and other larger (ethnic) group identities going away with 
the increasing modem potential for reflection, stressed by Habermas. Such collec­
tive identities serve many purposes, including strategic ones.46 But among them is 
certainly that they cater for deep needs of psycho-ontological security, feelings o f 
belonging and recognition, which, under modem conditions, seem irreplaceable by 
other identitary reference,47 and are also more difficult to domesticate, contrary to 
Marxist assumptions, than those of economic class.48 Indeed, national identity is 
returning, not only as post-communist *bent twigs’,49 or as popular defensive- 
xenophobic Western European backlash, but also in the form of an increasingly 
widespread, often deliberate, reflective, and elite-centred concern with ‘national 
mentality’.50 We are as obsessed with identity as ever. Such identities do not tend 
to go away, or even necessarily become less strong, as their substantial cultural 
content becomes progressively thinner, more symbolic, and more reflective.
Here, a seemingly reasonable suggestion might be to follow liberal intuitions, 
let sleeping dogs lie, and identities be. But this will not do. A  new concern with pa­
triotism is equivalent to an active encounter with nationalism, a political siding 
with the least exclusive identities. Refusal to engage with patriotism does not make 
nationalism go away, it leaves the field wide open for it.51 52Moreover, more or less 
inclusive conceptions of who could be a worthy citizen have material and institu­
tional consequences, i.e. in terms of rights, public policy, and risk of discrimina-
creation and visualisation of political interdependencies and tangible common proj­
ects that concern what could eventually become a European people, all without 
awaiting full scale European constitutionalism, but certainly requiring some fur­
ther mechanisms and procedures for democratic deliberations at this level 
(Schmitter 2000).
47. Glazer & Moynihan (1975)
48. Bell (1975); Berlin (1976); Ignatieff(1993).
49. E.g., Hirschman (1994:214).
50. Berlin (1990a).
51. Complete with a fast growing academic industry investigating histories of, say, 
‘Englishness’ (Samuel 1989:voI.I-III), ‘Canadianness* (Kaplan 1993), Danishness 
(0stergaard 1987) which thrives on the wealth of national myths while attempting 
their deconstruction.
52. As noted also by Viroli: “Se i socialisti, scriveva Rosselli, e sono parole da me­
ditare, ‘pur si combattere queste forme primitive o degenerate o interessate di at­
taccamento al paese, si ostineranno a ignorare i valori più alti della vita nazionale, 
non faranno che facilitare il gioco delle altre correnti che nello sfruttamento del 
mito nazionale basano le loro fortune" (Viroli 1993:463).
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tion. Secondly, as recognised by politicians from Chirac to Blair to Clinton, and as 
evidenced in the rhetoric of their speeches, existing national identities is simply the 
medium of political integration. Such identities may be employed for good or bad 
purposes, but there is no alternative, ‘pure’ language of patriotism.
1 believe that the republican tradition contains elements towards a critical the­
ory of political identity. This would be a theory of the content of collective political 
identities which are substantial and concrete enough to integrate modem citizens 
by motivating them to do their share in a community to whose existence and ade­
quate functioning they are reminded of owing the enjoyment of their common lib­
erty; but also sufficiently flexible and capable of reflective reformulation so as to 
make room in principle for newcomers with their contributions, and even to cater 
for their specific, hitherto excluded or degraded identities. And it would be a theory 
of the practice - and the conditions and constraints of such a practice - of generat­
ing such forms, i.e. of conceptualising patriotism as a civic activity of reflective, re­
constructive re-membering.52 The parameters of such practice is an empirical mat­
ter of the discursive matrixes at hand in countries with each their political cultures 
and constitutional traditions.
In this last regard the conception of constitutional patriotism is not quite on tar­
get. Habermas does note that patriotism is tied to historical horizons of diverse na­
tional experiences, his point being that national pride is legitimate when, against 
what the ‘too conservative* Gadamer thinks possible, it is subjected to a public dis­
course which achieves sufficient distance to criticise It from the point of view of the 
present, excluding bad bits and keeping the good ones.53 However, in Habermas’ 
essentially Kantian theory, the solidarity work Is done by increasingly rationalised, 
increasingly abstract and ‘de-subjectivised’, and increasingly boundary- 
transcending processes of ‘communication*.54 5Traditions are simply the contingent 
contexts of these processes, the overlapping life-world resources that facilitate 
communication by providing it with a starting point. But this takes the bite (and
53. In terms of Nancy Rosenblum’s typology of the integrative tasks of civil soci­
ety, appropriated for our purposes, republican identity must create substantial 
moral attachments, feelings of obligation (to the political community). Secondly, it 
must deal with alienation (of excluded groups). And thirdly, it must temper and 
loosen the grip of too strong and particularistic solidarities, i.e. weaken the hard 
cores of (majority) nationalism (Rosenblum 1994a). See Alexander (1991; 1992); 
Parekh (1994).
54. Habermas (1990; 1992b).
55. Compare this with Habermas’ hopes for a European identity of the same post­
nationalist stuff as state patriotism, and capable, it seems, of indefinite extension. 
The vague sociological notion o f participation in a forward-oriented public dis­
course may be interpreted as a ‘communicative* version of the second republican 
idea of solidarity through joint political activity. But it is as difficult to connect re­
publican notions of concrete solidarity with Habermas’ ideas of rationalisation 
through communicative processes in a generalised Lebenswelt, as it Is to see it in
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the ambiguity) out of republican patriotism. Habermas fails to recognise that soli­
darity, in order to work, is always - somehow - bounded and particular. ‘Post- 
national’ identities should not only make traditions reflective and normatively le­
gitimate, but also do so in a manner that keeps such identities instrumentally effec­
tive as factors of collective motivation, as well as capable of modification to gener­
ate new, culturally overarching solidarity.55
Viroli makes much more of the need for concreteness56 in an analysis which 
makes a number of points parallel to my own discussion in Chapter 8. However, 
while the recovery of the historical concept of patriotism (as distinct from national­
ism) is important, Viroli’s own advocacy of contemporary patriotism is slightly rosy. 
In the epilogue to his book on the topic, Viroli takes issue with Rusconi’s critique o f 
Habermas,57 589rightly criticising Rusconi’s suggestion of basing democratic patriot­
ism on substantial cultural belonging. Instead, and using as his example one of the 
few countries where KultumaHon elements have no role to play, he argues that love 
of country must be a strictly political love o f liberty which in turn:
produces only liberty. Bigotry, intolerance, and war are the products of 
another love: that is, love or longing for oneness or uniqueness (...) Our 
way should be that of liberty; that is, a political way. We do not need 
more citizens attending national festivals with great fervour; nor do we 
need more citizens willing to offer their lives to protect their country’s re­
ligious or ethnic or cultural unity56
It is difficult to disagree. But Viroli’s neat distinction, like the work of Habermas, 
fails to take seriously the way that also the experience (or memory) of liberty is 
concrete and contextually embedded. Patriotism, because created and talked 
about, is not static and fixed but malleable and subject to contestation, different 
interpretations, even reinvention. But this does not make it an easy categoiy. The
Rawls’ ‘participation’ in a just and well-ordered society (Habermas 1992b: 6-7).
56. Habermas discusses how citizenship to immigrants should not be restricted 
on ’cultural’ grounds as in Germany - not how immigrants could partake in a Ger­
man constitutional patriotism or why it is relevant that they do so (Habermas 
1994a: 135fi).
57. Viroli (1992:290fif; 1993; 1995, especially the epilogue).
58. Rusconi (1991a; 1991b). Rusconi pointed out that Habermas does not attend 
to the fact that (competing) national identities belong to particularist Lebenswelt 
structures which, in Habermas own reflective hermeneutic, can only be rational­
ised in a piece-by-piece fashion: "Il lavoro critico di correzione e autocorrezione di 
queste deformazioni - affidato al discorso universalistico dei citadini - non può ne­
gare o ignorare le matrice storiche e materiali da cui quel discorso prende leteral- 
mente le sue parole. E il suo ambiente e contesto communicativo" (Rusconi 
1991b:326). Yet, Habermas Implies the possibility o f a fully rationalised rights- 
universalism, shared by all, but somehow ’linked’ to particular cultural heritages.
59. Viroli (1995:185).
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‘pollution’ of patriotism is not coincidental. A tension does exist between asking 
What is the nature of our common liberty*, with its focus on the history of a par­
ticular country, the experience of specific groups, and the cooperative tasks such 
groups could envisage for themselves in the future: and. on the other hand, the 
disposition to take into consideration how others, newcomers, have different histo­
ries and aspirations of liberty, and to try to incorporate or construct bridges to 
these. Moreover, we have stressed the non-relativism of republican core values, but 
only to a certain point: The constitutional specifics of libertas, the particular his­
torical predicaments, insecurities, or trespasses (be they territorial, economic, or 
religious) experienced in its name, and the contingent institutional outcome of 
historical settlements, all delimit a people's liberty.59
6. Pluralism and Political Deliberation
The last important area where a contemporary republican argument is incompati­
ble with Rawls’ liberalism, not touched upon by Patten because not discussed by 
his interlocutors either, is of course the republican departure from the philosophi­
cal foundationalism of neo-Kantian political theory. Republicanism is defined by its 
acceptance of a core of libertas and more broadly of the idea that the common lib­
erty of citizens in a republic is constituted by a juridically (constitutionally) defined 
set of ‘rights' (apart from the fact that early republicans did not use this term). But 
the difference that divides the waters between Rawlsians and republicans is the 
latter's acknowledgement that rights and constitutions derive, not just empirically 
but also normatively -  despite the use of natural law arguments too - from (some 
incarnation or representation of) the people, and not from a philosophical recon­
struction of it. It is between liberalism as a utopian doctrine to be used entirely 
against politics, and republicanism as conceptualisations of how to generate situ­
ated types of impartiality and reasoned give and take deliberations about plural 
values.
Republican thought may in part be seen to concern the art of the possible, 
about how to conceptualise the fact that constitutional outcomes are always sub- 
optimal, because of limitations in impartiality, reason, and knowledge, but that 
popular legitimation of libertas is nevertheless required. However such a contempo­
rary theory could look like -  where to place a role for civil disobedience for instance 
-  Rawlsians may choose to call this a concession to non-ideal theory that is of no 
concern to political philosophy.
But there are two additional ways, again, that a republican view would be em­
pirically informed so as to be at odds with Rawlsianism. The first way is in its con- 60
60. We may compare Germany's constitutional provisions against Holocaust deni­
als and conspiratorial political activity with USA's celebration of freedom of speech 
and association in each their collectively mnemonic contexts.
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1stitutive recognition of a high degree of ultimate normative indeterminacy: there is 
no other way to establish the best constitutional settlement in a given time and 
place than to deliberate on the aspirations about liberty that individuals bring to 
the public sphere. Values are plural, situated in history, attached to evolving aspi­
rations of cultures -  more or less overlapping, local or global, temporary or durable 
-  forwarded by ever new groups which emerge from obscurity and oppression, or 
form in the face of new social, technological, ecological, or national dangers, or 
scarcities and dimensions of conflict, which may legitimately be seen to jeopardise 
their projects. And there is additional pluralism because new constellations of aspi­
rations emerge in new peoples: new pluralist combinations of groups who find that 
they have to live together, or choose to do so.60
I am inclined to share the view that the very meaning of morality for modems 
involves a Kantian baseline of equal respect and concern, of affirmation of the 
equal dignity and value of persons, and that normative argument is significantly 
structured by these and certain other related values. I also believe that this places 
non-trivial constraints on the conceptions that could be accepted from a 'moral 
point of view’.61 This said, any conception, including Rawls’ particular view ‘from 
nowhere’62 reflects a specific time and place, and more particularly the moral pre­
conceptions and ultimate values which the philosopher brings to his construction. 
This does not render such constructions either illegitimate or useless, or rule out 
that specific values and combinations of values may be given a more or less coher­
ent and impartial reconstruction. Nor is it at all implied -  indeed the republican 
tradition implies the contrary -  that no continuity of basic values exists to be mod­
elled in such manners, nor that all or most basic values are incompatible, let alone 
incommensurable and inaccessible for reasoned compromise.63 Nor does it deny 
that some formalised system of rights and duties has to be formulated, by the very 
nature of the several dimensions of moral pluralism in societies of any complexity, 
and that these dimensions constrain its possible formats in ways ignored by tradi­
tional communitarians and marxists alike64
Recent years has seen a general lowering of universalistic ambitions. In Political 
Liberalism Rawls responded to criticism by changing the subject,65 6although the 
degree to which ‘overlapping consensus’ and ‘reasonable pluralism’ signals a de-
61. Bellamy (2000).
62. Kymlicka (1990:4); Macedo (1990:46); discussed in Mouritsen (2000c).
63. Rawls, according to Lukes, endowed his hypothetical individuals “with his­
torically and socially located features", which were "recognizably those of some 
modem, Western, liberal, individualistic men" and this was “not merely contin­
gently, but necessarily the case” (Lukes 1977c; 1977d). A short critique of univer­
salist intentions of liberal rights theory is Bellamy (1993:44-54).
64. Berlin (1969; 1990; 1994:81-82); Lukes (1994).
65. Lukes (1991b).
66. Anderson (1994).
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parture from his own belief injustice as Jaimess as the right liberal view has been 
exaggerated. However this may be, Rawls’ idea of an overlapping consensus seems 
to imply the idea that groups living under justice as fairness could come to support 
it from different perspectives, modifying their comprehensive views in various ways 
to secure the fit. For republicans, inclined to say that such a convergence would 
merely be around a conception of justice (among several flavours of libertas which 
no original position construct could so drastically reduce) all the fuss about rea­
sonable pluralism is somewhat odd in the first place.
The way that Rawls deals with political pluralism, from this perspective, is ir­
relevant in a very fundamental way. The entire point of Political Liberalism is to ex­
amine the conditions of ‘stability*, i.e. in this connection circumstances under 
which an overlapping consensus could be made to converge around a political con­
ception of justice, and justice as fairness in particular. The point is not to develop 
systematically why a general or a specific conception o f liberal justice is justified in 
the first place (that is, meeting the main body of criticism of Theory). Thus, Rawls 
uses a two stage process which begins by simply presuming that a conception of 
justice has been derived. Such a conception has somehow been parachuted into 
place, as if Rawls were a philosopher king, or as if, as it sometimes seems, he 
thinks of himself as the philosophical voice of a 'nearly just society* (the United 
States?), or of an emerging actual consensus on his type of egalitarian welfare lib­
eralism. With these matters in place, the second stage is an argument about how 
adherents to various comprehensive doctrines - having been properly socialised by 
living in such a society - would come to affirm this conception. Rawls assumes the 
perspective of an egalitarian liberal majority (or elite) who sees the task of political 
liberalism as getting as many as possible inside the fence, justifying to minorities 
principles that are already safely in place, because their reasoned consent is valu­
able. If some recalcitrant dogmatic were to insist on fighting it out. this is too bad, 
but not a serious problem - for us:
Nevertheless, in affirming a political conception of justice we may 
eventually have to assert at least certain aspects of our own 
comprehensive ... doctrine ... At (a) point we may have no alternative 
than to deny [something], or to simply imply its denial ... maintain the 
kind of thing we had hoped to avoid66
If as noted Rawls' hope to avoid affirming deep autonomy (so as not to offend tradi­
tionalists) constituted misplaced defensiveness, his continuing 
‘comprehensiveness* as regards the content of justice is oddly complacent.
There is also a second way a republican account of political pluralism as a pre­
condition for deliberative politics is empirically informed, i.e. beyond the above
67. Rawls (1993a: 152).
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sense of necessaiy engagement with concrete constellations of value pluralism. 
First of all, republicans would generally stress, as particularly evident in American 
writers, that rights and liberties in a constitution are institutional and contingent, 
not just or (in America) primarily in the sense of embodying different shades of 
value around libertas, but also a specific ways to organise a community in light of 
what are assumed to be the likely effects of such rights -  on individuals and their 
interest, on the distribution or curtailment of specific priviliges, on social peace, the 
distribution of property, and so on. Again, such functionality of rights was under­
stood to be a matter of (contested) empirical evidence in different and changing cir­
cumstances -  as contrasted to those remote ‘self-evident* rights which concerned 
the essence o f humans and broader rhetoric of democratic justification.
In a contemporary context, the relevance of a similar attention to the function­
ality and likely (unintended) consequences of rights is currently evidenced in con­
troversies over multicultural rights,67 the citizenship policies of the European Un­
ion68 and the future of different welfare state models.69 70In each of these areas dif­
ferent value visions are at stake, and reasonable citizens stepping into the public 
light to debate (or behind the veil to reflect) could not be expected to leave behind 
those libertarian, conservative, radical democratic, or multicultural bids for citizen­
ship all of which are inside a compass of generalisable human values. But the way 
debates about such general conceptions are carried out is about how particular 
rights are spelled out in detail (i.e. ’social* citizenship) and translated into institu­
tions and policy programs. Moreover, the contestation of one model or another is 
very much based on judgements and demonstrations of realism and functionality: 
Would libertarian citizenship give us a place where large groups o f people steal 
bread and sleep under bridges, or a benevolent and spontaneously self-regulating 
right-anarchic utopia? Would restrictions of the freedom of speech in areas of inter­
ethnic hate speech produce more or rather less tolerance? Would it start a snow­
ball effect towards an illiberal society? Would sensitivity to cultural needs of certain 
groups create a spiral of demands and strategic ethnification, and make people 
prisoners of their origins? Is there a trade-off between the rapid acquirement of so­
cial rights for immigrants and their capacity to become self-supporting?
Finally, republican conceptions of citizenship, because of this attention to em­
pirical conditions and effects, appears to be self-reflective. To the extent that cer­
tain enforceable duties, restrictions of rights, entitlements, and immunities are 
necessary in order to have sufficient general virtue, or in order to generate the mo­
tivation and capacity to exhibit such virtue, these necessities must become part of 
republican citizenship. Through history candidates to such elements of republican
68. Appiah (1996); Glazer & Moynihan (1975); Gutmann (1996); Gür (1996); Necef 
(1996); Vertovec (1996); Mouritsen (1999b; 2000b).
69. E.g. Meehan (1993); Welsh (1993); Kveinen (2000).
70. For an overview, see Roche (1992).
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citizenship have included the distribution of land and property, a right (and duty) 
to receive public education, a duty to military service, and much else. Contempo­
rary writers have suggested that a range of rights (in particular political rights, but 
also other ‘supporting’ rights) may be derived in this manner, with Habermas al­
most matching Rawlsian ambitions.70 Others have taken a different road, attempt­
ing to derive a set of duties.71 Although certain basic rights and. possibly, some 
duties may well be established this way. it follows from my presentation of republi­
can argument that a whole range of rights and duties, as well as the specification of 
criteria and conditions of civic membership -  along with other constitutional mat­
ters such as the design of political (participatory) institutions and their jurisdic­
tions -  must be debated and decided with reference to the best empirical and 
causal arguments and evidence which exist in a society. Needless to say, such ar­
guments and evidence, even under the best of circumstances, will be the stuff of 
essential political contestation.
A discussion of what an empirically informed normative theory of republican 
deliberation would look like,72 or to what extent it shares any common ground with 
various forms of discourse ethics73 is beyond the scope of this thesis and my pres­
ent powers, as are any attempts to comment on the enormous literature on the so­
ciology and psychology of motivational constraints to impartiality in constitutional 
foundation processes.74 or on various experiments with forms and institutional 
settings of deliberative politics and on the amenability of different types of issues to 
reasonable debate or to interest brookering.75
7. Neutrality?
By now a number of reasons have been forwarded to the effect that republicanism 
may be rather controversial for Rawlsians (including new Rawlsians) to affirm. One 
way of summarising this is to consider the more general Rawlsian ambition of neu­
trality.76 7Rawls of course does not mean that neutrality should be understood in the 
self-undermining sense, occasionally attributed to liberals, of extending indiffer­
ence towards such practices and forms of life which jeopardise basic liberal values.
71. Amar (1990); Gutmann (1993); Habermas (1992a; 1994b).
72. Bellamy (1993f; 1994).
73. Attempts which, despite their differences, share the pluralist and conflict- 
accepting starting points of republicanism include Ackermann (1988; 1991); Gut­
mann & Thompson (1996), Bellamy & Hollis (1999) and, in a European context, 
Bellamy (2000:105-9).
74. Ale^y (1992); Benhabib (1989); Cohen (1990); Habermas (1983; 1992a; 1994a), 
Ingram (1993); Moon (1991); Weinberger (1994).
75. Ackerman (1992); Elster (1991; 1993).
76. Diyzek (1990); Diyzek and Torgerson (1993); Mansbridge (1992); Fishkin 
(1995); Majone (1989).
77. Rawls (1993a: 190-95). On liberal neutrality see also Dworkin (1978a); Acker­
man (1980); Nagel (1986; 1991).
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1The question is if Rawlsians are prepared to ponder whether they can afford to be 
neutral as regards a range of practices which may be necessary to realise and sus­
tain these values. There is not, I believe, so much room for moves in this direction 
inside Political Liberalism as Rawls and Patten seem to think. And this is so even if  
we abstract from the very obvious ways that neutrality is wrecked by that universe 
of pluralism and compromise which is not a part of Patten’s discussion.
Strictly speaking, Patten notes, following Rawls and Joseph Raz. liberals en­
tertain a “reasons-for-action or justification-based view" of neutrality which avoids 
the "appeal to the truth or superior value of any particular conception of the good". 
They do not have a "consequentialist view of neutrality" which seeks to further 
strict neutrality in the actual outcome of policy,77 and which, Patten implies, would 
rule out a liberal concern with patriotism, civic virtue, or a sense of duty.
But what Rawls is actually saying is that a state should "not do anything in­
tended to favour or promote any particular comprehensive doctrine rather than an­
other, or give greater assistance to those who pursue it". However, "|w]e must ac­
cept the facts of common sense political sociology" that any working system of jus­
tice will in fact further some comprehensive doctrines. Rawls’ endorsement in the 
second statement of such unintended effects is quite different from an endorse­
ment of a republican type of deliberate and calculated instrumentalism which, on a 
number of points, clearly violates also the first of Rawls’ statements.70
In the case of duties, I argued that the duties republicans had in mind might 
include some that went well beyond the weakly specified duty to justice and its cor­
relates, and more importantly that the very question of which duties were needed 
could not be ‘taken of the agenda.’ In the case of virtues and institutions and poli­
cies required to sustain virtue we found that Patten, like Rawls himself, played 
down the need for, and the demanding nature of, civic activity in a well-ordered 
state -  causing us to wonder how left liberals could hope for a realisation and long 
term entrenchment of Justice as fairness egalitarianism plus comprehensive cul­
tural tolerance, except by means of considerable degrees of continued mobilisation 
of public reflection. Rawls* quasi-endorsement of Skinner’s republicanism seems 
quite incompatible with the type of neutrality he also claims for a liberalism of 
overlapping consensus that ‘stays on the surface’. Institutions, say, which favour 
more political participation at grassroot levels, or a better deliberative space in 
various public forums constitute controversial public support of distinct political 
forms of life. Republican advocacy of institutions and educational practices aimed 
to produce democratic reflection would seem to militate exactly against this avoid- 789
78. Patten (1996:43). See Raz (1986:114). Rawls’ endorsement of the principle is 
in Political Liberalism (Rawls 1993a: 192-93).
79. Rawls (1993a:193,196).
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ance of ‘deep’ liberalism, as would the piecemeal engineering of the shape and 
strength of civil society associations.79
The case of patriotism is equally obvious. A republican perspective suggests the 
legitimacy of a state-sponsored patriotism which might involve the structuring of 
public space (monuments and exhibitions, independence days and anthems), civic 
history in schools (a certain focus on important events of national histories, link­
ups with immigration narratives), and forms of political and social participation for 
integrative purposes. Even as a progressive political discourse tries to move patri­
otism in a more and more political, reflective, and inclusive direction, it is still con­
cerned with a country’s experience with, and memory of, common liberty. Not all 
liberals would have a problem with this, but clearly Rawls and his like would.80
8. Political Theory and Empirical Analysis
Patten’s article has been discussed at some length because its critique of Skinner 
represents one of the only attempts to discuss ‘instrumental’ republicanism from a 
main stream liberal perspective that I have come across. His article highlights the 
general point that if the republican challenge to (liberal) political theory regards the 
need to integrate empirical concerns. Patten's Rawlsianism also reflects how the 
two camps think in different ways about such concerns.
Patten significantly ends his discussion of Skinner’s statement of republican­
ism by dismissing it "because it fails to identify any philosophically interesting dis­
agreement between the two positions". Although there may be some disagreement 
“about specific policy prescriptions" there is none "at the level of philosophical ab­
straction at which Skinner’s critique operates". While liberals may “balk at some ... 
proposals" this is “not, as Skinner maintains, because they cannot, in principle, en­
dorse the republican argument”.81 Although Rawls and republicans may have dif­
ferent empirical assumptions, Rawls is in fact able to accommodate republican in­
strumentalism philosophically -  as indeed Rawls states himself, noting that “(a]t
80. Yet, already among Rawls’ natural duties to justice in Theory were the “will­
ingness to see the situation of others from their point of view, from the perspective 
of their conception of their good* and being “prepared to give reasons for our ac­
tions whenever the interests of others are materially affected" (Rawls 1972:337). In 
Political Liberalism he speaks of the (non-legal) ’duty o f civility’ (“to be able to ex­
plain to one another on those fundamental [constitutional] questions how the prin­
ciples and policies they advocate and vote for can be supported by the political val­
ues of public reason" (Rawls 1993:217).
81. Even if Rawlsians could affirm patriotisms on purely instrumental grounds, it 
should be obvious that also the “reasons-for-action or justification-based view" of 
neutrality is violated. Part of the republican idea of republicanism is the recognition 
that a patriotic identification, given its instrumental point of common liberty does 
give rise to a public affirmation of the “value of ... a particular conception of the 
good". Unless this is part of the public advocacy of patriotism, it will not work 
(Patten 1996:43).
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Imost there can be certain differences on matters of institutional design and politi­
cal sociology of democratic regimes." Nor does Rawls have difficulties with the fact 1
that such "differences, if there be such, are by no means trivia]; they can be ex- I
tremely important." In what way can these statement be understood -  in light of 1 
the differences and seeming incompatibilities between the two doctrines? They tes­
tily to a certain argumentative strategy which can only be sustained, as I shall ar- « 
gue, at some cost. (
The sequence of this argument, at any rate in Patten, is the following. First it is I
denied that there is a difference (Rawlsians also recognise duties and a place for '
virtue). Then it is noted that there may be some differences in details (but that also ,
some additional unspecified measures, possibly empirically relevant but so far un- j
noticed by Rawlsians, could be integrated in a neutral liberal account). After this it (
is recognised that some measures do come into conflict with Rawlsianism (although '
Patten significantly avoids the details of this question -  leaving outside the fence j
only the strictly illiberal elements of Taylor’s account of patriotism), but these (
measures are deemed unnecessary (or even less realistic) than an alternative lib- I
era! account. Finally, at the same time that such a more or (in Patten) less serious 
denial of relevance is voiced, it is argued that the difference is of minor importance, f
merely contingent and disputable, i.e. not one o f principle, the point here being that i
Rawlsians can be shown to have an alternative empirical and instrumental account 
of how the world could be (how a just society could work), one that fits the theory , 
better in moral terms. The position is ambivalent: between clearly wishing to dis­
credit the republican account on empirical grounds (as unnecessary or productive f
of illiberal side-effects) and, if pressed, claiming that this is just another empirical J
account, implying that the question of which is better is not important for philoso- (
phers to discuss. This way of arguing is also visible in Rawls' new turn to ‘instru- (
mentalism’, as we shall see below. (
I wish to end this thesis with some reflections on what such integration of em- 1
pirical concerns may mean and where this leaves political theoretical enquiry.82 (
Providing that any or all of the republican causal analyses are sound, in what way, i
if at all, does this affect political theory and Rawlsian theory in particular? There 1
are, it turns out, a number of different possible positions.
8.1. Kauris* Stability Argument i
One possible answer, and not at all an uncommon one, would be *in no way at all’.
A tendency has been visible in analytical moral philosophy to retreat to a position i 
that merely requires moral propositions and systems to correspond to what is em- 1
i
^ ^ ^ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ^ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  i
i
82. Patten (1996:36, italics added). j
83. The following brief reflections on a large and complicated topic have been , 
partly prompted by two (yet) unpublished papers by, and interesting discussions ,
i
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pirically possible. ‘Ought implies can’, in this line of reasoning, does not rely on 
psychological theories of motivation (e.g.f the incentive structures of market socie­
ties) or sociological theories of moral learning. Only, the moral demands that are 
placed on individuals and societies must not be impossible to meet. Normative the­
ory is seen as an independent inquiry which only accepts the most uncontroversial 
and unchanging social facts about human capacities, and human societies must be 
made to correspond to the results of this inquiry or be criticised when they do not. 
not the other way round.
I certainly do not dismiss this type of theory. There is a basic truth, overlooked 
by communitarians, in the idea that the very meaning of moral discourse and con­
ceptions of justice is that they do not reflect prevailing conceptions and institu­
tions. Also, it is evidently a legitimate and valuable task to investigate systemati­
cally the logical structure and implications of diverse normative intuitions and ar­
guments about the meaning, distribution, and interrelation of central human val­
ues like rights, equality, and liberty. Such inquiry, with its formal rules, stringent 
language, and thought experiments remains an important intellectual resource, 
providing ideas, clarifications, and analytical tools for all types of political theory. 
Although not all inquiries we would call political theory uses abstraction in this 
way, there is certainly a prominent place for theory that does. But there may be, I 
would argue, a disagreement on where abstraction should start from.
When still maintaining that this obstinately purist form of arm chair philosophy 
in a sense constitutes a ‘retreat’, I have in mind the fact that all classical political 
theory, from Aristotle to Hobbes to Mill (yes, even Kant) was constantly and seri­
ously concerned with explaining the world as it was and could be, with humans 
being as they were. So was, incidentally, the political theory of the fifties and early 
sixties,83 famously pronounced ‘dead’ until Rawls entered the scene.84 To voice, 
against Locke, Rousseau, or Jefferson, the complaint that their theories were unre­
alistic or unrealisable was to offer a very serious challenge. Thus, to practice seri­
ous empirical abstinence, not only as a convenient stage of analytical abstraction 
but out of principle, let alone to suggest that such abstinence ought to be a main 
defining element in the self-understanding of an academic discipline, is tanta­
mount to redefining the task of Western political theory. (Of course, normative 
purism strikes one as all the more exotic in a complex moral world where many 
different values compete, and where an ahistorically valid, final conception of Jus­
tice is not to be expected.)
Rawls has been seen as moving beyond the pure version. His somewhat idyllic 
remarks on moral psychology and sociology in the second half of Theory cannot be
with, my colleague Soren Flinch Midtgaard (Midtgaard 1998a; 1998b).
84. Parekh (1996:503-7).
85. Laslett (1956), but cf. Berlin (1962).
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ignored. His dual concern in Political Liberalism with the problem of stability also 
seems to have empirical repercussions. His ambition here was to inquire.
whether people who grow up under just institutions (as the political con­
ception defines them) acquire a normally sufficient sense of justice so 
that they generally comply with those institutions ... (and) whether in 
view of the general facts that characterise a democracy’s political culture, 
and in particular the fact of reasonable pluralism, the political concep­
tion can be the focus of an overlapping consensus85
This, combined with his talk of the political cultures of Western societies as these 
have developed historically, has been interpreted as a retreat to the much more 
limited ambition to work up the ‘situated’ intuitions of Western liberalism with its 
mixture of egalitarian potential and cultural pluralism. The ambiguous notion of an 
overlapping consensus as embedded in a common ‘political culture*,86 and Rawls* 
decision not to focus on the part of Theory which had received most criticism, i.e., 
the argument from the original position, led some commentators to detect a com­
munitarian turn in Rawls.87 Others have seen, in Rawls* ambition from the begin­
ning of the eighties to avoid ‘comprehensive doctrines* and thick accounts of the 
liberal self, little more than a disguised modus vwendi concession for purposes of 
appeasing non-liberal minorities to accept, pragmatically rather than from a sense 
of justice, the terms of a social peace.88 Such readings have also charged Rawls 
with lack of realism: contemporary Western political cultures do not converge on 
Rawlsian egalitarianism, and several brands of (Western based) fundamentalists 
still exist (and still appear) who are not likely to trade their most treasured articles 
of faith and identity for peace and toleration, be it Hobbesian or Lockean.
Both readings of Rawls are mistaken and fail to understand the manner in 
which he wants to avoid making liberalism "political in the wrong way**.89 Although 
the significance of Rawls “burdens of judgement**90 91is less than clear, as is exactly 
which doctrines come inside his normative fence, Rawls is concerned with reason­
able pluralism, not empirical pluralism tout court His references to the content of
86. Rawls (1993a: 141).
87. Rawls, in an article prior to Political Liberalism, noted that the purpose of 
‘Kantian constructivism* was to “articulate and to make explicit those shared no­
tions and principles thought to be already latent in common sense; or ... to propose 
to it certain conceptions and principles congenial to its most essential convictions 
and historical tradition“ (Rawls 1980:518).
88. E.g., Bell (1993:9-11).
89. Hampton (1989).
90. Rawls (1993a:142).
91. Rawls (1993a:54-58).
390
Western political culture, while seemingly mistaken,91 do not signal his intention to 
adapt his theory to what currently prevails.
Unlike more radical left-egalitarian theorists such as Cohen,92 Rawls does in 
fact seem to be convinced that his ideal, perhaps for quasi-Hegelian (or Haberma- 
sian) reasons to do with Justice as Fairness tapping the essence of the rationalisa­
tion process of modernity, is indeed about to be vindicated by [Western) history, so 
that an overlapping consensus is emerging around his conception of justice. 
Moreover, the actual legitimisation (affirmation) of a political conception of justice is 
part of its value, both as a precondition for having a reciprocal ‘fair system of coop­
eration’ and because of the independent liberal importance to individuals of being 
able to confirm the validity of political institutions to themselves.93 And sufficient 
legitimisation, its exact numerical extent unspecified, is, again, a precondition for 
stability. However, there is no question of letting the contingencies of actual plu­
ralism affect the content of the basic justice principles. Hence Rawls’ recognition 
that some comprehensive conceptions simply have to be ‘denied’.
In the same way, his other stability idea, i.e., that citizens holding different 
comprehensive conceptions will not only confirm, but also support (’comply with’) a 
political conception of justice, does not constitute acceptance of non-moral (prag­
matic, Hobbesian) reasons to support justice. In stead, they reflect Rawls* appeal to 
moral reasons of a ‘political’ kind, in particular the affirmation of civility and social 
co-operation as independent values.94 The realism of this (along with other aspects 
of “moral sensibility”, in particular the Lockean recognition by citizens of burdens 
of judgement and their propensity to cooperate justly with those who are willing to 
so co-operate with them)95 96constituting the foundation of a ‘normally sufficient sen­
se of justice’ is also claimed by Rawls, although evidence, presumably depending 
on reasonably just societies doing their work for some time, is obviously less avail­
able. However, the question of whether or not such a sense of justice is actually 
about to be produced, or produced in the heart of every citizen as effective solidar­
ity, still has no bearing on Rawls’ conception o f justice.
This is important. Rawls’ concern with ‘empirical’ stability is dependant on a 
previous stage of high moral theory, and the introduction of stability requirements 
and arguments must not be allowed to affect this first stage. In his own words, re­
garding “the problem of stability",
92. Also as regards the question of egalitarianism, as shown by Miller (1992).
93. Cohen (1995).
94. For this point, see Mulhall & Swift (1996).
95. This important point is stressed by Midtgaard (1998a:4-6). For the idea o f the 
reasonableness and moral, as opposed to the merely instrumental or rational, 
meaning of reciprocity, see Rawls (1993a:48-54).
96. Rawls (1993a:81-88).
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the explicit discussion of it begins only at the second stage since the 
principles of justice for the basic structure are not on hand until then96
The task that Rawls sets himself with the stability problem is to inquire if and how 
it is possible for a just society, i.e., one that has adopted institutions and policies 
that embody a political conception of liberalism, to Junction, in the sense of per­
petually generating the two conditions of an overlapping consensus on its core 
principles and a propensity to comply with and support the institutions of this po­
litical liberalism.
In what way does Rawls move beyond the purist position with which we 
started? At one level, he does not move a great deal. Thus, a main point of Political 
Liberalism is to introduce certain new unchangeable empirical aspects simply as 
moral background conditions for political theory, i.e. the rediscovery of the Lockean 
“fact o f ... reasonable pluralism“.97 Here, Rawls* concern with stability appears as a 
moral argument about the reasonableness of stability, as it were. Departing from a 
revised understanding of reasonable moral diversity and a set of constraints on le­
gitimate moral arguments that follow from this unavoidable fact, he advances a set 
of new moral, although ‘political’ reasons that diverse individuals would have for 
rendering political liberalism stable, although they are not (and because they are 
not required to be) comprehensive liberals. At this level, although the framework o f 
his enquiry is more ‘realistic* in the sense of accepting the fact of pluralism, Rawls 
may be read to stay clear of the low phenomenal ground entirely: He may not be 
concerned with how real individuals actually behave, but only with how they ought 
to, or have reasons to behave, and are in fa ct capable o f behaving.
At another level, to repeat, Rawls’ analysis does show evidence of the same am­
bivalence discussed in connection with Patten. It is full of references, vague but 
optimistic, to how Western societies are operating, or almost about to operate. And 
while most of Rawls’ analysis (and probably all of his claim to merit inside the 
community of analytical philosophy) is staked on moral analysis, he does seems to 
want to do more, to suggest that his theory is not completely disconnected to what 
we se'e around us. He states it as his ambition also to investigate whether what 
should reasonably happen may also realistically be assumed to happen in real so­
cieties. Indeed “the political philosopher should be concerned with ‘practical politi­
cal possibilities’".98 9Discussions of moral psychology and institutions of moral 
learning in Theory, and (in Political Liberalism) o f constitutional law making, of the 
role of “the basic structure,” and of “how the aims and aspirations of people are
97. Rawls (1993a: 141).
98. Rawls (1993a:xix).
99. Midtgaard (1998a:2), citing Rawls. In the same passage, Rawls significantly 
notes that “moral philosophy need not be" (1987:24).
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formed” are all also to be seen in this light." But Rawls* optimism, to whatever de­
gree he actually entertains it, is also tied to the fact that he does not have to sus­
tain them -  for reasons which he states in a principled way;
It is necessary to appreciate the nature of the empirical constraints of Rawls' 
conception. We recall that Rawlsian stability arguments only start at the second of 
two stages, where the first is the analysis of the principles of justice in a reflective 
equilibrium. Rawls* introduction of empirical questions at the second stage is itself 
normatively constrained, in the sense that the psychological mechanisms and in­
stitutional frames which are to further an overlapping consensus and the develop­
ment of an effective moral sense (republicans would add further preconditions of 
‘stability’) must also only be such that can be reasonably affirmed by someone who 
supports the political conception. Furthermore, it is conjectural, as it were, in the 
negative sense that while a scheme must be “viable”, this only means that it must 
not stand defeated by established knowledge of “human nature and social theory". 
Rawls’ empirical or ‘instrumental’ concern only has to be a concern. Although it 
cannot be wildly implausible, moral coherence is much more important then ‘real­
ism’. Rawls, we might say, is always willing to give his theory the benefit of the 
doubt. His thoughts on moral psychology are particularly illuminating and deserve 
to be quoted at length:
Human nature and its natural psychology are permissive: they may limit 
the viable conceptions of persons and ideals of citizenship, and the moral 
psychologies that may support them, but do not dictate the ones we 
must adopt. That is the answer to the objection that our account is un­
scientific. We cannot say anything we want, since the account has to 
meet the practical needs of political life and reasoned thought about it
However, this falls short of an attempt to establish the most realistic conditions of 
“human psychology as a natural science”. Instead, we must
specify the most reasonable conception of the person that the general 
facts about human nature and society seem to allow. The difficulty is that 
beyond the lessons of historical experience and such bits o f wisdom as 
not relying too much on scarce motives and abilities (say, high altruism 
and high intelligence), there is not much to go on. History is full of sur­
prises. We have to formulate an ideal of constitutional government to see 
whether it has force fo r  us and can be put into practice successfully in the 
history o f society100 10
100. Rawls (1993a:269).
101. Rawls (1993a:87, italics added).
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8.2. Beyond Rawls: Options fo r  an *Empirically Sensitive* 
Political Theory
There is little doubt that Rawls’ analysis of the empirical conditions of stability is 
quite weak, both in terms of institutions and psychology. But there is a deeper 
question here which Rawls does not raise, and which he may be aided in not rais­
ing by his seeming conviction that the Western world is about to vindicate his sta­
bility requirement. What, one might ask, would happen to the first stage of norma­
tive enquiry, if this were not the case (i.e., that the stability requirement were not 
vindicated, and more importantly that Rawls were to be willing to accept this fact}? 
What, more particularly, could Rawls respond, if the best social science information 
available - with all the limitations pertaining to the ambitions of truth claims in the 
social sciences or science generally101 - relatively unambiguously failed to contain 
examples of stable empirical worlds where aspects of Rawls’ conception were real­
ised?
At least three options would be open to Rawls. First, he might admit to have 
learnt that the world will never see a completely well-ordered and just society and 
that humans are forced to live in a suboptimal moral reality, as suboptimal moral 
creatures. Although individuals are in principle capable of living together in perfect 
justice, facts, say, of inherent egoism or failure of rationality, that exist as a matter 
of empirical social science regularity prevent them from reaching this felicitous 
state. Justice would become an abstract ideal that could be comprehended, but 
never reached. The trouble with such an ideal would be its uncertain status as a 
guide for policy: would it be desirable or prudent to move towards it, when it could 
never be reached and, in particular, if the side effects of doing so might render out­
comes less than second best? Theoretically, the very construction of a theory of 
justice would perversely require Rawls to withhold the most important bit of infor­
mation from the participators to the Veil of ignorance* procedure.
Secondly, Rawls might opt, as he is about to do in the passage cited above, for 
a utopian strategy. Faced with troubling social science evidence, he might simply 
argue that what seems Impossible now might be possible later. In fact, the very 
structure of his two stage reasoning invites a Hegelian short circuit. Marx, with 
typical recklessness, once claimed that “mankind always sets itself only such tasks 
as it can solve**.102 103But appeals to History, most people have recently become in­
clined to argue, are not very good arguments for anything, and it would certainly be
102. E.g. Popper (1968].
103. Marx, Preface to A Critique o f Political Economy, Selected Writings (p.390). A 
sustained criticism of Marxist teleology is found in Lukes (1985a:27-47). According 
to Lukes, Marx and Engells were utopian in the wrong way: they accepted the uto­
pian hopes o f the ‘utopian socialists* whom they despised. But they did not, as the 
latter did, ask such speculative questions that were sensitive to empirical evidence 
and experience about the way a socialist society might function.
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unreasonable to expect anyone to step behind a veil of ignorance armed with 
Hegelian or Marxist historicism. At any rate, even if ‘Justice’ were reserved to de­
note this abstract hope that History might deliver, political theory would surely 
have to be concerned not only with the purely hypothetical institutional form of a 
society abiding by the moral law within us, but also with the investigation of its 
best empirically possible approximation now. And not the former but the latter 
would be the focus of attention for a participator to an original position, whose in­
terest, according to Rawls himself, is to have an actual, reciprocal system of social 
co-operation.
This points towards the third possibility that Rawls might adopt, which is also 
the one that I think he should adopt, and which may in fact occasionally be latent 
in his theory already.103 This is the option of accepting in principle that political 
theory should be prepared for ‘falsification’, i.e. that it must embody a principled 
sensitivity to the evidence of social science research, and thus to the possibility 
that certain moral ideas, such as Marx* undeveloped and hazy, yet still comprehen­
sible notion of a communist society, just may not be possible, or at least may not 
be possible under conditions acceptable inside the theory itself. Political theory, 
here, would be concerned with the just society, in a sense where ‘just’ also means 
empirically possible. Taking this step of course lets the cat out of the bag. The 
quality and meaning of evidence is endlessly contestable, as is the question of how 
realistic something has to be. Certainly, a legitimate academic division of labour 
would allow theory of the Rawlsian kind to start with a set of more or less contro­
versial empirical assumptions, but then quickly proceed to a relatively self- 
contained logic of strictly normative enquiry. The difference would be the possibility 
that reality strikes back, that certain theories may have to be abandoned or modi­
fied.
This would also of course open the field for research dedicated to showing that 
Rawlsian theory, its normative shape since Political Liberalism intact, could in fact 
be given an empirical foundation beyond Rawls’ own vague conjectures, for in­
stance by analysing a requisite set of robust but non-controversial (to political lib­
eralism) social and political institutions, and possibly by specifying the place of 
knowledge about such institutions in a *wide reflective equilibrium’.104 105But such a 
program to rescue Rawls’ conception might soon run into difficulties, for a number 
of reasons which republican thought is able to highlight.
However, it is necessary to distinguish between two different levels of criticism 
that take into account Rawls’ premises and intentions.
104. Thus, as pointed out by Midtgaard (1998b:2), Cohen (1995) has recently dis­
cussed the status of Rawls' assumptions of incentive structures, claiming that 
these are indeed non-moral facts that should not be allowed into the original posi­
tion. Our point here is that they should, and more facts along with them.
105. Such a project is suggested by Midtgaard (1998a:8-36).
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First, it is a fundamental premise of Rawls’ new concern with stability that he 
does not claim (or rather, given his vague gestures to signs that the West is ’getting 
there’, he does not have to claim) that his political liberalism is actually stable, or 
that contemporaiy political cultures presently contain the seeds to make it. The 
potential fact that they do not, does not affect the type of realism at which Rawls 
aims: he does not concern himself with the question of transition. By ‘practical pos­
sibility’ Rawls exclusively refers to the possibility of a plausible account of “the 
ability of justice as fairness to be stable once achieved".105
Now, there is a case for delineating the question of realism in this manner. For 
a political theory dedicated to ask empirical questions, there is a clear analytical 
distinction between what is empirically possible now - given historical relations of 
power and inadequate popular understanding - and what could be conceived to 
function empirically under certain specified, possible conditions. (A strong reason to 
at least also work with the latter type of theory is of course that the former may de­
generate: either to a crude rationalisation of what some members of a society have 
an interest in affirming, or to a rationalisation of the depressing fact that many 
states of affairs in any society at any one time fail to conform to its conception of 
justice, thus causing some to deem that conception irrelevant.)
This does not mean that the normative problems of how to operate in a subop­
timal moral environment, in particular how to (gradually) effect a transition to­
wards a just society by legitimate means, and how to balance means against ends 
in a world where the exact chances of reaching desired ends are impossible to as­
sess, must not remain of first importance for political theory. In particular, and as 
noted above, a normative theoiy is certainly required which is able to address the 
relation between ideal reasonable pluralism and the requirements of a democratic 
process of constitutionalism. Some might even say that these matters, difficult to 
handle as they may well be, are more important than Rawlsian projects of perfect 
justice, and too important to leave entirely to politicians, none of whom have the 
makings of the Great Legislator. Another way of putting it is that analytical political 
philosophy, while ■normative’, is not ‘critical*, as in critical theory. There is hardly a 
trace of interest, here, in liberation, in the sense of a systematic consideration of the 
way that historical societies must place normative goals before them whose reali­
sation are latent in their material development and in the critical consciousness of 
unnecessaiy unreason and injustice of which they are historically capable.106 107Rawl- 
sians make their task easy by erasing from their field of concern exactly those 
problems, i.e. of revolution, repair of past injustice, perhaps heavy handed political 
socialisation, all of which, on the road to a just society, are likely to be rather too
106. Midtgaard (1998a:8); cp. Daniels (1996:150ff) to whom Midtgaard refers,
107. Habermas (1973; 1981); Held (1980). Not all critical theorists may agree with 
my definition.
396
comprehensive to fit the requirements of a wished for political liberalism. In con­
trast to Rawlsian theory, the republican tradition fills a gap by its constitutive in­
terest in exactly these questions. >
However, secondly, also Rawls’ own form of stability theory is empirically more 
questionable than he thinks. There is clearly a place for analytically prescriptive 
moral theory which is not critical in the sense of critical theory, and which makes a 
point of abstracting from the present. But although the distinction between prob­
lems of transition and problems of stable function is legitimate as far as it goes, 
there is a tendency for the latter to become self-protecting. Once the formulation of 
principles of justice has been achieved, the idea of post-transitional conditions 
easily translates to tautology: anything that is not perfect working justice is simply 
evidence of the transition not having taken place yet. However, also post- 
transitional theory, in order to investigate stability counterfactually, must respect 
empirical evidence. Moreover, the distinction is probably exaggerated in the first 
place, and this is where the real bite of republican thought lies. The trouble with 
the transition concept is its implied Enlightenment prejudice that histoiy is pro­
gressive, that injustice and unreason are evidence of malfunctioning and somehow 
incomplete societies and individuals, and that once these problems are rectified, no 
reversals and no further problems are likely to occur.
Republicanism does not just question whether a Rawlsian system of justice 
could get off the ground or appear through some just or unjust metamorphosis of 
existing societies in the first place. It also questions whether, under conditions 
where institutions and cultural elements which are compatible with political liber­
alism itself are allowed to do their work over time, such a system of justice would 
yet be stable. There is no question here of ‘adapting’ a theory to what is currently 
feasible in the light of the powers that be, or to this or that notion of the world 'as it 
is’. But there is a place for at least considering specific causal and factual argu­
ments which point out what, in the light of our best evidence, seems not to be pos­
sible. Discussions in this thesis have pointed out a whole range of such arguments.
This is the republican challenge to liberalism. It is empirical, but not merely 
empirical. Maybe not all republican assumptions and arguments hold water. Maybe 
the point about collective identity is that it is too dangerous to tangle with, and 
that a working solidarity is more a matter of engineering apathy and making citi­
zens watch more TV. Maybe we should take steps towards dismantling the chan­
nels of public deliberation which exist, because of their disruptive effects and be­
cause they make political conflicts much to complex, and instead place our faith in 
elite compromise and wise rulers. Maybe the best civic culture for protecting liber­
tas is a subject culture.
I do not think such claims are sound. But if backed by good evidence, they are 
certainly kinds of arguments that would seriously affect the republican view of the 
world - and do so more than Rawlsian moralism. My point is that contemporary
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political theory should leave its armchair positions at least occasionally, to engage 
reality in the manner of the great classical debates which have been studied in this 
work. In order to convince it should integrate empirical and causal assumptions 
already at the outset, and see what this does to the theoiy. Or rather, it should pay 
more systematic attention to the assumptions that are there already, seeking to 
explicate and confront them. To the extent that republican accounts remain per­
suasive, everything is not as before with liberal political theory. I am not sure of the 
degree to which I have succeeded myself in explicating all of the republican as­
sumptions, let alone in establishing the soundness of republican arguments. 
Hopefully at least some of my failures might illuminate a more sustained quest in 
that direction.
Many of the points of the republican challenge to traditional liberalism are in 
fact mirrored in contemporary political theory. There is a new concern with political 
identity, with indeterminate constitutional deliberation, with the importance of 
civic virtue, and with practices of toleration, all in the context of empirically in­
formed analysis of citizenship. I have been at pains to stress that republicanism 
was always ‘liberal’, in the sense of its ultimate value, and also that ‘liberal’ repub­
licans like Tocqueville and Arendt should inspire us the most. If new departures in 
liberal political theoiy are about to blur the field completely by appropriating all of 
the fragility of liberty argument and thus closing the historical gap, I should be the 
first to cheer the advent of a new republican liberalism.
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A b s t r a c t  o f  t h e  th e s is
T h e  th e s is  e x a m in e s  th e  re p u b lic a n  tra d itio n  o f  p o litic a l th o u g h t w h ic h , it a rg u e s , can  a n d  s h o u ld  be 
d e lin e a te d  u s in g  th e  m e ta p h o r  'th e  f ra g ili ty  o f  l ib e r ty '. T h is  f r a g i l i ty  re fe rs  to  a  c o n s ti tu t iv e  a r g u ­
m e n t  a b o u t th e  n e e d  f o r  c itiz e n s  to  p ro te c t a n d  p re se rv e  th e ir  c o m m o n  lib e r ty  b y  th e ir  j o i n t  p o lit ic a l  
a c tiv it ie s , in c lu d in g  v a r io u s  fo rm s  o f  p a r t ic ip a tio n  in s e lf - g o v e r n m e n t  a n d  e x e rc is e  o f  c iv ic  v ir tu e . 
T h e  th e s is  ta k e s  as its  s ta r tin g  p o in t th e  re v is io n  o f  J .G .A . P o c o c k 's  c iv ic  h u m a n is m  th e s is  w h ic h  
h a s  b e e n  c a rr ie d  o u t b y  Q u e n tin  S k in n e r, M a u riz io  V iro li  a n d  o th e r s  w h o  s u p p o rt  a  m o r e  in s tr u ­
m e n ta lis t  a c c o u n t o f  th e  re p u b lic a n  tra d itio n  a n d  w h o  c la im  th e  e x is te n c e  o f  a  ’n e g a tiv e ’ (b u t  c o l­
le c t iv e )  c o n c e p tio n  o f  l ib e r ty  fo r th is  tra d itio n . T h e  th e s is  c o n ta in s  a  s e rie s  o f  s h o rt  a n d  lo n g e r  r e a ­
d in g s  o f  k e y  f ig u re s  a n d  p e rio d s  o f  r e p u b lic a n  d is c o u rs e  fro m  a n c ie n t  G re e c e  to  T o c q u e v il le ,  and  
d e v e lo p s  fo u r  a n a ly tic a l  d im e n s io n s  o f  th e  ’f ra g ility  o f  l ib e r ty  a r g u m e n t’, in p a r t ic u la r  e m p h a s is in g  
th e  p o in ts  o f  d if f e re n c e  w ith  ’n o n - r e p u b lic a n ’ o r  (p ro to )l ib e ra l  c o n c e p tio n s . In  th e  p r o c e s s  it a lso  
d is c u s s e s ,  e x te n d s , a n d  re fo rm u la te s  th is  n e w  ’in s tru m e n ta lis m ’ in  a  n u m b e r  o f  w a y s, in c lu d in g  th e  
w a y  it  m a k e s  s e n s e  a t  a ll to  e m p lo y  th e  d if f ic u l t  n o tio n  o f  a  d is t in c t  tra d itio n . A m o n g  o t h e r  th in g s  it 
a r g u e s  (a g a in s t  S k in n e r )  th a t a rg u m e n ts  r a th e r  th an  (o n ly )  c o n c e p ts  a n d  d is c o u rs e  is th e  m o s t  f ru i t­
f u l  m e th o d o lo g ic a l  to o l;  th a t  th e  m e re  e x is te n c e  o f  a la w -c e n te r e d  c o n c e p t  o f  l ib e r ty  (P h i l l ip  P e t t i t )  
fa i ls  to  d iffe re n tia te  re p u b lic a n is m  f ro m  lib e ra lism ; th a t th e  c o n tr a s t  to  n o n -re p u b lic a n  a n d  in  p a r t i­
c u la r  v a rio u s  e a r ly  e n lig h te n m e n t l ib e ra l d is c o u r s e s  h a s to  be m a d e  b y  re fe re n c e  to  a  v a r ie ty  o f  d if­
f e r e n t  p o s s ib le  m o d e s  o f  d e n y in g  o r  d is c re d itin g  p a r tic u la r  a s p e c ts  o f  re p u b lic a n  d is c o u r s e  -  a n d  
th a t  r e p u b lic a n  a rg u m e n ts  w e re  c a p a b le  o f  b e in g  re fo rm u la te d  in s id e  n e w  c o n c e p tu a l  te r r i to r ie s ,  so  
th a t  f o r  in s ta n c e  th e  e x is te n c e  o f  la n g u a g e s  o f  n a tu ra l r ig h ts , c o m m e rc e , o r  p ro g re s s  n e e d  n o t  sp e ll 
th e  d e a th  o f  r e p u b lic a n is m . In  th e  c o n c lu s io n  th e  th esis  b r ie f ly  d is c u s s e s  w a y s  in  w h ic h  th e  re p u b li­
c a n  tra d itio n  m a y  b e  ta k e n  o u t o f  th e  h is to r y  o f  id ea s to  in fo rm , m o r e  sy s te m a tic a lly , c o n te m p o r a r y  
p o lit ic a l  th e o r y  d e b a te s  as a  re p o s ito ry  o f  d iffe re n t a rg u m e n ts , fo rm u la te d  in  d if f e re n t  h is to r ic a l  
c o n te x ts ,  a b o u t how l ib e r ty  m a y  b e  fra g ile . I n  p a rtic u la r, th e  q u e s tio n  is  ra ise d  o f  th e  s ig n if ic a n c e  o f  
r e p u b lic a n is m  a s  a  m o r e  ’e m p ir ic a lly ’ in fo r m e d  s ty le  o f  a rg u m e n t  a s  c o m p a re d  R a w ls ia n  l ib e ra lis m .
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